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PREFACE 
 
“"Most of the creations of the intellect or fancy pass away for good after a time that 
varies between an after-dinner hour and a generation. Some, however, do not. […] 
These we may well call the great ones. […].”  
(Joseph A. Schumpeter, 1883 – 1950) 
 
When considering the above quote, one can ask onself, what is being done to pro-
mote these unique and great things? As an honorary business start-up consultant 
for the Bochum start-up competition (now business promotion) in Germany, I have 
found that there are enough great innovative ideas and good business plans for 
potential entrepreneurs. The most striking problem, however, remains the lack of 
financial support (equity) for entrepreneurs. What must be done to ensure that 
more equity providers are engaged? It is the main goal of this dissertation to find 
the answers to this very important question. To do this, the dissertation looks to 
the industry that provides equity - the private equity industry - and considers its 
current fiscal framework. The basic assumption is that if the conditions for the sup-
porters are better, they will be more committed. The return benefits in turn ulti-
mately benefit the entrepreneurs. The idea to write this dissertation was created by 
the progressive need to help business founders to implement their projects. In ad-
dition, as a lecturer at the FOM College of Economics & Management in Germany, 
I have gained access to many helpful discussions. My thanks for that. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PREAMBLE 
1.1.1 Emotional Situation in Europe 
“Whoever does not believe in Europe, who doubts Europe, whoever despairs of 
Europe, should visit the military cemeteries in Europe.” 
 
(Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission)1 
 
Not least because of the problems of some countries within the European Un-
ion (EU), it is necessary to obtain stability within the European Economic Area. 
Some countries such as France and Italy (Broyer, Renner, Schneider, & Utermöhl, 
2014, pp. 11-18) have already wanted to deviate from the stipulated budget deficit 
limit of 3 percent. The economic downturn in Europe is increasingly impeding the 
adherence to the self-imposed goal to carry out an austerity plan for the consolida-
tion of markets. Countermeasures, such as the ones taken by Mario Draghi, presi-
dent of the European Central Bank (ECB) since November 1, 2011, who has 
prompted the reduction of the key interest rate2 by the ECB from 0.05 percent 
(Fischer & Hennersdorf, 2014, p. 18) to now 0.00 percent  (Wirtschaftswoche, 2016) 
or the promotion of a further coalescence of the markets, are supposed to help the 
sluggish economy throughout the Eurozone back up on its feet. A functional Euro-
pean Single Market (Neumair, Schlesinger, & Haas, 2012, p. 460) is mainly depend-
ent on the free movement of goods, free movement of persons, the free transaction 
                                                     
1 Speech on 16.11.2008 from Jean-Claude Juncker in Congress on Rememberance Day 2008. At the 
time he was still Prime Minister of Luxembourg. 
2 Also central rate. The key interest or central rate is fixed by the European Central Bank for the 
countries of the euro zone. The key interest rate is the interest rate for which banks can borrow 
money from the central bank itself. Thus the key interest rate determines how expensive a loan 
from the European Central Bank for the credit institutions is (Wildmann, 2015, p. 158 et seqq.). 
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of capital and the free exchange of services. Most of these areas encounter quite 
extensive problems. As there is indeed a price convergence in goods, the price dif-
ferences for services – or exemplary in the electricity market (Hitzeroth, 2012, p. 11) 
– are still blatant. There are still significant opportunities for improvement in re-
gards to the infrastructure as well. Plans of the European Commission to launch 
initiatives and invest billions of Euros in transport, energy and information tech-
nologies (Corner, 2014, p. 203) could not be complied (Lucke, 2014, p. 142) with 
because the heads of state reduced the multi-year financial framework of the Con-
necting-Europe-Facility. These general obstacles need to be eliminated. Already in 
2009, the former president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso3 had 
cited the deepening of the internal market as being one of the main priorities for 
the future of the European economy. However, this project is also influenced by 
the still not fully overcome debt crisis, which was caused by the turmoil throughout 
the international financial market and had reached its peak during fall of 2008 with 
the collapse (De Haas & Van Horen, 2013, p. 244) of the investment bank, Lehman 
Brothers (Soros, 2009, p. 25).  
These disruptions developed into the most important and most fatal global 
economic and financial crisis since the Great Depression with its “Black Thursday” 
– or “Black Friday” due to the time difference in Europe – on October 24, 1929, 
hitting also and in particular the European Union.  
Europe was a place that enticed high hopes for almost one decade. Limitless 
freedom (Gebhardt, Glaser, & Lentz, 2013, pp. 2-25) to travel and the prospect of 
undisturbed trade was terrific. Meanwhile, many do have concerns regarding the 
future success of the European Union. The trust in the European Union (EU) is only 
slowly gaining momentum again. Merely the Euro seems stable in its popularity. 
While the approval rate for the EU had stood at 60 percent in 2012, according to a 
study (PewResearch, 2014, p. 3)  of the Pew Research Center, a polling institute 
                                                     
3 As from November 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker from Luxembourg is the new president of the Eu-
ropean Commission (Friedrichs, 2015, p. 63). This marks an historic situation, since he is the first 
president of the European Commission, more or less having been elected by the people, which 
illustrates the expansion of the significance of the European Union (europarl, 2014). 
 
INTRODUCTION                                                                          Page |  3  
 
 
with a neutral position towards the European Union and based in Washington 
D.C., this value took a nose-dive by 2013 with only 46 percent of the EU – with 
Greece – and 52 percent without Greece - citizen polled showing a positive attitude 
towards the EU. A survey, also conducted by the Pew Research Center from March 
17 through April 9, 2014, suggested a slight improvement of the situation within 
the EU. Out of the 7.022 persons surveyed in seven member states - France, Ger-
many, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom, now 52 percent - with 
Greece – and 53 percent without Greece - of the respondents were in favor of the 
EU and stated that the integration of their own countries into a European economy 
is good. In figure 1, the sensitivities, respectively the consent of the citizens of these 
member states from 2012 to 2015 are displayed.  
Figure 1: Consent of Citizens of selected EU Member States in the EU in % 
 
Source: Own representation based on PewResearch, 2014 and 2015. 
In 2015, a new study (Stokes & Oates, 2015, pp. 1-36) of PewResearch Center was 
conducted (April 7, 2015 to May 13, 2015) with a total of 6.028 citizens. They were 
interviewed by phone or in Poland and Italy face to face. The study found (Stokes 
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& Oates, 2015, pp. 1-36) that Italy and Spain now believe more in the European 
Union (Stokes & Oates, 2015, pp. 1-36), while the consent of United Kingdom and 
especially in Germany subsides (integrated in figure 1) so that the so-called Brexit 
of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU) after the referendum of June 
23, 2016 was not very surprising (Stokes & Oates, 2015, pp. 1-36), although 55% of 
respondents had chosen to remain in the EU since 2015 (Stokes & Oates, 2015, pp. 
1-36). Greece has made no predictions for this new study. 
Even though consent seems to slightly recover, skepticism in states such as 
Greece is still particularly high. Primarily the Greeks, which have been hit espe-
cially hard by the crisis, are extremely skeptical in regards to the European idea.  In 
its biggest crisis, Europe is tattered.  
Figure 2: Frustration of the Members of the with Brussels in % 
 
Source: Own representation based on PewResearch, 2014 and 2015. 
Overall, the citizen in detail, even if he appreciates the economic integration in a 
more positive aspect again (Koppelberg & Schlotmann, 2014, p. 30), is hardly of the 
opinion that his interests are being protected adequately. This is being illustrated 
in figure 2. 
My voice does
not count in the
EU
EU does not
understand the
needs of its
citizens
EU is intrusive EU is inefficient
Median % 71 65 63 57
71 65 63 57
0
20
40
60
80
100
Frustration of the Members of the EU with 
Brussels in %
Median %
INTRODUCTION                                                                          Page |  5  
 
 
The difficulties in solving the debt and economic crisis, leaves the Europeans anx-
ious. The impression has arisen that the divide between the citizens and politicians 
throughout the European politics has become larger (Herrmann, 2014, p. 123). It 
has been repeatedly suggested that reducing this gap is taking a high priority on 
the agenda in order to prevent the development respectively the extension of elites 
(Kirt, 2016, p. 1).  
Almost grotesque, yet understandable in this context is the awarding of the 
Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union (Dittrich, 2016, p. 1) for over six decades 
of contributing to the development of peace and reconciliation, democracy and hu-
man rights, which should possibly appease the citizens (Ruf, 2014, p. 52).  
Regardless of such surveys concerning the mood, it can be agreed that under 
the deepening of the internal market as defined by Barroso, not only the clarifica-
tion of questions of detail regarding the facilitation of trade relations are to be un-
derstood, but also and foremost the growth of the European market, long to be 
identified as independent.  
That the growth, of which the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Dr. Angela Merkel spoke (Merkel, 2003, p. 13), must be responsible espe-
cially for the future Wealth of Nations, already prophesied by Adam Smith  (List, 
2012, p. 205), is beyond dispute, an infinite growth, on the other hand, surely at 
least arguable. A key driver for the growth of an economy are new foundations and 
further development of businesses, which not only create jobs (bmwi, 2014), but are 
also responsible for transfer payments such as taxes and interest and provide im-
petus for other companies such as suppliers. The support of these companies, e.g. 
in the sense of providing equity and improved framework needs to be a central 
task in the future of the EU, if she is to rationally oppose the recession of the eco-
nomic growth. 
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1.1.2 Motivation, Private Equity Cycle and Research Situation 
“We need increased willingness to be independent, better fiscal conditions, and 
more innovation-friendly banks.”  
 
(Roman Herzog, Federal President of Germany from 1994 – 1997)4 
 
Motivation 
Becoming self-employed is part of the growing process. Every market and 
thus every economic space lives and thrives on growth (Aaker, 1989, p. 188; 
Schmidt R. , 2015, p. 33; Vries, 2013, p. 461). It is undisputed that entrepeneurs in 
sense of business founders can contribute significantly to this growth through their 
activities (Barth, 1995, p. 4; Pohl, 2014, p. 62; Leineweber, 2003, p. 79). They – as 
mentioned above – create jobs, pay taxes and in some cases even help suppliers to 
get orders (Lahn, 2015, p. 13; Hölzle, Puteanus-Birkenbach, & Wagner, 2014, p. 40). 
Unfortunately, it is not always easy for entrepreneurs. 
The present work pursues an approach to facilitate access to funds for entre-
preneurs who are often unable to finance their ideas. Access to funds from banks 
is sometimes not possible or incredibly difficult. Banks want collaterals that many 
founders often do not have (Möckel, 2005, p. 158 et seqq.; Brettel, Rudolf, & Witt, 
2005, p. 193; Schneider S. , 2015, p. 24). Regrettably, banks do not provide current 
low interest rates to start-ups (Soisses, 2014, p. 56; Schmale, 2015, p. 1). Companies 
that provide private equity - so-called private equity or venture capital companies 
- can help in these cases (Nathusius, 2001, p. 145; Kollmann T. , 2016, p. 83 et seqq.). 
However, unclear and, above all, inconsistent tax regulations provide for the par-
tial restraint on this market. The proposed tax harmonization is not yet sufficient 
(Biebinger, 2015, p. 148; Pressrelease, 2014). For this reason, tax-related parameters 
are determined in this work, which are optimized (unified) for such companies and 
                                                     
4 Own translation – original quote (German): „Wir brauchen mehr Bereitschaft zur Selbständigkeit, 
bessere steuerliche Rahmenbedingungen dafür und etwas innovationsfreundlichere Banken.“ Ad-
dress by Federal President Roman Herzog on the occasion of the opening of the Hanover Fair 
'96, Herzog (1996). 
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their funds (funds are designated for certain purposes – in this case the provision 
of equity capital) and thus create a completely new type of fund. By unifying the 
taxation of private equity companies, this restraint could cease. The increased in-
volvement of such companies would benefit entrepreneurs, because more of these 
companies would result in more money, which can flow as equity in business start-
ups. This again creates growth. 
 
Private Equity Cycle 
Basically, three groups of stakeholders are involved in the Private Equity market 
(Bayaz, 2013, p. 46; Grethe, 2010, p. 65; Hehn, 2011, p. 50): the investors as equity 
holders, the Private Equity firms and the target company - including portfolio com-
panies (Bandulet, 2005, p. 40) - as equity buyers (Bandulet, 2005, p. 40; Bayaz, 2013, 
p. 46, Grethe, 2010, p. 65).  
Figure 3: Private Equity Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own model based on Gebhardt, G., 2009, pp. 71-90. 
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With an investment of debt as part of a total corporate acquisition (Geidner, 2009, 
p. 30), banks are further participants (Kraft, 2001, p. 34) within this business model 
(Bandulet, 2005, p. 40; Geidner, 2009, p. 30; Kraft, 2001, p. 34). Such a cycle 
(Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2008, pp. 1-23) might look like figure 3 
on page 7 (Gebhardt G., 2009, pp. 71-90; Grethe, 2010, p. 65; Mauer, 2015, pp. 140-
143). 
Consultants and management companies complete this model (Gebhardt G. , 2009, 
pp. 71-90). In order to obtain a cycle in the sense of the graphic chart in figure 3, 
this model needs to be supplemented by an input – in this case the fundraising and 
investment – and an output – here the revenues and returns.  
At the beginning of a Private Equity (Caselli, 2010, p. 36) investment, there is 
the soliciting of funds and the fundraising (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011, pp. 619-654), 
which will be explained in more detail below. To do so, a Private Equity firm 
launches a fund to pool capital for participation in a company (Hannich, 2012, p. 
7). This fund collects the monies (Balz & Arlinghaus, 2007, p. 419) from banks, in-
surance companies, pension funds, corporations and private investors (Balz & 
Arlinghaus, 2007, p. 419; Grethe, 2010, p. 67; Vogt, 2007, p. 40). In the consideration 
of Private Equity investments, the individual investment areas are being identified 
according to the life cycle phases, respectively the activities of the funded target 
companies as described in detail in 2.1.2.2. Revenues arising from the investment 
in the target company from the sale of shares or the returns (Marquez, Nanda, & 
Yavuz, 2015, pp. 1783-1823) from, for instance, a silent participation are then ad-
justed for the amounts (Bernhardt, 2010, p. 89) deriving from expense allowances 
withheld by the Private Equity Company, returned to the investors (Hehn, 2011, p. 
53), which in turn satisfy their customers with the corresponding expected returns 
(Bernhardt, 2010, p. 89; Hehn, 2011, p. 53; Marquez, Nanda, & Yavuz, 2015, pp. 
1783-1823). 
The way to the emergence of a Private Equity transaction (Koester, 2011, p. 
261) is initially paved by the investors (Grethe, 2010, p. 67; Koester, 2011, p. 261; 
Pankotsch, 2005, p. 2). Its success depends on their readiness to invest in such a 
quite risky undertaking. Because of the generally very high minimum investment 
amounts required (Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn, & Sobczak, 2008, p. 16), it may well 
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be assumed that the investors in the asset class Private Equity (Pankotsch, 2005, p. 
2) display a high level of professionalism (Bayaz, 2013, pp. 46-47; Pankotsch, 2005, 
p. 2; Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn, & Sobczak, 2008, p. 16). The most important inves-
tors, by volume, who are providing Private Equity firms with means in fundraising, 
are first and foremost – as mentioned above – institutional investors such as insur-
ance companies, banks or pension funds (Bayaz, 2013, p. 46; Thum, Timmreck, & 
Keul, 2008, p. 16). The allocation of fundraising, which has been rather constant for 
some time on the different investor groups, is shown in figure 4 (Thum, Timmreck, 
& Keul, 2008, p. 16). 
Figure 4: Fundraising for Private Equity Funds by Investor Groups 
 
Source: Own representation. Data from Thum, Timmreck, & Keul, 2008, p.  
However, funds are provided by private investors, the public sector or are collected 
on the capital market as well (Thum, Timmreck, & Keul, 2008, p. 16). The motive 
for investors to place their money in such a form of investment lays naturally in 
achieving a high return on their invested capital (Bayaz, 2013, p. 46; Fueglistaller, 
Müller, & Volery, 2008, p. 137). 
31%
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Many institutional investors are approaching Private Equity via so-called 
Fund of Funds (Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn, & Sobczak, 2008, pp. 24-27; Gresch & 
Wyss, 2011, pp. 43-58; Jugel, 2003, p. 101). In the first instance, Fund of Funds 
(Gresch & Wyss, 2011, pp. 43-58) are to be understood as a Mutual Fund that invests 
the money of the shareholders in shares of Mutual Funds (Wolf E. , 2011, p. 3). For 
Private Equity, this means that these funds in turn invest in Private Equity 
(Scharfman, 2012, p. 309). Fund of Funds are a possible and reasonable investment 
option also for less experienced investors (Natter, 2003, pp. 201-203) who do not 
want to invest in expensive research on their own, because the operator of Fund of 
Funds (Cumming, 2010, p. 58) is taking over the search for suitable cost objects in 
the class of investments of Private Equity – as far as it is to be considered as such – 
and is spreading the risks by distributing his monies into several Private Equity 
funds (Cumming, 2010, p. 58; Natter, 2003, pp. 201-203). Nearly every risk-return 
profile can be depicted with this particular form of a fund (Peterreins, 2008, p. 103). 
This construct has an unmistakable character. One positive aspect for the investor 
is probably that the portfolio can be broadly diversified and is actively managed 
(Peterreins, 2008, p. 103). In this context it should be noted that for the effective 
operation of the diversification, the independence of the Fund of Funds manage-
ment needs to be ensured in order to prevent an increased consideration of funds 
of a certain house (Götzenberger, 2008, pp. 105-107). The major advantage (Born, 
2009, p. 30) of the active participation in this event is being slightly clouded by the 
high costs such a vehicle entails (Born, 2009, p. 30; Peterreins, 2008, p. 103). The 
additional management level – the very Fund of Funds manager – who appears 
alongside the management of the target fund, naturally adds to the costs (Born, 
2009, p. 30; Peterreins, 2008, p. 103). 
The demeanor of Private Equity companies has a certain similarity 
(Reichmann, 2011, p. 210) with the exchange construct (Bayaz, 2013, p. 47; Reich-
mann, 2011, p. 210). On the one hand, capital is being supplied, and on the other 
hand, capital is being demanded (Bayaz, 2013, p. 47). The difference is just that this 
is preferably not done in a public place (Reimers, 2004, p. 5), but mostly over the 
counter (Bayaz, 2013, p. 47; Reimers, 2004, p. 5; Trübestein, 2012, p. 369). Just as the 
stock exchange acts as an intermediary, it is the Private Equity firm that acts as an 
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intermediary (Witt, 2012, p. 457) between the investor and the target company (Ba-
yaz, 2013, 47-48; Hehn, 2011, 46; Prym, 2011, p. 27; Witt, 2012, p. 457). Very often, 
the Private Equity companies (Cumming & Johan, 2014, p. 145) present themselves 
as Limited Partnerships (Bayaz, 2013, p. 48; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 26) or in Ger-
many as limited partnership with a limited liability company as general partner 
(Gmbh & Co. KG). However, more or less rare exceptions can be found here as well. 
Thus, public companies, as well as other forms of corporations present themselves 
so in this industry (Jugel, 2003, 224; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 175). The Limited Part-
nership (Schauer, 2016, p. 51) is by its very nature, the combination of at least two 
shareholders (Schauer, 2016, p. 51; Scherbaum, 2015, p. 87). Here, at least one part-
ner is completely and indefinitely liable (Müssig, 2010, p. 421 et seqq.), and at least 
one partner exclusively (Mühlhaus & Wenzel, 2014, pp. 87-92) with the deposit pro-
vided by him (Mühlhaus & Wenzel, 2014, pp. 87-92; Müssig, 2010, p. 421 et seqq.; 
Schauer, 2016, p. 51). 
Figure 5: Private Equity Fund Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation. 
 
Figure 5 is a construct of a private equity fund. For this graphic, the German GmbH 
& Co. KG has been simulated, since the task of the general partner is somewhat 
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more evident in this structure than in a limited partnership which otherwise works 
in the same way. 
In principle, Private Equity companies do not have any interest in providing 
target companies with equity deriving from their own money (Bayaz, 2013, p. 48). 
Rather, these companies float a fund during the fundraising already indicated (Ba-
yaz, 2013, p. 48; Daniels, 2004, 21; Prym, 2011, p. 21). In the process, the so-called 
General Partners (Bayaz, 2013, p. 48; Weißflog, 2014, p. 47) – thus, the partner of a 
partnership or, like above, the limited liability company with a limited partnership 
company being completely and indefinitely liable – provide 1% of the fund’s capi-
tal, while 99% comes from the Limited Partners (Smith, Smith, & Bliss, 2011, p. 90). 
The Limited Partners are only liable (Grunewald, 2008, p. 128 et seqq.) to the 
amount of their capital contributed (Schauer, 2016, p. 51). The General Partners (or 
a management company representing the General Partners) take over the opera-
tional fund management, the investors as Limited Partners have – again based on 
the stock market and similar to shareholders – only controlling rights. The General 
Partners are being compensated with a management fee in the amount of 1-2% per 
annum on the capital stock and the profit share (Bayaz, 2013, p. 48) the carried in-
terest, of approximately 20% on capital gains of the fund (Müller K. , 2007, p. 18). 
However, this fund remuneration is only calculated after the repayment of the cap-
ital contributions to the other limited partners plus an average minimum interest 
rate of 8% (the so-called hurdle rate). 
In addition to their capital employed, the capital gain less the management 
fee and the carried interest remains with the Limited Partners (Bayaz, 2013, p. 49; 
Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 26). Within the industry, the Private Equity companies are 
to be diversely subdivided. On the one hand, they can be subdivided according to 
their geographical, industrial and functional specialization, and on the other hand 
they can be differentiated in globally acting, more opportunistically construed fi-
nancial investors (Bayaz, 2013, p. 49) – see also the empirical study on the partici-
pation types for clarification of correlations of participation motivations, for exam-
ple, of companies, that purchase businesses or stocks of businesses for strategic and 
and financial reasons – and the active industry specialists. 
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It is possible and even common (Renz, 2015, pp. 26-27) for the management 
of a fund to be taken over by a management company.  
 
Figure 6 is intended to illustrate the position of the manager or the management 
company within a private equity structure. 
Figure 6: Management as General Partner in a Private Equity Investment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Own model. 
This structure is typically (Jugel, 2003, p. 62) designed as part of a business man-
agement contract. Therein, the management company takes over the position (Lan-
dau, 2010, pp. 27-29) of the General Partner.  
Normally, a management company operates, according to their management ca-
pacity, several fund companies, which are established one after the other within a 
certain time (Grethe, 2010, p. 65) interval.  
In general, the main motivation for target companies to turn to a Private Eq-
uity investor is the strengthening of its equity ratio (Stadler, 2013, p. 194) and to 
gain access to means for growth (Quelle & Woikowsky, 2011, p. 28), respectively 
investments (Bayaz, 2013, p. 52; Quelle & Woikowsky, 2011, p. 28; Stadler, 2013, p. 
194). There are manifold reasons for wishing to strengthen the equity base. These 
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are described in detail in the chapter regarding the reasons for Private Equity fi-
nancing. Especially young, capital-intensive businesses that are in the start-up or 
growth phase (Kollmann & Kuckertz, 2003, p. 32), often experience difficulties in 
financing (Reichle, 2010, p. 1) themselves through banks or the public capital mar-
ket (Bayaz, 2013, p. 52; Kollmann & Kuckertz, 2003, p. 32; Reichle, 2010, p. 1). For 
this reason, a large part of the capital derives from Venture Capital (Börner & 
Grichnik, 2005, p. 97) firms, from which the companies also expect management 
support (Bayaz, 2013, p. 52; Börner & Grichnik, 2005, p. 97). The alternative financ-
ing Private Equity has long extended to the circle (Bayaz, 2013, p. 53) of medium-
sized (Matejun, 2008, p. 12) and family businesses (Aronoff & Ward, 2011, p. 1). 
Especially medium-sized companies (Wiedmann & Heckemüller, 2003, p. 73) often 
show a permanent lack of equity to execute investments (Bayaz, 2013, p. 53; Wied-
mann & Heckemüller, 2003, p. 73). This weak equity base has fatal consequences 
for the company (Bayaz, 2013, p. 53). The debt ratio, which results from this strategy 
– or rather negative strategy – leads to a poor credit rating (Hess, 2007, p. 29), which 
in turn impedes the borrowing of additional debt (Bayaz, 2013, p. 53; Hess, 2007, p. 
29). Meanwhile, family businesses are increasingly requesting Private Equity or 
considering such alternative financing in order to – another essential reason for 
Private Equity financing – find a succession plan in the sense of selling to an exist-
ing management or selling to a management (Bayaz, 2013, p. 53; Renner, 2016, p. 
62)5 from the outside.  
 
Research Situation 
Investments in new businesses – and this goes undisputed – is essential (Eu-
ropäische Kommission, 2016) to the future of Europe. There are a number of funds, 
which at first sight, promise relief for regions, structures or industries (Europäische 
Kommision, 2014). This was started in Europe early on. The European Agricultural 
                                                     
5 In contrast, there are those who say, that there are problems in the financing of family business 
(Schraml, 2010, p. 247) with private equity (Simon, 2012, p. 348). So there is a tension between 
the long-term horizon of family businesses and the relatively short-term private equity exposures 
(Simon, 2012, p. 348). 
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Guidance and Guarantee Fund for Agriculture (Hofreither, 2012, pp. 8-12), estab-
lished in 1962 (Kienle, 2009, p. 1) probably counted as one of the first financial aids 
designated in their entirety as a structural fund. This fund was also once a very 
extensive fund and at last – until 2006 it was in charge of the financing (Beichelt, 
2006, pp. 162-163) of the common agricultural policy of the EU – accounted for ap-
proximately half the budget of the European Union (Koerber, Männle, & Leit-
zmann, 2012, p. 173). Today, the funds for the development of structures and in-
dustries are the  
 
 European Social Fund (ESF),  
 the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF),  
 the Cohesion Fund,  
 the Solidarity Fund of the European Union,  
 the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EARFRD),  
 the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF),  
 the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and  
 
other entities wishing to supportively engage (Europäische Kommission, 2015). 
Thus, in this context, the JASPERS (Joint Assistance in Supporting Projects in Eu-
ropean Regions), JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enter-
prises), JESSICA (Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas) 
or as well JASMINE (Joint Action to Support Micro-finance Institutions in Europe) 
are to be mentioned (European Commission, 2015). Not quite uniformly yet in gen-
eral, the ESF and the EFRE are henceforth being subsumed under structural funds 
(Europäische Union, 2013).   
They work on the concept of co-financing (Steinrücken, 2016, p. 47), which means 
nothing more than the projects funded by the Structural Funds must always be 
supported by the public fund of the country concerned as well. The European So-
cial Fund is also designed to be permanent, as well as the European Regional De-
velopment Fund (Rein & Schuler, 2012, p. 257 et seqq.). 
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It is the most important employment policy instrument of the EU (Rein & Schuler, 
2012, p. 258). It was created with the formation of the European Economic Commu-
nity (Heise, 2014, p. 6) in 1957 and launched in 1958, at which the production and 
strengthening of regional competitiveness was issued as the goal (Becker S. , 2003, 
p. 183 et seqq.) of this fund (Rein & Schuler, 2012, p. 257 et seqq.; Becker S., 2003, p. 
183 et seqq.). It is used to promote growth and employment in the regions least 
developed (Rein & Schuler, 2012, p. 257 et seqq.; Becker S., 2003, p. 183 et seqq.). It 
aims to improve employment opportunities in these regions and to help people 
through education and training (Rein & Schuler, 2012, p. 257 et seqq.; Becker S., 
2003, p. 183 et seqq.). Furthermore, it is set to contribute to the reduction of inequi-
ties, disadvantages and discriminations in the labor market (Rein & Schuler, 2012, 
p. 257 et seqq.; Becker S., 2003, p. 183 et seqq.). So should – by volition of the Euro-
pean Union – all people receive a professional perspective (Rein & Schuler, 2012, p. 
257 et seqq.; Becker S., 2003, p. 183 et seqq.). In the process, each region, respectively 
each Member State shall develop its own strategy in the context of an operational 
program (Rein & Schuler, 2012, p. 257 et seqq.; Becker S., 2003, p. 183 et seqq.). The 
funds from the European Social Fund can be requested, for example, by public au-
thorities or charities that are active in the field of employment and social inclusion 
(Saarland, 2016, p. 1). The European Regional Development Fund is targeted into a 
similar direction. It is the most important instrument of regional development of 
the European Union, supporting regions which are showing development deficits 
and structural problems. Under article 176 (Brandenburg, 2014, p. 41) of the TFEU 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (AEUV – Vertrag über die Ar-
beitsweise der Europäischen Union)) the purpose of this fund is to:  
 
„…., help to redress the most significant regional imbalances in the Union by participating 
in the development and structural adjustment of underdeveloped areas and the restructur-
ing of industrial regions with regressive development.” (Anikor, 2014) 
 
The European Regional Development Fund primarily finances investments to 
strengthen business competitiveness and job creation in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (Kirchhof & Kreuter-Kirchhof, 2012, p. 82). However, a promotion of 
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measures is possible, which are relevant to the environment, such as the develop-
ment of technologies that are conducive to energy efficiency. It goes without saying 
that the Structural Funds as well as the other provided funds are very helpful.  
This work is essentially not about intervening in the structure of funding or 
to even provide an additional fund that could be accessed in particular by entre-
preneurs or managers of Private Equity funds. Instead, it is about the fact that a 
well-known phenomenon, or rather an industry and its dependents could be 
granted better options as it has been the case thus far. The participation of compa-
nies in and with other companies through the provision of Equity Capital (Private 
Equity) is of paramount importance for the European Union. The economic rele-
vance of Private Equity, which provides equity and detaches the supported enter-
prises from the banks (Heyke & Stahl, 2010, p. 28), shows itself significantly in an 
economically uncertain environment and the associated reluctance in the lending 
policy of banks. Relatively independent from economic activities, Private Equity 
companies can invest in sustainable and promising companies, using the funds 
launched by them for that very purpose. Therewith, they support the creation of 
new jobs and the preservation of the innovative capacity of a nation. Private equity 
is a major contributor to the development of high-tech industries, information, 
communications, biotechnology and medical technology, and should actually go 
above that. It is well known, that – compared to other companies - Private Equity 
firms performed much better (Gottschalg & Schramm, 2013) in the past as well, 
thus showing considerably stronger growth rates, creating more jobs and investing 
higher volumes in research and development (Cerqua & Pellegrini, 2014, pp. 115-
126). However, due to the differing views of the Member States concerning the 
treatment of Private Equity funds, a not only imaginary bolt has been placed before 
more extensive activities so far.  
The private equity business therefore plays an important role in the global fi-
nancial economy (Lucks & Meckl, 2015, p. 36; Schüle, 2015, p. 18 et seqq.). The fact 
that a private equity investment brings the expected profit to the investor is not 
least due to the particular tax conditions in the country in which the company's 
stake was acquired (Groh, 2004, p. 29 et s; Jesch, 2004, p. 157 et seqq.). The taxation 
RALF MAUER Page | 18 
 
 
of profits from the sale of company interests is of particular relevance (Jesch, 2004, 
p. 157 et seqq.). Overall, private equity (PE) is influenced by a variety of things. In 
addition to taxation, these are the legal framework conditions which later lead to 
fiscal treatment, the private equity market in general, the fund structures of the 
individual member countries of the European Union and, in particular, financing 
in the early stages of a company (Venture capital) the entrepreneurs addressed 
here. Figure 7 is intended to illustrate this. 
Figure 7: Influencing Variables on Private Equity (PE) 
Source: Own representation. 
 
When speaking of private equity, there are two main stocks. Some speak of the 
opportunities and the others of the risks of private equity. Thus, discussed is, on 
the one hand, the economic importance, while on the other hand, the risks in the 
sense of company purchases which are charged to the acquired company. For ex-
ample, Bayaz (2014, p. 39) and Achleitner, Schramel and Tappeiner (2011, p. 9) ar-
gue that the private equity market has gained in importance. On the legal side, too, 
a lot has been done in recent years to make private equity and venture capital more 
interesting in Europe. 
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The AIFM Directive 2011/61 / EU (Alternative Investment Fund Manager Di-
rective), which had to be implemented in the Member States of the European Union 
(EU) on 22 July 2013, initially set strong regulation in response to the financial crisis 
(Postler, 2015, p. 5 et seqq.; Sixt, 2014, p. 175 et seqq.). However, this should also 
create a clear structure (Postler, 2015, p. 5 et seqq.; Sixt, 2014, p. 175 et seqq.). The 
EuVECA Regulation (European Regulation on European Risk Capital Funds) of 17 
April 2013 goes further (Hoffmann-Riem, 2014, p. 413 et seqq.; Gogarn, 2015, p. 4 
et seqq.). This regulation is intended to ensure that the obstacles to cross-border 
fundraising and the creation of a Europe-wide level-playing field for venture capi-
tal funds are eliminated (Hoffmann-Riem, 2014, p. 413 et seqq.; Gogarn, 2015, p. 4 
et seqq.). This European venture capital fund will facilitate access to start-ups for 
financing (Hoffmann-Riem, 2014, p. 413 et seqq.; Gogarn, 2015, p. 4 et seqq.). 
Through the uniform regulation of this fund, the EU hopes that investor-backed 
investors will have more confidence (Hoffmann-Riem, 2014, p. 413 et seqq.; 
Gogarn, 2015, p. 4 et seqq.). This regulation has not yet had any success (Schwarz 
& Hillebrand, 2016, p. 60). A further consideration is the European Investment 
Fund, which was established in 1994 and is based in Luxembourg (Europäische 
Union, 2016). Its main shareholders are the European Investment Bank, the Euro-
pean Commission and various European banks and financial institutions (Eu-
ropäische Union, 2016). The task of risk capital financing in favor of small and me-
dium-sized enterprises provides that the financing is not directed to companies, 
but rather to private banks. 
Also the private equity market, which has organized itself in associations in 
the respective national states (eg BVK as the German Association of German Equity 
Companies for Germany, AVCO as Austrian Private Equity and Venture Capital 
Organization for Austria, LPEA as Luxembourg Private Equity & Venture Capital 
Association for Luxembourg), as well as the umbrella organization EVCA (now In-
vest Europe) as European Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, are 
working to improve the framework for private equity. In this way, the associations 
demand that the taxation of management fees be abolished and the tax conditions 
be made more transparent. BVK (see above) calls for a list of measures, specifically 
the amendment of the Income Tax Act, the Corporate Income Tax Act, the Trade 
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Tax Act and the Value Added Tax Act. The Investment Tax Act is also to be 
amended. The measures to be taken are: transfer of profits for the promotion of 
participation in small and medium-sized companies and special depreciation for 
the promotion of participation in small and medium-sized enterprises. That is, e.g. 
profits realized on the sale of shares may be carried forward over the next four 
financial years, or, for example, that purchase costs for shares may be claimed for 
five equal annual amounts (Richters, 2015). For knowledge on the taxation of such 
funds, specific literature is needed, some of which do not originate from the aca-
demic sector. Specialists such as the foundation "Deutsches Venture Capital Insti-
tut", which is operated by Pöllath & Partner, an economic legal and tax consulting 
firm, are dealt with in more detail. With the income tax treatment of venture capital 
and private equity funds. In particular, it is a question of whether a fund is asset 
management or commercial. This segment shows that the market is developing 
very little. There is no longer a general solution. In contrast, this work attempts a 
new approach - the approach of a tax-optimized model - which facilitates the work 
of all European venture capital funds and thus indirectly helps entrepreneurs. The 
novelty of this approach is, therefore, that work is being done mainly on the regu-
lations, but not on a fiscal solution. 
In order to know who is involved in this work, the protagonists will be ex-
plained in the next sections. In this work, the end result is that the entrepreneurs 
are helped - so that these companies are promoted. Therefore, these are defined in 
the following sub-chapter. Chapter 1 continues with the research questions and 
ends with the presentation of the investigation procedures. 
1.1.3 Entrepreneurs in the Common Market 
The entrepreneur – and that applies in particular to the European Union – 
cannot place his possibly brilliant reflections on the market without further ado. 
Entrepreneurs must and will play a crucial role in the European Union in the future 
(Hotz-Hart & Rohner, 2014, p. 11). In accordance with a not quite uniform defini-
tion, he is at first a founder of a new business and has to take some determining 
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considerations into account. Despite or because of his partially brilliant ideas – ex-
emplary is and always will be Ray Kroc, who with his innovative business model, 
to spread existing business modules further under a franchise system (Kierdorf, 
2011, p. 223), helped McDonalds (Schögel, 2012, p. 310) to attain global success – 
there is a risk that foundation-specific aspects in particular are being overlooked. 
Other than the foundation of a company itself, the establishment of a tax structure 
(This does not, of course, address the taxes that are examined in this work for pri-
vate equity funds) plays an essential role (Kußmaul & Beckmann, 2002, pp. 40-51). 
In total, corporate taxes are a factor rightly receiving much attention in the course 
of corporate planning and corporate management. All taxes relevant for a business 
and the owner-manager – and therefore also for the entrepreneur – are in part sub-
ject to an impetuous change. The list of amendatory and continuously newly edited 
statutes, executive orders, statutory notices and guidelines seems ad infinitum, 
their constant modifications are vexing.  
Hardly less extensive and therewith confusing for the entrepreneur is the 
range of literary aides. Generally literary support hardly exists. It would be helpful 
to provide the founders with a general framework. However, this remains the re-
sponsibility of the several Member States of the European Union. The key problem 
that entrepreneurs face is that they sometimes encounter difficulties in financing 
their ideas. In general, and according to the prevailing opinion of the parties con-
cerned, entrepreneurs do not feel sufficiently appreciated (Faber, Siems, Riedel, & 
Pohl, 2014, p. 43) and supported in Europe. 
Entrepreneur 
In this context, an entrepreneur (Wolk & Zerres, 2009, p. 7) is to be understood as 
an individual (Horngeber, 2012, p. 3), who – with the help of predictive talent and 
creativity –  is able to enforce products, services or production methods on the mar-
ket, where others might possibly fail. He distinguishes himself in that, due to his 
efforts, he is being provided with the necessary resources for his project 
(Fueglistaller U. , Müller, Müller, & Volery, 2012, p. 21) and he is consistently pur-
suing his business idea.  
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Entrepreneurship 
Thus entrepreneurship (Stokes, Wilson, & Mador, 2010, p. 8) can indicate a process, 
which is being initiated and conducted by those very individuals, having the pur-
pose to recognize the entrepreneurial opportunities offered with this talent, crea-
tivity, risk-taking and enthusiasm (Volkmann & Tokarski, 2006, p. 2) and utilize it 
accordingly.  Despite all the apparent specificity of an entrepreneur, he as well is 
challenged with first having to implement and realize a business idea. Therefore, 
entrepreneurship can be understood as a classical foundation (Kollmann, 2004, p. 
1) of an enterprise, assuming that the founder is equipped with a certain degree of 
dynamics and motivation. There are good reasons (Berning & Novak, 2010, p. 129) 
for starting a business (Tanski, Schreier, & Thoma, 2013, p. 6), such as the threat of 
losing the place of work (Heyse & Erpenbeck, 1994, p. 130), as well as the pursuit 
of free allocation of working hours and work load (Thomas, 2011, p. 37). Also, an 
excellent business idea could account (Wassmuth, 2004, p. 168) for withdrawal 
from a supposedly secure existence. A good business idea is the basic requirement 
for a successful foundation of an enterprise (Langholz, 2011, p. 74). However, it is 
a condition precedent for success that there is a consumer demand for the product 
or service.  
 
„There is no point in having a business idea if no one wants to buy it. To set 
up a company and make money you need a product that people want” 
(Russo, Gleich, & Strascheg, 2008, p. 19). 
 
Summary 
 
The entrepreneur (Kunze & Offermanns, 2016, pp. 177-196) is being distinguished 
in that he also provides – aside from this idea – talent, perseverance, joy in self-
employed working and most of all the will to actualize himself within his own 
company. In doing so, it does not matter whether he acts within a familiar industry 
or tries a completely new business idea (Hoffmann T. M., 2015, p. 21) to conquer 
the market. Once such consideration is completed and usually placed under a com-
petitive situation, he needs to be aware of the status of competitors and customers 
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before finalizing his decision to start a business, but also of how he wants to finance 
his company in the initial phase and beyond (Ahr, Schwenk, & Matros, 2011, p. 16). 
How much more difficult must such a decision be with the increasingly converging 
markets within Europe, but as well as in global aspects? 
The problems and uncertainties with which an entrepreneur is being con-
fronted during the beginning of his activities could certainly not be sufficiently and 
satisfactorily solved on a European level at present, since the regional, respectively 
the domestic occurrences, for instance in regards to the above-mentioned tax and 
establishing aspects, as well as the financing aspects, are too deeply embedded 
within the structures of the individual Member States and their traditions. Never-
theless, the European Union could intervene, by providing entrepreneurs with a 
fund that has general validity in itself throughout the European Union for all who 
are eager to start a business. Thus, this model would overcome language barriers, 
borders of interest and countries and institutionally is subject to only the feasibility 
of the project of the entrepreneur. Structures could be designed, which at first do 
not help the entrepreneur directly but rather indirectly by providing this fund, re-
spectively the fund company that oversees these funds with general fiscal condi-
tions in order to reduce the barriers for the operation and operators of such funds. 
Consequently, standardized provisions and improved structures for Private Equity 
funds could result in providing more funds and facilitating access to Private Equity 
for entrepreneurs.  
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1.2 RESEARCH ISSUES: OBJECT OF OBSERVATION PRIVATE EQUITY 
This work intends to discuss the possibility of changed conditions, particu-
larly in regards to fiscal but also regulatory treatment of Private Equity funds from 
a theoretical point of view. This study would also draw a little attention to the reg-
ulatory overkill. The background to this is the creation of better opportunities for 
entrepreneurs in the European Union via improved, modified and new structures 
for the development of Private Equity. In the context of the consideration of the 
actors in a Private Equity transaction, the regulatory requirements of private funds, 
and the modified parameters for such structures, the possibility of a different ap-
proach shall be analyzed and presented using the description and empirical data. 
In a rough outline, this work shall 
 
1. present the approach on Private Equity transactions and consider the pro-
tagonists in such participation constellations, as well as to establish a rela-
tionship to the European Union, 
2. study, compare and discuss the fiscal and corporate parameters for Private 
Equity funds in selected Member States of the European Union,  
3. and modify the above-mentioned fiscal parameters in such a way that com-
pared to current realities new opportunities can be identified. 
 
These three research approaches, considered as starting points, are in recourse once 
again responsible for the development of the research questions. They follow a log-
ical chain analysis to pursue a forecast, design and respectively a utopian approach.  
The first research question is addressed to the Private Equity industry, in order to 
select and analyze which information is required to later correctly classify the im-
portance of Private Equity. Necessarily, Private Equity is being presented in great 
detail and the economic benefit examined. This includes theoretical knowledge, 
which may also have a generally valid character for e.g. the company evaluation. 
Furthermore, empirical data are collected to identify areas of activity.  
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What role do Private Equity firms and their funds play in addition to the other players in 
an investment transaction and what economic importance has Private Equity for the EU? 
 
The second research question addresses the constitutional conventions, rules and 
regulations of the Member States to be examined, resorting to basic theoretical 
knowledge of fiscal and regulatory concepts of these states. The selection of coun-
tries has changed several times during the data acquisition phase and processing 
phase of this work. Reasons are the changed conditions – explained in chapter 3 - 
from the previously selected states.  
 
How do fiscal and regulatory provisions influence the Private Equity industry? 
 
The third research question is addressed to option of future design opportunities 
for the treatment of Private Equity funds, resorting on a theoretical basis on previ-
ous data, which are then modified appropriately. Furthermore, already conducted 
comparative data are being consulted in order to determine the inter-related effects 
between the current approach and the changed conditions. This third central re-
search question can be described as superior. Answering this questions is aimed at 
entrepreneurs. This means that Venture Capital is considered at the end. 
 
Which countries within the European Union and beyond are measurably successful in re-
gards to Private Equity, respectively Venture Capital investments, and have such similari-
ties among each other that their conditions for optimized fiscal conditions may be taken 
under consideration? Which parameters requires a tax-optimized Private Equity fund?  
 
Naturally, all measures to facilitate start-ups to finance their ideas and projects also 
have strong growth and interconnection effects for the European Union and the 
EU-market.  
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Figure 8 represents a cycle, in which the goal of growing the market is achieved by 
optimized Private Equity Financing of entrepeneurs.   
Figure 8: Effects of Optimizing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation. 
 
These research questions shall provide an overview of the research program, which 
is carried out in this work. The development of other, more specific questions will 
result from a fundamental discussion of the aspects surrounding Private Equity in 
the respective preliminary remarks of chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
1.3 COURSE OF INVESTIGATION  
If it is possible for the market within the European Union to achieve such a 
structure as mentioned above, the necessary transparency of these framework con-
ditions would probably provide the non-market equity, for example the private 
equity companies, with an increased commitment from companies, which in turn 
would benefit the entrepreneurs. 
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It has already been established that entrepreneurs have difficulties financing 
their projects – which is the reason for the pursuit of a solution to this issue – and 
because the provision of equity by appropriate companies can be helpful in solving 
these difficulties, in a small digression in the mood of European citizens (EU) the 
great idea of a European internal market and its dependence on market growth has 
been discussed. The mood is important because a low interest rate, which is cur-
rently available, should actually increase the investment and therefore a better at-
mosphere is to be expected. The convergence of markets into a single single market 
is an essential part of the EU's efforts. Its growth could be a building block in order 
to increase the sentiment among the inhabitants of the EU. Now back to the entre-
preneurs. A strong entrepreneurial scene could revive the market, which is why it 
is important to be involved in this segment. The provision of equity is therefore an 
approach. These entrepreneurs and therefore entrepreneurship as a whole was sub-
sequently defined. In order to get an overview of the industry, which is intended 
to help these entrepreneurs generate equity capital, the participants were intro-
duced beforehand to such a project (investors, private equity companies, target 
companies) with the help of a corresponding graphic. Chapter 1 examines the rel-
evance for the European Union and also addresses the research situation. This pas-
sage ends with the aforementioned research questions. The main focus here is on 
the framework conditions for the provision of equity (private equity) and the tax-
related framework conditions still to be developed in order to provide indirect ac-
cess to equity for entrepreneurs. To this point, private equity has been spoken of 
only to a certain extent. In the next chapter (chapter 2) the procedure for such a 
private equity transaction (provision of equity in the life phases of a company) is 
explained in detail. The question is therefore answered as to the reason for using 
such equity and in this part of a company's life. To this end, the company is being 
further expanded (right up to internal and external financing) in order to be able to 
precisely classify what is known as private equity. After the defining private equity 
comes a decisive step: the distinction between private equity and venture capital. 
Private equity can be understood as an umbrella term for the provision of equity; 
while venture capital is more likely to support companies "only" in the early stages 
of their existence (for example, entrepreneurs). The provision of equity leads to the 
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provider (private equity company) acquiring a stake in the subsidized company. 
For this reason, the following section examines the type of participation (majority 
or minority participation) that occurs most frequently. This is particularly im-
portant for entrepreneurs, so they know who to turn to. The economic significance 
of private equity in the European Union, which is also the total investment in par-
ticipations in the European Union, is large, and this chapter is inclusive of the cap-
ital of the European Union and growth behind it. The point is that entrepreneurs 
from all over the European Union will have easier access to equity. This can be 
achieved if the owners of capital are uniformly taxed and are therefore more com-
mitted, while no individual state has its own structures. Therefore, the European 
Union is considered a system. Some data, such as the number of inhabitants, are 
also collected in order to be able to classify later that the total income of a country 
is not essential for the willingness to invest in entrepreneurs, but rather the per 
capita income. In addition, this section also mentions for the first time the key fig-
ure of the Gross Domestic Product (in essence, the total value of all goods and ser-
vices produced within a given economy over the course of one year). The deriva-
tion of this figure is then made clear in the following chapter on national accounts. 
Since this indicator is an indicator of the growth of an economy, the growth theories 
according to Keynes and Neoklassik are still indicated. Thus, the demand function 
as stated by Keynes, according to the literature, is identical with the formula for the 
Gross Domestic Product. After considering the entrpreneurs in the sense of busi-
ness founders, the overview of the provision of equity as an alternative financing 
of a company (private equity), the short insight into the European Union (EU), an 
overview of the investment volume in participations and the development of the 
essential indicator of growth (GDP), the tax parameters (capital gains tax, with-
holding tax, company tax, value added tax) are now determined in Chapter 3, 
which are later important for the investigation. The legal framework for private 
equity is examined intensively. The analysis of the legal and fiscal frameworks of 
selected EU countries is intended to exemplify the differences and thus the lack of 
consistency of the conditions. For the investigation in Chapter 4, all the necessary 
components are now known. This is the Gross Domestic Product (divided by the 
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population of one country it is the Gross Domestic Product per capita), the Pur-
chasing Power Standard (PPS - Purchasing Power Standard), the investments in 
participations and the different taxes. Through a series of cluster analyzes, Chapter 
4 examines which countries within the European Union have the greatest similari-
ties taking into account these parameters. In the end, only those investments in 
participations that are made in the early stages of a company (the above-mentioned 
venture capital) are taken into account. From the countries determined, the taxes 
which are important for venture capital (as for private equity) are now extracted at 
the company level and the fund level, which have contributed to the obvious suc-
cess of these countries with regard to venture capital. These taxes and / or their tax 
rates are now summarized. This is used to calculate average tax rates, which in turn 
are used to calculate an optimized "European" Gross Domestic Product. Chapter 5 
summarizes the investigation and provides an outlook for the tasks that need to be 
done to make such an optimized fund a reality. For example, at the highest level 
the legal framework such as custody, accessibility and administration of such funds 
must be clarified. 
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1.4 GRAPHICAL STRUCTURE OF THE INVESTIGATION 
Figure 9: Structure of the Dissertation 
Source: Own representation. 
 
   
2 RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
2.1 PRIVATE EQUITY AS FINANCING ALTERNATIVE 
2.1.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The development of economies increasingly depends on the start-up activi-
ties and the growth of young companies (Lüken, 2016, p. 54), as initially discussed 
(Zeuner, 2014, p. 30). Regardless of the doubtlessly strongly to be observed above 
mentioned problems of the founders, the difficult financial situation of such a pro-
ject needs to be especially considered (Strauß, 2012, p. 3). These difficulties extend 
from covering the external capital requirements (Brecht, 2005, p. 116) with financial 
means of external investors, to the troubles of diverse capital and financing envi-
ronments of the founding companies (Schöning, 2006, p. 273). These differ already 
regionally and even more so compared to the other countries (Wolf B. , 2006, p. 1), 
for instance within the European Union. For example, it is possible to obtain fund-
ing at a given point in time, but not in separate country or at a later date. When 
determining the financing environment (Wolf, 2006, p.3) a distinction has to be 
made according to the existence of different types (Lerch, 2011, p. 13) of financing 
options (Fueglistaller et al, pp. 344-347) and the extent of available (Alt, 2015, p. 36) 
resources (Linz, 2001, p. 27). This refers to the distinction of quality of the environ-
ment and quantity of the environment (Wolf & Nathusius, 2007, p. 149). These are 
being influenced (Wolf, 2006, p. 3). by the parameters (Wolf, 2006, p. 3) socio-cul-
ture (Fischer, Picot, Reichwald, & Franck, 2004, p. 41) and legal (Busack & Kaiser, 
2006, p. 116) framework (Friedrichsen, Grüblbauer, & Haric, 2015, p. 57), of the fi-
nancing system (Cumming D. , 2010, pp. 359-393). Despite the regional and inter-
national differences, these influential factors of the qualitative and quantitative de-
velopment of the financing environment are, in general, to be considered similar 
everywhere and include the following factors listed, which are not sorted by rele-
vance nor are they to be understood as being conclusive (Hackethal & Schmidt, 
2000, pp. 53-102): the preferential structure of investors and intermediaries (Schultz 
C. , 2011, p. 122), the power of the financial market (Wiegert, 2003, p. 101), the gov-
ernment funding (Breloh, 2000, p. 159), the tax legislation (Sellien, 1964, p. 113), the 
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regulatory law (Wolf, 2006, p. 3), the economic activity (Dupriez, 1963, p. 314), the 
investment alternatives (Kessel, Gawlitta, Hilbig, & Walther, 2015, p. 515), the com-
petition between investors and (Wolf & Nathusius, 2007, p. 52) the needs for capi-
tal. The past has shown, that fiscal (Potthof, 1998, p. 187) and company laws 
(Schmoll, 2015, p. 817), respectively the regulatory framework (Matz, 2002, p. 33) 
and the funding instruments are significantly influential on the financial services 
offered (Müller, Gramigna, & Linder, 2008). Thus, the fiscal law can already prefer 
or exclude certain forms of capital. The following explanations show which options 
the entrepreneur has within the financing system, and where private equity is clas-
sified. In order for the delineation and arrangement to be carried out successfully, 
the foundations are described in detail. Inclusion of private equity in the forms of 
financing 
  
Inclusion of private equity in the forms of financing 
Characteristically, the entrepreneur is initially looking at the usual financing trans-
actions and types of financing (Bobka, 2014, p. 28). In principle, a distinction is be-
ing made between internal and external financing (Becker H.-P. , 2013, p. 240), 
whereas these terms of financing (figure 10) are each being subdivided, as pre-
sented in the figures 11 and 12 (Perridon, Steiner & Rathgeber, 2012, p. 358).  
Figure 10: Types of Financing 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on Perridon, Steiner & Rathgeber. 
                                      Financing 
External Financing Internal Financing 
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An internal financing is then provided when the funds are raised internally, that 
is to say by the enterprise itself. Accordingly, self-financing from retained earn-
ings and other internal financing such as depreciation and provisions are in-
cluded. 
With internal financing (Vernimmen, 2011, p. 727), the funds are released 
(Härdler, 2015, p. 363) within the company and no injection of cash is obtained 
(Olfert & Reichel, 2005, p. 33) from the outside. Among internal financing are, as 
can be seen in figure 11, the retention of earnings, the financing of depreciation, 
financing from provisions (Becker, 2016, p. 245) and the financing from the rede-
ployment of capital (König, 2014, p. 7). Due to the profits partially or completely 
remaining in the company, the company finances itself. While internal financing 
may take the form of retained earnings by waiving a dividend or a distribution, 
with concomitant increase in capital (Becker H. P., 2016, p. 246), the financing 
through depreciation is done over a settlement of profits against the depreciation 
expenses (Losbichler, 2015, p. 248).  
Figure 11: Internal Financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on Perridon, Steiner & Rathgeber. 
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With financing from provisions (Röhrenbacher, 2008, p. 233), balance positions for 
contingent liabilities, warranties and anticipated losses from pending transactions 
are recognized (Hermanns, 2006, p. 235). The previously formed provisions are in-
itially recorded as expenses decreasing the profit (Röhrenbacher, 2008, p. 233; Her-
manns, 2006, p. 235). With the occurrence of the event, the provisions must be re-
solved (Binger, 2009, p. 112), just as the creation (Paul J. , 2015, pp. 430-432) of pro-
vision has been recorded as income (Binger, 2009, p. 112; Paul J., 2015, pp. 430-432). 
The profit resulting from the reversal of the provision (Tanski J. S., 2014, p. 6) earn-
ings increases the tax burden and therefore has an opposing effect (Daum, Petzold, 
& Pletke, 2016, p. 155).  
Figure 12: External Financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on Perridon, Steiner & Rathgeber, 2012, p. 358.6 
                                                     
6 The KfW aid money is from the Development Loan Corporation in Germany and only an example. 
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Financing through redeployment of assets (Ganzer, 2015, p. 29) procures liquidity 
(Wöltje, 2013, p. 381), for example, by selling no longer needed assets, such as non-
operating buildings (Ganzer, 2015, p. 29; Wöltje, 2013, p. 381). 
External financing includes all financial transactions in which resources from the 
outside are introduced into the company (Brauchle & Pifko, 2011, p. 139 et seqq.). 
As can be seen in figure 12 at page 34, all inflows of external financing occur via 
equity financing or debt financing (Schulte, 2009, p. 56).  
The equity financing includes (Schmidt & Terberger, 1996, pp. 230-231) participa-
tion in the opportunities and risks associated with the company (Reuter, 2008, p. 
20). With credit financing however (Neugebauer, 2014, p. 36), the investor obtains 
creditors ‘rights such as the right to repayment and interest payment (Grundmann, 
2013, p. 16), which may be distinguished from a time of one to less than four years 
and long-term loans (Ermschel, Möbius, & Wengert, 2011, p. 111) with a term of 
four years and more (Neugebauer, 2014, 2014, p. 36; Grundmann, 2013, p. 16). The 
interest rate of a bank loan (Geyer, Hanke, Littich, & Nettekoven, 2015, p. 151) can 
be agreed upon for the entire term (Jacob, Klein, & Nick, 1994, p. 164). In addition 
to a fixed rate agreement (Buck, 2016, p. 36), the contracting parties may conclude 
an agreement of a variable (Kuttner, 1995, p. 36) interest rate (Buck, 2016, p. 36; 
Kuttner, 1995, p. 36). With this interest rate agreement, the debit interest is adjusted 
at regular intervals according to the development of the money market (Bitz & 
Stark, 2015, p. 57). The delivery of goods in which the payment target is in the fu-
ture considered a supplier credit, which – just like the premature customer pay-
ment – counts among the credit financing (Hering, 2015, p. 24). Likewise, the credit 
financing includes development loans, which are often used for their beneficial 
conditions and favorable contractual arrangements when a company is founded 
(Plenker, 2016, p. 239). Figure 12 shows the instruments of equity financing. The 
crowdfunding belongs to the equity financing as well as the IPO (Initial Public Of-
fering). In crowdfunding, equity or equity-related mediums are provided by the 
crowd, mostly by internet users, ie the crowdfunders. In return for the provision of 
minimum sums, the crowdfunder receives rights, benefits or idle values. The com-
munication between the borrower and the crowdfunder takes place as part of a 
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crowdfunding platform (website). The donor provides e.g. a video with its idea on 
this platform and the crowdfunder donates money or participates in this idea. An 
IPO is discussed when shares of a company are offered for sale to interested inves-
tors. This is also referred to as a "first public offer". Through an IPO, a company 
acquires risk capital from the outside by using the shares as a financing instrument. 
As figure 12 illustrates, equity financing includes Private Equity 
(Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 204), which seeks to offer a financing option (Hoffmann 
D. , 2014, p. 77) for such companies whose credit is already exhausted or that no 
longer receive loans (Bieg, Kußmaul, & Waschbusch, 2015, p. 130) due to lack of 
collaterals (Tchervenichki, 2007, p. 204; Bieg, Kußmaul, & Waschbusch, 2015, p. 
130). A Private Equity firm acquires company shares, through which the firm par-
ticipates in the odds and the risks of loss (Bieg, Kußmaul, & Waschbusch, 2015, p. 
130). The participation on corporate earnings allows for a possible return through 
dividend payments or a profitable selling of the company´s shares (Renz M. , 2015, 
pp. 25-28). Venture Capital as part of Private Equity typically pursues yield-ori-
ented goals (Schüle, 2015, p. 20). The difference to Private Equity is the entry point 
(Bernhardt, 2010, p. 84). While Venture Capital invests in very young companies to 
reveal the possible present high growth potential, Private Equity investors invest 
at a later phase of the company (Bernhard, 2010, p. 84). 
In addition, mezzanine financing should be mentioned (Völker, 2014, p. 36), 
which is a hybrid form of financing (Nohtse, 2012, pp. 19-20), i.e. a mixture of equity 
and debt (Brezki, Böge, Lübbehüsen, Rohde, & Tomat, 2006, p. 23), and – as a the-
oretical consideration regarding the capital structure – the Irrelevance Theorem of 
Modigliani and Miller (Harris & Raviv, 1991, p. 297), who assume in opposition to 
the traditional hypothesis of an optimal capital structure (Uhrig-Homburg, 2001, p. 
187) that it does not affect the asset position of the shareholders (Modigliani & 
Miller, 1959) in what ratio a company resorts to equity and debt. Mezzanine financ-
ing is then used when a company with sufficient and stable cash flow has to meet 
the demands of investors and all credit lines are exhausted (Hockenbrink, 2015, pp. 
64-65). Thus the gap between the maximum available borrowing and the financing 
needs of the company is closed (Bienert, 2005, p. 410). The traditional core applica-
tion area  (Fersadi, 2015) for mezzanine financing (Lühn, 2013, pp. 37-38) can be 
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found in management buyouts (Lühn, 2013, p. 37; Fersadi, 2015). For small and 
medium-sized companies mezzanine financing (Abrahamczik, 2012, pp. 269-270) 
is used to finance growth strategies (Lehmann-Tolkmitt, Knöll, & Elmers, 2010, p. 
14), for project financing (Lühn, 2013, p. 35) or for the initial public offering (Wirtz 
& Salzer, 2001, p. 10) financing (Reichling, Beinert, & Henne, 2005) . 
Basically, equity financing means the provision of capital by the owner of the 
company (Tursch, 2009, pp. 5-7). This type of financing, paradoxically identified as 
self-financing, already indicates Private Equity (Cooke, 2011, p. 21). Namely, if the 
provider of equity is not the original owner of the company, but an outside player, 
this already is - assuming that the company to be financed is generally not market-
listed – Private Equity in its original mold (Widmann, 2014, p. 3).  
Figure 13: Investments in Holdings in Europe in bn. Euro 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2015, p. 1-76. 
Meanwhile, Private Equity has established itself on the international markets as a 
form of financing and investment (Grethe, 2010, p. 4). Although, the financial crisis 
took a sharp decline in the positive development of the Private Equity industry 
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starting in 2007 – and before then in 2005, triggered by the locust debate initiated 
by the SPD politician Franz Müntefering (Frommann, 2014, p. 24), which showed 
its effects not only in Germany – those circumstances could not prevent a revival 
of the Private Equity engagement back to an average level due to its undisputable 
advantages as is being illustrated in the graph of the investments in holdings in 
Europe (figure 13). More than 1.200 European Private Equity firms have been ana-
lyzed in the process (Invest Europe, 2015, pp. 1-76). 
As seen in figure 13 on the previous page after the sharp decline between 
2007 and 2009, the upward development initially made good progress again and 
has consolidated in the meantime (Meyer T. , 2009, pp. 1-16). This convalescence 
was mainly driven by the fact that this form of financing companies is interesting 
for investors (Speck, 2014, pp. 24-25) and it is certainly being discussed that the 
Private Equity market did not plummet as strongly during the financial crisis in 
comparison to other investment forms (Meyer T., 2009, pp. 1-16). The most im-
portant reason as a young entrepreneur, founder and growth company to consider 
Private Equity as a form of financing is and will remain - first and foremost – the 
difficulty for these companies to finance themselves (Lutz, 2011, p. 194) via “nor-
mal” bank loans (Möckel, 2005, p. 158). The regulations in Basel II and Basel III 
(Schröder, 2014, p. 30) have not necessarily encouraged the access to capital, spe-
cifically the willingness of banks (Neuthinger, 2014, pp. 38-41) to take a certain risk 
in financing (Schröder, 2014, p. 30; Neuthinger, 2014, pp. 38-41). 
2.1.2 Terms and Approach of Private Equity 
2.1.2.1 Derivation of the Term Private Equity 
Private Equity is actually a financing concept (Becker, 2013, p. 233) and not a 
financial instrument (Philipp, 2012, p. 3). In addition to the financing function 
(Bernhardt, 2010, p. 102) in general (Müller F. , 2010, p. 70), Private Equity supports 
the target company (Weißflog, 2015, p. 254), also called the portfolio company, in 
solving many problems an enterprise will encounter during the course of develop-
ment (Wöhe, Bilstein, Ernst, & Häcker, 2013, p. 193).  According to Invest Europe, 
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formerly known as EVCA (European Private Equity & Venture Capital Associa-
tion), now Invest Europe, Private Equity is defined (Schoon, 2011, p. 69) as follows 
(EVCA, 2013, pp. 1-16; Mauer, 2015, pp. 140-143): 
 
„Private Equity provides equity capital to enterprises not quoted on a stock 
market. Private Equity can be used to develop new products and technologies, 
to expand working capital, to make acquisitions, or to strengthen a company´s 
balance sheet. It can also resolve ownership and management issues – a suc-
cession in family-owned companies, or the Buyout or buy-in of a business by 
experienced managers may be achieved using Private Equity.” (EVCA, 2013, 
p. 1-16; Sauermann, 2010, p. 7) 
 
This definition points to an important requirement, namely that most or almost all 
target companies of Private Equity (Reimers, 2004, p. 4) are not publicly listed 
(Zipser, 2008, p. 1). This means, that the companies are not yet listed (Gaedke, 
Nöstlthaller-Kropf, Pinter, Rhomberg, & Weigl, 2012, p. 205) on the stock exchange 
(Barkalov, 2015, p. 120). Anyhow, it must be pointed out, that this definition is not 
yet a unified description of Private Equity (Kartashova, 2014, p. 3300). The current 
scientific literature lists a variety of definitions. The term component Private is often 
misunderstood (Henreich, 2012, p. 1) as private funding from individuals. How-
ever, it represents the fact, that the own funds are not public funds (Meyer, 2010, p. 
181), but over the counter, as explained above. The term Equity (Schröer, 2009, p. 8) 
refers to the provision (Niederdrenk & Müller, 2012, p. 29) of capital as liable and 
risk-bearing equity or quasi-equity (Humphery-Jenner, 2013, pp. 1-50). As opposed 
to debt capital (Pohlhausen & Röder, 2013, p. 724), where the interest rate over 
(Grunow & Figgener, 2006, p. 188) a certain period of time is generally determined 
prior to the approval of the loan, there is generally no previously fixed return 
(Timm, 1976, p. 27) and no repayment (Hagenmüller, 1959, p. 241) or exit-date with 
equity investments (Bayaz, 2013, p. 39). Compared to lenders of debt capital 
(Vormbaum, 1990, p. 46), equity investors acquire (Bösch, 2009, p. 67) a greater risk 
since (Perridon, Steiner & Rathgeber, 2012, p. 358) the company’s losses (Wöltje, 
2016, p. 343) are first offset against equity (Behringer, 2014, p. 98). At the same time 
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as well, however (Kreuzer, 2013, p. 46), the equity investor benefits from a business 
success, (Schneeberger & Peyerl, 2011, p. 46) much more than the lenders of debt 
capital (Schneeberger & Peyerl, 2011, p. 327). This equity participates in both the 
positive as well as the negative (Philipp, 2012, p. 3) corporate development (Hehn, 
2011, p. 78). 
Therefore, the goal (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005) of Private Equity (Siegel, Wright, 
& Filatotchev, 2011) and its accompanying services can be defined as the achieve-
ment of profit through the performance of the company (Sust, 2009, p. 86) within 
the investment period (Fahrenschon, Kirchhoff, & Simmert, 2015, p. 343). With the 
support (Achleitner, Schraml, & Tappeiner, 2011, p. 27) of Private Equity, (Pfeifer, 
et al., 2009, p. 37) the value of the investment increases, whereby the expected re-
turn can be achieved (Hehn, 2011, p. 42). The investment period (Weimerskirch, 
2000, p. 10) of the equity capital in the target company is limited (Hahn, 2014, p. 
61). In most cases this is five to ten years (Lerch, 2011, p. 5), which corresponds to 
a medium or long-term (Moritz G. , 2004, p. 400) Private Equity investment (Groh, 
2004, p. 26). During the investment period, the investor is a shareholder of the com-
pany (Becker L. , 2006, p. 227). Subsequently, the company can resort to the addi-
tional equity as well as (Söding, 2012, p. 17) to the expertise of the investor 
(Engelbrechtsmüller & Losbichler, 2010, p. 123), if necessary (Philipp, 2012, p. 3).  
In addition, the investor acquires certain rights (Müller, 2010, p. 79), and obligations 
to the company (Vogt, 2007, p. 35), such as in terms (Schenck, Balda, Dorbert, Hogh, 
& Zieske, 2015, pp. 1-37) of strategic decisions (Dworezkij, 2010, p. 4) and opera-
tional activities (Schneider, 2011, p. 57).  
It is also referred to as private because it is a private corporate financing 
(Eilenberger & Haghani, 2008, p. 11) as opposed to a public (Bassi & Grant, 2006, p. 
123) company. But for all that, this does not imply (Bayaz, 2013, p. 40) that Private 
Equity companies (Friedrich, 2005, p. 11) only engage (Landau, 2011, p. 1) in com-
panies (Bruhn & Hadwich, 2011, p. 154) that are not (North & Caes, 2012, pp. 6-8) 
quoted (Vogt, 2007, p. 4) on the stock exchange (Scherbaum, 2015, p. 6), rather they 
are unlisted (Bayaz, 2013, p. 40), because after the acquisition of the shares through 
a publicly available market, the company would be taken off the exchange (Bayaz, 
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2013, p. 40). A public company would turn (Stamp, 2001, p. 11) into a private com-
pany (Bayaz, 2013, p. 40) and public equity would turn (Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn 
& Sobczak, 2008, p. 111; Bayaz, 2013, p. 40) into Private Equity (Brettel, Kauffmann, 
Kühn & Sobczak, 2008, p. 111).  
Thum, Timmreck & Keul (2008, pp. 13 f) define Private Equity as a temporary 
(Bayaz, 2013, p. 40) - seven to ten years (Bayaz, 2013, p. 40) - majority shareholding 
- usually over 40% (Bayaz, 2013, p. 40) - in the equity of non-listed companies with 
the target to increase the value through restructuring (Bayaz, 2013, p. 40). In con-
trast Boué, Kehlbeck & Leonhartsberger-Heilig (2012, p. 84) distinguishes between 
evergreen funds and funds with a fixed maturity. The evergreen funds (Bascha, 
2001, pp. 153-187) have an indefinite term and the term of the fixed fund is about 8 
to 10 years. Others like Willert (Willert, 2006, pp. 35-36) are of the opinion that the 
term is not regulated and therefore must be determined individually. Despite nu-
merous discussions, and public debates (Bayaz, 2013, p. 40), the term (Auel, 2014, 
p. 11) Private Equity (Sewing, 2008, p. 10) is not yet clearly defined (Bayaz, 2013, p. 
40). On one hand, it applies in a broader sense (Bayaz, 2013, p. 40) to the entire 
market of private corporate financing, (Manchot, 2009, p. 20), following the exam-
ple in figure 14, whereby, in my view, under Venture Capital in the early stages of 
financing up until the later stage are meant.   
Figure 14: Forms of Private Equity 
 
      VENTURE CAPITAL               BUY OUTS                      MEZZANI 
Source: Own representation based on Bayaz, 2013, p. 40. 
FORMS OF PRIVATE EQUITY 
                                                         
        VENTURE CAPITAL              BUYOUTS                         MEZZANINE 
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In part, Secondary Purchase (Cateora & Richardson, 1967, p. 323) and Tertiary Pur-
chase (Friedlander, 2004, pp. 10-11) are also being considered (Fraser-Sampson, 
2010, p. 189) Private Equity (Renz M. , 2015, p. 25) in general (Siegel, Wright, & 
Filatotchev, 2011). Overall, it can be agreed that in fact, depending on the chrono-
logical use, Venture Capital (Gompers, Kovner, & Lerner, 2009), Buyouts (Bratton 
& McCahery, 2015, p. 491) – Management Buy Out (MBO - take over of the com-
pany or company shares by the existing management), Management Buy In (MBI 
– takeover of the company or company shares by external management) und Lev-
eraged Buy Out (LBO – take over of the company by an external group of investors) 
can all be subsumed under Buyouts -  and Mezzanine Capital (Willis & Clark, 2005) 
(Gladstone & Gladstone, 2002, pp. 5-8) under Private Equity (Manchot, 2009, p. 20; 
Bayaz, 2013, p. 40). On the other hand, terms (Manchot, 2009, p. 20; Bayaz, 2013, p. 
40) such as equity, Venture Capital, and risk capital (Lohfert, 2003, p. 2) are used 
interchangeably (Bayaz, 2013, p. 40).  
Short Demarcation Venture Capital  
Venture Capital usually provides equity at an early stage (Middelberg, 2013, p. 9) 
of a company. This financing is therefore associated with a high risk (Ramsinghani, 
2014, p. 6). Buyouts rather represent majority shareholding (Dänzer, 2010, p. 25) up 
to the acquisition of a company, (Schwenkedel, 1991, pp. 4-19) and Mezzanine Cap-
ital (Hager, 2007, p. 1) is a hybrid form of equity and debt capital (Slee, 2011, p. 
347). On the other hand, and to come back to the attempt to uniformly define the 
term of Private Equity, it is to be understood in a narrower sense as the commit-
ment in the late life cycle stages (Sacher, 2013, p. 10) of a company.  
Origin 
The origins of the term Private Equity are to be found in the United States and it 
derives from the term Venture Capital (Lessambo, 2013, pp. 186-187). Already dur-
ing the 50s, companies of the technology sector were supported by Venture Capital 
firms (Manger, 2003, p. 154) during their Start-up Phase by providing equity 
(Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 16). This special form of long-term but temporary busi-
ness and innovation financing with risk-bearing equity or equity-like capital 
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(Gaughan, 2011, pp. 363-364), coupled with active business consulting and support 
of the company to be financed without affecting and influencing the ongoing daily 
business is nearly unchanged to this day. The recipients of Venture Capital are 
mainly small or medium-sized, mostly highly innovative and often technology-ori-
ented companies with a high growth potential that are not issuable and cannot gen-
erate enough capital from its own resources (Kraus, 2008, p. 150). 
2.1.2.2 Venture Capital as Risk Capital 
The classification of Venture Capital is, above all else, incredibly important 
for this study. While the phases of a Private Equity Investment are explained chron-
ologically and are thus unambiguous, the distinction to Venture Capital is neither 
clear in the literature nor according to its character (Schüler, 2016, p. 43 et seqq.; 
Brettel, Rudolf & Witt, 2005, p. 79 et seqq.; Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 46 et seqq.; König, 
2014, p. 16 et seqq.). In chapter 2.1.2.1, Venture Capital was described as an early-
stage of financing, which is at a high risk (Schüler, 2016, p. 43 et seqq.; Brettel, Ru-
dolf & Witt, 2005, p. 79 et seqq.; Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 46 et seqq.; König, 2014, p. 
16 et seqq.). Thus, if Venture Capital is risk capital (Schüler, 2016, p. 43 et seqq.; 
Brettel, Rudolf & Witt, 2005, p. 79 et seqq.; Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 46 et seqq.; König, 
2014, p. 16 et seqq.), the question arises when the risk is particularly high. Certainly, 
financing is a risk in the early stages of a company. However, the financing of a 
Turnaround is dangerous as well. Per definition, financing the Turnaround would 
be a Venture Capital funding. In practice it is quite common for Venture Capital 
companies to completely finance a company - from the foundation to the expan-
sion, to the exit through the financing (Schüler, 2016, p. 43 et seqq.; Brettel, Rudolf 
& Witt, 2005, p. 79 et seqq.; Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 46 et seqq.; König, 2014, p. 16 et 
seqq.). This, in turn, would qualify as a total private equity financing. While in prin-
ciple the work has the financing of entrepreneurs in mind, the later analyses will 
often refer to venture capital.  
As a result, a uniform definition is necessary. Under Venture Capital, the seed, 
start-up and expansion financing (expansion not in the sense of growth financing 
to open up new markets or restructure operations) is included in the investigation 
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(Schüler, 2016, p. 43 et seqq.; Brettel, Rudolf & Witt, 2005, p. 79 et seqq.; Hocken-
brink, 2015, p. 46 et seqq.; König, 2014, p. 16 et seqq.). This risk of Venture Capital 
is usually required as a capital support in order to develop products or to finance 
initial growth in sales (Schüler, 2016, p. 43 et seqq.; Brettel, Rudolf & Witt, 2005, p. 
79 et seqq.; Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 46 et seqq.; König, 2014, p. 16 et seqq.). Seed fi-
nancings are investments in companies, which are in a very early phase, sometimes 
also in the pre-founding phase (Schüler, 2016, p. 43 et seqq.; Brettel, Rudolf & Witt, 
2005, p. 79 et seqq.; Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 46 et seqq.; König, 2014, p. 16 et seqq.). 
The risk of entrepreneurial failure is still high, as it is unclear whether the company 
and the planned products will be able to penetrate the market. The financing of a 
start-up is incredibly important in a young company (Schüler, 2016, p. 43 et seqq.; 
Brettel, Rudolf & Witt, 2005, p. 79 et seqq.; Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 46 et seqq.; König, 
2014, p. 16 et seqq.). The products often have to be developed or brought to market 
maturity. Even at this stage, the risk of entrepreneurial failure is high (Schüler, 
2016, p. 43 et seqq.; Brettel, Rudolf & Witt, 2005, p. 79 et seqq.; Hockenbrink, 2015, 
p. 46 et seqq.; König, 2014, p. 16 et seqq.). Expansion financing focuses on compa-
nies whose products are already developed and which have a customer base. How-
ever, further expansion is needed to expand, with the risk of failure at this stage 
already declining. This view is also in line with that of EVCA, today's Invest Europe 
(investeurope.eu, 2016). 
2.1.2.3 Motives, Phases and Leveraged Risk of Private Equity Financing 
A series of considerations prompts companies to address financing outside 
the classic financing methods (May, 2006, p. 71). Most certainly, the succession plan 
(Müller F. , 2010, p. 154) is one of the more often mentioned reasons especially for 
small to medium-sized companies. Hence, motives for Private Equity financing 
could be (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 53; Müller F., 2010, 
pp. 65-67): 
 
- Succession planning (Klein & Vossius, 2013, p. 7). 
- Growth (Croce & Martí, 2016, pp. 657-683). 
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- Bridge Financing (Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 69; Bayaz, 2013, p. 41). 
- Going Private (Schneider & Valenti, 2010, pp. 75-106). 
- Spin-Off (Austin & Gottlieb, 2003, pp. 2-7). 
- Private Placement (Tuli & Shukla, 2015, pp. 165-190; Shiu & Wei, 2013, pp. 
875-877). 
- Turn Around (Lymbersky, 2013, pp. 53-56). 
- Buy and Build (Hoffman, 2005, p. 39). 
 
Succession Plan 
Often, a generation change within a company is not possible (Herzog, 2014, p. 1), 
either because of the lack of a successor or because an adequate member of the 
family for example is not available (Eddleston, Kellermanns, Floyd, Crittenden, & 
Crittenden, 2013, p. 1177).  
However, in order to maintain the company, a less restrictive regulation must 
be found (Wegmann & Wiesehahn, 2015, p. 201). One scheme of this kind could be 
the MBO (Kluth, 2011, p. 41) or MBI (Jesch, 2013, p. 79) as explained in the previous 
chapter. Prevalently, MBO is the only possible succession plan (Kluth, 2011, p. 41). 
It entails an extensive financial restructuring, since it requires the overtaking man-
agement to move large volumes of money. Consequently, a large part of the fund-
ing needs to be provided by financial investors. The advantage of Management 
Buyout is (Kappeller & Mittenhuber, 2009, p. 245), that the former owner hands 
over his business to people he has known for many years (Hohenlohe, 2006, p. 83). 
Discussions and decisions are simplified by the fact, that the former owner has con-
fidence in his former employees – mostly executives – and is able to assess their 
skills well (Habbel, 2001, p. 19). This environment of trust includes that confidential 
and critical business documents, possibly bearing the signature of the former 
owner in collaboration with the ex-managers, do not fall into the hands of potential 
external buyers. However, an advantage and at the same time, disadvantage of the 
acquisition by the former management is the information advantage of the former 
employees being able to precisely assess the situation of the company, if necessary 
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(Fueglistaller, Müller, & Volery, 2008, p. 141). When negotiating the price of the 
company, this could cause an imbalance between the proceeds expected by the pre-
vious owner (Kreis, 1998, p. 362) and that of the well-informed transferee (Holstein, 
2015, p. 143).  
 
Growths 
Growth financing (Portisch, 2016, p. 647) is used to finance expansion projects. 
These expansions include the expansion of production capacity (Werner T. , 2009, 
p. 186) and additional working capital, whereas in this case, working capital is to 
be understood as an accounting ratio which determines the difference between the 
current assets and current liabilities of the company (Rao & Rao, 2014, pp. 1-14). 
The expansion of market shares or a change in the product range as well could 
stimulate demand for financial resources (Hoffmann W. , 2011, p. 49). Acquisitions 
that cannot be financed through debt capital are part of the expansion capital (Por-
tisch, 2016, 319). Usually, Private Equity companies are financing the growth of 
companies (see also 2.1.2.5) through minority shareholdings (Hahn, 2014, p. 203). 
In contrast to the early-stage financing, this is mainly because the former owners 
would like to limit the influence of the Private Equity company. In addition, the 
minority shareholding is often sufficient for realizing the financing of these expan-
sion projects (Seggewiss, 2015).  
 
Bridge Financing 
Bridge Financing (Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 69; Bayaz, 2013, p. 41) is used for the prep-
aration of an IPO (Brokamp, Ernst, Hollasch, Lehmann, & Weigel, 2012, p. 41). Pri-
vate Equity financing is an essential prerequisite for small to medium-sized com-
panies (Hess, 2007, p. 20) in obtaining the ability to go public (Brüse, 2011, p. 37) 
and to finance the IPO (Hess, 2007, p. 20; Brüse, 2011, p. 37). Here, additional equity 
is being provided to bridge the time period until the introduction of the company 
on the stock exchange is available (Dürr, 2007, p. 40). Also in the Venture Capital 
sector, Bridge Financing arrangements can be witnessed (Huchzermeier, 2006, p. 
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203) in the form of interim financing (Bayaz, 2013, p. 41) for the IPO of young tech-
nology companies immediately after the expiration of the Venture Capital commit-
ment (Huchzermeier, 2006, p. 203; Bayaz, 2013, p. 41). The IPO (Hohla, 2001, p. 60) 
usually requires a long-term preparation (Staroßom, 2013, p. 360) to meet both the 
legal requirements and those required by the legislation governing stock exchange 
transactions (Deloitte, 2009, p. 13), as well as the expectations of potential private 
and institutional investors (Deloitte, 2009, p. 13; Hohla, 2001, p. 60; Staroßom, 2013, 
p. 360). The preparation phase for an IPO (Natter, 2003, p. 164), in which a Private 
Equity firm accompanies an enterprise, may take one to two years to complete 
(Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 52), even with larger medium-
sized companies (Deloitte, 2009, p. 13) already established on the market (Boué, 
Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 52; Deloitte, 2009, p. 13; Natter, 2003, 
p. 164). In that, the Private Equity capital improves (Arnold, Englert, & Eube, 2013, 
p. 171) the equity adequacy (Burkhardt, 2008, p. 59) to accomplish the preparation 
time for the IPO (Arnold, Englert, & Eube, 2013, p. 171; Burkhardt, 2008, p. 59; 
Deloitte, 2009, p. 13). In addition, many companies need capital in preparation of 
the IPO in order to deliver a compelling equity story – meaning the possible course 
of the investment (Kirchhoff, 2006, p. 217) – to the potential investors (Deloitte, 
2009, p. 13; Kirchhoff, 2006, p. 217). Part of these efforts at persuasion is that it needs 
to be clearly explained to the investors why, for example, the acquisition of a certain 
company (Bernhardt, 2010, p. 97) and the capital required might be necessary 
(Bernhardt, 2010, p. 97; Deloitte, 2009, p. 13). Through the additional capital, the 
perfect time for the IPO can be arranged without exposing the company to financial 
pressure by having to perform an IPO under circumstances based on a bad market 
environment (Deloitte, 2009, p. 13). This flexibility, brought forth by Bridge Financ-
ing can be declared as the essential advantage (Deloitte, 2009, p. 13).  
 
Going Private 
As already suggested in 2.1.2.1, Going Private (Müller F., 2010, p. 67) indicates the 
conversion of a publicly listed company – thus Public Company (Deloitte, 2009, p. 
13) – to a private company whose shares are no longer traded on the stock markets 
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(Borden & Yunis, 2006, p. 6) – thus Private Company (Borden & Yunis, 2006, p. 6; 
Deloitte, 2009, p. 13; Müller F., 2010, p. 67). Private Equity is an essential prerequi-
site (Eisele, 2006, p. 5) for the transition of medium-sized companies from the stock 
exchange (Bloss, Ernst, Häcker, & Eil, 2009, p. 194), which allows medium-sized 
enterprises a greater flexibility regarding the use of and dependence on capital 
markets (Bloss, Ernst, Häcker, & Eil, 2009, p. 194; Deloitte, 2009, p. 14). For the clas-
sification of a transaction as Going Private (Abrams, 2004, pp. 14-15), a complete 
delisting of the company (Vernimmen, 2011, p. 777) is carried out and the company 
will be transferred to a shareholder level (Abrams, 2004, p. 14-15; Deloitte, 2009, p. 
14; Vernimmen, 2011, p. 777). In this context, delisting (Jansen, 2016, p. 146) is to be 
understood as the discontinuation of the trading of shares on all stock markets, all 
the while maintaining investor protection (Picot C. M., 2009, p. 6). The transferees 
of a corporation, which is to be taken from the stock market (Deloitte, 2009, p. 14), 
seek to obtain full control over a listed company in order to accompany it after the 
conversion in a non-listed company and at best, continue further development 
(Deloitte, 2009, p. 14).  
 
Spin-Off 
In a Spin-Off, a part of an existing company is spun off (Deloitte, 2009, p. 14) as an 
independent company (Festel & Rittershaus, 2014, pp. 5-10). These divestitures or 
spin-offs do not receive their own legal independence (Deloitte, 2009, p 14). Often, 
the motive for a Spin-Off (Austin & Gottlieb, 2003, pp. 2-7) is a change in the stra-
tegic orientation of the parent company (Deloitte, 2009, p. 14), which no longer con-
siders the tasks of this department or component of the company as being an ele-
ment of the priority tasks for the entire company (Anand, 1994, p. 581). Of course, 
it is also possible that newly developed products are being considered for a Spin-
Off (Herzog, 2014, p. 20), which the corporate group does not wish to integrate after 
their maturity (Deloitte, 2009, p. 14; Herzog, 2014, p. 20) has been reached.  
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Private Placement 
Private Placement (Tuli & Shukla, 2015, pp. 165-190) refers to the placement of se-
curities (Deloitte, 2009, p. 15), which are not publicly sold (Rudolph, 2006, p. 294) 
and traded (Cao, Xia, & Wang, 2013, pp. 91-93). After their sale, they usually remain 
in the charge of the first investor (Deloitte, 2009, p. 15). Private Placement includes 
(Deloitte, 2009, p. 15) not only the OTC (over-the-counter) issue (Shiu & Wei, 2013, 
pp. 875-877) of shares of other participatory instruments in which investment cap-
ital from private investors is placed as a non-voting, diversified investor capital 
(Werner H. , 2006, p. 42); the scope of investment opportunities within the scope of 
private emissions (Deloitte, 2009, p. 15) is much broader and more interesting than 
a securities issue on the stock exchange and covers the entire range of mezzanine 
financial instruments (Geisel, 2004, p. 17). Given the equity capital requirements 
under Basel II and Basel III, more and more companies realize the benefits (Deloitte, 
2009, p. 15) of Private Placements (Gündel & Katzorke, 2014). Basel II has the goal 
to ensure capital adequacy of financial institutions and to create standardized com-
petitive conditions both for lending and loan trading; also, it aligns regulatory cap-
ital requirements (Rossi, 2011, p. 17) with actual risk and hence approaches the cap-
ital requirement, internally determined by those institutions (Herfurth, 2010, pp. 
20-22), whereby the so-called regulatory arbitrage is to be reduced (Duthel, 2013, p. 
76), thus making the allocation of risky and possibly non-performing loans on a 
larger scale unlikely in the entirety of its regulations (Kelm, 2007, pp. 4-11). On the 
other hand Basel III, refers to the regulations regarding the increase of quality (Zirk-
ler, Hofmann, & Schmolz, 2014, pp. 1-4), consistency and transparency of equity 
capital, the improvement of risk coverage (Breidenbach, 2011, pp. 7-15), the intro-
duction of a debt limit – the leverage ratio (Hofmann & Schmolz, 2014, p. 31) – the 
reduction of pro-cyclicality and the strengthening of counter-cyclical buffers (Wal-
ter, 2012, pp. 29-44), as well as the liquidity and the general reluctance of banks to 
grant loans as a result of the changing of the lending business of banks.  
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Turn Around 
A Turn Around (Gietl, 2009, p. 33) financing is forced by external circumstances. If 
a company’s structure is outdated and no longer competitive (Walters-Malcolm, 
2007, pp. 19-22), Turn Around capital must be applied in order to keep the com-
pany alive (Schneider, 2011, p. 11). Accordingly, Turn Around capital is dedicated 
to logging off or respectively averting insolvencies; this happens, in extreme cases, 
if the company has already gone bankrupt (Lymbersky, 2013, pp. 53-56). Therefore, 
Turn Around financing does not only consist in the provision of capital by inves-
tors, but also in the change of its corporate strategy to bring it back on track, i.e. to 
lead it back to a competitive level on a sustained basis and take it back to profita-
bility (Renz, 2015, p. 20). The goal of Turn Around financing is to ensure short-term 
liquidity (Mezger-Boehringer, 2015, pp. 1-4) and, as in a medium term, a constant 
cash flow (Renz, 2015, p. 20). Among the applied corporate strategies are marketing 
strategies (Krämer C. , 1992, p. 123), repositioning on the market, and a new corpo-
rate structure (KMU-Kredite, 2014; Krämer C., 1992, p. 123). Executive consultants 
could, if applicable, point out which measures could be taken in regards to the com-
pany’s situation (KMU-Kredite, 2014; Schneider, 2011, p. 78). Due to the fact that 
Turn Around capital is being invested in financially-troubled companies, it is to be 
considered risk capital, because the financial sustainability is by far not secured 
with the provision of Turn Around capital (KMU-Kredite, 2014; Hommel, Knecht, 
& Wohlenberg, 2006, p. 399).  In order to find an investor for Turn Around capital, 
a very sophisticated financing concept (Meusel, 2009, p. 64) must be presented by 
the company accordingly (KMU-Kredite, 2014; Meusel, 2009, p. 64). Also notewor-
thy is the role Debt to Equity Swaps plays in Turn Around. This concept involves 
a transaction between a debitor and creditor, in which the creditor relinquishes the 
debt of the debitor in turn for shares in the company (Gruner, 2015, p. 15). When 
Turn Around does not materialize, the shares can be sold to another investor in 
what is called a secondary sale (Schneider L. , 2011, p. 51 et seqq). Because this 
capital is afflicted with higher risks (KMU-Kredite, 2014), it should be difficult to 
obtain external financing in the form of bank loans (Hommel, Knecht, & Wohlen-
berg, 2006, p. 399), which is also why Private Equity is to be considered especially 
for such restructuring projects (KMU-Kredite, 2014).  
RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE EQUITY                                          Page  |  51  
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
 
 
 
Buy and Build 
The construct „Buy and Build“ is classically known from the field of financial in-
vestors, especially from the Private Equity industry, and even emerged from it 
(Hoffmann N., 2008, p. 1-2). It designates a specific investment strategy, which is 
more than merely providing equity capital (Hoffmann N. , 2008, p. 39). This refers 
to any management services, which can be additionally provided. Such a strategy’s 
goal is to acquire the company with complementary business models and thus con-
solidate fragmented and intransparent branches and markets (Karbenk, 2002, pp. 
2-6). For Private Equity firms, this means that initially a financial investor identifies 
a fragmented – thus those which are fragmented and intransparent in itself – in-
dustry, which exhibits a high consolidation pressure (Moritz J. , 2008, pp. 373-391). 
Out of this industry, a company is then acquired which serves as a basis for further 
additional purchases of competitors and other target companies which prove to be 
reasonably supplemental for the business model (Borell & Heger, 2013). Jens Moritz 
(Moritz, 2008, pp. 373-391) means in his article “Private Equity und Mezzanine” 
(Picot G. , 2008), that a group of companies is established which reaches a critical 
mass within the formerly fragmented industry environment, and thus by using 
economies of scale – just those same positive effects, which result within the context 
of the dependence of the production volume on the quantity of applied production 
factors within a purposefully set up group of companies – holds a competitive ad-
vantage. While the term Buy and Build was heavily influenced by the financial in-
vestors, strategic investors are also increasingly taking over this concept (Jansen, 
2008, p. 53). However, in this case, the search for a fragmented industry is not nec-
essary. The initial acquisition of a base company is not required either, because the 
relevant company is already operating within a particular industry and acts insofar 
as a base company itself. Via this concept, respectively through these strategies, 
Private Equity can contribute to the fact, that competitiveness of enterprises in pol-
ypolistic markets is being increased (Beyer & Brüsken, 2011, p. 6). 
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Phases of a Private Equity Financing 
Figure 15 illustrates terminologically the development and financing phases 
(Philipp, 2012, pp. 8-12) of a company in this category (Reichling, Beinert, & Henne, 
2005, p. 47) and where Private Equity (ITCONSULT, 2013) is located in the hierar-
chy of financing (Philipp, 2012, pp. 8-12; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 18).  
Figure 15: Phases of Development of Private Equity 
Source: Own representation based on Brettel et al., 2008, p. 14. 
Figure 16: Earl Stage and Late Stage in the Norrow Sense 
Source: Own representation. 
A complementary graph (figure 16) shows the phases especially during the Early 
Stage (Kuntz, 2016, pp. 12-13), because of the participation of Venture Capital, the 
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Late Stage (Heister, 2010, p. 49), concerning Buyouts and Buy-Ins (Banks, 2010, p. 
318) in detail, as well as Private Equity in the narrower sense; this is integrated in 
the next chapter. 
For the use of Private Equity in the broader sense, the following phases are to be 
distinguished (Prym, 2011, p. 24), with the starting point being figure 15 (Brettel et 
al., 2008, p. 14).   
 
- Early Stage (Lerch, 2011, p. 14), 
- Expansion Stage, 
- Late Stage, 
- and Turn Around (Brettel et al., 2008, p. 14; Lerch, 2011, p. 14; Prym, 2011, 
p. 24). 
 
In the Early Stage (Kuntz, 2016, pp. 12-13), also chronologically as in figure 
16, it is to be distinguished between the Seed Phase (Hahn C. , 2014, p. 83) and the 
Start-up Phase (Hahn, C.; 2014, p. 83; Lerch, 2011, p. 14, Prym, 2011, p. 24). The Seed 
Phase (Kaiser & Vöcking, 2002, p. 307) refers to the period of preparation specifi-
cally during the beginning of starting a business (Hahn, 2014, p. 83; Kaiser & Vöck-
ing, 2002, p 307). Initially, the basics for the future company are being created here 
(Hahn, 2014, p. 83; Kaiser & Vöcking, 2002, p. 307).  
In this phase (Seed), the product idea is being developed (Kollmann, 2004, p. 
23), market analyses are being conducted (Heckmair, 2009, p. 10) and the business 
concept is being created (Kollmann, 2004, p. 23; Heckmair, 2009, p. 10). Regularly, 
the required capital is at least in part provided by the founders themselves or the 
personal environment of the founders at this stage (Saggau, 2007, pp. 13-15).  
A commitment of Private Equity providers and Venture Capital companies 
at this Early Stage (Jacobi, 2010) is rather rare (Gaedke, Nöstlthaller-Kropf, Pinter, 
Rhomberg, & Weigl, 2012, p. 229). The Start-up Phase concerns the following de-
velopment (Staroßom, 2013, p. 168) of a product to market maturity (Niederöcker, 
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2002, p. 214) and the creation of marketing concepts (Hahn, 2014, p. 68; Staroßom, 
2013, p. 168; Niederöcker, 2002, p. 214). At this stage, the company is already heav-
ily reliant on outside capital, as the running costs increase considerably, but at the 
same time (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, p. 20), no revenue is recorded (Busack & Kaiser, 
2006, p. 20; Mes, 2011, p. 253). 
During this Start-up Phase, a commitment by Venture Capital firms now oc-
curs more often already (Hahn & Naumann, 2014, S. 127-128). The next phase de-
scribes the stage of growth (Weitnauer & Esser, 2008, p. 1017) of the young com-
pany after the successful market launch of the product, during which funds for the 
product expansion and the development of a larger sales market (Sacher, 2013, p. 
12) are needed (Weitnauer & Esser, 2008, p. 1017; Sacher, 2013, p. 12).  
Figure 17: Zone of Potential Leverage – Venture Capital Financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own model.  
Already at this time, the borrowing of debt capital (Mayer M. D., 2003, p. 150) in 
addition to the financing by Venture Capital (Ege, 2003, p. 159) can be observed 
(Wenzl, 2010, p. 65). This (Kollmann, 2009, p. 51) is especially true with reaching 
the break-even point (Jennihsen, 1967, p. 81). Figure 17 shows the zone of the po-
tentially appropriate application of debt capital. Depending on how the financing 
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horizon is aligned, meaning the chosen form of participation (Saenger & Schewe, 
2012, p. 307), the duration of the commitment (Lerch, 2011, p. 37) and the planned 
phasing out of the investment (Jesch, 2004, pp. 97 et seqq.), an increased application 
of debt capital from the break-even point may make sense (Renner, 2016, p. 63). 
Thinking about the locust debate (Maurenbrecher, 2008, p. 2) in regards to Lever-
aged Buyouts (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009, pp. 121-146), this may not always be a 
positive signal (Maurenbrecher, 2008, p. 2; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009, pp. 121-146). 
On the other hand, it certainly makes sense, especially in a dynamic market such 
as the high technology (Markert, 2009, p. 114) market for example, to apply, in-
creasingly, capital from the break-even point on (Jürgens, 1994, p. 38), in order to 
conquer markets (Hackenberg & Empter, 2011, p. 124). In this regard, advantage 
could be taken from the Leverage effect (Murphy, 1968, pp. 121-123), which is 
known to state that through the application of debt capital (Sufana, 2013, pp. 783-
787), the return on equity (ROE) on an investment can be increased (Cheng & 
Tzeng, 2014, pp. 1-63), where an investor can borrow debt capital at better rates 
than what the return on asset (ROA) will realize (Murphy, 1968, pp. 121-123; Sufan, 
2013, pp. 783-787; Cheng & Tzeng, 2014, pp. 1-63). Under the premise that the bor-
rowing interest remains constant even at a high debt-equity ratio (L), the following 
formula (Huch, Behme, & Ohlendorf, 1995, p. 188) applies (Wöhe, Bilstein, Ernst, 
& Häcker, 2010, pp. 42-49): 
  
ROE = ROA + L * (ROA – return on borrowed capital). 
 
It shall not be concealed at this point, that the application of debt capital in 
connection with Private Equity also harbors certain risks (Brettel, Kauffmann, 
Kühne, & Sobczak, 2008, p. 69). H. Kußmaul reconstructed a debt financed pur-
chase (Kußmaul, Pfirmann, & Tcherveniachki, 2005, pp. 2533-2540) using the ex-
ample of the take-over of Grohe AG (Kuttner R. , 2008, p. 122) in Germany, by the 
British Private Equity fund BC Partners (Kußmaul, Pfirmann, &. Tcherveniachki, 
2005, pp. 2533-2540). Already in 1999, BC Partners (Sauermann, 2010, p. 218) ac-
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quired the company (Anonymous, 1999, p. 58), which had been profitable and ex-
pansive for decades (Kußmaul, Pfirmann, & Tcherveniachki, 2005, pp. 2533-2540). 
While the total capital amounted to approximately 1.1 billion D-mark in 1998, the 
equity ratio (Fisch & Roß, 2009, p. 256) ranged from 49.9% to 56.6% in the five years 
between 1994 and 1998 and the return on equity ranged from 29% to 31% (Jarass & 
Obermair, 2007, p. 43). The profit margin was 11% to 12% and the cash-flow in-
creased steadily (Jarass & Obermair, 2007, p. 43). For the purchaser, this ongoing 
high cash-flow was an indication that they could service the liabilities resulting 
from debt financing of the purchase price with the cash-flow of the acquired com-
pany (Jarass & Obermair, 2007, p. 43). That led to the fact, that by 2003 the equity 
ratio was reduced to 6% and within a few years, the cash-flow was more than 
halved, as were the gross investments (Jarass & Obermair, 2007, p. 43). While from 
1994 through 1998 significant annual surpluses had been earned, between 2000 and 
2003 the company generated deficits (Jarass & Obermair, 2007, p. 43). At the end 
stood a heavily indebted company, which was sold for the purpose of restructuring 
(Jarass & Obermair, 2007, p. 44; Kuttner, 2008, p. 122). The result: many employees 
in Germany were laid off, plants were closed and productions moved abroad 
(Jarass & Obermair, 2007, p. 44). Therefore, an observation and a review of the fund-
ing situation of such transactions is crucially significant (Baumann R. , 2012, p. 57).  
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Figure 18: Risks of leveraging a Private Equity Transaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on Hofmann & Schmolz, 2014, p. 164. 
 
Also, with a Private Equity (Hasan, 2014, pp. 73-101) transaction, the borrowing 
rate (Betge, 1998, p. 81) increases with the increase (Hutzschenreuter T. , 2009, p. 
157) of the debt-equity ratio (borrowed capital/equity), since the default risk in-
creases as well (Hasan, 2014, pp. 73-101; Betge, 1998, p. 81; Hutzschenreuter T.; 
2009, p. 157). It can be realized in figure 18, that the return on equity (Nothacker, 
2015, p. 111) only increases as long as the overall profitability (Köhler K. , 2014, p. 
61) and the borrowing rate (Gaedke, Nöstlthaller-Kropf, Pinter, Rhomberg, & 
Weigl, 2012, p. 86) curve meet (Eichhorn, 2005, p. 220). The Leverage risk (Hofmann 
& Schmolz, 2014, p. 164) arises at ROA < I (Busse, 2003, p. 839). Therefore, at this 
point, the risk of over-indebtedness of the company occurs (Horst, 2014, p. 111), 
provided that the funding is taken from the cash-flow (Horst, 2014, pp. 113-115).  
In the final stage of a company’s development (Vater, 2003, p. 53), the Late 
Stage (Vogt, 2007, p. 14), the capital investments are being divided mainly (Harris 
T. J., 2002, S. 59-63) into two financing situations:  
- Bridge Financing (Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 69; Bayaz, 2013, p. 41), 
- and Management Buy-Ins (MBI), Management Buyouts (MBO), Spin Offs 
(Bayaz, 2013, p. 41; Herzog, 2014, p. 22). 
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Figure 19: Entire Course of a Private Equity Transaction 
Source: Own model based on Hackl & Jandl, 2004, p. 194 et seqq. 
 
Bridge Financing (Bayaz, 2013, p. 41; Hockenbrink, 2015, p. 69) is the provi-
sion of additional financing, which is required by more mature companies to over-
come obstacles to growth or to prepare for the IPO (Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave, & 
Tylor, 1999, pp. 99-113). Figure 19 shows a possible course of a Private Equity trans-
action (Hackl & Jandl, 2004, p. 194 et seqq). 
Management Buy-Ins (Robbie & Wright, 1996, p. 5) or Management Buyouts 
(Herzog, 2014, p. 22) serve, as already explained above, the financing of the acqui-
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sition of a company by an external or the existing management. Spin-Offs (Rich-
ards, 2008, p. 7), however, are spin-offs from companies, which concentrate increas-
ingly on their core business (Bayaz, 2013, p. 41; Herzog, 2014, p. 22).  
Finally, outside the normal business development is the so-called turnaround 
phase (Vater, 2003, p. 53; Bayaz, 2013, p. 41). Frequently, this term (Jesch, 2004,, p. 
94) describes the time period in which a financially-stricken company is being led 
out of a period of losses by means of restructuring measures zone (Schneider L. , 
2011, p. 11) and back into profit (Jesch, 2004, p. 94; Schneider L., 2011, p. 11). 
2.1.2.4 Classification of Private Equity as Equity Capital 
The 70s and 80s were characterized by an increasing demand for financing of 
expansion investments (Daniels, 2004, p. 12; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 17) of estab-
lished companies (Seeburger, 2010, pp. 38-39), preparatory actions to initial public 
offers (IPOs) as well as leveraged and management Buyouts (Daniels, 2004, p. 12). 
Due to this fact, the term Private Equity (Bernhardt, 2010, p. 83) was developed, 
which was used until the mid-80s homonymous (Jugel, 2003, p. XI) with the term 
Venture Capital (Bernhardt, 2010, p. 83; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 17). After that, 
Private Equity proceeded to be applied as a general term for equity capital in the 
USA and Europe, under which - to complement the above discussion - at first the 
financing products Venture Capital and Buyout Capital were summarized (Krecek, 
2005, pp. 6-7) as subordinate terms (Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 17). Buyout Capital is 
understood as the provision of equity (Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 17) that should 
serve to finance acquisitions (Jesch & Kreuter, 2002, pp. 407-412), if necessary in 
combination with substantial debt capital (Jesch & Kreuter, 2002, pp. 407-412; 
Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 17). In addition, Private Equity companies have a focus on 
the capital structure if they want to make a Leveraged Buyout (Axelson, Jenkinson, 
Tim, Strömberg, & Weisbach, 2013, p. 2223). In this context, as a reminder, it is to 
be differentiated between Management Buyout (MBO), Management Buy-in – MBI 
– (Jesch, 2004, p. 91), and Leveraged Buyout – LBO – (Jesch, 2004, p. 93; Tcherveni-
achki, 2007, p. 17). While a MBO (Lujen, 1992, pp. 106-109) is always present when 
the company acquisition is being conducted by the existing company management 
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(Herzog, 2014, p. 20), MBI requires the participation of an external management in 
the acquisition (Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 17; Lujen, 1992, pp. 106-109; Herzog, 2014, 
p. 20).  LBO means that the company in question is overtaken by an external group 
of investors (Tasma, 2012, pp. 11-14), which in turn commissions the existing man-
agement or an external management team with the company management (Tcher-
venichki, 2007, p. 17; Tasma, 2012, pp. 11-14). In a leveraged Buyout, the target is 
acquired by a specialized investment firm using little equity (Tcherveniachki, 2007, 
p. 17) and more outside debt financing (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009, p. 121).  
Long ago, Mezzanine Capital had been included under the general term of 
Private Equity (Weißflog, 2015, p. 83), which is a hybrid form of financing, as stated 
above, which ranges between equity and debt capital (Weißflog, 2014, p. 83; Tcher-
veniachki, 2007, p. 17). Subordinate loans or convertible and option bonds (Guserl 
& Pernsteiner, 2004, p. 829) are to be mentioned (Dürr, 2007, p. 52) in this context 
as well (Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 18; Guserl & Pernsteiner, 2004, p. 829; Dürr, 2007, 
p. 52). Usually, Venture Capital financing is being complemented (Lühn, 2013, p. 
34) by Mezzanine Capital (Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 18; Lühn, 2013, p. 34). The same 
applies for Buyout financing (Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 18; Lühn, 2013, p. 34).  
The following empirical study is to be drawn up to determine the interests of 
private equity companies. It is also intended to establish the extent to which the 
Ventura Capital activities of the investment companies under investigation are sig-
nificant. At the beginning of the work, it was assumed that improved tax conditions 
also entail an increased commitment of the participating companies. 
2.1.2.5 Forms of Participation – Empirical Analysis 
Preliminary Remarks 
At the beginning of their activities, Private Equity companies have a conception 
about which type of participation (Eilenberger & Haghani, 2008, p. 28) they want 
to incur (see 2.1.2.5). A number of investment types are available for this purpose 
(Matz, 2002, p. 41). Although there are hybrid forms of participation, the industry 
essentially relies on the standard forms of participation. Initially considering the 
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willingness of portfolio companies to publicize their participation or not, a distinc-
tion is made between a direct open participation (Zepezauer, 2012, p. 163) and a 
silent partnership (Prätsch, Ludwig, & Schikorra, 2007, p. 208). In an open, specifi-
cally direct participation (figure 20), the affiliates acquire shares in a target com-
pany, in which they are to be co-shareholder for a limited time (Kienbaum & 
Börner, 2003, p. 364). The silent partnerships (Reichling, Beinert, & Henne, 2005, p. 
254 et seqq) do not legally represent equity, however, are regarded as economic 
equity (Kollmann, 2005, p. 307) and thus have a positive impact, for example, on 
the credit rating of the target company (BVK, 2015). In this form of participation, 
the shareholders will post a deposit in the assets of the company without acquiring 
shares of the company (Wöhe G. , Bilstein, Ernst, & Häcker, 2013, p. 77).  
Figure 20: Forms of Participations in Regards to Readiness to open 
 Source: Own representation based on Zepezauer, 2012, p. 163 and BVK, 2015. 
Because of the definition of maturity and interest rate and other performance-based 
compensation, however, the silent (figure 20) participation (Sunderdieck, 2015, p. 
65) is not dissimilar (Löffelholz, 1993, p. 12) to a traditional loan (BVK, 2015; Löf-
felholz, 1993, p. 12; Sunderdieck, 2015, p. 65). After the stipulated time, the target 
company will return the silent participation including accrued interest (BVK, 2015; 
Niederöcker, 2002, 239). As the name already implies, this participation (Paul, 2015, 
223) remains mostly anonymous (Pleschak, 2001, p. 98). The shareholders will not 
be entered in the commercial register (Pleschak, 2001, p. 98) and usually do not 
represent the company externally (Schneider & Fritz, 2013, p. 135).  
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Depending on how the protagonists – that is, the holding company and the 
target company – have agreed upon, a further division (Gietl, 2009, p. 18) into ma-
jority interest and minority interest (Honold, 2012, p. 1) is being applied (Göppert 
& Müller, 2014, pp. 189-207).  Simplified, a majority interest is on hand, if the own-
ership exceeds 50%, while a minority interest is on hand (Lucks & Meckl, 2015, p. 
31), if the ownership is below 50% (Zentes & Swoboda, 2003, p. 532). The percent-
age of shares held triggers legal consequences, especially in terms of profit sharing 
and voting rights, as also in any other company (Kisslinger-Popp, 2014, p. 206). 
Blocking minorities can block decisions (Burger, Ulbrich, & Ahlemeyer, 2010, pp. 
14-15) as well as some decisions require qualified majorities – that is, a participation 
quota of more than 75% (Ampenberger, 2010, p. 201). At this point allow for the 
participation arrangements not to be discussed at further length. Other forms of 
participation are participation certificates (Guserl & Pernsteiner, 2015, p. 404) and 
subordinated loans (Hoppe, 2005, p. 51), which are either part of the atypical silent 
partnership (participation certificates) or the typical silent partnership (subordi-
nated loans), but are in either case attributable (BVK, 2013) to the Mezzanine Cap-
ital (BVK, 2013; Guserl & Pernsteiner, 2015, p. 404; Hoppe, 2005, p. 51). One speci-
ficity of participations is being scarcely or not at all discussed (equitrust, 2015) and 
thus rarely is being approached throughout pertinent literature – revenue sharing. 
This means that the participating company does not participate, as in all other as-
sumptions, from the sale of the company or the sale of the shares, but permanently 
from future profits.  
Analysis Design 
Before the start of their commitment, it is of considerable importance for the Private 
Equity companies and their funds in which sector they would like to invest, 
whereas sector describes how and when they wish to participate in a target com-
pany. Hence, for this study it has been empirically examined, whether or not the 
type of participation (Grethe, 2010, p. 69) will also simultaneously trigger a partic-
ular financing purpose. The financing purposes from the view of the target com-
pany (Brettel, Kauffmann, & Kühn, 2008, p. 32) have already been discussed in the 
previous chapter. However, and slightly differing therefrom, the analysis is based 
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on the chronological employment by the Private Equity companies (Lühr, 2010, p. 
191). 
  
The hypothesis, that Private Equity companies favoring a particular type of participation 
also prefer to invest at a particular time, respectively choose a particular financing purpose, 
constitutes the superior hypothesis.  
 
Further hypotheses were proposed during the course of the study and are prepend-
ing the respective results. The selection of subject matter of these studies (Sellien & 
Sellien, 1980, p. 1362) first requires an objective, spatial and temporal delimitation 
of the population (Müller W. , 2005, pp. 1-122). Population describes the amount of 
analysis units considered, about which a statement is to be made (Bankofer & 
Vogel, 2008, p. 5). An analysis unit, in this context, denotes a subject, on which the 
measurements are to be taken (Bol, 2004, pp. 9-15). Initially, more than 300 records 
of as many Private Equity companies within Europe were examined. Changes in 
statements of the Private Equity companies made after June 30, 2016 have not been 
taken into account. In material terms, all companies listed in relevant member di-
rectories, such as those of the EVCA, respectively Invest Europe (Europe, 2016) or 
the BVK (BVK, 2016), have been examined. The first pre-selection reduced the vol-
ume of data records to little more than the above-mentioned 300. Out of these data 
records, 163 in turn proved to be valid and ultimately served for the analysis.  
In addition to the company names, which of course remain unpublished herein, the 
following have been recorded: 
 
 Type of investment. 
 Equity investments. 
 Managed capital. 
 Transaction volume. 
 Number of employees. 
 Investors. 
 Legal form. 
 Turnover of the portfolio companies. 
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 Financing purposes. 
 Industries. 
 
Since only the interrelation between type of investment and financing purpose was 
to be examined, the remaining data were not subject to detailed analysis. However, 
subsequent to this study, they could certainly be helpful. Thus, further studies 
could possibly provide indications to the target company regarding the orientation 
and previous success of the Private Equity companies.  
Regarding the types of participation, the following details of the Private Equity 
companies have been examined: 
 
 Silent partnership. 
 Direct open participation. 
 Minority holding. 
 Majority holding. 
 Loans. 
 Participation certificate / Mezzanine. 
 
On part of the financing purposes, the following has been examined:  
 
 Seed stage. 
 Start-up Phase. 
 Expansion phase. 
 Bridge financing. 
 Secondary Purchase (Daniels, 2004, p. 50; Manchot, 2010, p.2). 
 Public to Private. 
 Small Buyout. 
 Mid-Buyout. 
 Large Buyout. 
 Turnaround. 
 
The statistical data analysis and the presentation of the research results is done with 
Statistic R and Microsoft® Excel PowerPivot/View. First, the absolute frequency of 
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participation types and financing purposes is presented. To determine the correla-
tion between different types of investment and financing purposes, the chi-square 
test is being applied (Papula, 2016, p. 607). In mathematical statistics, the chi-square 
test denotes a group of hypotheses tests with X²-distributed test statistics 
(Bleymüller, 2014, p. 127). In this case, X² (Henze, 2004, p. 247) describes the meas-
ure value originated from Karl Pearson (Porter, 2010) and is being determined in 
the calculation of one-dimensional frequency distribution (Hafner, 1992, p. 9 et 
seqq.) as follows:  
Figure 21: Calculation of X² in One-Dimensional Frequency Distribution 
X2 =  ∑
(𝑜𝑗−𝑒𝑗)²
𝑒𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 . 
Source: Own representation based on Hatzinger, Hornik & Nagel, 2011, p. 162. 
It is being defined for (Hatzinger, Hornik, & Nagel, 2011, p. 162): 
 
 oj  = observed frequency for category j (o = observed), 
 ej  = expected frequency for category j (e = expected), 
 J = overall quantity of categories. 
 
The X² value provides us with information about the size of deviations between 
expected and observed frequencies (Hatzinger, Hornik, & Nagel, 2011, pp. 147-
192). Based on the formula in figure 21 it can be observed that the size of deviations 
between expected and observed frequency increases (Hatzinger, Hornik, & Nagel, 
2011, pp. 147-192). This value shall provide information about whether or not the 
deviations are significant (Hatzinger, Hornik, & Nagel, 2011, pp. 147-192).  
2.1.2.5.1 Analysis and Assessment 
The 163 Private Equity companies have been investigated regarding the type of 
investment and the financing purposes. First off, it was determined how frequently 
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the individual types of investment do occur. The Private Equity companies could 
make multiple entries.  
The following perception, often cited by politicians (Peters, 2008) and other critics 
(Heilmann, 2015) throughout the media, serves as a hypothesis: 
 
The majority holding – up to a takeover – is the most common type of investment.  
 
Already in the first analysis it is clear that contrary to public opinion which states 
that Private Equity firms are primarily acquiring companies in order to profitably 
sell them again, obviously minority interest is the most common form of participa-
tion.  
Even if direct (Reichling, Beinert, & Henne, 2005, p. 20) open (Investoren-
Beteiligung, 2016) participation (Lessat, et al., 1999, p. 95) has been named more 
commonly, the silent partnership is still clearly not underrepresented.  
According to this assessment, minority interests (Kauffmann, 2009, p. 37) still 
clearly take the lead over majority interests (Sacher, 2013, p. 10), which derive a 
value about a high as that of the subordinated loan (Haunerdinger & Probst, 2006, 
p. 92) with Mezzanine Capital (Dürr, 2007, p. 24). In terms of percentage this result 
displays a share of minority interest of approximately 44% while the majority in-
terest reaches roughly 29%. However, with around 13% each, the remaining invest-
ment opportunities are not irrelevant either. Participation certificates and subordi-
nated loans, as explained above, pertain to Silent Partnerships. This percentage 
evaluation for majority and minority interests only displays a tendency.  Important 
in this figure is that it is evident that the subordinated loans and participation cer-
tificates as Silent Partnerships are equally often applied. Figure 22 shows the fre-
quency distribution by type of participation, ie the type of participating most fre-
quently occuring.  
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Figure 22: Frequency Distribution according to Types of Participation in % 
 
Source: Own representation. 
On the other side, the data to be examined is the financing purposes. The assump-
tion in the form of a hypothesis regarding the financing purposes shall be: 
 
The most common type of participation on the side of the Private Equity companies takes 
place in the context of a Large Buyout (Fraser-Sampson, 2010, p. 61) - quasi corresponding 
to the assumption that all Private Equity companies are buying enterprises. 
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Figure 23: Frequency Distribution according to Financing Purposes 
 
Source: Own representation. 
 
Considering the analysis in such a detailed manner as shown in figure 23, the in-
vestment occurs very frequently during the expansion stage of a target company 
(Jesch, 2013, p. 97). According to the Private Equity companies, investments in tar-
get companies during the Start-up Phase (Weißflog, 2015, p. 83) come in second 
place. Thus, according to the above definition, a strong Venture Capital exposure 
may be assumed. The next examination is based on the assumption that all Buyouts 
total the largest share of responses regarding the financing purposes. Thus, the hy-
pothesis is: 
 
Private Equity companies invest from the outset on in target companies with the intention 
of a Buyout.  
 
Taken the analysis in figure 24 any further assumption is not yet recognizable. This 
assumption, whether Private Equity companies select a preferred financing pur-
pose next to a specific type of investment, is examined with the chi-square test. 
While at first it seemed as though the participation in expansions would be very 
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distinct, the hypothesis that Private Equity companies preferably invest in target 
companies with the intent for a Buyout may be presumed appropriate.  
Figure 24: Frequency Distribution with all Buyout Specificities in % 
 
Source: Own representation. 
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The representation of individual figures relevant to the majority and minority in-
terest is shown in Figure 25. 
Figure 25: Minority Interest or Majority Interest 
 
Source: Own representation. 
Post-Deliberation 
During the investigation of participation types, the majority and minority interests 
were not extracted from the loans, participation certificates and Mezzanine Capital 
but analyzed according to the number of entries. Now considering the investments 
exclusively by their majority or minority character, in terms of the chi-square test 
it is already noticeable that there is no apparent connection yet between the major-
ity interest and the Buyouts, at least by frequency.  
2.1.2.5.2 Chi-Square Test 
The following hypothesis has been the initial point of the considerations: 
 
The investments made by Private Equity companies having a majority interest character, 
lead to a Buyout investment.  
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This test is based upon the above-mentioned data and is referred to as test x1. First, 
an active data matrix in terms of descriptive statistics was created, which only rep-
resents a summary statistic. The variables mean: 
 
 MiHB  = Minority Interest. 
 MeHB  = Majority Interest. 
 DOB  = Direct Open Participation. 
 D  = Loan. 
 G.M  = Participation Certificates / Mezzanine. 
 SB  = Silent Partnership. 
 Br.  = Bridge financing. 
 Seed  = Seed. 
 SUP  = Start Up. 
 Expans.  = Expansion. 
 Second.  = Secondary. 
 PP  = Public to Private. 
 SM  = Small Buyout. 
 MB  = Mid Buyout. 
 LB  = Large Buyout. 
 TA  = Turnaround. 
 
In order to show a recognizable significance, Statistic R uses the function of a cross 
tabulation, which looks as follows for this test: 
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and determines the test data: 
 
 
 
 
 
In this case, the null hypothesis H0 (Holling & Gediga, 2016, p. 23) is: The small 
Buyouts (Cendrowski, Petro, Martin, & Wadecki, 2012, p. 45) cannot be signifi-
cantly linked to the majority interest. It is generally said, that if the p-value is large, 
the null hypothesis is retained, and if the p-value is small the null hypothesis is 
rejected.  
Three figures are found in the output. The first, the x-squared (Wollschläger, 2016, 
p. 177), indicates the value 26.9942. This is Pearson X², thus the difference between 
the expected and observed frequencies. The second value, df, is the degree of free-
dom (Pesch, 2003, p. 120) and shows the number of categories minus 1 (Hatzinger, 
Hornik, & Nagel, 2011, p. 162). The third figure, the p-value (Browner, 2006, p. 63) 
is the most important here.  
As comparison value for this test, 0.05 is specified. The significance level 
(Hatzinger, Hornik, & Nagel, 2011, p. 161) is thus 0.05 and means 5% probability 
that small Buyouts are not significantly often linked with majority interests.  
Interpretation 
The null hypothesis that small Buyouts do not significantly often correlate with 
majority interests had to be discarded due to a chi-square test (X² = 26,9942, p < 
0,05). The data rather indicates that there is an interrelation between the participa-
tion type of majority interest and a small Buyout.  
It has already been established in the previous analysis - frequency distribution -
that in the accumulation of the different Buyout forms, the Buyout is the most com-
mon financing purpose, so that it is already clear that there is a correlation between 
. 
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Buyouts and the form of participation – the majority interest. The reason behind 
this assumption is that the cumulative counting leads to the p-value getting even 
smaller.  
To support this observation, the evaluations of the other two Buyout forms, Mid-
Buyout and Large Buyout, are to be analyzed and reported at this point.  
Mid—Buyout of majority interest: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Large Buyout of majority interest: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both p-values are extremely small, so it is very plausible that the entire Buyouts are 
in distinct correlation with the commitment of Private Equity companies in major-
ity interests.  
. 
. 
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Counter-Analysis 
If the majority interests correlate with the Buyouts, the assumption is at hand that 
minority interests rather cannot be associated with Buyouts. This can be assumed 
with certainty. Therefore, the possible correlations of minority interest and the fi-
nancing purposes exclusive of Buyouts were examined. However, only three fi-
nancing purposes with a high probability of correlation with minority interests 
shall be displayed.  
One assumption (hypothesis) is that: 
 
Minority interests are often in correlation with an early stage of financing of a Private 
Equity target company.  
 
The early stages of financing of a target company include the Startup phase, the 
Seed Phase and, as a transition phase, the Expansion phase.  
The null hypothesis H0 for a correlation between the Expansion phase and minority 
interest is: 
 
Private Equity companies seeking a minority interest will not invest in target companies 
wishing to expand.  
 
Expansion phase to minority interest: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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The null hypothesis H0 for a correlation between the Seed Phase and minority in-
terest is:  
 
Private Equity companies seeking a minority interest will not invest in target companies 
being in the Seed Phase.  
 
Seed phase to minority interest: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The null hypothesis H0 for a correlation between the Startup phase and minority 
interest is: 
 
Private Equity companies seeking a minority interest will not invest in target companies in 
the Startup phase.  
 
 
. 
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Interpretation 
Importance for Entrepreneurs  
According to the analysis of these data, it seems as if a large part of the Private 
Equity companies actually intend to generate profits by buying companies or com-
pany shares and –  presuming good intentions of the Private Equity firms – resell-
ing them again after a certain time of the investment and management support. 
This business is being flanked by risky investments during the early stages of a 
company, which would explain the minority interest. Entrepreneurs are therefore 
well advised, should they have the option of choice, to take a careful and closer 
look at the investor. For the larger the participation of Buyout companies is, the 
larger the risk to suffer a similar fate as the Grohe AG (Regner, 2008, p. 71) in re 
gards to a leveraged Buyout. 
At the end of this study, the theoretical impact of changes in the tax environment 
will be re-examined with regard to the willingness to invest in venture capital and 
thus in entrepreneurs with regard to the above data. Here, too, the hypothesis is 
that, if the number of participating companies with the number x is involved in the 
current conditions with the volume y in the early stages of a target company, these 
investment companies will increase their number and scope in an improved frame-
work for venture capital. 
Another figure is important for entrepreneurs - but also for affiliates. In total, 
2.435.214.550,00 euros were collected by the Member States examined in 2015. This 
money is preferably acquired by investment companies. That makes a per capita 
fundraising of 87,35 euros. For entrepreneurs, it is important that a larger share is 
invested in the direction of venture capital. At the moment, the share is slightly too 
low with a little over 22,00 euros (see chapter 4.1). The aim of this study is to extract 
better tax conditions. The associated hypothesis is if there are optimized tax condi-
tions for venture capital, the interest of venture capital companies also increases. 
This would lead to more venture capital companies. 
. 
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2.1.2.6 Digression: Private Equity as Asset Category  
It is debatable whether and to what extent Private Equity constitutes an asset 
category of its own (Fleischhauer, 2008, pp. 1-6). At least it is widely agreed that 
Private Equity is to be classified as an alternative investment (Metrick & Yasuda, 
2011, pp. 619-654) alongside Hedge funds (Kaiser D.G., 2004, p. 117) and deriva-
tives. In this context, Hedge funds are to be understood as unregulated or hardly 
regulated investment funds, which are actively managed (Gülener, 2012, p. 5). Ac-
cording to its naming and the originally associated hedging, it is now hardly being 
communicated with such a vehicle (Kremer, 2014). In most cases, Hedge funds 
(Wellas, 2011, p. 238) are characterized by a particularly risky investment (Ruchay, 
2014, p. 9) strategy (Ruchay, 2014, p. 9; Wellas, 2011, p. 238). The aforementioned 
collapse (Diaz-Bone & Krell, 2015, p. 299) of Lehman Brothers (Capek, 2010, p. 93) 
is attributed in no small measure to these funds, which is why they were, for in-
stance in Germany until 2003 (Kamp & Krieger, 2005, p. 71), temporarily banned 
(Capek, 2010, p. 93; Diaz-Bone & Krell, 2015, p. 299; Kamp & Krieger, 2005, p. 71). 
Derivatives, however, are financial products whose price and development depend 
on the price of another financial product (Payami, 2013, p. 13), such as possibly a 
share (Bösch, 2014, pp. 2-5). It is, in a broader sense, a financial asset speculating on 
whether the price of a product increases or decreases in the future (Hull, 2009, p. 
24). Lumping Private Equity together with these investment instruments would be 
almost unfair, if only for its initial positive overall orientation – supporting compa-
nies by providing equity.  
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Figure 26: Trend of EURO-STOXX and DAX from 1998 to June 2016 
 
Source: Own representation. Data from boerse.de, 2016. 
Private Equity transactions showed a positive average performance during the fi-
nancial crisis in 2008 and thus outperformed the stock investments. This excess re-
turn is documented by a study of Golding Capital Partners and Oliver Gottschalg 
(HEC Paris), which was published on May 27, 2014 (Gottschalg & Golding Capital 
Partners, 2014). The study wanted to prove that Private Equity investments can 
achieve more Alpha than a comparable investment in equities. In order to apply a 
better classification, figure 26 displays the development of the Euro-STOXX. The 
German stock market index (DAX) is used as a reference (boerse.de, 2016). In each 
case, the final rate information of the last trading day of a year, respectively in 2016, 
the rates of the last observation in June (boerse.de, 2016), were taken into account.  
In this study (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014), about 5.600 Private 
Equity transactions between the years 1977 through 2014 were examined, whereas 
one of the questions to be answered was whether the Alpha of Private Equity trans-
actions (Buchner, 2014, pp. 1-58) is above comparable yields on the stock market 
and thus, whether this is repeatable. The study (Gottschalg & Golding Capital 
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Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5) provides a comparison of the two asset classes of Private 
Equity and shares.  For this purpose, a similar investment in shares is derived for 
each Private Equity transaction, which takes the following factors into account:  
 
1. Timing effect. 
2. Industry effect. 
3. Leverage effect. 
 
In this context, the timing effect describes the respective points in time of in- and 
outflows (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, p. 1), the industry effect the 
influence of the movement of the industry in which the company operates 
(Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, p. 1), and the leverage effect 
(Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, p. 1) – q.v. chapter 2.1.2.3 under Risks 
by Leverage at a Private Equity transaction – the level of indebtedness of the Private 
Equity investments compared to listed companies (Gresser, 2005, pp. 5-6). For this 
study (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5), the return rate of Pri-
vate Equity transactions is being adapted by using the M-IRR (Modified Internal 
Rate of Return), whereas the M-IRR (Lin, 1976, pp. 237-248) represents a method to 
marshal alternative assets of equal volume (Askar & zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2008). 
The target is to map a realistic reinvestment (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Part-
ners, 2014, p. 1). Basically, the Alpha refers to that part of the return which exceeds 
the calculated or assumed rate of return (faz.net, 2016). The share of the adjusted 
Private Equity returns which cannot be achieved by a similar investment on the 
stock market is the Alpha of Private Equity (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 
pp. 1-5). The question of the Alpha in respect to the financial crisis could be more 
nuanced (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, pp. 1-5):  
 
Will the results for the long-term Alpha, the Alpha over the cycle and the Alpha during the 
crisis remain stable? 
 
For the analysis of persistence, that means a repetition of excess return (Kunze K.-
K. , 2009, pp. 14-15), the following methods were used, see Golding Capital Part-
ners, 2014:  
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- the correlation of the examined variables of the previous period to the same 
variables of the subsequent period and  
- the contribution to the portfolio return by the specific selection of fund man-
agers whose performance is within a certain quartile7 (in the case of the pre-
sent study this performance ranks in the top quartile), with the subsequent 
calculation of the effect of these selections relative to an investment in the 
overall market (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5).  
 
The result of this analysis brings to light that Private Equity transactions average a 
positive Alpha of 8.6% over the comparable (see figure 27) yield on the stock mar-
ket (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5). The Alpha above the 
capital market cycle is shown in figure 28. 
The return analysis shows that the transactions active at the height of the financial 
crisis could achieve an Alpha of 3.3% (see figure 29) over comparable returns on 
the stock market (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5). The abso-
lute return for these very difficult transactions moves below the long-term average, 
however, remains positive at 5.3% (M-IRR), while the comparable stock return 
ranges in the negative (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5).  
                                                     
7 Share quartile means the underlying distribution in four quarters. So a particular quartile is the 
boundary between two neighboring quarters of the distribution (Lohninger, 2016).  
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Figure 27: Long-term Alpha of Private Equity Investments 
 
Source: Own representation based on Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5. 
Figure 28: Alpha above the Capital Market Cycle 
 
Source: Own representation based on Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5. 
4,30%
12,90%
0,00% 2,00% 4,00% 6,00% 8,00% 10,00% 12,00% 14,00%
Comparable yield on stock
Alpha
M-IRR
Long-term Alpha
5%
5%
11%
19%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18% 20%
Boom-cycle
Moderate growth
Solid environment
Downturn
Boom-cycleModerate growthSolid environmentDownturn
Datenreihen1 5%5%11%19%
Alpha above the Capital Market Cycle
8,6% 
RALF MAUER Page | 82 
 
 
Figure 29: Alpha of Transactions Active during the Crisis 
 
Source: Own representation based on Golding Capital Partners. 
Thus, the study (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5) proves that 
Private Equity holds an overall positive Alpha over the entire cycle and the coun-
ter-cyclical development and stability of this Alpha is given in a year of crisis as in 
2008 (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5). Consequentially, it can 
be derived that the success of Private Equity transaction – see also Saenger & 
Schewe (Saenger & Schewe, 2012, p. 302) - is repeatable (Gottschalg & Golding Cap-
ital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5). These characteristics are highly relevant for institu-
tional investors for inclusion in their portfolio (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Part-
ners, 2014, pp. 1-5). So far, Private Equity investors have mostly made their invest-
ment decisions based on past performance (Maurenbrecher, 2008, p. 224; 
Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5). This study provides strong 
evidence that a persistence in the performance of Private Equity funds actually ex-
ists (Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partners, 2014, pp. 1-5). Hence, a connection be-
tween the existing track records – thus, the previous results of investments (Müller 
F., 2010, p. 127) – and the expectations in future funds can be established 
(Gottschalg & Golding Capital Partner, 2014, pp. 1-5). 
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2.1.3 Phases Prior to a Private Equity Investment 
2.1.3.1 Preliminary Remarks 
After consideration and in-depth explanation of the participants in a Private Eq-
uity transaction in Chapter 1.1.2., (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 
83; Sauermann, 2010, p. 4), the steps of such a transaction are highlighted below. Dif-
ferent views of the discussion about how to approach such a venture will not prevent 
the process in itself from looking basically the same. 
While Becker et al (Becker, Schulte-Krumpen, & Graneß, 2011, p. 34) are re-
garding five phases as sufficient, Brettel et al (Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn, & Sob-
czak, 2008, p. 18) divides it into into six. Weber and Hohaus (Weber & Hohaus, 
2010, p. 62) summarizes it further in providing a division in three steps. An ex-
panded chronological subdivision in two investments phases could look as dis-
played in figures 30 and 31.   
Figure 30: Pre-Investment Phase of a Private Equity Transaction 
 
Source: Own representation based on Staroßom, 2013, p. 171. 
Whereas DD refers to Due Diligence, the financing is also essentially subsumed in 
the structuring.  
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Figure 31: Post-Investment Phase of a Private Equity Transaction 
 
Source: Own representation based on Bayaz, 2013, p. 74 et seqq. 
This model represents a Buyout (Zipser, 2008, p. 11) and displays the approach for 
a Leverage Buyout (Becker A. , 2009, p. 14). For the different financing needs, this 
financing model is adjusted accordingly. A consideration of how to proceed with 
the target company in the future regarding the restructuring, does not belong to 
this model.  The – in connection with the locust debate publicly debated – Buy it, 
Strip it, Flip it (Essvale, 2010, p. 73) – scenario, whereby the investors blatantly con-
vert the acquired companies (Henry & Thornton, 2006, pp. 1-5) by means of down-
sizing or the abolition of entire corporate departments, can be part of these restruc-
turing procedures (Geisler, 2012, p. 32). However, more and more voices are being 
heard preferring a sustainability (Müller F. , 2009, p. 120) in context with the strat-
egy. This strategy is consistently dedicated to growth through acquisitions by ei-
ther the Private Equity Company (Schütte, 2013, pp. 12-14) or the target company 
(Herzog, 2014, p. 22; Tasma, 2012, p. 11 et seqq.). 
2.1.3.2 Business Valuation 
Prior to the detailed consideration of the stages of the process of a Private 
Equity transaction (Hehn, 2011, p. 50), it should be noted at this point that the Due 
Diligence (Niederdrenk & Müller, 2012, p. 28) shown in figure 30 could be preceded 
by another stage, if applicable – the business valuation (Bysikiewicz, 2008, p. 1). 
The business valuation (Tinz, 2010, p. 17 et seqq.) will disarrange the process actu-
ally shown in the above graph, since it can take place at different times, depending 
on priority, which is why it is preceded by reasons of neutrality and importance. 
The price expectations of buyer and seller (Wolter, 2011, p. 20) are relevant in de-
termining (Kranebitter, 2007, p. 75) whether there will be a business transaction 
(Bayaz, 2013, p. 60; Kranebitter, 2007, p. 75; Wolter, 2011, p. 20). Experience has 
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shown, that those expectations usually differ (Bayaz, 2013, p. 60; Kranebitter, 2007, 
p. 75, Wolter, 2011, p. 20). The amount of the purchase prices is often the reason for 
differences (Odenell, 2013, p. 1) between the former owner and the buyer (Faller, 
2005, p. 35). The absolutely correct and objective business value will hardly ever be 
given (Hohenlohe, 2006, p. 91; Odenell, 2013, p. 1)). In general, the purchase prices 
are a result of long, often tough negotiations between seller and buyer (Bysikiewicz, 
2008, p. 255; Odenell, 2013, p. 1)). Various methods are available for determining 
the enterprise value. Essentially known (Lorenz, 2009, p. 17) are the following 
methods (Voigt, Voigt, Voigt, & Voigt, 2005, pp. 19-21):   
 
- Net Asset Value method 
- Capitalized Earnings method 
- Multiples method 
- Discounted Cash Flow method 
 
The net asset value method (Hutzschenreuter T. , 2009, p. 369) is again divided into 
a traditional asset value method (Heinrichs, 2008, p. 56) and the liquidation process 
(Kreyer, 2009, p. 21). With the former method, the sum of the company’s existing 
assets minus liabilities are determined (Heinrichs, 2008, p. 56; Hutzschenreuter, 
2009, p. 369, Odenell, 2013, p. 2)). The company’s value is calculated according 
(Odenell, 2013, p. 2) to what a buyer would have to spend for the reproduction of 
the existing company (Sygusch, 2008, pp. 44-45). The liquidation process (Odenell, 
2013, p. 2) involves the asset stripping (Heinrichs, 2008, p. 3) of a company (Henke, 
2009, p. 79). The assets are being valued (Rose, 1990, p. 221) at selling price (Oden-
ell, 2013, p. 2; Rose, 1990, p. 221). All arising costs are being deducted from the sales 
proceeds (Odenell, 2013, p. 2). This result represents (Brenner & Misu, 2015, p. 300) 
the absolute minimum value (Brenner & Misu, 2015, p. 300; Odenell, 2013, p. 2). 
With the capitalized earnings method (Reichmann, 2011, p. 244), the enterprise 
value is determined based (Schmidt A. , 2010, p. 185) on future surplus revenue 
(Odenell, 2013, p. 4; Reichmann, 2011, p. 244; Schmidt A., 2010, p. 185). In practice, 
there are different variants (Sommer, 2012, p. 163) of the multiples method (Oden-
ell, 2013, p. 6; Sommer, 2012, p. 163). One variant (Schacht & Fackler, 2009, pp. 21-
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22) is set on the operating income (Schwab, 2008, p. 117) – that is, the profit before 
tax (Goldammer, 2012, p. 25) – whereas imputed costs, in particular the imputed 
owner’s salary (Peto, 2014, pp. 63-65), need to be taken into account (Goldammer, 
2012, p. 25, Odenell, 2013, p. 6; Schacht & Fackler, 2009, pp. 21-22). Another multi-
plier, however (Odenell, 2013, p. 6), is set on the total revenue (Schacht & Fackler, 
2009, pp. 21-22). The most commonly used method (Winter, 2009, p. 62) for deter-
mining the enterprise value is the discounted cash flow method (Dierkes & Schäfer, 
2015, pp. 19-25). For the calculation (Pfeiffer, 2014, pp. 22-30), cash flows in the fu-
ture are being discounted to the present day.  
𝑉0 =  
𝐼1
(1 + 𝑌)
+
𝐼2
(1 + 𝑌)²
+ ⋯ +  
𝐼𝑛 + 𝑉𝑛 
(1 + 𝑌)𝑛 
 . 
V0 is the property value sought; n is the forecast period; I1, I2 are the cash flows; In 
is the cash flow for the last year of the projection period; Y is the rate of return on 
capital; and Vn means the cash flow arising from the resale of the property at the 
end of the forecast distance (Gribovsky, 2014, S. 61). In order to determine a fair 
value for the transaction, the balance sheets are being consulted as well, which in 
the context of business valuation is infrequently (Brückmann & Patzig, 2015, pp. 1-
30) observed in literature, yet must not be underestimated. Through performance 
indicators and balance sheet analysis relatively reliable scenarios can certainly be 
developed. These figures are also necessary for the deal itself. Thus, a distinction is 
made between two types of deals. In an asset deal (Diller, 2014, p. 215), the investor 
buys all of the assets of a company such as machinery, vehicles, licenses but also 
the liabilities. Usually, however, the sale price exceeds the sum of the individual 
assets, because goodwill is added, which the buyer is willing to pay beyond the 
tangible and intangible assets.  In a share deal, the company’s shares are acquired, 
which are granting the purchaser certain rights such as the voting right or profit 
participation rights (Scholz, 2008, p. 93). 
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Figure 32: Characteristics of DCF Methods 
 
 
*WACC: Weighted Average Cost of Capital. 
Source: Own model based on Dierkes & Schäfer, 2014, pp. 19-25. 
For the evaluation, it is essential that the payment claims are in the future and thus 
uncertain. Due to the unique capital market dominance in terms of future cash re-
quirements – cash flow, the overall assessment process, such as the above exempli-
fied DCF method (figure 32), has prevailed over the individual evaluation proce-
dure (Everling & Jahn, 2009, p. 250).  
2.1.3.3 Fundraising 
Basically, fundraising is the acquisition of means (Schiemenz, 2015, p. 2) - the 
systematic analysis, planning, implementation and control of all activities - aimed 
at obtaining all resources necessary for the project (Erwin, 2013, p. 25) as economi-
cally as possible, whereas both monetary and contributions in kind as well as the 
provision of services (Urselmann, 2014, p. 1) can be exploited (Erwin, 2013, p. 25; 
Schiemenz, 2015, p. 2 et seqq.; Urselmann, 2014, p. 1 et seqq.). The raising of capital 
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from investors is the basis for any investment activity of Private Equity funds. Ac-
cording to Brettel (2008, p. 23 et seqq.) such a collection of money until the closing 
of the fund generally lasts for more than fourteen months (Bayaz, 2013, p. 58; Bret-
tel, 2008, p. 23 et seqq.). Investors (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2008, 
p. 77) in this context - see 2.1.3.2 - are mainly banks, pension funds, government 
institutions, insurance companies, but also, to a lesser degree, very wealthy indi-
viduals (Bayaz, 2013, p. 46-47; Thum, Timmreck, & Keul, 2008, p. 16). Especially 
independent Private Equity firms (Lerch, 2011, p. 7) which operate within the pa-
rameters of Buyouts (Farschtschian, 2010, p. 26) and which can rely neither on an 
industrial corporation nor a bank for safety reasons, are dependent on funds from 
external investors (Bayaz, 2013, p. 58; Grethe, 2012, p. 68)). To collect the equity 
(Bayaz, 2013, p. 58), the companies draw on placement agents which are considered 
experts for capital market communications (Bayaz, 2013, p. 58), to support and as-
sist them (Bagley & Dauchey, 2012, p. 151) in the marketing of fund shares (Bagley 
& Dauchey, 2012, p. 151; Bayaz, 2013, p. 58). Initially, a paper is being drawn up 
(Achleitner, Schraml, & Tappeiner, 2011, p. 42), which regulates personal, legal, fis-
cal and financial aspects (Achleitner, Schraml, & Tappeiner, 2011, p. 42; Bayaz, 
2013, p. 58; Grethe, 2010, p. 96). These issues include the formation of an investment 
team and associated advisory board, a possible administration fee, management 
fee (Bayaz, 2013, p. 58) and the carried interest (Pinilis, 2013, p. 23), meaning the 
amount of profit sharing for the fund company at the expense (Lawton, 2008, pp. 
846-867) of the investors (Bayaz, 2013, p. 58; Lawton, 2008, pp. 846-867; Pinilis, 2013, 
p. 23). Especially for investors, it is important to know how successful an invest-
ment is (gruenderszene.de, 2015) or might be (Bayaz, 2013, p. 58). This information 
is also included in the paper. To do so, a so-called track record (Hochberg, 
Ljungquist, & Lu, 2007, p. 293) is being used representing an individual reference 
list of executed investments (Bayaz, 2013, ß. 58; Kauffmann et al, 2008, p. 22; Ljung-
jquist, & Lu, 2007, p. 293). Hence, it involves a record of previous investments by 
Private Equity companies (Bassi & Grant, 2006, p. 94). This track record reveals not 
only the successes of existing investments (Leleux, Swaay, & Megally, 2015, p. 220), 
the experience gained by the investor during these transactions are being listed 
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therein (Bassi & Grant, 2006, p. 94; Leleux, Swaay, & Megally, 2015, p. 220). De-
pending on the scope of this track record it can be identified whether the investor 
is new to the market or an industry expert.  In relation to fundraising within Private 
Equity transactions this means that this track record provides information about 
how previous funds were designed and how they performed (Kommer, 2012, p. 
29). With all these features and findings, Private Equity companies will try to attract 
investors for their funds (Heckmair, 2009, p. 23). Especially industry experience is 
crucial when collecting equity (Tausend, 2006, p. 155). Further ways for fundraising 
are offered by specially organized fundraising days or conferences within the in-
dustry market (Haibach, 2012, p. 96). 
2.1.3.4 Deal-Flow und Screening 
After the fundraising, the collected funds will be invested on the basis of the 
investment strategy in participations in appropriate companies. To ensure a high 
selectivity, a large number of potential participation projects (Baumgärtner, 2005, 
p. 144) is being identified (Kauffmann et al, 2008, p. 31). Such a participation occurs 
rather seldom, just because of this stringent selection (Portisch, 2016, p. 295). A 
large selection in the context of the deal flow (Weber, Bender, Eitelwein, & Nevries, 
2009, p. 51) supports the discovery of a hidden champion (Simon, 1996, pp. 1-8). 
The portfolio companies (Lohfert, 2003, p. 128) are identified through formal and 
informal networks, such as banks, accountants, tax and business advisers and other 
Private Equity funds, sometimes as well by the capital-seeking companies (Vater, 
2003, p. 104) themselves (Weber, Bender, Eitelwein, & Nevries, 2009, p. 51). Thus, 
the portfolio companies are determined by active market analysis in cooperation 
with third parties and capital-seeking companies, whereas a Private Equity trans-
action is most commonly initiated through network activity (Metzger, Achleitner, 
Reiner, & Tchouvakhina, 2010, pp. 28-31). Prior to addressing the potential portfo-
lio company with Due Diligence (Pomp, 2015, p. 2), an investor, respectively the 
Private Equity Company will conduct a screening for a first overview of the com-
pany (Kauffmann et al, 2008, p. 31).  
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Target of such a deal flow is always to reach a positive agreement between 
the potential portfolio company and the Private Equity firm (Bayaz, 2013, p. 59). 
Due to the participation of many third parties within the Private Equity industry, 
often a deal is being initiated that is potentially not profitable or too complicated 
(Bayaz, 2013, p. 59). Berens et al (Berens, Brauner, & Nevries, 2005, p. 115) are re-
ducing the probability of a deal to a ratio of one to ten, so that for one company in 
which is being invested, ten more are believed to be not suitable (Bayaz, 2013, p. 
59). Even and especially the most careful review of a potential investment object is 
the reason for the occurrence of such a disproportion. 
2.1.3.5 Due Diligence as Hedging Instrument 
Due Diligence (Remy, 2011, p. 23) – meaning a thorough examination – is 
applied in the context of a business purchase, but also in an extraordinary evalua-
tion, like the evaluation of a target object (Kapoor, 2010, pp. 6-7) in connection with 
Private Equity. In order to assure the quality of an investment, an investor exam-
ines all relevant aspects of this project (gruenderszene.de, 2015). Through system-
atic analysis (Sinkon & Putney, 2014, pp. 26-29) and assessment of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the target company (Schramm & Hansmeyer, 2011, p. 154), it is 
tried to induce an alleged security for this deal (Schramm & Hansmeyer, 2011, p. 
154; Sinkon & Putney, 2014, pp. 26-29; gruenderszene.de, 2015). Since primarily ex-
pert knowledge is needed in such an audit, preferably lawyers, accountants 
(Höhne, 2013, p. 17), industry experts or engineers are considered for this task 
(gruenderszene.de, 2015; Höhne, 2013. p. 17). The content of Due Diligence (Remy, 
2011, p. 33 et seqq.) can be classified into diverse processes (gruenderszene.de, 
2015; Remy, 2011, p. 33 et seqq.):  
Market-related Due Diligence 
Especially in a business purchase, the market of an investment is being examined 
(Velten, 2010, p. 108) in order to assure that there is a sufficiently large group of 
buyers and foremost, to define the competitors (gruenderszene.de, 2015; Velten, 
2010, p. 108).  
RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE EQUITY                                          Page  |  91  
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
 
 
Corporate Legal Due-Diligence 
This review serves to consider the legal (Gleich, Kierans, & Hasselbach, 2010, p. 22) 
structure (Rosenbloom, 2002, p. 6) of the target company (Scharfman, 2012, p. 209 
et seqq.). All contracts, increases in capital stock and other measures on the capital 
side, as well as the resolutions of the shareholders and, if applicable, the Supervi-
sory Board, are being examined (gruenderszene.de, 2015). Also the position of the 
shareholders is being analyzed under some circumstances (Gleich, Kierans, & Has-
selbach, 2010, p. 22; gruenderszene.de, 2015; Scharfmann, 2012, p. 209 et seqq.; Ros-
enbloom, 2002, p. 6).  
Financial Due Diligence 
This analysis investigates the financial situation (Scott C. , 2002, p. 61) of the target 
company (Pomp, 2015, p. 25 et seqq.; gruenderszene.de, 2015; Rosenbloom, 2002, 
p. 101 et seqq.). In this, the investor screens all contracts, conclusions, liabilities 
(Schultz & Cantwell, 2014, pp. 69-84) and receivables including the budget, in order 
to obtain a tangible view of the profitability and financial situation (Wirtz, 2003, p. 
189) of the enterprise (gruenderszene, 2015; Pomp, 2015, p. 25 et seqq.; Rosenbloom, 
2002, p. 101 et seqq.; Scott C., 2002, p. 61; Schultz & Cantwell, 2014, pp. 69-84; Wirtz, 
2003, p. 189).  
Technical Due Diligence 
To gain an overview of the technology (Sinewe, 2010, p. 44) and the products of the 
target company (Balz & Arlinghaus, 2007, p. 103), this assessment is primarily con-
ducted by specialists (Böttcher, 2012, p. 55) and experts (Balz & Arlinghaus, 2007, 
p. 103; Böttcher, 2012, p. 55; gruenderszene.de, 2015). Here, the creation process is 
of utter importance since it might offer an approach for improvement (gruender-
szene.de, 2015). Also, it is important to remember the expertise that Private Equity 
firms (Ott, 2010, p. 58) may yield (gruenderszene.de, 2015; Ott, 2010, p. 58).  
In addition, and if needed, another IPR (Intellectual Property) Due Diligence 
(Sammons, 2005, p. 64) and/or environment-based Due Diligence (energy-base.org, 
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2014) is being conducted (gruenderszene.de, 2015; Sammons, 2005, p. 64). The IPR 
Due Diligence considers legal matters (gruenderszene.de, 2015) such as patents and 
copyrights (Spedding, 2004, p. 242) in the meaning of infringements to others 
(gruenderszene.de, 2015; Spedding, 2004, p. 242). If the investor is committed to 
ethical (Schnapf, 2000, pp. 80-83, 124-128) or sustainable investments, environmen-
tal issues need to be excluded (gruenderszene.de, 2015; Schnapf, 2000, pp. 80-83, 
124-128). The Due Diligence report (Howson, 2003, p. 50) in which the individual 
reviews are being combined, is being accurately and in detail discussed by the man-
agement and is the basis for the investment decision (gruenderszene.de, 2015; 
Heister, 2010, p. 306). Since in this process the responsible parties of the potential 
target company should be present as well, a review in the sense of a personal Due 
Diligence (Berkman, 2013, p. 163) may be taken into consideration – namely if the 
investment should be an investment in the context of Venture Capital (Berkman, 
2013, p. 163; gruenderszene.de, 2015). In such a case, the investor is investing into 
the human capital (Philipp, 2012, p. 22) of the target company due to lack of capital 
and material assets (gruenderszene.de, 2015; Philipp, 2012, p. 22). 
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2.1.3.6 Structuring of a Buyout 
After taking a close look at the results of the Due Diligence, the investor will 
submit a final purchase price bid (Schütte, 2013, p. 12), provided the Private Equity 
firm has positively confirmed the results (Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn, & Sobczak, 
2008, p. 67; Schütte, 2013, p. 12).  
Figure 33: Structuring Phases of a Buyout  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation Herzog, 2014, p. 33 et seqq. 
The actual takeover of a company proceeds in two phases, which may well happen 
parallel to each other (Becker, 2009, p. 42; Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn, & Sobczak, 
2008, p. 67). The two phases are the financial structure and the legal structure as 
shown in Figure 33. 
 
Financial structure 
The central performance figure with the investment in a company (Bitz, Ewert, & 
Terstege, 2002, p. 121 et seqq.) is the internal rate of return (IRR) of the capital em-
ployed (Wöltje, 2013, p.149). The internal rate of return  (Glatte, 2014, p. 193), how-
ever, is the discount factor (Dernick, et al., 2016, p. 53). When applied, the dis-
counted future payments correspond with the initial investment (Glatte, 2014, p. 
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193). If this rate of return is greater than the interest plus risk premium, the invest-
ment (Glatte, 2014, p. 193) is profitable (Geilhausen, Bränzel, Engelmann, & 
Schulze, 2015, p. 273).  
In order to calculate the profitability of an investment decision, that interest 
rate r is sought at which the capital value of the project is equal to zero (Aucamp & 
Eckhardt Jr., 1976, p. 329), in which NPV represents the net present value and C 
represents the cash flow (Perridon, Steiner, & Rathgeber, 2014, p. 55):  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = ∑
𝐶𝑛
(1+𝑟)𝑛
= 𝑂
𝑁
𝑛=0
. 
The internal rate of return has its limits. The minimization of the probability of in-
solvency and maintaining adequate liquidity (Konrad, 2005, p. 159) in a Private 
Equity transaction takes priority – mainly because of the risks posed by Leverage 
in Buyouts.  
Legal structure 
The legal structure is dependent on the particular needs and objectives of the stake-
holders (Becker, 2009, p. 50). These, often divergent interests, need to be taken into 
account (Becker, 2009, p. 50). While the objectives of the seller are primarily focused 
on the tax neutrality (Brück & Sinewe, 2010, p. 104) and the reduction of liability 
risks (Schumacher, Sobau, & Hänsler, 2011, p. 45), the buyer, in the first place, will 
pursue fiscal objectives, such as the deductibility of interest expense (Brück & Sin-
ewe, 2010, p. 304), the conversion of the purchase prices in depreciable amount, 
which thus may be used for tax purposes, or will mobilize the corporate tax credit 
resting on already taxed reserves (Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn, & Sobczak, 2008, p. 
81 et seqq.). In doing so, the seller will choose a form of corporate sale that will 
grant him the lowest possible tax burden on the sale and will prefer the exemption 
of liability for past activities and quality defects of the company (Brettel, Kauff-
mann, Kühn, & Sobczak, 2008, p. 81 et seqq.). With forms of corporate sale, the asset 
deal or share deal is to be understood (Wilplinger, 2007, p. 106). In order to mini-
mize liability risks, Due Diligence is helpful, but cannot eliminate all future liability 
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issues, because as the legal successor, the buyer assumes all responsibilities arising 
from contractual agreements of the company (Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn, & Sob-
czak, 2008, p. 81 et seqq.). 
2.1.4 Phases Following a Private Equity Investment 
2.1.4.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The phase after a Private Equity investment is not only the longest, but also 
the most high-maintenance phase of a participation in a company. During a period 
of several years, the target company has to be supervised by the Private Equity firm 
or its affiliated management in the manner that it will grow consonantly with the 
objectives (Brettel, Kauffmann, Kühn, & Sobczak, 2008, p. 94). A prudent approach 
is particularly important for everyone involved. Especially, yet not only at an early 
stage participation – the Venture Capital commitment – it is necessary to protect 
the target company and the own high-risk capital (Ruppen, 2011). Therefore, the 
minimization of risks in the phase after the investment belongs to the main tasks of 
the Private Equity firm (Natter, 2003, p. 155). In contrast to capital providers such 
as banks, who may terminate their loans (Krepold & Fischbeck, 2011, p. 150) or 
shareholders of listed companies, who can sell their shares, this is not possible for 
an investor in a Private Equity commitment (Natter, 2003, pp. 134-141), because the 
capital is contractually promised for a long period of time (Heckmair, 2009, p. 30). 
Therefore, the maxim is: 
 
The minimization of risks (Paxmann & Fuchs, 2010, p. 55) and the maximization of profits 
(Fleischer, 2009, p. 104) is the mission of a good portfolio company. It can only meet this 
task, if it has adequate impact on the target company (Wollersheim & Barthel, 2011, p. 6) 
without destroying it. 
   
While investors of other persuasions are able to minimize their risks (Natter, 2003, 
pp. 134-141) by flexibly drawing capital in order to invest it more profitably or more 
securely, the Private Equity investor is reliant on carrying out a positive influence 
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(Hungenberg & Wulf, 2015, p. 123) on the development and business operations of 
the target company (Hehn, 2011, p. 54).  
2.1.4.2 Supervisory Approaches of Holding Companies 
After there had been hardly any categories at the beginning of professional 
participations, under which the Private Equity companies were divided in intense 
supervision and non-intense supervision, the Private Equity companies are now 
distinguishable in type classes. Today, a Venture Capital investment in a target 
company is no longer compatible with a more passive supervisory (Natter, 2003, p. 
134 et seqq.) approach (Sauermann, 2010, p. 24). On the other hand, a medium-
sized business owner who only needs monetary means for an investment that he 
cannot obtain through banks for various reasons, may not accept a co-determina-
tion by the investor (Hertz-Eichenrode, 2004, p. 217). This principal-agent problem 
led to Private Equity companies specializing themselves and possibly publicizing 
this information (Daniels, 2004, p. 42). This is confirmed by the study of the corre-
lation between type of investment and financing purposes with its significances. 
An increasing number of potential target companies themselves take that step to-
wards the Private Equity companies, inquiring about funding opportunities and 
funding arrangements. Nevertheless, skepticism is especially strong among small 
and medium-sized enterprises to see their future in Private Equity (Köhler P. , 2007, 
p. B2). Possible scenarios are manifold.  Some entrepreneurs fear to lose their influ-
ence with the participation of another (Römermann & Praß, 2012, p. 56), while oth-
ers are scared by the idea of ending up like the Grohe AG. Even if for the investor 
the investment and not the target company will always be in focus (Füglistaller, et 
al., 2008, p. 137), aiming at achieving his financial goals, all participants should pro-
vide acceptable conditions for both sides in order to be successful.  The investor 
needs to understand that he should not completely dominate a company, which 
may have endured without him for decades, and the capital seeker should be aware 
that the investor will only hold a position in “his“ company, because due to the 
know-how of the investor it will be for the best in regards to survival or advance-
ment up to an increase in value. 
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2.1.4.3 Restructuring Considerations  
It is the objective of restructuring (Wright, Cressy, Wilson, & Farag, 2014, pp. 
109-129) to substantially increase the company through strategic or operational re-
structuring measures (Bayaz, 2013, p. 76; Wagner, 2014, p. 21)). Reasons for a re-
structure where already determined by KPMG in a survey in 2004, asking Private 
Equity firms how to create values by restructuring target companies (Scott, 
Andersch, & Jugel, 2004, p. 3). Often, the need for restructuring (Thoms, 2014, p. 1) 
is not identified early on (Scott, Andersch, & Jugel, 2004, pp. 1-8). Operational cri-
teria such as imminent illiquidity or a lack of profitability take the spotlight (Scott, 
Andersch, & Jugel, 2004, pp. 1-8). Only in 50% of all cases will strategic questioning 
like the development of the market or the behavior of competitors trigger the re-
structuring (Scott, Andersch, & Jugel, 2004, pp. 1-8), shown in figure 34. 
Figure 34: Causes of Restructuring a Company 
 
Source: Own representation based on KPMG (Andersch, 2011, p. 13). 
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The reasons (Scott, Andersch, & Jugel, 2004, pp. 1-8) for a restructuring (Osterhage, 
2009, p. 5) need correspond with a multitude of measures (Atiase, Platt, & Tse, 2004) 
in target companies (Paul & Weber, 2014, p. 77; Bayaz, 2013, p. 77 et seqq.): 
 
 corporate governance structure (Henry D. , 2008, pp. 912-942), 
 personnel (Bayaz, 2013, p. 77; Scott, Andersch, & Jugel, 2004, pp. 1-8), 
 performance test (Scott, Andersch, & Jugel, 2004, pp. 1-8), 
 company management (Scott, Andersch, & Jugel, 2004, pp. 1-8), 
 structural and procedural organization (Hammann & Freiling, 2000, p. 88), 
 production area (Bayaz, 2013, 77; Scott, Andersch, & Jugel, 2004, pp. 1-8), 
 it-structure (Bayaz, 2013, p. 77; Osterhage, 2009, p. 5), 
 company acquisitions and sales (Bayaz, 2013, p. 77; Thoms, 2014, p. 1), 
 marketing area (Bayaz, 2013, p. 77; Scott, Andersch, & Jugel, 2004, pp. 1-8), 
 capital measures, 
 procurement, 
 corporate culture, 
 employee training, 
 research and development (Wagner A. , 2014, p. 50; Bayaz, 2013, p. 77). 
 
The implementation of these measures in the post-investment phase is al-
ways dependent on the size, orientation and the single problem of the target com-
pany (Krystek & Moldenhauer, 2007, p. 179). 
2.1.4.4 Exit from Private Equity Financing  
Preliminary Remarks 
Private Equity transactions (Braun, Schmeiser, & Siegel, 2014, p. 115) have a specific 
investment horizon (Schramm, 2011, p. 216). This exit form of a Private Equity fi-
nancing is referred to as exit (Jelic, 2011, p. 946) restrictive or divestment (Wagner 
W. , 2010, pp. 591-592). These processes are being traditionally summarized under 
the term Exit (Hess, 2007, p. 33). Only in the last phase of the investment process is 
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the actual success of an equity interest in a portfolio company8 finally for certain 
(Prym, 2011, p. 44), unless the Private Equity company has agreed on a profit-shar-
ing, which is a participation in the profits of current and future operations. The 
different ways to withdraw from an investment are referred to as exit (figure 35) 
channels (Kußmaul, 2008, p. 516) and include the listing of the target company - 
IPO = Initial Public Offering - (Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998, p. 27) as well as 
the sale of the stake to other investors (Kollmann, 2011, p. 487) or the repurchase of 
the participation by the former owner (Kollmann, 2011, p. 490). Needless to say, a 
failure of the investment is also feasible and may lead to a total depreciation of the 
capital contributed (Bines & Thel, 2004, p. 483).  
Figure 35: Private Equity Exit Variations 
 
Source: Own representation based on Daniels, 2004, p. 44 et seqq. 
                                                     
8 In this paper, the term target company is depending on the approach called portfolio company. 
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Initial Public Offering  
The IPO is comparatively often named as the preferred exit variant (Bösl, 2004, p. 
11) from a Private Equity investment (Bösl, 2004, p. 11; Hess, 2007, pp. 40-41). Em-
pirical studies (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992, p. 167 et seqq.) have shown in the past 
that higher profits can be achieved with IPO than with other exit variations (Dan-
iels, 2004, p. 46; Fueglistaller, et al., 2012, p. 396). The returns from sale are in com-
parison with exit options, not always higher than the returns from the sale on the 
stock market (Daniels, 2004, p. 46). This rather subjective position is in considera-
tion of the fact that those target companies going public are particularly well-posi-
tioned companies (Daniels, 2004, p. 46). Besides the benefit of a supposedly higher 
sales price, the IPO has to offer additional advantages (Daniels, 2004, pp. 46-47):  
 
 Congruity of interests (Daniels, 2004, pp. 46-47): If a company is being sold 
on the stock market, all parties involved wish to obtain a high rating and 
are also equally interested in the conclusion of the exit. Variables such as 
loss of position, power and influence do not play a role during and after the 
process (Gerig, 2003, p. 20).  
 Capital market (Daniels, 2004, pp. 46-47): Once the company is listed on the 
stock market, it secures on a long-term basis the possibility of raising capital 
by increasing capital stock (Dworak, 2010, pp. 280-281). Listed companies 
are subject to strict disclosure requirements and are bound to the stock quo-
tations as a subjective assessment approach, which can facilitate access to 
debt financing.  
 Awareness level (Daniels, 2004, pp. 46.47): Through publications and the 
presence in the media, a publicly traded company has become better known 
immediately after the IPO (Wirtz & Salzer, 2001, p. 223), which has a posi-
tive effect on the contact with customers, suppliers or potential employees.   
 Growth (Daniels, 2004, pp. 46-47): Since neither the former owners nor the 
Private Equity firms may sell their shares instantly in an IPO (Salzer, 2004, 
p. 84), they can participate in further growth (Daniels, 2004, p. 47).  
 
The disadvantages of an IPO (Daniels, 2004, pp. 46-47) lie mainly in the high dis-
closure requirements and the high costs (Singh & Bhowal, 2010). The so-called lock-
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up period – that is a ban on sale for Private Equity firms and the target company – 
holds the overall risk of the uncertainty of the stock market (Daniels, 2004, p. 47). 
In addition, the stock market access remains difficult even if there has been a facil-
itation of access for young and small enterprises (Freese, 2006, p. 17).  
Trade Sale 
A Trade Sale (Kollmann, 2004, p. 370) means the sale of shares in a target company 
to a strategically interested investor (Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 142), in most 
cases coming from an industrial background (Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 142; 
Daniels, 2004, p. 48; Kollmann, 2004, p. 370). Competitors, suppliers, customers 
(Hannich, 2012, p. 38) or other large enterprises (Breuer, 2001, p. 528) are possibili-
ties (Breuer, 2001, p. 528; Daniels, 2004, p. 48; Hannich, 2012, p. 38). The objectives 
of these potential buyers are the realization of synergies, obtaining strategic ad-
vantages, the accelerated establishment in new markets or the acquisition of know-
how that would possible not be available otherwise (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2012). 
Benefits of a trade sale are (Daniels, 2004, p. 49): 
 
 Short transaction time 
 Low transaction costs 
 High company rating 
 Complete exit as opposed to the IPO (Schalkowski, 2013, p. 43) 
 
The biggest disadvantage (Daniels, 2004, p. 49) of a Trade Sale is the lack of con-
gruency between the management of the target company and the Private Equity 
firm. Because a loss of influence is being apprehended, this exit variation is partic-
ularly at risk of falling through (Hannich, 2012, p. 40).  
Buy Back 
The repurchase of shares by the entrepreneur or company provides an alternative, 
but less popular or less used exit channel and is generally only used, if other exit 
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options fail (Schlitt, 2014, p. 204). This circumstance is in consequence of competi-
tion and the strong position of the buyer, which is reflected in a lower purchase 
price (Herzog, 2014, p. 50).  
Secondary Purchase 
The Secondary Purchase (Philipp, 2012, p. 28) is the counter-model to a Trade Sale. 
Instead of a strategic investor, another financial investor takes over the target com-
pany for sale (Fraser-Sampson, 2010, p. 189). While previously and recently a Pri-
vate Equity firm tried to support and raise the price of the target company, it is now 
succeeded by another financial investor, possibly another Private Equity firm, seek-
ing to retrieve even more from the enterprise (Pott & Pott, 2012, p. 360). At this 
point, an investor will find a company which, as the case may be, is so far in debt 
through debt financing (Philipp, 2012, p. 28) that he will appear as a chief restruc-
turing officer (CRO) and implement the above contemplated restructuring 
measures (Bauer & Düsterloh, 2013, p. 58).  
Total loss 
With this exit option surface, the risk and the liability issues for the portfolio com-
pany, which is simultaneously equity investor and shareholder and is liable with 
the equity capital (Gregoriou, Kooli, & Kraeussl, 2007, p. 385). A target company is 
considered a total loss, if no positive return is scored and the equity provided is 
partially or fully lost (Kiesel, Scherer, & Zagst, 2010, p. 25). 
RELEVANCE OF PRIVATE EQUITY                                          Page  |  103  
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  
 
 
2.2 ECONOMIC AREA: EUROPEAN UNION 
2.2.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The European Union (Reichstein, 2012, p. 11) is an economic and political un-
ion of currently 28 European countries (Noack, 2014, p. 65)9. Initially, there were 
six states that established the so-called European Community (Eberstadt & 
Kuznetsov, 2008, p. 82). Already in the 1950s (Faber A. , 2005, p. 42), along with 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Germany, Italy and the Netherlands took this 
step (Eberstadt & Kuznetsov, 2008, p. 82; Faber A., 2005, p. 42). The reason and 
meaning behind this endeavor was to prevent political and military conflicts 
among each other by building strong economic ties (Schmidt & Schünemann, 2013, 
pp. 330-331; Bartl, 2015, p. 8). In addition, the economic growth was to be acceler-
ated with the emergence of a larger market (Streit, 1988, p. 36; Reinhardt, 2015, p. 
711). More and more states joined in until finally with the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992 the European Union was founded (Fröhlich, 2008, p. 12; Wessels, 2008, p. 89). 
Since that time, the European institutions were continuously democratized (Meyer 
& Eisenberg, 2009, p. 60). The European Union now also holds its own legal per-
sonality (Zerres & Zerres, 2015, p. 26) and holds the right of speech as well as the 
right of inspection with the United Nations (Lange, 2012, p. 4; Sinn, Wang, Wu, & 
Zöller, 2015, p. 16) and was awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize (Greschkow, 2014, 
p. 7; Zerres & Zerres, 2015, p. 26). Taking the gross domestic product in considera-
tion – which will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter of this paper - the 
European Single Market is currently the largest single market in the world 
(Stratenschulte, 2014, p. 2; Fröhlich, 2014, p. 11). The increasing democratization of 
the Institutions of the European Union naturally leads to more regulations, that 
must be employed and – in the case of the framework for Private Equity funds - 
need to be improved. 
                                                     
9 There was a referendum in Britain. The majority of citizens has decided to leave the European 
Union. It will take a while until the United Kingdom is no longer a member of the Euro-
pean Union. It may take up to two years. Until then, all rights and obligations must be 
complied with (Harms, 2016, p. 1). 
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2.2.2 Areas of Activity and Members of the European Union 
The current Member States of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and 
United Kingdom. 
With their almost innumerable institutions (Radicova, 2013, pp. 55-62) and or-
ganizations, the European Union acts by now in virtually every area which the na-
tional states also need to cover (Kuhn, 2010, p. 33). To enumerate all of them would 
go beyond the scope of this paper. However, those fields are to be mentioned, which 
are directly or indirectly influencing the subject of Private Equity, respectively invest-
ments and the labor market. Thus, e.g. The European Investment Fund 2012 launched a so-
calle Fund for Business Angels (volume, 2012). The European Court of Justice has found a 
disadvantage for foreign corporations in Germany by the Treasury (Handelsblatt, 2012). The 
European Investment Bank is involved in almost 50 private equity funds with almost € 5 bil-
lion. The European Commission may need to approve private equity acquisitions and the Eu-
ropean Central Bank intends to tighten up its supervision of the financing of private equity 
deals (Bamberg, 2017). 
 
 the European Investment Fund (Ferruz, Ortiz, & Vicente, 2007, pp. 238-248), 
 the European Court of Justice (Wilmott, 1984, pp. 211-218), 
 the European Investment Bank (Robinson, 2009, pp. 651-673) , 
 the European Commission (Kostadinova, 2013, pp. 264-280), 
 and especially (Hustedt, Wonka, Blauberger, Töller, & Reiter, 2014, p. 53), 
 the European Central Bank (Kaltenthaler, Anderson, & Miller, 2010), based 
in Frankfurt (Europäische-Union, 2014).  
 
The European Investment Bank (Hellmann, 2009, p. 442; Storck, 2001, p. 364) plays 
for example a crucial role in the interaction between economic recovery and growth 
in Europe (Berens R. E., 2014, p. 351; Hägele, 2003, p. 90). The European Commis-
sion’s offer to build a new “European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI)” in 
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cooperation with the European Investment Bank in order to boost growth and cre-
ate jobs in Europe (EU-Kommission, 2014), is being discussed at present. To what 
extent this project will support those with the desire to set up a new business in 
Europe and whether it will bring forth manageable regulations, remains to be seen.  
2.2.3 Macroeconomic Situation of the European Union  
2.2.3.1 European Performance Strength 
Olli Rehn, Member of European Parliament since 2014 (European-Parlia-
ment, 2014) and until recently a member and Vice-President of the European Com-
mission (Kleinert, 2014, p. 56) is a Finnish politician of the Centre Party10. The po-
litical scientist and economist drew attention to himself with his dossier „Economic 
and Monetary Union and the Euro“ (European-Commission, 2014), when he re-
marked:  
 
„A well-functioning economic and monetary union and a strong and stable 
Euro are the basis for growth and employment in Europe“. (Rehn, 2014, p. 2) 
 
The performance of the European Union is based on this simple formula. The Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union is responsible for price stability (Schuppan & Tamm, 
2014; Roy, 2002, p. 36; Dittrich, 2016, p. 60). The independent European Central 
Bank (ECB) is responsible for the monetary policy in the Euro-Zone (Thiemeyer, 
2010, p. 177; Zierer, 2015, p. 210).  
                                                     
10 The Finnish Centre Party is a rural-liberal party of the political center in Finland. She is a member 
of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), the European Association of liberal 
parties (Luif, 2007, pp. 52-53, 96). 
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Figure 36: Rate of Inflation – Euro-Zone from 2005 to 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
It can be implied that the major task and, at the same time, the main task of the ECB 
is to ensure the stability of consumer (Schmidt & Wollenschläger, 2016, p. 199) 
prices and to protect the Euro against loss of value (European-Commission, 2014, 
Schmidt & Wollenschläger, 2016, p. 199). Figure 36 shows the inflation rate of the 
Euro-Zone. 
The ECB must and wants to ensure that the inflation rate permanently ranges 
around 2% (Mayer & Schiebler, 2008, p. 52; Holtmann, 2004, p. 223; Mayer T. , 2015, 
pp. 1-3). This assumption will be examined at this point, at which it should be first 
noted that in many European countries, two important inflation rates are deter-
mined (Wildmann, 2016, p. 53; Neubäumer & Hewel, 2005, p. 523). On one hand 
the consumer price index (CPI), and in opposition, the harmonized index (Lübke 
& Vogt, 2014, p. 57; Auer & Rottmann, 2015, p. 133) of consumer prices (HICP). 
While the CPI is rather determined by each country itself, the HICP is a perfor-
mance figure to enable a comparison of the European inflation rates (Wildmann, 
2016, p. 53; Neubäumer & Hewel, 2005, p. 523; Lübke & Vogt, 2014, p. 57; Auer & 
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Rottmann, 2015, p. 133). This experiment investigates the HICP (EUROSTAT, 2016), 
which relate the data from 2015 to the last entry. 
Figure 37: Rate of Inflation – Euro-Zone 2016 Month 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
If the data from the years 2005 to 2015 are to serve as a basis for the determination 
of a mean value, that value of 18,7%/10 = 1,87% annual inflation rate comes very 
close to the self-declared goal to permanently pursue an inflation rate of 2%. If, 
however, the tendency of the figures from the recent past (EUROSTAT, 2016, pp. 
1-4) is brought in, this figure is not as optimistic as the values in figure 37 and the 
mean value thereof demonstrate. 
The mean value of the months January – May 2016 is 0.4%/5 = 0.08%, which is well 
below the targeted 2%-mark, which – according to the ECB – is the value where 
prices are stable as under the mark of the last months in 2016. Due to the corre-
sponding low interest rates, the low inflation rate should stimulate. Nevertheless, 
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The Euro benefits Citizens 
The fact that the Euro has a practical benefit to citizenry becomes evident when 
crossing former borders. The costs and expenses for the exchange (Weidel, 2011) of 
currencies (Hansen, 2010, p. 530) cease to apply (Hallepape, 2001, p. 19). The aboli-
tion of borders incidentally simplifies shopping and also important competitive 
price comparisons (European Commission, 2003). The Euro is providing Europe 
with more weight in world trade (Zierer, 2015, p. 210). Due to its strength, the as-
sertiveness of Europe is significantly increased worldwide. As the economic and 
financial crisis (Kempf, Lüderssen, & Volk, 2010, p. 291) – among economists it is 
being discussed who the cause of the crisis (Schwarzbach, Rudschuck, & Schulen-
burg, 2012, p. 69) had been and whether it had not been and is both – has made 
clear, the European Union as a strong partner is quite capable of withstanding 
global shocks and to act as a corrective (Europäische-Kommission, 2015, pp. 1-20).  
The Euro is good for Business as well 
The Euro brings forth considerable benefits (Europäische-Kommission, 2015, pp. 1-
20) for European companies (Mayer, 2013, p. 223). The Economic and Monetary 
Union and thereby especially the ECB provide the businesses (OECD, 2014, p. 74) 
with favorable (Lang, 2014, p. 218) interest rates (Heller, 2014, p. 27). This in turn 
favors (Europäische-Kommission, 2015, pp. 1-20) the creation of jobs (Götz, 2016, 
p. 45). Also, rivalries in monetary policies cease since its introduction, at least for 
the affected areas (Europäische-Kommission, 2015, pp. 1-20). The elimination of 
transaction costs (Weeber, 2015, p. 80; Brunner & Kehrle, 2014, p. 742) in the cur-
rency exchange is also felt on the employer’s side, so that more money has become 
vacant for investments (Europäische-Kommission, 2015, pp. 1-20). The relative 
price stability in some areas also allows companies to engage in long-term planning 
(Janßen, 2012, p. 22), which has a positive effect on competitiveness, since focusing 
on the core business is no longer disturbed by minor issues, such as price adjust-
ments and currency problems (Europäische-Kommission, 2015, pp. 1-20). Overall, 
the global competition for companies has been disburdened by the strong Euro 
(Europäische-Kommission, 2015, pp. 1-20). 
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2.2.3.2 Trend of the European Union and the Labor Market 
As per communication of the European Commission (Europäische 
Kommission, 2015), which published the final Annual Growth Survey 2016 on 
26.11.2015, a slow recovery is emerging. According to this report, the crisis has 
peaked and the incipient recovery is still moderate and fragile (European-Commis-
sion, 2014). In particular, the issues, necessarily important for this paper, still seem 
uncertain. The confidence in the resilience of the banking sector (Langley, 2014, p. 
94) continues to be unabatedly deficient (Pätzold, 2010, p. 106). The fragmentation 
of financial systems and credit markets, the restructuring and adaptation of the fi-
nancial sector (European-Commission, 2014) and high unemployment (Dörre, Jür-
gens, & Matuschek, 2014, p. 130) will continue to constrain growth (Sarfati, 2013, 
pp. 145-156; OECD, 2014, p. 116). The European Semester, which was launched in 
2010 is the cornerstone for the coordination and monitoring of economic and budg-
etary policies of the Member States (Borchardt, 2012, p. 375; Lhotta, Ketelhut, & 
Schöne, 2013, p. 205). Public finances have made significant progress in consolidat-
ing (Krämer, 2013, p. 205) and Member States have, for example, introduced Youth 
Guarantees (Brenke, 2013, p. 16), which are intended to ensure that all young peo-
ple under the age of 25 are offered a job position, advanced education, an appren-
ticeship or a traineeship of good quality within the first four months after complet-
ing their education or training or after the loss of a job (European-Commission, 
2014). The situation of employment, however, will only gradually improve due to 
the time interval of the reforms regarding the economic recovery (European-com-
mission, 2014). The statistics in figure 38 shows the overall situation in figures 
(eurostat, 2016). It shows the gross domestic product (GDP) of the European Union 
and the Euro Zone from 2005 to 2015 in trillion Euros. The GDP is the total value of 
all goods and services produced in that year within the national boundaries (Wild-
mann, 2010, p. 31 et seqq.). They must serve the final consumption. It is considered 
an important indicator of the economic power of a country (Wildmann, p. 31 et 
seqq.). In 2015, the GDP of the European Union was approximately 14.64 trillion 
Euros, while the Euro Zone came to about 10.4 trillion Euros (Eurostat, 2016). 
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Figure 38: Gross Domestic Product EU vs. Euro-Zone until 2015 in tn. Euro 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
Right at the beginning of this paper it was noted that some areas are still 
awaiting adaption. Prices on the electricity market were mentioned as an example. 
The situation on the labor market is particularly striking. Fatal differences explain 
the discontent discussed in the introduction and supported by statistical data. Fig-
ure 39 shows the significant differences in employment (eurostat, 2016). No other 
figure can reveal the employment situation of a country or region as clearly as the 
unemployment statistics. This data is also important because it is not only the ac-
cess to more venture capital (via the detour for private equity companies or funds) 
that is to be guaranteed by changing, improved, and optimized tax rates, but also 
higher investments and thus a higher gross domestic product (and vice versa). This 
will have a positive effect on the unemployment rate. 
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Figure 39: Unemployment Rate – EU-Members at the End of 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat.  
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The extremely high unemployment rates in countries such as Greece and Spain 
even cause a very high unemployment rate in the European Union (figure 40), es-
pecially in the Euro-Zone, as is substantiated by the following chart. 
Figure 40: Unemployment Rate – EU vs. Euro-Zone 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
2.3 ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY WITHIN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
2.3.1 Preliminary Remarks 
For centuries economists have discussed the most diverse economic theories. 
Economists know many approaches to theories, wherein the, until recently pre-
ferred, neoclassic (Solo, 1975, pp. 627-644; Simpson, 1949, pp. 861-882) and the 
Keynesian theory (Keller, 1983, pp. 1087-1095; Fellner, 1957, pp. 67-95) are probably 
the best-known (Paesler, 2015, p. 29; Nissen, 1999, p. 295). Paul A. Samuelson de-
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„Economics is the study of how men and society end up choosing with or 
without the use of money, to employ scarce productive resources which could 
have alternative uses, to produce various commodities and distribute them for 
consumption, now or in the future, among various people and groups in soci-
ety.“ (Samuelson, 2011) 
 
A large number of people are trying to follow this general principle. However, with 
success? Judging by the problems the European Union is currently experiencing, it 
is somewhat doubtful that all possible efforts with respect to this maxim have been 
made. He, who wants to produce, needs money; he, who is in need of money, needs 
an investor. If this investor does not come from the banking sector, then what is 
left? Private Equity definitely is an alternative (Koziol, Proelss, & Schweizer, 2011, 
pp. 465-484) financing option (Englmaier, 2013, p. 1). Even the figures per se speak 
from themselves. That Private Equity even qualifies as an asset class has already 
been discussed in this paper, because Private Equity seems to perform better 
(Hedtstück, 2013) as an investment than comparable equity investments (Busack & 
Kaiser, 2006, p. 160).  The economic and financial crisis has left its mark; it cannot 
suffice as reason for the reluctance of shareholders, investors and other participants 
(Acharya, Philippon, Richardson, & Roubini, 2009, pp. 89-137). What other model 
can provide such positive first impressions as Private Equity? First, Private Equity 
is an instrument used to aide companies in a particular situation where other fi-
nancing options fail to be available. The reasons for this still not well-functioning 
financial system are well known and have been already discussed in this study. 
The regulation of investment funds itself, the regulations in the banking sector in 
general, are not without fault in this misery. Nevertheless, the Private Equity in-
dustry managed – although with greatest efforts – to revive a highly efficient mar-
ket beyond the locusts’ debate. Private Equity plays a significant role in Europe’s 
economy (Wirtz, 2006, p. 159). 
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2.3.2 Economic Impact of Private Equity  
Private Equity financed enterprises grow faster in comparison to other com-
panies, create more jobs and are more export-oriented, therefore providing a strong 
economic momentum (Frommann & Dahmann, 2014).  In the European context, the 
investment in Private Equity and thus primarily in Venture Capital (Sixt, 2014, p. 
53) equals an investment in the future (Heimlich, 2013). Private Equity financed 
companies are often characterized by a high degree of innovation and offer new 
ideas in order to develop sustainable products and goods. Not only the innovation 
activities of Private Equity-backed companies are outstanding, they are not to be 
underestimated as creators of jobs (Schäfer, 2004). Studies of Buyouts showed that 
target companies could report an annual increase in employees of 4.5% while a 
control group of non-Private Equity financed enterprises merely achieved 2.2% in 
growth (Cressy, Munari, & Malipiero, 2011, pp. 1-22). A more critical point of view 
was offered by the evaluators of a study by the World Economic Forum, which 
came to the conclusion that employment specifically decreases during the first 
three years and can only compare itself with the other group in the following years 
(Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Lerner, & Mirander, 2014, pp. 41-61). Moreover, 
growing Private Equity-financed companies are involved in all other processes of 
an economy. Especially young high-technology companies need more than man-
power. Adequate suppliers are necessary as well (Passarge, 2010, p. 21).  So, with a 
growing Private Equity industry with all its participants, the Private Equity firms, 
the consultants, target companies, suppliers, customers, funds of funds, banks and 
not least the state participating from tax revenues, there can be hardly any figures 
which are rating this industry in a just way. However, if numbers are being in-
volved (Investeurope, 2016, p. 41), the importance of Private Equity (Kaplan & 
Schoar, 2005, 1791-1823) becomes clear (Boué, et al., 2012, p. 61). For this purpose, 
first, all Private Equity investments in comparison to the total GDP (around 14.7 
Trillion Euros in Europe shall be displayed in % (figure 41), followed by the invest-
ment of European countries, also compared to their own gross domestic products 
(GDP) in % (figures 42 and 43). In the analysis, generally two perspectives are being 
distinguished: Industry statistics (figure 42) and market statistics (figure 43). The 
industry statistics covers activities (investments, divestments) according to the 
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place of business of the Private Equity Company – investments by country of man-
agement – and the market statistics according to the place of business of the fi-
nanced enterprise – investment by country of portfolio management. 
Figure 41: All Private Equity-Investments compared to GDP in Europe 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe. 
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Figure 42: All Private Equity-Investments - Industry Statistics 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe. 
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Looking at the entire European area, this means (Investeurope, 2016, p. 42) that the 
United Kingdom carry forward to hold the top position in regards to willingness 
to enjoy drops in risk-bearing investments while Greece brings up the rear.   
Figure 43: All Private Equity-Investments Market Statistics 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe. 
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So when it comes to companies financed, Luxembourg takes a comfortable lead, 
even ahead of the traditional market of Private Equity in the United Kingdom. The 
Danish Market seems to be especially attractive for investments. In contrast, econ-
omies like Germany and Italy, which have always been very strong (Investeurope, 
2016, p. 46), perform rather poorly, which is in part certainly due to the regulatory 
and fiscal framework. 
2.3.3 Growth Theories 
2.3.3.1 Preliminary Remarks 
At the beginning of the dissertation, it was pointed out that the growth theories play a role 
because the derivation of the formula is hardly conceivable for the GDP, which is important 
for this study without the addition of these theories and national accounts. The formula BIP 
= C + I + G + Ex - Im is both based on the overall economic demand Y = C + I + G + Ex - 
Im and in the same form for the net domestic product. Depending on the literature, they are 
used synonymously. At the end of the work, the GDP is calculated once again with the new 
tax findings. Since the GDP is considered a clear indicator of the growth of a society or a 
market, it is therefore essential to consider this. It should also be pointed out, at this juncture, 
that this investigation is aimed at the fact that the higher the gross domestic product, the 
higher the willingness is to invest. Of course, there is also a causal link in the reverse se-
quence. The higher the investments, the higher the gross domestic product. This is made 
clear by a calculation at the end of the dissertation, hence the title "... on the impact on 
market growth ....“. 
 
2.3.3.2 Growth Theory According to Keynes 
In his seminal body of work, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money“, John Maynard Keynes (Keynes, 1936, p. 3) presents his theories on 
monetary, trade economic aspects and the labor market (Davidson, 2009, pp. 73-
81). Therein, he explains reasons for unemployment and poverty (Levitt, 1954, p. 
235). He advocates – and this is the primary goal of his theory – an expansionary 
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economic policy of all countries, which stimulates an accelerated economy due to 
increasing demand (Keynes, 2008, p. 5).  
Keynes is considered to be the founder of modern macroeconomics (Clement, 
Terlau, & Kiy, 2013, p. 8; Kruber, 2002, p. 63; Wiemann, 2011, p. 97). As opposed to 
neoclassical economics, Keynes considers that the subfields of the trade market, 
monetary market and labor market do not automatically lead to an equilibrium, 
because prices of goods and downward rigid wages are not flexible enough (Irwin, 
2014, pp. 199-227; Peto, 2008, p. 45; Göckler, Rübner, Kohn, Jäger, & Franck, 2013, 
p. 64). The adjustment of wages to changes in the prices of goods occurs relatively 
slowly, thus decelerating the recovery of the economy (Wienert, 2008, p. 151). The 
market alone, in this context, generates no balance (Willke, 2002, pp. 1-8). Thus, an 
equilibrium on the trade market and the monetary market leads to an imbalance 
on the labor market (Siebe & Wenke, 2014, p. 146). The wage rate is not the decisive 
variable for the demand of labor, but rather the demand for consumer and capital 
goods. A decrease in nominal wages cannot create additional jobs (Peto, 2008, p. 
45). Only if the demand for goods increases, new fields of activity, respectively jobs 
will emerge (Schnarrer, 1996, p. 209). Keynes is convinced (Vogt W. , 2016, pp. 1-
44) that the reduction of the aggregate demand for goods is the main reason of a 
recession. Consequently, the level of production and employment depends on the 
aggregate demand (Keynes, 2009, p. XIV).  
In contrast to the theory of Keynes, “Say’s Law“ states that supply creates its own 
demand (Cate, 2013, p. 621). The two elements of this theorem are: 
 
 Production itself creates its own needs (Ehrlicher, Esenwein-Rothe, 
Jürgensen, & Rose, 1975, p. 184), 
 by self-regulation of the market economy, not all sectors of the economy 
will generate an overproduction at the same time. An imbalance of supply 
and demand only occurs in specific sectors and this only on a temporary 
basis (Oppitz & Weigele, 2014, p. 54).  
 
The state’s role is to monitor the demand of goods and must, where appropriate 
and by way of example, reduce taxes, if the market cannot regulate the demand 
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itself (Peto, 2008, p. 45). This measure could compensate for past deficits. For this 
reason Keynes favors the government playing a larger role in case of a market fail-
ure, if the economy is subject to a demand shock, in order to quickly restore full 
employment (Putnoki & Hilgers, 2013, p. 134). An economic recovery cannot al-
ways be achieved by increasing the money supply because economic entities retain 
the money – the so-called liquidity trap – while awaiting higher returns (Peto, 2008, 
p. 45). Therefore, the side of the demand for goods can be designated as the main 
focus of the Keynesian Theory (Peto, 2008, p. 45). In summary, the Keynes Theory 
demands  
 
that the government has to apply an effective fiscal policy to increase investments in order 
to stimulate the demand on the labor market and thus to achieve full employment. Elimi-
nating unemployment positively counters the economic crisis.  
 
Looking at the current situation from the viewpoint of this theory, the current Eu-
ropean economic situation could be soothed by creating jobs (Pollert, Kirchner, & 
Morato Polzin, 2013, p. 123). At the beginning of this paper it has already been 
pointed out, that entrepreneurs contribute a fundamental part (Balke, 2014, p. 8) to 
improving the job situation (Sahadev & Demirbag, 2011) through start-ups or fur-
ther developments and could contribute significantly more, if the conditions for 
such companies, for example in regards to financing through Private Equity, would 
present themselves more favorable.  
Model 
An essential component of the Keynesian theory of income and employment is the 
aggregate consumption function (Kurihara, 2013, p. 161; Cezanne, 2005, p. 101; 
Below, Ebinger, Lorenz, & Pramann, 1977, p. 91).  
The aggregate consumption C depends on the available income YD : = Y – T (taxes), 
whereas the average propensity to consume C/Y decreases with increasing income 
(Welfens, 2008, p. 274; Brunner & Kehrle, 2014, p. 27; Rogall, 2006, p. 70). The sim-
plest form is (Welfens, 2008, pp. 274-275, Cezanne, 2005, p. 101): 
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𝐶 = 𝐶̅ + 𝑐(𝑌 − ?̅?),           0 < 𝑐 < 1. 
In this context, c is the marginal propensity (Brunner & Kehrle, 2014, pp. 26-27) to 
consume (Brunner & Kehrle, 2014, pp. 26-27; Cezanne, 2005, p. 101). 
To get an understanding of a general nature of these formulas, it should be men-
tioned here, that a variable is called exogenous (Blanchard & Illing, 2009, p. 92), if 
it is not explained in the model (Erlei, 2010, p. 72), is thus determined from outside, 
and are marked with a bar. In contrast, a variable is endogenously called when it is 
explained in the model (Ernste, 2011, p. 194).  
Suppose the prices and hence the price level is fixed and the investments and gov-
ernment spending are exogenous, the actual income Y adapts to the aggregate de-
mand YN, because the production capacity is not fully utilized, denoting unemploy-
ment. Subsequently, this results in the condition of equilibrium (Wohltmann, 2005, 
p. 38; Kromphardt, Clever, & Klippert, 1979, p. 153; Bofinger, 2011, p. 504)  
 
𝑌𝑁 = 𝑌. 
 
The aggregated national demand in a closed economy is YN = C + I + G 
(Wohltmann, 2005, p. 47, Brunner & Kehrle, 2014, p. 24)). 
 
Using the linear consumption function and with exogeneity of I and G, this results 
in (Welfens, 2008, p. 274 et seqq.) 
 
𝑌𝑁 = 𝐶̅ + 𝑐(𝑌 − 𝑇) + 𝐼 ̅ + ?̅?, 
 
with the condition of equilibrium YN = Y follows in equilibrium 
 
𝑌 =
1
1 − c
(C̅ − cT̅ + I̅ + G̅).  
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Keynesian Labor Market Theory 
Since the prices are not sufficiently flexible, it can lead to a lack of demand on the 
goods market for various reasons. Due to the correlation between goods market 
and labor market according to Keynes, the demand curve for labor experiences a 
kink, which is determined by the level of aggregate demand YN (Willke, 2012, pp. 
81-94). 
Figure 44: Labor Market Model according to Keynes 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on Willke, 2012, pp. 83-88. 
In figure 44 the demand for labor L (YN) becomes independent of the real wage rate. 
Even at a real wage rate w*, the demand for labor will therefore not suffice to ensure 
full employment. Unemployment is being identified in the respective area with LU. 
Solution: 
The aggregate demand (Dümmler, Hotz-Hart, & Schmuki, 2006, p. 635) is strength-
ened (Friedmann, 1968) by fiscal policy; (Goerdeler, 1987, p. 157). A reduction of 
the real wage rate would further reduce the aggregate demand. This demand-ori-
ented economic policy to that effect is not helpful.  
w 
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The problem of economic policy is the question for the correct theory. An exact 
analysis is always required, since unemployment does have the same cause for all 
affected persons. A distinction has to be made between (Beck, 2008, pp. 319-320): 
 
1. cyclical unemployment (Kölzer, 2014, p. 103; Beck, 2008, pp. 319-320), 
2. structural unemployment (Beck B. , 2008, p. 320; Werding, 2006, p. 2), 
3. and frictional unemployment (Späte, 2002, p. 41; Beck, 2008, pp. 319-320). 
 
Whereas the cyclical unemployment (Mellenthin, 2006, p. 52 et seqq.) under 1. is to 
be understood as the lack of aggregate demand. A possible solution would be a 
reasonable Keynesian policy associated with a transition to flexible labor markets 
in combination with social support (Kölzer, 2014, p. 103, Mellenthin, 2006, p. 52 et 
seqq.).  
With structural unemployment under 2. the qualifications do not correspond 
with the job specifications (Brandes & Weise, 1980, p. 81 et seqq.). Another issue is 
the lack of spatial mobility. One approach to solving that problem would be better 
education, better organization of training and promoting mobility (Brandes & 
Weise, 1980, p. 81 et seqq.; Beck, 2008, p. 320). 
The frictional unemployment is the least problematic, since this applies to job seek-
ers who are not acting imperatively (Beck, 2008, pp. 319-320, Späte, 2002, p. 41). 
2.3.3.3 Deliberations on National Economics in the Sense of Neoclassic  
Preliminary remarks  
The neoclassical economic theory (Joas, 2007, p. 467; Vilks, 1991, p. 2 et seqq.; Huth 
T. , Berlin, p. 13 et seqq.) deals with the idea of economism of the early twentieth 
century (Zhan, 2014, pp. 51-80). With the „Chamberlain Revolution“ (Brakmann & 
Heijdra, 2004, p. 135 et seqq.), the „Keynesian Revolution“ (Laidler, 1999, p. 3 et 
seqq.) and the „Rational Expectations Revolution“ (Mishkin, 1995, pp. 1-25; Cord, 
2013, p. 4 et seqq.), modern economics (Gagliardi & Gindis, 2011, pp. 336-342) has 
undergone three major intellectual upheavals (Fazzari, 1985, pp. 66-80). They 
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formed the theoretical framework, including both microeconomics and macroeco-
nomics (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009, p. 22). This framework is known as the neo-
classical economics (Riese, 1979, p. 88 et seqq.; Hampicke, 1992, p. 21 et seqq.; 
Muther, 2010, p. 20 et seqq.). It strikingly differs from the classical economics 
known to this date (Stadermann & Steiger, 2006, p. 237). The neoclassical economics 
reflects the research and development of modern Western mainstream economics 
(Macharzina & Wolf, 2008, p. 54; Gläser, 2014, p. 9) over the past hundred years.  
The common idea shared with classical economics is that of a free market 
economy and to combat the excessive governmental interference of Keynesianism 
(Buchholz, 2010). The central argument of the neoclassical theory can be summa-
rized as follows (Simons-Kaufmann, 2003, p. 44 et seqq.): 
 
Economic underdevelopment results from an incorrect price policy and excessive state in-
terference in the governments of the Third World causes a misallocation of resources. There-
fore, the respective roles of government and market must be re-evaluated with the economic 
development and market forces are to be used to solve development problems.  
  
The neoclassical economics emphasizes the role of the market in terms of economic 
development, and only the market can control a balanced economic development 
(Fuchs, 2002, pp. 178-179; Beitzinger, 2004, p. 123 et seqq.). The price is regarded as 
the core factor of economic development in neoclassical economics (Bontrup, 2004, 
p. 367; Henning, 2005, p. 133; Lippold, 2015, p. 5 et seqq.). Therefore, price distor-
tions in developing countries restrict a positive economic development the most. 
The most primary cause of price distortions is a false government policy (Shukla, 
2010, pp. 71-74).  Related to the European issues, this means a rethinking of the 
countries regarding their fiscal policies and – as discussed at the beginning based 
on the electricity rates – a quick reduction of price differences within the European 
Union.  
Neoclassical Theory of the Labor Market  
The neoclassic Labor Market Theory shall be become apparent with the help of fig-
ure 45. The labor supply LS of employee’s increases with the real wage rate w, the 
labor demand of the employers LN decreases with the real wage rate (Bofinger & 
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Meyer, 2011, p. 92; Mankiw, 1993, p. 383; Nissen, 1999, p. 240). If the labor market 
is left to itself, the result will be a balanced real wage rate w* with full employment 
L* (Biesecker & Kesting, 2003, pp. 355-360; Heine & Herr, 2013, p. 599; Ehreiser & 
Nick, 1978, p. 28 et seqq.). 
Figure 45: Labor Market Model Neoclassic Part 1 
 
Source: Own representation based on Biesecker & Kesting, 2003, pp. 355-360. 
     w 
 
 
 
 w* 
   0          L* Labor  
 
LN 
LS 
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Figure 46: Labor Market Model Neoclassic Part 2 
 
Source: Own representation based on Biesecker & Kesting, 2003, pp. 355-360. 
At a lower real wage rate w0 labor shortages (over-employment = OE see in figure 
46) prevails, at a higher real wage rate, unemployment (LU) prevails (Richert, 2007, 
p. 33). The cause for this condition are exemplary the high labor costs (Baumann 
M. , 2009, p. 140), but also the overly high wage demands (Fries, 2014, p. 34) by the 
unions (Lübke & Grossekettler, 1999). Due to the transition to flexible labor markets 
and the reduction of the real wage rate and wage labor costs, these supply-side 
economics could provide a solution.  
2.3.3.4 Growth Considerations During the Crisis 
These simplified models are based on the considerations of the different ap-
proaches in economics, which issue in part significantly divergent economic policy 
recommendations.  
 
While the neoclassical economics propagates (Uchatius, 2005, pp. 1-2), 
the deficit of today is the burden of tomorrow, 
the Keynesian School teaches (Uchatius, 2005, pp. 1-2),  
the debts of today are tomorrow’s growth! 
w 
 
 w1 
 w* 
 
 w0 
0 L(YN) L* Labor 
 
LU LS 
OE LN 
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Comprehensive economic thought has been given to the current problems of the 
European Union. Up until the crisis, basically most scientists and other experts 
were predominantly neoclassical focused (Nienhaus, 2009, p. 80; Rürup, 
Hengsbach, Weingart, & Leif, 2010, p. 49 et seqq.). Since both the demand-side and 
the supply-side models always stood in discussion among each other, the return to 
Keynes (Tichy, 2012, p. 89) is certainly not to be understood as a complete paradigm 
shift (Piper, 2010). Nevertheless, the almost forgotten Keynes is receiving more at-
tention again. Based on the above model, renowned representatives explain 
Keynes’ comeback (Economist, 2009) as follows:  
 
 The crisis has not been triggered by the misconduct of the central banks, the 
supervisory institutions or the rating agencies. The deregulation and sub-
sequent failure of the markets is rather due to the dominance of neoclassical 
and neo-liberal assumptions (Wellas, 2012, p. 339).  
 The financial market is not the cause of the problem, but the general unde-
sirable development of the global economy. Here, the financial crisis is 
merely a symptom of social and global inequality (Behrmann, 2011). 
 The market failure is responsible for the crisis, not the state like neoclassics 
maintains. Here, the deregulation of the economy is the cause (Schrüfer, 
2010, p. 56).  
 The world economic system must be fundamentally changed in order to get 
the problems under control. It is necessary to stronger regulate the financial 
sector (Mayert, 2011, p. 1). 
 
In part, these considerations are several years old. However, these approaches are 
more present than ever. The very fact, that the regulation of the financial sector 
(Sender, 2012, pp. 98-117) was not least initiated by the AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU 
(Späth, 2013, p. 42) and has since been implemented for the most part, which will 
be discussed in this study as well (starting chapter 3), indicates that there has been 
a rethinking back to Keynes (Krugmann P. , 2009, p. 211; Plickert, 2008, pp. 1-2; 
Straubhaar, 2008, p. 1). It was tried to counteract the crisis with numerous stimulus 
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packages (Steinbach, 2012, pp. 352-360) throughout Europe (Welfens, 2011, p. 16). 
Meanwhile, the politico-economic policy makers have accepted the recommenda-
tions of the economists which in majority have converted to the demand-oriented 
economic policy (Erber, 2013, p. 1).  
2.3.4 System of National Accounting 
2.3.4.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The goal of National Accounting – NA – (Brümmerhoff & Grömling, 2011, p. 
6; Schultz W. , 1990, p. 20; Perret & Welfens, 2016, p. 92 et seqq.) is the definition 
(Jones, 2000, pp. 167-178) and statistical measurement of macroeconomic income 
parameters such as the value calculation or flow figures. Generally, only goods and 
commodities produced in the respective period are being recorded, irrespective of 
their intended use (Thiele & Güntert, 2014, p. 54 et seqq.; Lachmann, 1990, p. 121; 
Richter J. , 2002, p. 99). The European System of Accounts (ESA) forms the reference 
base for the NA (Henkes, 2008, p. 543). With its introduction, the European Union 
expected and expects a harmonization (eurostat, 2016) of the European National 
Accounting (DESTATIS, 2014). The National Accounting (figure 47) is a value state-
ment (figure 47), which means that the quantities produced are valued at prices 
(Woll, 2011, p. 283; Koschnick, 1998, p. 484; Schäfer M. J., 1996). Simply put: 
Figure 47: Calculations of National Accounting 
 Production Unit price Production value 
CDs / XY-Ltd.      10.000 pieces          10,00 euro 100.000,00 euro 
DVDs / XY-Ltd.      10.000 pieces 15,00 euro 150.000,00 euro 
Blanks / Z-Ltd.      20.000 pieces 3,90 euro 78.000,00 euro 
Pro. value   328.000,00 euro 
Source: Own representation based on Schäfer M. J., 1996, p. 48 et seqq. 
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The value statement is the transition to value added and thus the gross domestic 
product (GDP). The measuring points for recording the value added are 
(Koschnick, 1998, p. 484):  
 Production approach (production) 
 Expenditure approach (consumption) 
 Income breakdown (remuneration of production factors) 
 
2.3.4.2 Measurand Gross Domestic Product 
The following statement has proven itself as a definition of the GDP, the 
Gross Domestic Product  (Cutler, 2013, pp. 19-24; Cao & Tate, 2016, pp. 1-14):  
 
The GDP is the market value of all goods and services intended for consumers, which are 
being produced in a country during a given period. It is called nominal GDP if it is calcu-
lated at current prices and price-adjusted or real GDP, if it is calculated at previous prices 
(Wildmann, 2010, pp. 31-34; Hohlstein, Pflugmann-Hohlstein, Sperber, & Sprink, 
2009, p. 120 et seqq.). 
 
There are three calculation options for the GDP. For this, also see the preliminary 
observations of the previous chapter. There, the measuring points for the recording 
of the value added have been noted. Supplementary thereto (Koschnik, 1998, p. 
484): 
 
Production  = Production approach. 
Consumption = Expenditure approach. 
Remuneration* = Income breakdown (Woll, 2014, pp. 282-284). 
*Remuneration means the payment of production factors.  
 
Incidentally, all calculation methods lead to the same result as the following little 
calculation shows (production chain figure 48). As an example of a small economy, 
the data from figure 47 are intended. It is about the representation of the GDP. The 
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GDP is the value of all final goods. The GDP is the sum of all values added 
(Wünsche, 2009, p. 120 et seqq.). 
 
Value added = sales revenue minus advance. 
Figure 48: Production Chain 
 
Z-Limited XY-Limited 
Sales                                   78.000,00 euro Sales                                  250.000,00 euro 
Wages                                  60.000,00 euro Wages                                120.000,00 euro 
Profit                                    18.000,00 euro Basic materials                  78.000,00 euro 
 Profit                                   52.000,00 euro 
Source: Own representation bases on Wünsche, 2009, p. 120 et seqq. 
 
Production approach: 
Value added Z-Limited = 78.000,00 euro – 0.00 euro = 78.000,00 euro. 
Value added XY-Limited = 250.000,00 euro – 78.000,00 euro = 172.000,00 euro. 
Sum of value added = GDP = 78.000,00 euro + 172.000,00 euro = 250.000,00 euro. 
 
 
Flow statement: 
The GDP resulting from the sum of uses. 
GDP = consumption (C) + investments (I) + government spending on goods and 
services (G) + exports (Ex) – imports (Im). 
In this simple example, there are only consumer spending totaling 250.000,00 euro. 
 
Distribution calculation: 
The GDP resulting from the sum of all income (labor income, capital income). 
Labor income = wages Z-Ltd. + wages XY-Ltd. = 60.000,00 euro + 120.000,00 euro = 
180.000,00 euro. 
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Capital income = profit Z-Ltd. + profit XY-Ltd. = 18.000,00 euro + 52.000,00 euro = 
70.000,00 euro. 
The sum of all incomes = 180.000,00 euro + 70.000,00 euro = 250.000,00 euro. 
 
The development of the GDP in the European Union has already been graphically 
presented in the above chapter 2.2.3.2.  In regard to the allocation of domestic prod-
ucts within the European Union it is important that in 2013 the Euro-Zone had a 
market share of 73.4%. The five biggest economies of the European Union - Ger-
many, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Spain – accumulated 71.0% alone 
(eurostat, ec.europa.eu, 2014). The GDP of the European Union in 2014 increased 
by 3.0 percent. The distribution with respect to the Euro Zone (EUROSTAT, 2015) 
and the five largest economies has almost not changed (72.6% BIP ER-19, 71.4% 
Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain). To determine the purchasing power, the 
GDP/capita (Cebula, 2013, pp. 368-372) is often used (Hanslik, 2012, p. 61). Because 
the fluctuations in the exchange rates of countries not parties to the Euro-Zone, this 
calculation, however, is uncertain. More suitable for the calculation of purchasing 
power is the Power Purchasing Standard (PPS). The PPS is a fictitious figure, inde-
pendent of the national currency, which is eliminating distortions based on differ-
ences in price levels in different countries (OECD, 2007). 
2.3.4.3 Measurand Net Domestic Product 
The net domestic product (Rübel, 2013, p. 5; Sauerwald, 2014, p. 16; 
Eichberger, 2011, p. 110) at market prices equals the value sum of private consump-
tion, public consumption, net investments and exported minus imported goods 
(Woll, 2014, p. 284; Wildmann, 2010, p. 36). It is also calculated by deducting the 
depreciation from the gross domestic product at market prices (Rübel, 2013, p. 5; 
Sauerwald, 2014, p. 16; Woll, 2014, p. 284; Wildmann, 2010, p. 36). After subtraction 
of indirect taxes minus subsidies, the net domestic product at factor prices 
(Fischbach & Wollenberg, 2007, p. 111 et seqq.) is attained (Rübel, 2013, p. 5; Sauer-
wald, 2014, p. 16; Woll, 2014, p. 284; Wildmann, 2010, p. 36; Fischbach & Wollen-
berg, 2007, p. 111 et seqq.). This is the value of all factor income incurred in a period 
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in the domestic production process (Fischbach & Wollenberg, 2007, p. 111 et seqq.; 
Woll, 2014, p. 284). The factor income is the earned income plus the investment 
income and equals exactly the sum of factor costs (Fischbach & Wollenberg, 2007, 
p. 111 et seqq.) of all domestic economic sectors (Hardes & Uhly, 2007). Adding the 
factor income abroad of national residents and subtracting the domestic factor in-
come of foreign nationals will equal the sum of all factor income accrued by na-
tional residents in that respective period, the national income. As a definition of the 
national domestic product (NDP) could apply (Rübel, 2013, p. 5; Sauerwald, 2014, 
p. 16; Woll, 2014, p. 284; Wildmann, 2010, p. 36; Fischbach & Wollenberg, 2007, p. 
111 et seqq.): 
 
The NDP is the measure for the actual aggregate income of an economy.  
The NDP therefore is equivalent to 
 
𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝐸𝑥 − 𝐼𝑚. 
 
Where C is consumption, I is the private investment, G stands for government 
spending, Ex - Im = net export, thus exports minus imports. According to the 
Keynesian theory, now sufficiently explained, the NDP is determined by demand 
(Wildmann, 2010, p. 112). The aggregate demand is composed of:  
 
 Consumer demand 
 Investment demand 
 Government demand 
 Foreign demand (Krugmann & Obstfeld, 2009, pp. 270-277) 
 
In contrast, the neoclassic theory states that the NPD determines the level of ex-
penditure (Heine & Herr, 2013, p. 272; Puhani, 2009, p. 88). Apparently, it seems to 
be no matter what kind of calculation is being applied, whether that might be the 
calculation of the GDP (gross domestic product) or the PPS (purchasing power 
standard) or even the NDP (net domestic product) – such a value always depends 
on the investments as well.  Whether by individuals or entire corporations, the in-
crease of these values within the European Union can only be accomplished by 
providing incentives for investments. 
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2.3.5 Economic Growth and Full Employment 
Goals that are inherent in a market economy are values (Falk, 2016, p. 1) such as 
prosperity (Erhard, 1957, p. 9), freedom, security and justice (Hißler, 2014, p. 98). 
Especially for the European Union, with its still very different regional living stand-
ards, these values need to be a constant inducement. In this, dealing between Mem-
ber States and those wishing to obtain membership needs to be optimized. Already, 
ancient societies have gained wealth by working with their near or distant neigh-
bors, as economists of earlier years have observed. Adam Smith already noted in 
his work (chapter 3) from 1789 – An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth 
of Nation – that the riches of e.g. ancient Egypt proved that a country could reach 
an especially high level of wealth, even if foreigners were in large part responsible 
for its export trades (Kiesewetter, 2006, p. 25). And some time later he notes that 
the North American and West Indian colonies would not have developed as 
quickly, if not for the use of foreign capital in order to export excess commodities 
(Smith, 2005, p. 314). From the above-mentioned values, the Magic Square (figure 
49) has emerged. This square symbolizes the four main objectives (Bofinger, 2011, 
p. 273) of an economy and their relation with each other (Cezanne, 2005, p. 66) For 
this study, the relation between growth and employment is of significant im-
portance. The fact that price stability is an important indicator, has already been 
recognized at the beginning. In any case, the balance of foreign trade is usually 
considered separately.  
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Figure 49: Magic Square – Economic System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on Bofinger, 2011. p. 273.11 
Economic Growth 
The traditionally most important indicator for the growth of an economy is the 
gross domestic product already discussed above (Wildmann, 2010, pp. 31-34)  
 
 Appropriate economic growth means that not only the benefits but also the 
potential costs of growth must be taken into account. Here, the eco-political 
objectives need to be incorporated. Appropriate growth is being pursued to 
improve the material living standard (Weeber, 2009, p. 24; Föhl & 
Oppenländer, 1968, p. 22; Sandte, 1998, p. 183).  
 Continuous growth (Herrmann F. , 2010, p. 194) is to alleviate the imbalance 
between aggregate demand and aggregate supply and to effectuate an in-
terference-free dynamic process.  Especially the degree of efficiency of the 
                                                     
11 Cezanne has also inspired for this presentation. In the field of stabilizing it comes to avoid as 
possible, unpleasant side effects of the productive economy process such as unemployment, infla-
tion, low growth and external imbalances. The policy objectives, that need to be achieved in the 
area of stabilization, are these four areas in figure 49 (Cezanne, 2005, p. 66). 
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macroeconomic production potential serves as an indicator 
(Ventzislavarova & Hensel, 2013, p. 25; Butschek, 2016, p. 29 et seqq.; Kirsch, 
Bamberger, Berg, & Weber, 1975, p. 129 et seqq.).  
Full Employment 
A key indicator of the employment situation is the unemployment rate already pre-
sented in chapter 2.2.3.2. However, when interpreting the unemployment rate as 
an indicator of underemployment (Wildmann, 2007, p. 84), there are still some 
forms of underemployment that need to be taken into account (Kasten, 1959, pp. 
81-82; Friedrich H. , 1986, p. 28 et seqq.; Issing, 2011, p. 227). In particular, home-
makers (Haustein-Teßmer, 2008, p. 1) and participants in government-funded em-
ployability measures remain unconsidered.  
Growth and Employment 
The link between economic growth and full employment is considered to be a har-
monious target relationship (Puhani, 2009, p. 3; Maly, 1991). With the increase of 
production, the employment situation will improve (Baumohl, 2007, p. 131) – and 
vice versa (Cezanne, 2005, p. 500). However, economic growth must exceed a min-
imum value – the employment threshold (Klopmeier, 2014, p. 59; Bitting, 2009, p. 
69; Frohn, et al., 2003, p. 161) – in order for employment to increase.  
 
The employment threshold is the economic growth (Clement, Terlau, & Kiy, 2013, p. 551 
et seqq.) which needs to be reached at least, in order for employment to increase 
(Klopmeier, 2014, p. 59; Bitting, 2009, p. 69; Frohn, et al., 2003, p. 161).  
 
According to Verdoorn’s law (Bairam, 1990, pp. 107-112) there is a linear relation-
ship between labor productivity and the production growth (Pusse, 2002, pp. 71-
78; Jungmittag, 2006, p. 20; Erber, Hagemann, & Seiter, 1998, p. 131). Assuming an 
aggregate economic growth, including that of employment, more labor productiv-
ity will lead to increased employment and, according to Keynes, to more demand. 
The study intends to show: 
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whether there is a relationship between labor productivity of individual countries – in this 
case, Austria, Germany and Greece – and the Gross Domestic Product, respectively the 
PPS, 
 
and is not being conducted in the frame of a regression analysis (Schenderra, 2014, 
p. 36 et seqq.; Hatzinger, Hornik, & Nagel, 2011, p. 281 et seqq.), because the 
amount of data is too small.  
Figure 50: GDP per Capita in the EU, Euro-Zone, Austria, Germany and Greece 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
The gross domestic product per capital in the EU, Euro-Zone in Austria, Germany 
and Greece is shown in figure 50. In figure 51 the unemployment in this areas can 
be seen and in figure 52 the purchasing power standard.  
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Figure 51: Unemployment in selected Countries 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
Figure 52: Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) 
 
Source: Own representation based Eurostat. 
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A correlation analysis (Hatzinger, Hornik, & Nagel, 2011, p. 276 et seqq.) would be 
appropriate, however, the author wanted a distinct depiction of the values, which 
speak for themselves (the figures, in which the data are derived from 2013 and have 
been gathered from the pages of the European Union (eurostat, 2016). These figures 
are only intended to illustrate the principle. In this context, under labor productiv-
ity, it is to be understood as nominal labor productivity per hour work. 
The study shows that, while Austria’s PPS is higher than that of Germany 
and Greece, the labor productivity (figure 53) of the Austrians is at least lower than 
that of the Germans. Since Austria has a higher traditional gross domestic product 
than Germany and reports an identical unemployment rate, a correlation cannot be 
necessarily established when looking at one period. Recent figures also give no de-
finitive statement about the consistency of the Verdoorn Law (Michie, 2013, p. 879) 
so there may be a correlation between the labor productivity and gross domestic 
product per capita and the purchasing power standard.  
Figure 53: Labor Productivity pro Working Hour 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
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Figure 54: Correlation Labor Productivity Austria – Germany  
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
For 2015 – without Greece – the following figures represent Austria. Labor produc-
tivity is 114.8 with a gross domestic product of € 39.100, a PPS of 127 and an unem-
ployment rate of 5.7%. In Germany the labor productivity is 126.4, with a gross 
domestic product of € 37.100, a PPS of 125 and an unemployment rate of 4.6%. The 
data are standardized for the graphics.  
However, since the values of Austria and Germany are at a very high level as 
opposed to Greece, a basic correlation (figure 54) between a high labor productivity 
and the economic growth of country can be assumed.  For the European Union and 
its Member States this could mean that investments in new production facilities 
and efforts to provide the operators of such enterprises – whether it be founders of 
new businesses or entrepreneurs or Private Equity firms – with reasonable frame-
work, should be promoted and expedited. 
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3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN SELECTED COUNTRIES  
3.1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
This work aims to generate benefits for entrepreneurs – in terms of start-ups 
(Ripsas, 1997, p. 69; Gleißner, 2001; Hartmann, 2010, p. 72). For this purpose, a new 
fund form is to be created, which overcomes primarily the fiscal barriers. With the 
AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU (Buck-Heeb, 2014, p. 270; Berens R. E., 2014, p. 98; 
Schwarz, 2016, p. 168) the European legislator has created a set of rules forcing the 
national legislatures to act accordingly (Muller & Ruttiens, 2013, p. 1). However, 
this elaboration does not want to interfere with regulatory requirements, whether 
at EU level or national level. Rather, it should be noted at this point that the author 
explicitly aims at a new fiscal optimized fund structure which places the focus on 
the founders of new businesses. For this, it is necessary to recognize existing Private 
Equity structures and to take measures to create an exemplarily Private Equity fund 
providing policy recommendations, which allow those interested in Private Equity 
to combine investments into the future of the European Union with their own busi-
ness interests.  
Chapter 3 presents how much the provisions of the Member states of the Eu-
ropean Union differ from each other in regards to Private Equity. In the course, 
regulatory and fiscal framework, without which at least in Germany a tax classifi-
cation is hardly possible, will be in part discussed in detail.  
The basis for the following explanations is the AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU, the di-
rectly flanking delegated regulation (EU) no. 231/2013 of the Commission of 19. 
December 2012 (with justification) and the ESMA guidelines 2013. Additional 
agreements and supplements as the delegated regulation (EU) no. 694/2014 or the 
corresponding implementing regulations would lead to a confusion, which is not 
conducive to the tax consideration. 
Thus, the chapter begins with a consideration of the rules, which have been pro-
vided by the European Union for its Member States. The following explanations 
were also treated in the publication “Income Tax Treatment of Private Equity 
Funds in Germany after Directive 2011/61/EU” by the author of this study (Mauer, 
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2015, pp. 135-154). Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) control signifi-
cant parts of all investments (Mauer, 2015, p. 144) in Europe (kpmg, 2013) and 
linked by the EU Commission to the reasons of the financial crisis (fmm-magazin, 
2012). These managers could influence the corporations in which they invest 
(Postler, 2015, p. 6) and increase the risks within the financial system (kpmg, 2013). 
In order to obtain comprehensive common supervisory rules, a framework had to 
be created to address these risks. The Alternative Investment Fund Manager Di-
rective (AIFMD). In the context of the G20 summit in London and Pittsburgh in 
2009 (Wallach, 2014, p. 96), the participating heads of State and government de-
cided to regulate system-relevant financial institutions (Grüner, 2011, p. 274). At 
European level, the regulation of Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) 
was implemented in June 2011 by Directive 2011/61/EU (fundresearch.de, 2013). It 
defines the common requirements for the approval of managers (Tietje, 2015, p. 
691; finanzen.net, 2013) and regulates their supervision (Sixt. 2014, p. 175). The goal 
is to ensure a common approach regarding the manager-associated risks (Glander, 
2011, p. 1) and their effect for investors and markets in the EU (fundresearch.de, 
2013; Mauer, 2015, p. 144). 
The AIFM Directive already entered into effect on 21 July 2011 (Burgmaier & 
Hüthig, 2015, p. 40; EUR-Lex, 2016). This EU Directive in part leaves the regulations 
and supervision to the nations. For example, the AIFM Directive does not regulate 
Alternative Investment Funds (AIF) in regard to the form of organization (Casper, 
2014, p. 136). Apart from that, the transition period into national law (Port & 
Steinlein, 2015, p. 80) expired on 22 July 2013 (Wallach, 2013, p. 96; Mauer, 2015, p. 
144). 
By the end of 2013, not all Member States had implemented this policy in its 
entirety, which certainly had a significant influence on this work. Prior to the be-
ginning of this thesis, thus in the context of the exposé and the proposal, it was 
intended to select Spain and Germany for a closer review of the fiscal framework 
in particular. Since Spain had not yet fully implemented the AIFM Directive by the 
expected date, Germany however in any case had been first chosen; Austria and 
Luxembourg were chosen to accompany this work as reference countries. The qual-
ification of Austria for this comparison is at hand. The close proximity to Germany 
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might initially suggest that the regulations of the two countries are at a similar 
level. The cultural differences may not be as large, so one could assume the readi-
ness to assume risks, which quite certainly has to be present for a commitment in 
Private Equity. In addition, Austria has already been examined in regards to 
growth and in the context of labor productivity in comparison with Germany, in 
which Austria has already provided surprising results compared to her neighbor. 
Austria and Luxembourg shall therefore now be examined along with Germany in 
terms of conditions regarding Private Equity. Luxembourg is considered the model 
country (Bernhard, 2010, p. 214) in terms of Private equity and has therefore been 
nominated. The cause that a major proportion of this chapter is devoted to Ger-
many is simply due to the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany is in a difficult 
position with regard to Private Equity, despite its prominent position in terms of 
its gross domestic product (sozialpolitik-aktuell.de, 2015), which is probably due 
to its opaque regulation (Hinrichs, 2012, p. 1). Greece, being another candidate, was 
also removed from the inner circle during the investigation, since Greece on the 
one hand has only a few organized Private Equity firms and on the other hand is 
currently in such a poor economic condition in every respect, that an examination 
of the terms for Private Equity funds would be predicated on only few data. Nev-
ertheless, Greece is even and especially most interesting for further investigations, 
since it is there that new conditions for Private Equity within the European Union 
could provide such an important revival, even though the continuing membership 
of Greece is yet undetermined (Rieth & Wittenberg, 2014, p. 750). 
The AIFM Directive allows EU fund managers to sell Alternative Investment Funds 
under certain conditions, such as the mandatory use of an authorization process 
and under the control of national state regulatory, to professional investors 
(Lexology, 2016).  
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Figure 55: AIFMD Transposition Timeline 
 
 
 
3.2 LEGISLATIVE CONTENT OF THE AIFM DIRECTIVE 
3.2.1 Background of the Establishment of the Directive and its Scope of Appli-
cation 
3.2.1.1 Backgrounds for the Necessity of Action 
With the continuous development and innovation of the global financial in-
dustry, a variety of financial and investment institutions have emerged since the 
21st Century as a counter-pole to the traditional banks (Schalast & Barten, 2008, p. 
11).  The new instruments have similar credit, financing and investment functions 
like the banks (Brettel et al, 2008, p. 14), but were not subject to formal regulation 
like the banks (Keuper & Puchta, 2010, p. 198). In the year 2007, these new financial 
institutions were still titled “Shadow Banks” by the Managing Director of the US 
Pacific Investment Management, Paul McCulley (Felsenheimer, Klopfer, Mirth, & 
Altenstadt, 2011, p. 388). These alleged shadow banks do encounter quiet some 
     2018        2013        2014        2015        2016        2017 
July 2013:  
Implementation into national law 
December 2013:  
Implementation of 
reporting requirements 
July 2014:  
Transportation period ends.  
Deadline for application for  
authorization of AIFMs 
Potential extension of passport regime to third countries 
Potential termination of Maltese clause 
provision (Art. 61(5) AIFMD) 
Transposition into national law 
ESMA may decide to abol-
ish the national private 
placement regime 
Source: Own representation based on Braun, Haas, & Hornsby, 2013, p. 5. 
 
The timeline (figure 55) above illustrates (Braun, Haas, & Hornsby, 2013, p. 5) the trans-
position of the Directive. 
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problems (Shiller, 2012, p. 70). Among those are non-standardized trade, high li-
quidity risk and a poor regulation of these potential risk factors and are therefore 
being partly held responsible for the outbreak of the financial crisis (Berg, 2009, p. 
265).  
For the European Union this also meant that a response was called for (Barnier, 
2013). In reaction to the latest financial crisis, the EU legislator adopted Directive 
2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, the so-called AIFM-
Directive (Ulmrich, 2013, p. 179). It, for example, introduced a license requirement 
for fund managers managing and/or distributing alternative investment funds, the 
so-called AIF (Bürgers & Körber, 2014, p. 20; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 2).  
The Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers adjusts the needs for the 
natural or legal persons entrusted with the management and the administration of 
alternative investment funds distributed by professional investors in the EU 
(Braunberger, Everling, & Rieken, 2011, p. 47). For managers of AIF that are sold in 
accordance with national regulations to small investors, minimum standards are 
set (Ammon & Izzo-Wagner, 2015, p. 1408). 
The directive applies to a wide diversity of AIF and extends from equity funds to 
funds that invest in non-liquid assets and their managers (Europäische 
Kommission, 2013, p. 2; Izzo-Wagner & Baas, 2015, p. 396 et seqq.). Illiquid assets 
in this context are for example real estate or Private Equity (Izzo-Wagner & Baas, 
2015, p. 396 et seqq.; Delegated regulation, 2013, p. 2). The directive is to be applied 
to all investment strategies and legal types of AIFM and AIF (bafin.de, 2015). For 
Private Equity Companies, respectively their funds, this means that it regulates the 
future in a strict and controlled manner, (Izzo-Wagner & Baas, 2015, p. 396 et seqq.; 
Delegated regulation, 2013, p. 2) so they need in the future a license and a deposi-
tary (Izzo-Wagner & Baas, 2015, p. 396 et seqq.; Delegated regulation, 2013, p. 2). 
Thus, if the AIFM shall have an approval, it must comply with a few requirements 
(Izzo-Wagner & Baas, 2015, p. 396 et seqq.; Delegated regulation, 2013, p. 2). These 
include capital requirements, risk and liquidity management, and as already men-
tioned the appointment of a depositary and information requirements to investors 
and duties to inform the responsible agencies (Izzo-Wagner & Baas, 2015, p. 396 et 
seqq.; Delegated regulation, 2013, p. 2). 
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Figure 56: Categories of Investment Funds in Europe 
 
Source: Own representation based on Buck-Heeb, 2014, p. 314 et seqq. 
All investment funds in Europe are now divided by the AIFM Directive (Buck-
Heeb, 2014, p.277) into two (figure 56) categories (Delegated regulation, p. 2)12. 
There are now the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securi-
ties (UCITS) and the Alternative Investment Funds (PWC, 2014, p. 72), in which 
UCITS are regulated by the UCITS Directive (2009/65/EC) and may be sold on the 
retail market (Delegated regulation, p.2).  
For the UCITS area, management assets exist (Moroni, 2015, p. 1) in the 
amount of nearly six trillion euros, (Delegated regulation, p.2), which is almost 
three times as much as for the AIF area (Chevalier & Sciales, 2010) with 2.2 trillion 
euros, (Delegated regulation, p.2). In 2010 – before the enacting of the AIFM Di-
rective – the AIF-managed assets caught a total of 18 percent of the EU GDP and 68 
percent of the assets of AIF were held by institutional investors, of which 70 percent 
were pension funds or insurance companies (Delegated regulation, 2012, p. 2). The 
AIFM Directive provides very detailed implementing measures affecting a wide 
range  (Höring J. , 2013, p. 281) of issues, (Delegated regulation, p. 2), for example, 
including the calculation (Dietrich, 2016, p. 234) of assets under management 
(Bafin, 2013), measures for accurate alignment of leveraged investments, the deter-
mination of certain conditions for exercising the AIFM activity, the transfer of 
                                                     
12 Delelierte Verordnung (EU) Nr. 231/2013 (EU, 2013) der Kommission vom 19. Dezember 2012 
zur Ergänzung der Richtlinie 2011/61/EU (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 
of 19 December 2012 supplementing Directive 2011/61/EU). 
 
INVESTMENT FUND CATEGORIES 
 
UCITS 
 
AIF 
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AIFM functions, special provisions for risk and liquidity management (pwc, 2014), 
clarification of roles and the liability of a depositary, transparency requirements 
and rules relating to third countries (Delegated regulation, 2012, p.2; pwc, 2014). 
The here-cited delegated regulation introduces, with regard to the authorization to 
adopt delegated acts, a uniform body of rules and regulations, ensuring that a level 
playing field for AIFM exists in the European Union (Delegated regulation, pp. 2-
3). A rule is the appropriate legal instrument for establishing uniform rules appli-
cable to the AIFM (Delegated regulation, p. 3). Since a regulation essentially re-
quires no implementation (DNR, 2014), there is no risk of varied applications in the 
different Member States (Delegated regulation, p. 3). For AIFM it will be easier to 
cross-border (Volhard & Jang, 2013, pp. 218-219) manage and distribute AIF (Dele-
gated regulation, p.3; Volhard & Jang, 2013, pp. 218-219). In principle, this ap-
proach can be viewed as a relief. 
3.2.1.2 Scope of Application and Transitional Provisions 
The scope of application of the Directive deals with the managers of alterna-
tive investment funds (Gubalke & Zander, 2013; Preisser, 2013, p. 217 et seqq.). Al-
ternative investment funds are the collective assets that do not fall under the UCITS 
Directive (Höring J. , 2013, p. 282; Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 18). For the period until 
the final implementation of the Directive, some special arrangements have been 
created, that are partly no longer valid now. Nevertheless, they should be briefly 
presented here. 
This negative definition from above flows to an extremely broad construction. 
Among the managers are the managers of hedge funds or Private Equity funds, as 
well as those of open and closed-end funds and special funds, regardless of their 
form of organization (Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft, 2014, pp. 241-246; Andres, 
2011, p. 95). A manager of an AIF means any legal or natural person (Dietrich, 2015, 
p. 1203) under the draft directive (Weiser & Jang, 2011). The normal activities of 
managers are to manage one or more AIF (Braunberger, Everling, & Rieken, 2011; 
Gubalke & Zander, 2011, pp. 1-5). AIFM may be a manager from outside who is 
instructed to the management of the AIF accordingly (Gubalke & Zander, 2011, pp. 
1-5). Opposite, it may be the AIF itself, which shall then be admitted as AIFM, 
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where the form of organization of the AIF allows an internal management (Gubalke 
& Zander, 2011, pp. 1-5). The governing body of the AIF (Gubalke & Zander, 2011, 
pp. 1-5) then decides not to appoint an external AIFM (Cruccolini, 2012, pp. 567-
574). 
The final draft provides facilitations in the context of the application of the 
AIFM Directive (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Gubalke & Zander, 
2011, pp. 1-5)) when falling below certain thresholds of the total assets under man-
agement – the so-called small AIFM (Berk, 2013, pp. 20-21) – and in the manage-
ment of certain, already existing, closed-end funds. In terms of the draft directive, 
it is such a small AIFM, if the total assets of all managed AIF do not exceed 100 
million Euros or their managed, not leverage financed total assets do not exceed 
500 million Euros and no redemption rights (Gubalke & Zander, 2011, pp. 1-5) have 
arisen during the first five years (Markert, 2010, p. 333). The manager of such AIF 
only has to register and provide certain information (Zetzsche, 2015, p. 416; 
Hutzschenreuter T. , 2015, p. 58).  
Even when exceeding the thresholds, AIFM which managed funds already closed 
before the end of the two-year implementation period and which do not participate 
in additional investments after this period, do not require an authorization under 
the AIFM Directive (Bundesverband Öffentlicher Banken Deutschlands, 2014, pp. 
108-111). Also, according to the AIFM Directive, AIFM which managed funds al-
ready closed prior to the end of the two-year implementation period – regardless 
of any successive investments – required no authorization, if the funds have been 
launched for a time period which expires latest three years after the two-year im-
plementation period. In this case, however, Article 19 (Späth, 2013, p. 42) and – if 
necessary – Articles 26 through 29a are to be considered, which include inter alia 
the obligation to disclose the annual report and to verify the figures presented in 
the annual report within six months after the end of the financial year (Frick & 
Gericke, 2013, p. 89). 
3.2.1.3 Accreditation Scheme for the Management and Distribution of AIF 
The AIFM Directive regulates the principle that the management and the dis-
tribution of AIF requires accreditation (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084); 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN  SELECTED COUNTRIES  Page | 149 
 
 
this means without authorization the future AIF funds may not be managed 
(Braunberger, Everling, & Rieken, 2011, p. 36) or sold in the European Union, (Kra-
mer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). In this context it is referred to the so-called 
disqualification with reservation of authorization (Götting, et al., 2015, p. 691), 
(Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). In addition to the requirement of certi-
fication for AIFM and thus the regulation of the market access, the Directive incor-
porates the following (Mayert, 2011, pp. 43-47; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-
2084): 
 
 Requirements of transparency (Dietrich, 2015, p. 40; Kramer & Recknagel, 
2011, pp. 2077-2084) 
 Conditions for the pursuit of activities as a manager (Dietrich, 2015, p. 513; 
Buck-Heeb, 2014, p. 270; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084) 
 Special regulations for managers of non-leveraged AIF and Private Equity 
AIF (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084) 
 Distribution rules and third country regulations (Kramer & Recknagel, 
2011, pp. 2077-2084) 
 Provisions (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084) on competent au-
thorities (bafin.de, 2013) 
 
Some of these requirements do not only apply for the management of funds, but 
they need to be partially taken into account with the investments of the AIF  
(EAPSPI, 2012, pp. 5-14) managed by the AIFM, (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 
2077-2084). With the acquisition of an authorization for the management and dis-
tribution of one or more AIF, many admission requirements are related to the di-
rective (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). This includes, inter alia, the 
stocking of a particular seed capital, reliability of directors, and the guarantee of 
control (Demgensky, 2014, p. 1) by the owners, (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 
2077-2084) and the place of the headquarters of the AIFM (Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 
2012, p. 316) in the same (Tietje, 2015, p. 79) Member State (Kramer & Recknagel, 
2011, pp. 2077-2084; Article 8 Directive 2011/61/EU),.   
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With the permit application under the AIFM Directive, a large number of docu-
ments need to be presented (Article 7 para. 2 Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Reck-
nagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). This includes information on the managers and the 
owners of substantial holdings in the AIF, remuneration structures compliant with 
the regulations, a business plan, an organizational structure as well as information 
concerning the implementation and maintenance of an AIFM compliance and fi-
nally information (finanstilsynet.dk, 2013) on outsourcing issues (Kramer & Reck-
nagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). In addition, information on the AIF to be managed are 
needed; they relate to the investment strategy, potential leverage, possible feeder- 
and master structures, the seat of the AIF, contractual terms, depositaries 
(Moloney, 2014, p. 294) and investor information (Article 7 para. 3 Directive 
2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). 
Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) as an internally administrated 
AIF need a capital stock of at least 300.000 Euro whereas an external AIFM has to 
provide seed capital  (Hantschel, 2015) of 125.000 Euro (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, 
pp. 2077-2084). If the account of the AIF portfolio administrated by the AIFM  
(Markert, 2009, p. 334) exceeds 250 million Euro (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 
2077-2084) further equity capital needs to be raised, whereas the Member States of 
the European Union can authorize that this may be made available for up to 50 
percent through collateral of a credit institution (cssf.lu, 2013) or an insurance com-
pany (Article 9 para. 3 Directive 2011/61/EU; Article 6 Directive 2011/61/EU; Kra-
mer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). As may be the case there are liability risks, 
it can be covered by additional equity or by taking out liability insurance (Kramer 
& Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). The forecited capital resources of the AIFM shall 
be invested in liquid assets and may not include notional positions (Kramer & 
Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). Liable for the authorization process are the super-
visory authorities at the registered office of the AIFM (Article 7 para. 1 Directive 
2011/61/EU; Höring, 2013, p. 282; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011). This function is ex-
emplified accepted and executed in Germany by the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority (BaFin) and in Austria (Wallach, 2013, pp. 104-112) by the FMA (Finan-
cial Market Authority). 
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3.2.2 General Principle of Regulations Regarding AIFM 
3.2.2.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The requirements for the pursuit of the AIFM activities (Haase & Dorn, 2015, 
p. 57) are generally formulated in chapter III (Buck-Heeb, 2014, p. 270) of the Di-
rective 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and Council (cssf.lu, 2013; Kramer 
& Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). The complete catalog consists of good conduct 
and organizational obligations (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084) intended 
to ensure that an AIFM always fulfills his duties in a carefully competent, fair and 
honest manner in the best interest of the AIF and its investors and to avoid any 
conflicts of interest (Article 12 Directive 2011/61/EU; BaFin, 2013; Kramer & Reck-
nagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). The following section describes the criteria for adequate 
remuneration structures, answering questions such as: 
 
 How can conflicts of interests be avoided? 
 How can risk and liquidity management be adequately implemented? 
(BaFin, 2013). 
 
The crucial importance of the organizational structure of the AIFM is to function-
ally and hierarchically  (Schmidt-Zango, 2013) separate (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, 
pp. 2077-2084) the essential areas of operation according to its material definition 
of the portfolio and risk management in compliance with article 15 of the AIFM 
Directive (Schlitt, 2015, p.93; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011).  
3.2.2.2 Avoiding Conflicts of Interest 
The AIFM Directive requires the commission to establish the criteria (cssf.lu, 
2013; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 7). By these the responsible authority is in 
a position to judge whether the AIFM act in abidance by their duties (BaFin, 2013; 
Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 7). That is, if they candidly perform their duties 
with due skill, care, accurateness and act in the interest of the AIF (Braun & Kinsch, 
2013, p. B8), as well as treat the investors fairly, using appropriate resources and 
procedures and to take measures relating to conflicts of interest (Braun & Kinsch, 
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2013, p. B8; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p.7). The delegated regulation (Dele-
gated regulation (EU) No. 231/2013 of the commission from 19.12.2012) clearly de-
scribes, that the obligations primarily are intended to preserve the interests of the 
AIF or the investors, just as the fairness of the market (Europäische Kommission, 
2013, p. 7). It settles the extent of due care in general and the extent of due diligence 
when investing in limited liquid assets and the choosing and nomination of prime 
brokers (Prassl, 2015, pp. 63-64) and counterparties (Prassl, 2015, pp. 63-64, Eu-
ropäische Kommission, 2013, p. 7). In this context, the prime broker (Moloney, 2014, 
p. 275) is a service provider specializing both in the needs of hedge funds and the 
Private Equity funds (Kaiser D. G., 2004, p. 109; Curley, 2008, p. 61). This involves 
the raising of outside capital and the trade and custody of securities (Kaisser D.G.; 
2004, p. 109; Curley, 2008, p. 61). The regulation also determines rules for the crea-
tion of incentives and the treatment of contracts, including reporting requirements 
for the implementation of subscription and redemption orders and regulations for 
the placement of trade orders of the AIF and their establishment, and the pooling 
and distribution of orders (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 7). It also clarifies 
which types of conflicts (Behme & Lichtenstein, 2015, p. 324 et seqq.) of interest 
may occur (Behme, 2015, p. 329; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 7). In addition, 
it also specifies the respective principles with measures and regulations. Thereby 
AIFM shall be implemented and applied in order to determine conflicts of interest 
(Dietrich, 2016, p. 93; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 7). This intends to prevent, 
manage, monitor and report conflicts of interest (Europäische Kommission, p. 7). 
3.2.2.3 Requirements Regarding the Liquidity Management and the Risk Management 
Subject of consideration of the requirements for risk management (Eu-
ropäische Kommission, 2013, p. 7) are the regulation of the risk management func-
tion and its structural integration into the AIFM organization (Nack, 2012, pp. 351-
363; Schwarz, 2016, p. 168; Preuß & Schöne, 2016, pp. 391-438). The main principles 
of the AIFM Directive are in the functional and hierarchical separation of the port-
folio and risk management (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 8). Due to the in-
creasing importance of the risk management function, it is necessary to enable 
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AIFM for a more independent and objective risk assessment (credit-suisse.com, 
2014).  
Managers of AIF are encouraged to divide the portfolio and risk management in 
different areas of responsibility and to execute a permanent risk management func-
tion (Stadter & Dirnaichner, 2011, pp. 1-33). If AIFM implements an unclear divi-
sion of areas or executes those with disproportional efforts, precautions shall be 
conducted so as to ensure a minimum level of autonomy of the risk management 
function (Stadter & Dirnaichner, 2011, pp. 1-33). A conceivable measure would be 
to separate the conflicted areas of responsibility (Europäische Kommission, 2013, 
p. 8). The methods for this are the establishment of independent reporting channels 
and control mechanisms and the assessment of the risk management function by 
an independent third institution or by an internal panel (Goldbeck, 2013, pp. 17-
22).  
The assignment of the risk management function of the AIFM Directive is 
mainly the enforcement of the risk policy, which means the AIFM must create the 
conditions for an effective risk management (Schulz & Partner, 2015). The require-
ments are aimed at maintaining a typical risk profile (Hornschuh, et al., 2013, pp. 
1-97). Based on the directive, AIFM can implement appropriate risk management 
processes, methods and systems about which written documentation are created 
(Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 66; Article 15 Directive 2011/61/EU). The man-
agement should review these processes, systems and methods at least once every 
year in regards to their effectiveness (Bubel & Steinbissl, 2012, p. 67).  
As established in the 2013 published final ESMA proposals (ESMA – European Se-
curities and Markets Authority), AIFM are instructed to address especially non-
payment risks in regards to the liquidity, the market and credits in the context of 
their risk management (esma, 2013, pp. 1-50). To comply with the AIFM typical risk 
profiles, qualitative and/or quantitative limits must be determined (esma, 2013, pp. 
1-50). If then these limits are exceeded, AIFM must immediately report to the senior 
management. In addition, risk positions are to be quantified regularly (Article 15 
Directive 2011/61/EU), in which the AIFM Directive expressly prescribes the appli-
cation of stress tests (Stadter & Dirnaichner, 2011, pp. 1-33). 
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In the basic regulatory area of the AIFM Directive, the establishment and warranty 
of an adequate liquidity management is considered to be very important (Eu-
ropäische Kommission, 2013, p. 12; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). The 
mission of liquidity management is to create a balanced liquidity profile (Eu-
ropäische Kommission, 2013, p. 24; Baur, 2015, p. 412; Braunberger, Everling, & 
Rieken, 2011, p. 38). This permits the manager of the AIF to fulfill the commitments 
of investors or creditors even under unusual market conditions. An effective liquid-
ity management can assess the applicability of the methods and systems used and 
can identify and control liquidity risks at an early stage (Gehwald & Naumann, 
2011, p. 18).  
There is no “one size fits all” liquidity management (Glaser, 2015, p. 183). 
Therefore, the methods and systems must be individually tailored to the AIF 
(Stadter & Dirnaichner, 2011, pp. 1-33; Europäsiche Kommission, pp. 8, 73-75; Ar-
ticle 16 Directive 2011/61/EU). Consequently, there are no rigid regulations for the 
establishment of liquidity management, but rather more general specifications for 
its outline (Stadter & Dirnaichner, 2011, pp. 1-33; Europäsiche Kommission, pp. 8, 
73-75; Article 16 Directive 2011/61/EU). These can be implemented depending on 
the size and structure of the AIF (Stadter & Dirnaichner, 2011, pp. 1-33; Europäsiche 
Kommission, pp. 8, 73-75; Article 16 Directive 2011/61/EU). The principle, measures 
and instruments finally proposed in the ESMA include (Stadter & Dirnaichner, 
2011, pp. 1-33; Europäsiche Kommission, pp. 8, 73-75; Article 16 Directive 
2011/61/EU): 
 
 Provision of liquidity reserves must be tailored to the specifics of the AIF, 
 the execution and verification of appropriate provisions and methods for 
the judgement of different risks (size and quality) requires the existing and 
planned positions. Stress tests must regularly be performed at least once per 
year,  
 risk policy and risk management procedures must be documented and be 
subject to annual reviews, 
 appropriate de-escalation procedures are to be established in order to detect 
conceivable liquidity shortages at an early stage (Stadter & Dirnaichner, 
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2011, pp. 1-33; Europäsiche Kommission, pp. 8, 73-75; Article 16 Directive 
2011/61/EU).  
 
Similar minimum requirements are already proclaimed by InvMARisk (Minimum 
Requirements for Risk Management) in its circular 5/2010 dated June 30th, 2010 
(Wagner O. , 2015, pp. 73-96; Söbbing, 2015). 
3.2.2.4 Remuneration Schemes within the AIFM Directive 
Specific rules on remuneration policies and requirements for the design of 
bonus systems are defined in article 13 of the AIFM Directive and in annex II (Boué, 
Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, Lutter, 2012, 97; Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 
317; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 41; Article 13 Directive 2011/61/EU; Appen-
dix II Remuneration Policy AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU) of the same (Höring J. , 
2013, pp. 273-286). To guarantee the properties of the risk management, the AIFM 
Directive, respectively the parties liable for the definition, has determined the fol-
lowing (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 41; Article 13 Directive 2011/61/EU; Ap-
pendix II Renumeration Policy AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU): 
 
 The remuneration policy must match the business strategy, objectives, val-
ues and interests of the AIFM, the managed AIFs and their investors, inci-
dentally avoiding conflicts of interest (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 
41; Article 13 Directive 2011/61/EU; Appendix II Renumeration Policy 
AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU) 
 The remuneration policy shall be subject for an internal review at least once 
a year (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 41; Article 13 Directive 
2011/61/EU; Appendix II Renumeration Policy AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU).  
 The wages of employees are performance related (Europäische Kommis-
sion, 2013, p. 41; Article 13 Directive 2011/61/EU; Appendix II Renumera-
tion Policy AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU) 
 For the compensation of the AIFM is not only crucial the total income, but 
also the performance of his staff (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 41; Ar-
ticle 13 Directive 2011/61/EU; Appendix II Renumeration Policy AIFM Di-
rective 2011/61/EU) 
RALF MAUER Page | 156 
 
 
 The total remuneration shall consist of two parts, the fixed and the variable 
components must be in an appropriate ratio to each other (Europäische 
Kommission, 2013, p. 41; Article 13 Directive 2011/61/EU; Appendix II Re-
numeration Policy AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU) 
 An AIFM is required to constitute a remuneration committee according to 
size and complexity (Engert, 2014, pp. 108-122) of the business activities 
(Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 41; Article 13 Directive 2011/61/EU; Ap-
pendix II Remuneration Policy AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU) 
 
The guidelines of the remuneration policy, which are recorded in the AIFM Di-
rective, were enacted by the ESMA (esma, 2013, pp. 1-50) in cooperation with the 
European Banking Authority (Article 13, para. 2 AIFM Directive in conjunction 
with recital 27 of the AIFM Directive). Thus, a coalescence in the assessment of re-
muneration policies between different supervisory authorities can be achieved (Ar-
ticle 13, para. 2 AIFM Directive in conjunction with recital 27 of the AIFM Di-
rective). Outstanding for the remuneration policy is the requirement that at least 50 
percent (Appendix II remuneration policy AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU) of the var-
iable wages of the AIFM must derive from shares in the managed AIF or equivalent 
ownership interests (Volhard, Rodin, Jang, & Kruschke, 2013, p. 13). The back-
ground of the regulation may not be immediately comprehensible offhand. How-
ever, it is conceivable that the employees should be instructed to sustainability in 
handling the AIF. This allows them to directly and continuously approach the eco-
nomic success of the AIF. A self-interest in an investment always leads to more 
diligence and also the dissolution of the one or other conflict (Engert, 2014, pp. 108-
122).  
3.2.2.5 Asset Evaluation of the AIF 
The AIFM Directive on the assessment of the assets of AIFs shall foremost 
protect the investor interests (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 
et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side 
note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). Thereafter, the 
AIFM can impartially and carefully evaluate the assets with the expertise available 
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(Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kom-
mission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kra-
mer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). In compliance with the directive, the AIFM 
must ensure an adequate and coordinated process for independent and proper val-
uation of the assets for the AIF managed by it (Baur & Tappen, 2016, p. 1621 et 
seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; 
preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 
2077-2084). To do so, the evaluation guidelines and processes for each form of the 
AIFM assets are to be transparent created and documented in written form (Nack, 
2012, 359 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; 
Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 
29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084).  
With reference to the different assessment procedures in different jurisdic-
tions and the variety of assets, ESMA has merely established general principles for 
the development and implementation of assessment procedures for an appropriate 
and autonomous assessment of the assets by the AIFM (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et 
seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; 
preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 
2077-2084). The different valuation expertise in the different European jurisdic-
tions, especially in real estate AIFs, leads to inconsistent assessments; this can indi-
rectly affect the value of shares of AIFs (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 
2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary 
AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). Na-
tional legislators are therefore encouraged to endorse common assessment meth-
ods and procedures – either in the situs state or in the state of residence – for the 
evaluators (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Eu-
ropäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 
et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). If this happens, it might impede 
the documentation and inspection requirements of the AIFM, but at the same time 
will open conditions of competition that are marketable (bvi.de, 2012) in all of Eu-
rope (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische 
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Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; 
Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084).   
According to ESMA, the AIFM has to guarantee that the assessment strate-
gies and procedures are disposed in a stable and permanent manner (Dietrich, 2016, 
p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 
74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 
2011, pp. 2077-2084). The further provisions go towards evaluations strategies, pro-
cedures and methods being applied on a regular basis (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et 
seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; 
preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 
2077-2084). This means that at least once per year these strategies, procedures and 
methods are to be reassessed (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 
et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side 
note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). If new investment 
strategies are applied and investments are being placed in new asset categories not 
covered by the previous valuation principles, the assessment for an AIF (esma, 
2012) shall be reviewed (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et 
seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, 
para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). 
In compliance with ESMA, the AIFM shall finally ensure that the values of all assets 
of the AIF managed by it are accurate (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 
2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary 
AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). The 
AIFM has to document each asset class, exactly as this must be done for the indi-
vidual values (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Eu-
ropäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 
et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). The assessment schemes pro-
vide control processes for certain assets since complex and illiquid financial instru-
ments (esma, 2014, pp. 1-3) present a significant risk in the estimate of inadequate 
values (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische 
Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; 
Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084).  
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This assessment must be carried out at least once a year (Dietrich, 2016, p. 
1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 
et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, 
pp. 2077-2084). For open AIFs the frequency of assets and the sale and repurchase 
cycle of the AIFs must be reasonable. With closed AIFs, a reassessment has to be 
conducted with changes in capital (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, 
p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD 
side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084).  
The assessment for different types of assets may be implemented by different 
evaluators, externally or by the AIFM itself (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Die-
trich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; prelimi-
nary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). 
An external evaluator has to be independent and provide sufficient human and 
technical resources (Baur, 2015, p. 2002), as well as adequate expertise in order to 
provide an adequate and independent (Leißner, et al., 2012, pp. 1-39) assessment 
(Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kom-
mission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kra-
mer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). If the assessment is being conducted by the 
AIFM itself, the assessment of the portfolio management and remuneration policies 
needs to be ensured functionally independent (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Die-
trich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; prelimi-
nary AIFMD side note, para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). 
In the process, conflicts of interest must be avoided and an undue influence of em-
ployees must be excluded (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et 
seqq.; Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, 
para. 29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). The responsible parties 
can demand the review of the evaluation and the evaluation procedures by an in-
dependent evaluator (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; 
Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 
29 et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). Even if an AIFM commis-
sions an external evaluator, he is in authority for the correct valuation of the assets 
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of the AIFs (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Eu-
ropäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 
et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). However, the external evalua-
tor is liable to losses of the AIFM (Leißner, et al., 2012, pp. 1-39) due to culpable 
nonfeasance (Dietrich, 2016, p. 1621 et seqq.; Dietrich, 2015, p. 632 et seqq.; Eu-
ropäische Kommission, 2013, p. 74 et seqq.; preliminary AIFMD side note, para. 29 
et seqq.; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). 
3.2.2.6 Transparency Requirements for an EU AIF 
The transparency requirements represent another regulatory area of the 
AIFM Directive., which provides significantly more demanding requirements than, 
for example, the old German Investment Act used to provide (Europäische Kom-
mission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; Article 19-24 AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & 
Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Dietrich, 2016, p. 610, Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 
2012, p. 317 recital 250).  
Under article 19 of the AIFM Directive, an AIFM is required to submit an 
annual report in each fiscal year for each of the AIF managed and distributed 
throughout the European Union (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; 
Article 19-24 AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-
2084; Dietrich, 2016, p. 610, Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 317 recital 250). The 
annual reports mainly serve the responsible authorities of the origin Member State 
of the AIFM, the authorities of the origin Member State of the AIF, and the investors 
(Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; Article 19-24 AIFM Directive 
2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Dietrich, 2016, p. 610, Lutter, 
Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 317 recital 250). An AIFM must perform the information 
obligations towards the investors under article 20 AIFM Directive and towards the 
responsible authorities under article 21 of the AIFM Directive (Europäische Kom-
mission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; Article 19-24 AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & 
Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Dietrich, 2016, p. 610, Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 
2012, p. 317 recital 250). For the acquisition of companies and in the application of 
leverage the information and communication obligations do not only apply to-
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wards the relevant authorities, but also towards the target companies and their in-
vestors, as well as the employees (Volhard & Jang, 2012/2013, pp. 218-219) respec-
tively their representatives (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; Article 
19-24 AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Die-
trich, 2016, p. 610, Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 317 recital 250).  
AIF managers are required to submit an annual report - latest sixth months 
after the last financial year (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; Article 
19-24 AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Die-
trich, 2016, p. 610, Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 317 recital 250). The authorities 
require in addition to a balance sheet, a division of property, and a comparison of 
income and expenses. In addition, the manager must also make detailed infor-
mations on the remuneration of employees, including carried interests (bvi, 2013) 
paid from the AIF (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; Article 19-24 
AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Dietrich, 
2016, p. 610, Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 317 recital 250).  
It is not sufficient to fulfill the obligations above. Futher informations must 
be passed on to the investor (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; Article 
19-24 AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Die-
trich, 2016, p. 610, Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 317 recital 250). Therefore, it is 
necessary to communicate the objectives of the fund as well as the strategy of the 
investment (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; Article 19-24 AIFM Di-
rective 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Dietrich, 2016, p. 610, 
Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 317 recital 250). Particular importance is beyond 
the description of the assets in which the AIF may invest and all associated risks, 
information on liquidity management, cost and remuneration structures, and a de-
scription of the way the AIFM ensures a fair treatment of the investors (Europäische 
Kommission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; Article 19-24 AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer 
& Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Dietrich, 2016, p. 610, Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 
2012, p. 317 recital 250). In addition, the AIFM has to regular forward information 
about the markets and instruments of each AIF he manages to the (Bank, 2014, p. 
1) competent authorities (Europäische Kommission, 2013, p. 10 et seqq.; Article 19-
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24 AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Dietrich, 
2016, p. 610, Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 317 recital 250).  
3.2.3 Special Regulations for the Administrators of Leveraged AIF and Private 
Equity AIF 
3.2.3.1 Regulations for Leveraged Alternative Investment Funds 
For the administration of a leveraged Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) 
(Sixt, 2014, p. 175; Zöbeley, 2014, p. 20) the Alternative Investment Fund Manager 
is subject to extended disclosure (Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 317) obligations 
(Lutter, Bayer, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 37; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084) 
towards the competent authorities (Hornschu, et al., 2013) as well as towards the 
investors (Article 24 para. 4 Directive 2011/61/EU and Article 23 para. 5 Directive 
2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Hornschu, et al., 2013). The 
AIFM has the obligation to declare to the competent authorities (Dietrich, 2016, p. 
660), that the scheduled limiting of the scope of leverage with each of the AIF man-
aged by him is appropriate (Article 25 para. 3 Directive 2011/61/EU; Baur & Tappen, 
2016, p. 660; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). At the same time, the man-
ager of Alternative Investment Funds is obliged to always comply with this limita-
tion (Article 25 para. 3 Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-
2084). This information must be submitted to the competent authorities by the 
AIFM (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). In the obligations governed by 
the AIFM Directive, the competent national authorities are to communicate with 
ESMA (Article 25 para. 2 Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 
2077-2084) for information purposes so that systemic risks in the financial system, 
market disruptions or risks to the long-term economic growth (Zander, 2013, p. 43 
et seqq.) through the use of leverage is reduced (Article 25 para. 1 Directive 
2011/61/EU; Article 25 para. 2 Directive 2011/61/EU; Zander, 2013, p. 43. et seqq.; 
Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). 
The authorities obtained with the AIFM Directive in accordance with article 
25, para. 3, sentence 2 and para. 7 sanctions and intervention options (Dietrich, 
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2015, p. 132), go far beyond the information requirements and intervention (Die-
trich, 2015, p. 132; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). The sense of possible 
sanctions and interventions is to get stability in the financial systems (Kramer & 
Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). Therefore, the amount of debt financing by an 
AIFM, shall be determined by the authorities (Article 25 para. 3 Directive 
2011/61/EU; Dietrich, 2015, p. 132; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). This 
intervention has enough potential for managers of alternative investment funds to 
be more cautious at the choice of investments (Dietrich, 2015, p. 132; Kramer & 
Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084).  
Whether these mandatory rules are actually applied is still hotly debated 
(Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). Ambiguity, there is also the question – 
is such funding to limit – to the existing debt financing such investments (Kramer 
& Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). Surely, it would not be a problem to replace this 
debt financing with equity. Nevertheless, this would require that equity exist.   
3.2.3.2 Acquisition of Control over Companies by AIF 
For the Alternative (Vancas, 2010, p. 1 et seqq.) Investment Fund (AIF), which 
takes over control of companies (Trübstein, 2015, p. 239), the AIFM Directive has 
regulated that the AIFM has increased information and notification obligations 
(Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). In addition, there is the ban (Zetzsche, 
2015, p. 268) of the so-called asset stripping (Manchot, 2010, p. 59; Boué, Kehlbeck, 
& Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 98), which indicates a process in which an un-
dervalued company is bought with the intention of generating profits by selling 
(Coenen & Jovanovic, 2014) the assets (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084).  
According to Article 27 para. 1 Directive 2011/61/EU and commented by Kramer & 
Recknagel (2011, pp. 2077-2084) the AIFM shall inform the competent authorities, 
if the proportion of voting rights of AIF exceeds certain values or falls (10, 20, 30, 
50 and 75%). This applies to the purchase of shares in a non-listed company. Thus 
the reference to Private Equity would be restored. 
 Similar regulations are already being applied for stock companies - exem-
plary mentioned be at this point §20 of the German Stock Corporation Act 
(Diekmann, 2009, pp. 13-21) and similar provisions in the Companies Act of the 
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United Kingdom, the Companies Act in Austria or the Commercial Law in Luxem-
bourg - as well as for listed companies - here in example §21 of the German Securi-
ties Trading Act of Germany (Brellochs, 2015, p. 1) - or legal norms (Bafin, 2013) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of Austria. 
Meanwhile, the information obligation also extends to limited liability com-
panies  (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084).  If the AIF is not managed itself, 
these information requirements are related to the manager of the AIF. If a manager 
of alternative investment funds acquire control (Altmeyer & Ngo, 2015, p. B4) of 
the company (Zeppenfeld & von Jacobs, 2011, p. 1) managing by him, so that man-
ager is obliged to inform all parties about this change (Article 27 and 28 Directive 
2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084; Altmeyer & Ngo, 2015, B4). 
Therefore, it is henceforth no longer possible to take over virtually unnoticed with-
out the knowledge of the management and the workers.  
Of course, the normal rules of buying or selling of shares must be respected  
(Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). This of course includes the identity of 
the purchaser, the amount of voting rights, the conditions of the acquisition and 
the date on which control was acquired (Article 27 para. 2 and 3 Directive 
2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). However, the directive also 
refers to further information requirements  (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-
2084). Therefore, it is in accordance with Article 28 para. 2 Directive 2011/61/EU 
essential that AIFM submit information for preventing and managing conclicts  
(Bundesrat, 2012, pp. 1-597) of interest between the parties (managers, funds and 
entrepreneur). This information must also include the taken security measures  
(Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). The details of the presentation of the 
information is not supplied  (Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). Neverthe-
less, it is clear, that the legislature wants a strong exchange of information and 
thereby differ between companies, which are listed or not. The stricter obligation 
(Fundresearch, 2013) to provide information obtained AIFM for unlisted compa-
nies employees should be particular protected by the directive  (Bundesregierung, 
2012, pp. 1-406). According to Article 28 para. 2 letter c Directive 2011/61/EU, infor-
mation should be provided about the external and internal communication  
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(Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). Regarding the procedure for the settle-
ment of Grohe AG – see Regner (2008, p. 71) – that is a positive signal. That both 
the authorities and the investors must be informed of the financing of the transac-
tion can also be understood as a step in the right direction (Article 28 para. 5 Di-
rective 2011/61/EU; Fundresearch.de, 2013). Excluded from such notification re-
quirements are the so-called SPE or SPV (Article 26 para. 2 Directive 2011/61/EU; 
Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084) – special purpose entities or special pur-
pose vehicles are legal entities created to fulfill narrow specific or temporary objec-
tives (Lüdenbach, 2010, p. 341) – for the acquisition and holding of real estate and 
unlisted target companies, if this is a small or medium-sized company (Article 26 
para. 2 Directive 2011/61/EU; BaFin, 2013; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-
2084).  
The asset stripping describes an activity of buying low-yield but substance-
strong companies and are then breaking them down into its individual parts (Seffer 
& Gringel, 2014, pp. 1-16; Macharzina & Wolf, 2008, p. 717).  The directive aims to 
prevent this approach by managers of alternaive investment funds, by prohibiting 
that the AIFM involved, that it comes in the target company to distributions that 
lead the net assets below the subscribed capital (Article 30 para. 1 Directive 
2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). This includes measures 
(Behme, 2015, p. 114) such as dividends that exceed the profits or capital reductions 
(Article 30 para. 1 Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). 
Similarly, the directive prohibits the acquisition of own shares (Article 30 para. 1 
Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). The reservation 
must be made that this prohibition applies just two years after receipt of the control 
of the company (Article 30 para. 1 Directive 2011/61/EU; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, 
pp. 2077-2084; Seffer & Gringel, 2014).  
It also applies to the asset stripping that purpose entities for the acquisition and 
holding of real estate, and for small and medium enterprises, which are not listed, 
are not covered by this prohibition (Article 26 para. 2 Directive 2011/61/EU; cssf.lu, 
2013; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). Incidentally, it is not enough that 
the manager keeps those informed of such measures. Rather, the AIFM must co-
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operate actively to avert damage of the target company (Article 26 para. 2 Directive 
2011/61/EU; cssf.lu, 2013; Kramer & Recknagel, 2011, pp. 2077-2084). 
3.3 DEVELOPMENT OF TAX LAW IM THE EUROPEAN UNION 
3.3.1 Preliminary Remarks 
In order to be able to correctly put the states of Germany, Austria and Luxembourg, 
which are to be viewed at a later point in this work, and their regulations in regards 
to Private Equity in perspective after reflecting on the consequences of the AIFM 
Directive (Wallach, 2014, p. 96; Buck-Heeb, 2014, p. 270 recital 767), the develop-
ment of the tax law in the European Union (Tumpel, 2016, p. 31; Jesgarzewski & 
Schmittmann, 2014, p. 27) shall be presented as well. The elaborations are aimed to 
make it clear, in regards to taxes as well, that in spite of great efforts on all ends, 
there are great difficulties to consolidate all trade routes and their side effects. The 
fiscal systems (Rose, 1999, pp. 32-33) in the industrialized countries (Fuest & Huber, 
2003, pp. 378-390) – and this also means most of the states of the European Union 
(Strohmeier, 1994, p. 330) – are characterized by a large number of individual taxes 
(Kuhn, 2010, p. 65). One way to divide these types of taxes is to divide them into 
(figure 57) direct and indirect taxes (Birk, Desens, & Tappe, 2014, p. 16; Englisch, 
2008, p. 559; Brauchle & Pifko, 2011, p. 215; Mick, 1995, p. 120 et seqq.). Another 
system is the division in taxes on income and wealth (Schneider D. , 1994, p. 87), 
taxes on assets (Bontrup, 2004, p. 652), taxation of goods and other services (Hahn 
& Kortschak, 2011, p. 1; Rose, 1997, pp. 18-19), the so-called sales, as well as taxes 
on production, consumption and expenditure (Fischer, Federspiel, Arnold, & 
Michaelis, 2012; Kreft, 2000, p. 290). In most states, the income tax and the sales tax  
(bmf, 2014) are of paramount (figure 58) importance (Schwinger, 1992, p. 85; Benz 
& Lehmbruch, 2002, p. 337 et seqq.).  
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Figure 57: Tax Classification in Direct and Indirect Taxes 
   
 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on Englisch, 2008, p. 559. 
Figure 58: Tax Importance in many European Countries 
   
 
Source: Own representation. 
The respective national tax laws are based on different basic legal principles 
(Brähler, 2014, p. 1; Scheffler, 2011, p. 201). Either they are influenced by financial 
constitutional laws or by the political-economic side, respectively by both of them 
(Seibold, 2002, p. 250). In this chapter, only those taxes are included that actually 
are or could be related to Private Equity. This takes into account that the Private 
Equity fund generally occurs initially in the form of a partnership (Hehn, Klein, 
Jaskiewicz, May, & von Schlippe, 2011, p. 27). 
3.3.2 National Financial Constitutions 
Throughout the different states of the European Union – and of course be-
yond – the fiscal competences are to be divided among the individual (figure 59) 
levels (Benz & Lehmbruch, 2002, p. 336; Förster J. , 2014, p. 3).  
TAX CLASSIFICATION  
MAJOR TAXES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
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Figure 59: Individual Tax Levels 
 
Source: Own representation based on Förster, 2014, p. 3. 
The dispensing powers are not being equally treated in all countries of the Euro-
pean Union. For example, in Spain (Förster, 2014, p. 3), the regions and communes 
have more influence on fiscal regulations than in other states (Gabriel & Kropp, 
2008, p. 587).  
For the substantive tax law13 (Dahm & Hamacher, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.; Kellersmann 
& Treisch, 2002, p. 131 et seqq.; Schwarz S. , 2004, p. 90 et seqq.) and tax administra-
tion, the principle of legality applies in all states, which states that taxes may be 
only levied (Dietrich, 2013, pp. 13-15), if they are authorized by a law (Dietrich, 
2013, pp. 13-15; Förster, 2014, p. 3). In countries such as France (Hellio & Thill, 2002, 
p. 127 recital 402) or Belgium (Ihr Europa, 2015) and some other states, all taxes are 
                                                     
13 The substantive tax law governs taxpayer, the taxable object, exemptions, tax base and tax rates 
of the different types of taxes (Dahm & Hamacher, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.; Kellersmann & 
Treisch, 2002, p. 131 et seqq.; Schwarz S. , 2004, p. 90 et seqq.). 
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annual taxes (Hellio & Thill, 2002, p. 127 recital 402; Förster, 2014, p. 3; Ihr Europa, 
2015). Some countries regulate their taxes through ordinances (Förster, 2014, p. 3). 
The tax laws there only contain fiscal principles (Förster, 2014, p. 3). Of exorbitant 
importance in the fiscal practice is the fact that in many countries only through 
interpretations of these laws by tax authorities over decrees or the jurisdiction of 
fiscal courts a usable fiscal overview is being created (Förster, 2014, p. 3). Thus, for 
instance, the so-called “Private Equity Decree” of 2003 (Weißflog, 2015, p. 266; 
Jesch, 2004, p. 160) had a fulminant affect in Germany on the taxation of Private 
Equity funds and therefore widely cleared the question of how to differentiate be-
tween a business and an asset management fund vehicle (Autzen, 2005, p. 52). 
3.3.3 Types of Taxes, Tax Determination and Tax Rates 
3.3.3.1 Preliminary Remarks 
Tax policy has to reflect the increasing financial needs (Käfer, 2015, p. 1; 
Schaltegger & Züricher, 2009, p. 1). In addition, the States are trying to master the 
national debt (Förster, 2014, p. 4) because a high national debt counteracts towards 
the envisaged economic growth throughout the countries and thus the European 
Union (Wellisch, 2000, p. 110; Wilkens, 1980, p. 171 et seqq.; Bensch, 2014, p. 1; 
Berschens & Grüttner, 2009, pp. 1-2; Thalemann, 2011, p. 172). The legislature is 
therefore forced to absorb these needs, among other things, with tax increases 
(Groels, 2001, pp. 34-35). On the other hand, the warranty of international compet-
itiveness (Lachmann, 2014, p. 20; GDV, 2013, p. 1) cannot be achieved with tax in-
creases (Förster, 2014, p. 4). Rather, this is being attempted (Allmendinger, 
Eichhorst, & Walwei, 2005, p. 92; Friederichs, 2012, pp. 97-98) with tax cuts (Förster, 
2014, p. 4). This not only leads to more or less extensive tax reforms (Ludwig, 2011, 
p. 218; Arlt & Nehls, 1999, p. 292 et seqq.; Piller, 2014, p. 1; European Commission, 
2015, pp. 1-130), but – as already discussed in regards to the issues for entrepre-
neurs at the very beginning of this study – also to frequent changes to existing or 
just reformed taxes (European Commission, 2015, pp. 1-130; Förster, 2014, p. 4; 
Ludwig, 2011, p. 218; Arlt & Nehls, 1999, p. 292 et seqq.; Piller, 2014, p. 1). Here, the 
concept of taxes intersperses with the definition of duties (Förster J., 2014, p. 4). 
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Taxes, actually though earmarked, flow into public budgets without earmarking 
and then are being quasi alienated for road construction (Förster, 2014, p. 4) or eco-
political provisions (Daume, 2016, p. 169; Degenhart, 2015, p. 215 recital 562). The 
European Union lives on its cross-border trade (Europäische Union, 2015, p. 1; Die 
Bundesregierung, 2014, p. 1). In this context, fiscal problems have to be solved 
(Imhof, 2012, p. 284; Brähler, 2014, p. 96; Wehrße, 2011, p. 223), such as the avoid-
ance of double taxation, as well as the prevention of non-taxation (Brähler, 2014, p. 
96; Förster J., 2014, p. 4; Imhof, 2012, p. 284; Wehrße, 2011, p. 223). 
3.3.3.2 Obligation to Submit the Tax Return 
Tax payers are required to submit tax returns (Arndt, Jenzen, & Fetzer, 2016, 
p. 167 et seqq.; Boor, 2014, p. 42; Dittmann, Haderer, & Happe, 2015, p. 115 et seqq.; 
Förster J. , 2014, p. 4). In some countries, taxes are being calculated (Schäfers, 2013, 
p. 1) and paid by self-assessment (Förster J., 2014, p. 4; Schäfers, 2013, p. 1). In most 
countries, principally the due process of law (Buchwald, 2006, p. 88 et seqq.; 
Kaminski & Strunk, 2006, p. 47) applies in various specifications (Buchwald, 2006, 
p. 88 et seqq.; Förster J., 2014, p. 4; Kaminski & Strunk, 2006, p. 47). This implies 
that the taxation authorities – like in Germany (Förster J., 2014, p. 4) - have to de-
termine the actual situation ex officio (Dittmann, Haderer, & Happe, 2013, p. 165).  
Because of the international nature of the activities of the taxpayers, difficulties to 
obtain knowledge regarding certain revenue are increasing in all member states of 
the European Union (Förster, 2014, p. 4). This refers to income from foreign opera-
tion, investments abroad or dividends received from such (Förster J., 2014, p. 4). 
However, an international tendency towards an increase cooperation and mutual 
assistance between the tax authorities of the states (Förster H. , 2016, p. 1; 
Bundesministerium für Finanzen, 2014) has started to emerge, such as increased 
declaration and documentation obligations of taxpayers, particularly in the area of 
transfer pricing (Förster, 2014, p. 4). As can be observed in the Netherlands  
(brandeins, 2014, pp. 1-2), a trend can be observed to increasingly offer taxpayers 
the possibility to explicate the fiscal treatment of certain matters in advance with 
the tax authorities (Förster J., 2014, p. 4; brandeins, 2014, pp. 1-2). 
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3.3.3.3 Income Tax in International Comparison 
In the taxation of personal income, a certain approximation of the basic prin-
ciples in international comparison (Dietl, Pauli, & Royer, 1999, p. 245) can be ob-
served (Förster J., 2014, p. 4). The former, mainly in Romanesque States existing 
debt taxes, the so-called object taxes (Graf, 2005, p. 273; Wellisch & Kroschel, 2012, 
p. 9; Keser, 2011, p. 28) on individual income categories are indeed largely replaced 
by a progressive tax (Schön & Heber, 2015, p. 157 et seqq.) on total income, how-
ever, these principles have been continually modernized for some time (Förster J., 
2014, p. 4; Graf, 2005, p. 273; Schön & Heber, 2015, p. 157 et seqq.; Wellisch & Kro-
schel, 2012, p. 9). Some states have introduced special collective agreement regula-
tions for commercial gains, with which - as in Germany – an approximation 
(Richter A. , 2009, p. 18; Kaya, 2009, p. 77 et seqq.; Fischer L. , 1983, p. 77 et seqq.) 
of taxation of entrepreneurial activities of natural persons and corporations is 
sought (Fischer L., 1983, p. 77 et seqq.; Förster J., 2014, p. 5; Kaya, 2009, p. 77 et 
seqq.; Richter A., 2009, p. 18). In addition, there are, particularly for investment 
income and private capital gains (Brümmerhoff & Büttner, 2015, p. 440), special 
provisions (Förster J. , 2014, p. 5) for income determination and in the tariffs 
(Brümmerhoff & Büttner, 2015, p. 440; Förster J., 2014, p. 5).  
In some countries, especially in Anglo-Saxon tax systems and in Nordic coun-
tries, the concept of income (Wehrheim, 2001, p. 15; Tumpel, 2016, p. 49; Kania, 
2013, p. 29; Richter U. G., 1995, p. 254) is defined globally (Förster J., 2014, p. 5; 
Wehrheim, 2001, p. 15; Tumpel, 2016, p. 49; Kania, 2013, p. 29, Richter U.G., 1995, 
p. 254). This means that revenues are taken into account regardless of the source 
(Nickenig, 2015, p. 20) they are deriving from (Förster J., 2014, p. 5; Nickenig, 2015, 
p. 20)). This is done by identifying the main types (Gialouris, 2010, p. 83) of income 
(Gialouris, 2010, p. 83; Förster J., 2014, p. 5). In other states, all legally valid, thus 
taxable (Wünsche, 2015, p. 167; Sava, 2007, p. 5 et seqq.; Gabriel & Kropp, 2008, p. 
681), types of income are listed (Dinkelbach, 2010, p. 79; Förster J.; 2014, p. 5). This 
fundamental difference has little meaning for the objective scope of income, merely 
in so far as there is no need for the global concept of income to assign each type of 
revenue to a particular type of income (Förster J.; 2014, p. 5). The principle of a 
single tax on total income with balancing positive and negative income from all 
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sources of income within a year of assessment is in fact currently still predominant 
worldwide (Haase & Hofacker, 2012, p. 114; Scheffler, 2016, p. 144; Becker, Loitz, & 
Stein, 2009, p. 34), but is by now restricted in the majority of the countries and is 
becoming increasingly more limited (Becker, Loitz, & Stein, 2009, p. 34; Förster J., 
2014, p. 5; Haase & Hofacker, 2012, p. 114; Scheffler, 2016, p. 144). Certain negative 
income is then only compensable within the same category of income (Thomas & 
Windhorst, 2007, p. 221; Tanski J. S., 2013, p. 43) and transferable on to past or fu-
ture tax years (Förster J., 2014, p. 5; Tanski J.S., 2013, p. 43; Thomas & Windhorst, 
2007, p. 221). A special role is being played by the very different treatment of tax-
exempt income in the countries of the European Union, which counteracts the Eu-
ropean equal treatment tending to converge (Förster J., 2014, p.5).  
The Determination of Income 
Basically, the domestic tax payer is being assessed with his domestic and foreign 
income (Dinkelbach, 2010, p. 10; Scheffler, 2011, p. 106; Möllenbeck, 2010, p. 125). 
In this, it is also spoken of the unlimited tax liability (Stober, 2007, p. 452; Jajesniak-
Quast, Kiel, & Klodnicki, 2014, p. 94) – that is, the principle of global income 
(Förster J., 2014, p. 5; Scheffler, 2011, p. 106; Möllenbeck, 2010, p. 125; Stober, 2007, 
p. 452). In contrast, tax payers not residing domestically (Liebing, 2004, p. 3; 
Fleischer H. , 2001, p. 99 et seqq.; Schönwetter, 2009, p. 37 et seqq.) are being as-
sessed with the statutorily recorded domestic income (Liebing, 2004, p. 3; Fleicher 
H., 2001, p. 99 et seqq.; Schönwetter, 2009, p. 37 et seqq.; Förster J., 2014, p. 5). This 
principal of territoriality leads (Lange C. , 2005, p. 83 et seqq.; Egner, 2015, p. 131 et 
seqq.) to a limited tax liability (Egner, 2015, p. 131 et seqq.; Förster J., 2014, p. 5; 
Lange C., 2005, p. 83 et seqq.). Should there be subordinate regional administration 
bodies (Nowotny, 1991, p. 109) levying own income taxes or surtaxes, the limited 
tax obligations generally apply (Förster J., 2014, p. 5; Nowotny, 1991, p. 109). For 
the income recognized in total income, the net principle applies (Hundsdoerfer, 
2002, p. 81 et seqq.), which states that the expenses and impairment losses related 
to the earning of income are generally deductible (Hundsdoerfer, 2002, p. 81 et 
seqq.; Förster J., 2014, p.5). For the particular types of income different principles 
apply. This is especially true for the determination of net income of self-employed 
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persons, the determination of income (figure 60) from employment (Förster J., 2014, 
pp. 5-6) and income derived from property ownership (Hey, 1998, p. 140).  
Figure 60: Determining Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on Scheffler, 2011, p. 106 et seqq. 
In some countries (Förster, 2014, p. 6) a deviant taxation (Kuhr, 2013, p. 66) under 
average rates is being applied for smaller and medium-sized commercial enter-
prises, especially in the agricultural sector (Wellisch & Kroschel, 2012, p. 73).  
Also in some states income taxations can be observed which provide a wide variety 
of discounts, allowances and other reductions on income from employment and 
pensions and are being granted in addition to, for example, the income-related or 
special expenses (Brähler, 2014, p. 88 et seqq.; Scheffler, 2011, p. 218 et seqq.; Förster, 
2014, p.6). Among the expenses relating to the aforementioned realized income, 
most states of the European Union (Frenz, 2004, p. 638 et seqq.) recognize contribu-
tions to any social insurance, whose deductibility may be limited in height depend-
ing on the characteristics and regulations of the Member State (Frenz, 2004, p. 638 
et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 6). Interestingly, benefits from such insurances (Borrosch, 
2015, p. 975) are in most cases taxable (Förster, 2014, p. 6).  
To be fundamentally differed from the area of assessment of income are tax benefits 
relating to involuntary use of income or private provisions of the tax payer (Brähler, 
DETERMINING INCOME 
PRINCIPLE OF THE WORLDWIDE 
INCOME 
PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY 
RESIDENT TAXATION NONRESIDENT TAXATION 
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2014, p. 76 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 6). These expenses, in particular special ex-
penses or exceptional debits, are taken into consideration – limited in height – or 
tax-free or flat-rate amounts are being granted (Scheffler, 2016, p. 127 et seqq.; Din-
kelbach, 2010, p. 130 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 6). Regulations regarding charitable 
donations (Meyn, Richter, Koss, & Gollan, 2013, p. 289 et seqq.; Walz, Auer, & 
Hippel, 2007, p. 188 et seqq.) are awaiting the adaptation to a respectively compa-
rable level in the Member States of the European Union (Meyn, Richter, Koss, & 
Gollan, 2013, p. 289 et seqq.; Förster J.; 2014, p. 6; Walz, Auer, & Hippel, 2007, p. 
188 et seqq.). Throughout the majority of the countries, the deduction of special 
expenses and exceptional debits (Dinkelbach, 2014, p. 187 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 
6) occurs from the total amount of income (Jannott & Frodermann, 2005, p. 515 et 
seqq.). Some states have begun to grant these discounts as deductions from the 
amount of tax in order to prevent the progression effect (Heuer, 2008, p. 274) of the 
income tax rate (Scheffler, 2011, p. 186; Förster, 2014, p. 6; Heuer, 2008, p. 274).  
Also the financial burdens resulting from family, thus marriage or existing 
children (Richter & Hurrelmann, 2009, p. 224 et seqq.), are being taken into account 
under very different principles (Richter & Hurrelmann, 2009, p. 224 et seqq.; 
Förster, 2014, p.6). In most states the principle of individual person taxation applies 
as well to parents and children (Plenker, 2016, p. 345; Förster, 2014, p. 6). In those 
countries where married couples are being assessed jointly, the splitting (figure 61) 
method (Scheffler, 2009, p. 101 et seqq.) is being applied (Förster, 2014, p. 6; 
Scheffler, 2009, p. 101 et seqq.). This describes the method (Nowotny, 1999, p. 325) 
serving to determine the income tax of common households, thus especially fami-
lies (Nowotny, 1999, p. 325; Förster, 2014, p. 6). The principle of who earns a lot 
may also dispense with a larger portion of his income, while the ability-to-pay prin-
ciple (Coimbra, 2015, p. 101 et seqq.; Weber-Grellet, 2001), loses in justness on closer 
inspection of the family (Coimbra, 2015, p. 101 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 6). The 
income of the primary earner is optionally distributed to the members of the family 
(Gerlach, 2004, p. 327). Thus the performance of this community is limited. This 
disadvantage shall largely be offset by the splitting method (Scheffler, 2012, p. 174).  
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Figure 61: Assessment Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation. 
In most countries, the financial burdens resulting from family or other support pay-
ments are being considered as tax exempt amounts, so-called zone zero in rates or 
deductions from the tax amount, if the dependents have little or no income (Bun-
desfinanzministerium, 2015, pp. 1-60; Förster, 2014, p. 6). An exception is the child 
benefit, which is not taken into account (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2015, pp. 1-60; 
Förster, 2014, p. 6).  
Income Tax Scale Organization of the States 
In almost all countries, rates with an open subset graduation (Lieb, 1992, p. 121 et 
seqq.) apply for income taxes (Lieb, 1992, p. 121 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 7). Pro-
gressive formula tariffs (Grossekettler, 2012, p. 678) as in Germany are rather rare 
(Förster, 2014, p. 7; Grossekettler, 2012, p. 678). The course of progression of the 
rates is greatly simplified in the majority of the countries in recent years, the subsets 
are significantly reduced and the peak rate is being lowered (Förster, 2014, p. 7).  
The income taxes (figure 62) or surtaxes of subordinate regional administration 
bodies are usually based on proportional rates (Reif, 2005, p. 102 et seqq.; Förster J. 
, 2014, p. 7). The data (Denis, Hemmelgarn, & Sloan, 2015, pp. 1-154) are from the 
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE 
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statistical utility Eurostat of the European Union of 2015 along with recorded num-
bers up until 2013 from the Federal Ministry (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2015, p. 
34) of Finance (Bundesfinanzministerium). 
Figure 62: Income Taxes in the European Union in % 
 
Source: Own representation based on Bundesfinanzministerium, 2015, p. 34. 
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In countries such as Belgium, France or Great Britain, but also in Switzerland, spe-
cial statutory provisions apply, under which an annual adjustment of certain tax 
elements to the development of consumer prices must be made (Förster, 2014, p. 7). 
This affects (Förster, 2014, p. 7) mainly those countries with progressive subset rates 
(wko, 2015, p. 1). 
3.3.3.4 Corporate Income Tax in International Comparison 
The corporate income tax as a business tax (Schreiber, 2012, p. 77 et seqq.; Stiehler, 
2009, p. 18 et seqq.; Thomsen, 2009, p. 316 et seqq.) is far from being uniform 
throughout Europe, respectively the European Union (Bundesfinanzministerium, 
2015, pp. 1-60; Förster, 2014, p. 7). In some countries, such as Spain (Justlanded, 
2016, p. 1), actually private companies are considered under corporate income tax 
(Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 239 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 7; Justlanded, 2016, p. 1). 
Particular problems are especially economic double taxation through multiple tax-
ation (Rehm & Nagler, 2013, p. 250 et seqq.) of distributed profits and the taxation 
of internationally intertwined corporations (Förster, 2014, p. 7; Rehm & Nagler, 
2013, p. 250 et seqq.). In almost all states of the European Union, a governmental 
corporate income tax (Koch R. , 2010, p. 83; Bohn, 2009, p. 28) is imposed on the 
total income of corporations and other legal entities, partnerships and assets (Bohn, 
2009, p. 28; Förster, 2014, p. 7; Koch R., 2010, p. 83). Corporate income tax (Senger, 
2009, p. 86 et seqq.) and other surcharges are levied in some states at the level of 
subordinate local administrative bodies (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2015, p. 1-60; 
Förster, 2014, p. 7; Senger, 2009, p. 86). For the general scope of the objective tax 
liability, the principle of world income (Jacobs, 2011, p. 139; Lettmann, 1997, p. 388 
et seqq.; Rek, Brück, Labermeier, & Pache, 2008, p. 145) and the territoriality usually 
applies (Jacobs, 2011, p. 138, Lettmann, 1997, p. 388 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 8). 
This usually does not deviate from the principles of income tax (Förster, 2014, p. 7; 
Rek, Brück, Labermeier, & Pache, 2008, p. 145).  
Determination of taxable Earnings 
The principles of determining taxable earnings are generally based on the balance 
sheet comparison, partly flanked by the relevance of the trade balance with the 
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profit and loss account (Dahlke, 2011, p. 145; Bambynek, 2011, p. 84; Peyerl, 2015, 
p. 38 et seqq.) based on commercial law (Dahlke, 2011, p. 145; Förster, 2014, p. 8; 
Bambynek, 2011, p. 84; Peyerl, 2015, p. 38 et seqq.). The fiscal special provisions, 
particularly in the areas of depreciation (Kuhr, 2013, p. 230 et seqq.), valuation of 
current assets (Lettmann, 1997, p. 126 et seqq.), investment incentives, reserves, 
recognition and assessment of provisions, hidden profit distributions, are in vary-
ing degree partially included in the laws, in part to be taken from the decrees of the 
tax authorities or the adjudication (Förster, 2014, p. 8; Kuhr, 2013, p. 230 et seqq.; 
Lettmann, 1997, p. 126 et seqq.). They apply equally, apart from the legal provisions 
and business processes only applicable for corporations, to sole proprietors and 
partnerships which keep or aare being required to keep accounts and are anchored 
in the income tax laws (Hausen, 2009, p. 394) in most states (Hausen, 2009, p. 394; 
Förster, 2014, p. 8).   
The principle of accounting continuity (Steinbach A. , 1973, p. 69; Lutter, 2006, p. 
177) applies practically everywhere (Förster, 2014, p. 8; Steinbach A., 1973, p. 69; 
Lutter, 2006, p. 177). It signifies (Vollmuth, 2009, p. 76 et seqq.; Hirschler, 2012, p. 
53 et seqq.; Hilke, 1985, p. 32 et seqq.) that several chronologically successive an-
nual financial statements of a company must have both the same structuring, the 
so-called formal accounting continuity – as well as they should follow similar val-
uations principles as much as possible – the so-called material accounting continu-
ity (Förster, 2014, p. 8; Vollmuth, 2009, p. 76 et seqq.; Hirschler, 2012, p. 53 et seqq.; 
Hilke, 1985, p. 32 et seqq.). With regard to the depreciation (Schön & Osterloh-
Konrad, 2010, p. 68 et seqq.), in most states, the linear or diminishing-balance 
method with specific annual rates by groups of assets is being applied (Förster, 
2014, p. 8; Hellio & Thill, 2002, p. 98 et seqq.; Schön & Osterloh-Konrad, 2010, p. 68 
et seqq.). In the Nordic countries, collective depreciation (Beeck, et al., 2004, p. 568; 
Leibfritz & Meurer, 1985, p. 54) is usually permitted and common (Beeck, et al., 
2004, p. 568; Leibritz & Meurer, 1985, p. 54; Förster, 2014, p. 8).  
Although some countries process profits gained in times of inflation according to 
the nominal value principle – thus, that for all fund the numerical value is relevant 
and that the tax due is just this money debt (Wolfersdorff, 2014, p. 63 et seqq.; 
Scheffler, 2014, p. 57 et seqq.) – this principle, however, is being modified through 
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revaluation coefficients, especially in the determination of capital gains (Förster, 
2014, p. 8; Reichmann, 2011, p. 104 et seqq.; Wolfersdorff, 2014, p. 63 et seqq.; 
Scheffler, 2014, p. 57 et seqq.).  
General investment incentives (Birke, 2012, p. 44 et seqq.; Mroczek, Schuttenbach, 
& Ciurla, 2000, p. 300 et seqq.) exist in many countries in different forms (Förster, 
2014, p. 8; Birke, 2012, p. 44 et seqq.; Mroczek, Schuttenbach, & Ciurla, 2000, p. 300 
et seqq.). In particular, special depreciation (Wünsche S. , 2011, p. 169 et seqq.; 
Spengel, 2009, p. 69 et seqq.) and investment tax allowances (Wünsche S., 2011, p. 
169 et seqq.; Spengel, 2009, 2009, p. 69 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 8). In most countries, 
this investment incentive is not generally applicable, but coordinated with certain 
issues (Hörmann, Haslinger, & Hirschler, 2013, p. 91 et seqq.; Altenburger, 
Janschek, & Müller, 1999, p. 49 et seqq.) such as research funding (Hörmann, Has-
linger, & Hirschler, 2013, p. 91 et seqq.; Altenburger, Janschek, & Müller, 1999, p. 
49 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 8). Another form of funding in the meaning of special 
depreciation or investment allowances also relates to the entrepreneurs (Zeh & 
Schnell, 2008, p. 99 et seqq.). This funding is usually limited in time or ceases as 
soon as the company has reached a certain size (Easson, 2004, p. 211; Haufe, 2016; 
Goldstein, 2016, p. 248). 
Systems of Corporate Taxation 
The corporate income tax (Kraft & Kraft, 2014, p. 143 et seqq.) includes the total 
income of corporations with a uniform tariff without distinction of reserved and 
distributed profits (Scheffler, 2016, p. 195 et seqq.; Kraft& Kraft, 2014, p. 143 et 
seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 9). In some countries, this system is connected with very 
different principles of reduction or avoidance of economic double taxation (Haase, 
2014, p. 14 et seqq.; Schüller, 2014, p. 151 et seqq.) with dividends distributed to the 
shareholders (Brähler, 2014, p. 16; Haase, 2014, p. 14 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 8; 
Schüller, 2014, p. 151 et seqq.).  
Some of these distributions are not included in part or in their entirety in determin-
ing the income (Kellersmann & Treisch, 2002, p. 112) of the shareholder (Kel-
lersmann & Treisch, 2002, p. 112; Förster, 2014, p. 9). In part, there is a tax-credit for 
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the shareholder on the corporation tax raised on the dividend, in part a partial off-
set of the corporation tax raised on the income from investments is granted (Kraft 
& Kraft, 2014, p. 143; Förster, 2014, p. 8). In some countries, a reduced tax rate 
(Stellpflug, 2001, p. 38 et seqq.) is applied on dividends distributed to domestic in-
come tax payers (Förster, 2014, p. 9; Stellpflug, 2001, p. 38 et seqq.).  
In order to prevent a multiple taxation of dividends (Schön, Schreiber, & Spengel, 
2008, p. 55 et seqq.) between domestic corporations, it is partially necessary in the 
sense of the international intercorporate privilege (Brähler, 2012, p. 366 et seqq.) to 
keep minimum shares or to hold these shares over a certain period of time (Förster, 
2014, p. 9; Schön, Schreiber, & Spengel, 2008, p. 55 et seqq.; Brähler, 2012, p. 366 et 
seqq.). This also applies to distributions from foreign affiliates to domestic parent 
companies (Förster, 2014, p. 9; Schön, Schreiber, & Spengel, 2008, p. 55 et seqq.; 
Brähler, 2012, p. 366 et seqq.). In some countries, there are certain, also quite con-
ceivable for Private Equity structures, forms of unitary taxation for corporations 
depending on the scope, duration and type of investments (Schneider, 1994, p. 178; 
Förster, 2014, p. 9). These forms differ in so far as that partially the results, as it is 
in France, are being consolidated and in part the losses can be transferred through 
tax-effective contributions from affiliated partners, such as it is practiced in Swe-
den, or through intercompany assets, such as in the Netherlands (Satzger, 1999, p. 
83 et seqq.), without fiscal consequences (Satzger, 1999, p. 83 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, 
p. 10). 
Tariff Arrangement of Corporation Tax of the Countries 
In general, proportional rates (Brähler, 2009, p. 60 et seqq.) apply for corporate in-
come tax (Brähler, 2009, p, 60 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 10). Only some states man-
age to work with reduced (Strassburger, 2012, p. 162 et seqq.; Blaschke, 2008, p. 41 
et seqq.) tax rates (Förster, 2014, p. 10; Strassburger, 2012, p. 162 et seqq.; Blaschke, 
2008, p. 41 et seqq.). As an example, Switzerland is to be cited as a country that is 
not a Member of the European Union (swissinfo, 2007), but has quite a significant 
impact in regards to the financial market. There, most cantons levy corporate tax 
(Bohley, 2003, p. 322; Nowotny, 1987, p. 168) at a progressive rate (Bohley, 2003, p. 
322; Nowotny, 1987, p. 168; Förster, 2014, p. 10). In many states it was attempted to 
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strengthen the competitiveness of domestic enterprises by means of an often sig-
nificantly reduced (OECD, 2015, p. 103; Richter S. , 2011, p. 83) corporate income 
(figure 63) tax (Richter S., 2011, p. 83; Förster, 2014, p. 10). 
Figure 63: Corporate Income Taxes EU Standard Rates in % 
 
Source: Own representation based on Bundesfinanzministerium, 2015, p. 16.  
10,00
12,50
12,50
15,00
15,00
15,00
16,00
17,00
19,00
19,00
19,00
20,00
20,00
20,00
20,00
20,00
22,00
22,00
22,47
23,50
23,69
25,00
26,00
27,50
30,00
33,00
33,33
35,00
0,00 5,00 10,00 15,00 20,00 25,00 30,00 35,00 40,00
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Ireland
Latvia
Lithuania
Germany
Romania
Slovenia
Hungary
Czech Republic
Poland
Croatia
Finland
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Estonia
Slowak Republic
Sweden
Luxembourg
Denmark
Portugal
Austria
Greece
Italy
Spain
Belgium
France
Malta
Corporate Taxes in the EU in %
RALF MAUER Page | 182 
 
 
3.3.3.5 Business Tax in International Comparison 
Business taxes or similar taxes with different tax bases are still raised in several 
States of the European Union (Ruf M. , 2007, p. 159 et seqq.; Kudert, Jamrozy, & 
Glowienka, 2013, p. 408 et seqq.) for businesses and individual entrepreneurs today 
(Förster, 2014, p. 10; Ruf M.; 2007, p. 159; Kudert, Jamrozy & Glowienka, 2013, p. 408 
et seqq.). They are considered one of the main sources of income (Nentwig & 
Werwath, 2016, p. 287 et seqq.; Meffert & Müller, 2008, p. 218) for local authorities 
(Nentwig & Werwath, 2016, p. 287 et seqq.; Meffert & Müller, 2008, p. 218; Förster, 
2014, p. 10). The business tax in the German form is an international exception, even 
though many other countries with a federal structure – see figure Individual Tax 
Levels – provide similar taxes for businesses. As an example, the current circum-
stances in regards to the business tax (figure 64) of the countries of Germany, Austria 
and Luxembourg, which are being examined in this paper, as well as France, Spain, 
Italy and Switzerland are being described (Meister, 2015, pp. 106-109).  
 Germany: the business tax is levied as trade income tax on the object profitability 
of a business enterprise in the amount of at least 7% of the revenue (Richter, 2008, 
pp. 93-104; Schmidt, Sigloch, & Henselmann, 2005, p. 201 et seqq.). 
 Austria: The business tax was abolished in 1994 in favor of a municipal tax 
of 3% on the payroll (Dölker, 2012, p. 254; Madl, 2014, p. 71). 
 Luxembourg: The business tax - impôt commercial – is similar to the Ger-
many business tax and is also determined with a municipal rate fixed by 
the municipality (Höhn & Höring, 2010, pp. 168-169; Luxembourg 
Consulting Group, 2015).  
 France: The imposed business tax, as taxe professionelle, is independent of 
the revenue (Huth A. H.-J., 1996, pp. 183-187; Cross Border Business 
Lawyers, 2015). 
 Spain: The business tax – impuesto sobre actividades economicas – is a tax 
of the municipalities and independent of the revenue as well. However, and 
this could be of importance for start-up entrepreneurs whose net sales do 
not exceed 1 million Euro, it is exempted (Plattes, Fauteck, Strunk, & 
Fitzner, 2013, pp. 131-134) from tax (articulo 82 del Texto refundido de la 
Ley Reguladora de las Haciendas Locales). 
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Figure 64: Total Business Taxes in the EU in % 
 
Source: Own representation based on Bundesfinanzministerium, 2015, p. 18. 
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flat tax rate, 
generally reduced and in-
creased tax rate. 
reduced tax rate for certain 
goods and services beside 
the standard rate, 
 Italy: Here, a regional tax – imposta regionale sulle attività produttive – is 
being imposed, with which the creation of value is being taxed (Großmann, 
2010, pp. 1-27; Hilpold, 1999, p. 264).  
 Switzerland: With the exception of the cantonal regulated business tax, the 
Swiss do not impose business tax (iww, 2014; Hofert, 2012, p. 44 et seqq.).  
3.3.3.6 Turnover Tax in International Comparison 
With the turnover taxes, the value-added tax (VAT) in form of the all-phase 
net turnover tax (Birk, Desens, & Tappe, 2014, p. 474 et seqq.; Bühler, Loosli, Lüthi, 
& Pifko, 2008, p. 11 et seqq.) with input tax reduction has established itself in the 
European Union (Förster, 2014, p. 11; Birk, Desens, & Tappe, 2014, p. 474 et seqq.; 
Bühler, Loosli, Lüthi, & Pifko, 2008, p. 11 et seqq.). The standard rates and possible 
special rates of the value-added taxes, however, significantly differ from each other 
in some cases in European comparison (Seubert & Neureiter, 2010, pp. 1-48; 
Diemer, et al., 2016, p. 453 et seqq.). Thus, the Member States can be divided into 
different groups (figure 65).  
Figure 65: Groups of Countries class-divided – Value-Added Tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on Förster, 2014, p. 11. 
The types and the extent of special regulations for certain business sectors or certain 
goods and services are still somewhat different in international comparison 
(Förster, 2014, p. 11). As for the tax liability, the tax base, the place of performance 
and the input tax refund is concerned, it is not least due to the value-added tax 
system policy, that an approximate harmonization has been achieved (Weimann, 
VALUE-ADDED TAX – COUNTRIES WITH 
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2012, pp. 15-18; Sopp, 2010, p. 58 et seqq.) within the European Union (Förster, 2014, 
p. 11; Weimann, 2012, pp. 15-18). 
The multitude of other taxes, such as alcohol and tobacco tax, insurance tax, envi-
ronmental tax, inheritance and gift tax, etc. shall not be considered since they bear 
absolutely no relation to Private Equity or its operators. It should also be mentioned 
that in the wake of the financial crisis, the financial transaction tax was introduced 
in part (Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 189). In other countries, the implementation of the 
same was being planned or discussed (Oppitz & Weigele, 2014, p. 153; FAZ, 2014). 
For instance, there was a proposal for a Directive of the European Commission 
dated February 14, 2013, which provided for establishing a common financial trans-
action tax system (Dengl, 2013, p. 1) in the context of enhanced cooperation (Dengl, 
2013, p. 1; Förster, 2014, p. 11). 
3.3.4 International Double Taxation – Background and Issues 
If the same income or the same assets of the same person is taxed by at least 
two states it results in an international double taxation (Brähler, 2014, p 17; Haase, 
2014, p. 16; Förster, 2014, p. 13). This triggered (Bredow, 2011, p. 96 et seqq.; Mach, 
2008, p. 121 et seqq.) by the fact that the subjective tax liability in regards to direct 
taxes – that is, inter alia, the personal and corporate income taxes – is characterized 
by the two basic principles of the world’s income and territoriality (Förster, 2014, 
p. 13; Bredow, 2011, p. 96 et seqq.; Mach, 2008, p. 121 et seqq.). The access to the 
taxes of its domestic natural and legal persons by the state does not only apply in 
regards to the domestic, but also in regards to foreign income and assets (Birk, De-
sens, & Tappe, 2014, p. 217; Förster, 2014, p. 13). This marks the initially mentioned 
unlimited tax liability (Birk, Desens, & Tappe, 2014, p. 217; Förster, 2014, p. 13). 
Non-domestic residents, however, are taxed only on the domestic income and the 
assets – the limited tax liability (Egner, 2015, p. 131; Birk, Desens, & Tappe, 2014, 
pp. 217-218; Förster, 2014, p. 13).  Basically – there are special regulations, which 
are extensive and complicated in detail – the above principles apply to all States of 
the European Union (Rasmussen, Mogens, 2011, pp. 1-11). Thus, in these following 
cases, double taxations in the above-described sense arise (Förster, 2014, p. 13): 
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UNILATERAL BILATERAL 
MEASURES 
a. Two states compete in the wake of unlimited tax liability over the taxes on 
the same income of a tax payer (Wuntsch & Bach, 2012, p. 145), or 
b. an unlimited and at the same time limited tax obligation of a tax payer is at 
hand (Brähler, 2014, p. 19 et seqq.),  
c. or a limited tax obligation in more than one state applies (Brähler, 2014, p. 
19 et seqq.). 
 
In order to prevent (figure 66) or mitigate double taxation, agreements were created 
(Brähler, 2014, p. 96; Förster, 2014, p. 13; Schmidt, Sigloch, & Henselmann, 2005, p. 
263 et seqq.). Thus the measures regarding double taxation are distinguished as 
follows (Brähler, 2014, p. 22): 
Figure 66: Measures to avoid Double Taxation 
  BILATERAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on Brähler, 2014, p. 22. 
Unilateral measures 
National legislations to avoid international double taxations 
(Bundesfinanzministerium, 2015; Merten, 2012, p. 41 et seqq.) are in existence al-
most worldwide (Brähler, 2014, p. 96). This leads to the following activities (Förster, 
2014, p. 14): 
 
PREVENTATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION 
 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN  SELECTED COUNTRIES  Page | 187 
 
 
 Exemption of foreign income (Brähler & Lösel, 2008, p. 329). 
 Foreign tax credit (Frotscher, Lüdicke, & Hummel, 2013, p. 122). 
 Crediting of a fictitious (Günter & Geiß, 2010, p. 120) foreign tax (invest-
ment incentives). 
 Deduction of foreign taxes on the determination of income (Haase, 2012, p. 
1360). 
 Reduction of domestic taxes (Egner, 2015; p. 15). 
 
In many cases, double taxations (Bergemann & Wingler, 2012, p. 325) are only being 
reduced by these measures and not completely prevented, as these measures are 
often not able to compensate for the entire foreign tax burden (Bergemann & Wing-
ler, 2012, p. 325; Förster, 2014, p. 14). Due to this bias and the lack of coordination 
(Brähler, 2014, pp. 21-22), the results are unsatisfactory (Brähler, 2014, pp. 21-22; 
Förster, 2014, p. 14).  
Bilateral measures 
While the previous little paragraph was about unilateral, thus one-sided national, 
measures, bilateral agreements refer to measures agreed upon by two countries to-
gether (Rose, 1982, p. 73 et seqq.; Gaida, Hille, & Mendl, 2001, p. 149 et seqq.; 
Tippelhofer, 2013, p. 1 et seqq.). These agreements have a greater effect because 
they conduct an allocation of taxing rights of the contracting states under certain 
objective criteria (Förster, 2014, p. 14). Through this international contractual limi-
tation of national taxation law, a double taxation may already be prevented 
(Förster, 2014, p. 14). Double taxation only will come about, if the Double Taxation 
Agreement (DTA) assigns the right of taxation to both states (Förster, 2014, p. 14). 
This is the case for dividend income (Trennheuser, 2014, p. 159 et seqq.; Läufer, 
2014, p. 23 et seqq.) in which the State of Residence shall have the right to impose 
taxes, while the state of source, however, is entitled to levy a withholding tax 
(Trennheuser, 2014, p. 159 et seqq.; Läufer, 2014, p. 23 et seqq.; Förster, 2014, p. 14). 
But even in these cases, the DTA has included regulations to avoid such double 
taxations (Förster, 2014, p. 15). Either the tax levied will be credited in the other 
state or the foreign income will be exempted with progression (Knobbe-Keuk, 1993, 
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p. 321 et seqq.) by one of the states involved (Förster, 2014, p. 15; Knobbe-Keuk, 
1993, p. 321. et seqq.). 
The international double taxation (Scholz S. , 2006, p. 58 et seqq.) is an inter-
national problem that called for appropriate action at an early stage (Schmidt, Sig-
loch, & Henselmann, 2005, p. 265 et seqq.; Schüller, 2014, p. 109; Förster, 2014, p. 
15; Scholz S., 2006, p. 58 et seqq.). Example solutions for bilateral contracts were 
prepared. The most significant model convention is the OECD Model Convention 
of 1977 in the amendment of 2010 (Schüller, 2014, p. 106; Förster, 2014, p. 15). The 
European Union (European Commission, 2015) has, as opposed to the other world 
market, the USA, no own model (European Commission, 2015; Förster, 2014, p. 15). 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU (AEUV – Vertrag über 
die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union)) no longer provides for multilateral 
agreements (Haase, 2014, p. 402; Europäische Union, 2012) between Member States 
(Haase, 2014, p. 402; Förster, 2014, p. 16). 
3.3.5 Harmonization Measures of the European Union 
3.3.5.1 Preliminary remarks 
The already-discussed development of the tax law shows, that even without 
explicit harmonization measures (Ritter, 1991, p. 11 et seqq.; Eiling, 2014, p. 25 et 
seqq.) – despite some major differences – an approximation of national fiscal regu-
lations has been achieved (Förster, 2014, p. 17; Ritter, p. 11 et seqq.; Eiling, 2014, p. 
25 et seqq.). It is, as already initially stated in this document, of sublime importance 
that the diverse views of cross-borders activities in the European Union need to be 
overcome on the fiscal side as well.  Neumair, Schlesinger and Haas speak of, as 
noted during the introduction, the outstanding target to establish (Neumair, Schle-
singer, & Haas, 2012, p. 460) a single European market meaning the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital (Liebert & Wolff, 2015, p. 178 et seqq.; 
Liebmann, 2015, p. 93 ) in conformity with the regulations of article 26, para. 2 TFEU 
(Neumair, Schlesinger, & Haas, 2012, p. 460; Förster, 2014, p. 17; Liebert & Wolff, 
2015, p. 178 et seqq.; Liebmann, 2015, p. 93). Now, it is very easy to see that different 
taxation, or different treatment of vehicles or the taxation of such vehicles as it yet 
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has to be the mandatory case with Private Equity Funds due to the intrinsically 
nation-state practices, opposes this request or rather this requirement. However, it 
remains unrevealed to the viewer why this contract only treats provisions of a fiscal 
nature (Niedobitek, 2014, p. 213) in an inadequate manner (Niedobitek, 2014, p. 
213; Förster, 2014, p. 17). 
3.3.5.2 Tax Harmonization: Impact on Private Equity Investments 
Art. 113 TFEU (Arndt, Fetzer, & Fischer, 2015, p. 211; Frenz, 2011, p. 922 et 
seqq.; Lipp, 2014, p. 24 et seqq.) may well be described as the most important reg-
ulation in terms of the harmonization imperative (Arndt, Fetzer, & Fischer, 2015, p. 
211; Förster, 2014, p. 17; Frenz, 2011, p. 922 et seqq.; Lipp, 2014, p. 24 et seqq.). It 
applies especially for the sales tax, excise duties (Streinz, 2016, p. 337) and other 
indirect taxes (Förster, 2014, p. 17; Frenz, 2011, p. 922 et seqq.; Streinz, 2016, p. 337). 
The agreement covers such content to the extent that such harmonization is neces-
sary for the formation and the effective operation of the internal market and to 
avoid distortions of competition (Arndt, Fetzer, & Fischer, 2015, p. 211; Förster, 
2014, p. 17; Frenz, 2011, p. 922 et seqq.; Lipp, 2014, p. 24 et seqq.). The tax harmoni-
zation mandate therefore relates only to those taxes levied on the price for goods 
and services in accordance with their statutory purpose (Arndt, Fetzer, & Fischer, 
2015, p. 211; Förster, 2014, p. 17; Frenz, 2011, p. 922 et seqq.; Lipp, 2014, p. 24 et 
seqq.). As a result, a direct and immediate distortion of competition is created 
(Arndt, Fetzer, & Fischer, 2015, p. 211; Förster, 2014, p. 17; Frenz, 2011, p. 922 et 
seqq.; Lipp, 2014, p. 24 et seqq.). What the European Union committed itself to, 
namely the free movement of goods, the free movement of services and the free 
movement of capital with in the Union (Mick, 1995, pp. 129-132), is hardly sup-
ported or encouraged by this.  
An express regulation in the TFEU concerning the harmonization of direct 
taxes (Europäisches Parlament Service, 2016) is not provided (Europäisches Parla-
ment Service, 2016; Förster, 2014, p. 17). According to Art. 115 TFEU, this harmoni-
zation is given by the general legal basis for the adjustment of the laws (Arndt, 
Fetzer, & Fischer, 2015, p. 185, Förster, 2014, p. 17). In regards to the direct taxes, 
the harmonization competence (Behme, 2015, p. 272) of the European Union, thus, 
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refers only to laws and regulations that are in direct wording directly and immedi-
ately affecting the formation or effective operation of the common market (Behme, 
2015, p. 272; Förster, 2014, p. 14; Arndt, Fetzer, & Fischer, 2015, p. 185). 
In principle, the TFEU has changed nothing in terms of allocation of powers 
between the European Union and the Member States (Förster, 2014, p. 18). For in-
direct taxes (Goez, 2007, p. 462 et seqq.), the principle of conferral continues to ap-
ply, while for direct taxes the legislative power remains with the Member States 
(Goez, 2007, p. 462 et seqq.; Förster, 2017, p. 18). In the field of taxation, the una-
nimity requirement under article 114, para. 2 (Frenz, 2011, p. 207 et seqq.) in con-
junction with article 26 TFEU applies (Förster, 2014, p. 18; Frenz, 2011, p. 207 et 
seqq.). So far, a different political solution could not be brought about (Förster, 
2014, p. 18). A majority decision (Europäisches Parlament Service, 2016), in which 
specification ever, could also be conceivable (Europäisches Parlament Service, 
2016; Förster, 2014, p. 18). Because of this unanimity clause, it is difficult to harmo-
nize taxation throughout the European Union (Europäisches Parlament Service, 
2016; Förster, 2014, p. 18). It is quite noticeable that the fiscal autonomy is of the 
highest priority to the Member States and is being defended with all possible means 
(Europäisches Parlament Service, 2016; Förster, 2014, p. 18). Hence, Private Equity 
transactions are clearly subject to limitations. In particular, cross-border construc-
tions, respectively commitments are massively complicated. Considering the diffi-
culties of fiscal nature, a Private Equity firm encounters for example in Germany, 
one consequence could be that investors rather refrain from such an investment 
because of its fiscal opacity. That Private Equity is an instrument for investment 
also and especially for young companies, meaning start-ups, and that they would 
surely have a positive effect on the overall European market through their own 
efforts and the already discussed synergy effects, is indisputable. Therefore, the 
circumstance, that Member States rigidly stick to their tax system is a rather bad 
signal for entrepreneurs (Liebing, 2004, pp. 32-38). 
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3.3.6 Tax Tangents of Private Equity 
To get an overview of the variety of taxes and thus the complexity of the tax 
environment for Private Equity transactions, the figure (67), which was already 
presented in chapter 1.1.2, is being consulted.  
Figure 67: Tax Tangents of Private Equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation based on own model in 2.1.3.5 figure 6. 
Mindful of the actuality that there are various treatments of Private Equity con-
structs in the European Union (Leible & Lehmann, 2009, p. 28), it is necessary to 
identify all possible tax situations and explain those briefly. The graph shows the 
participants of an organized Private Equity business. For all participants there are 
reference points of a fiscal nature, which are to be observed.  
Asset administrative or commercial 
First of all, it is important to mention this situation, which essentially only 
exists in Germany. The distinction which divides between either fiscally transpar-
ent or not, does otherwise not exist in hardly any other country (Weißpflog, 2015, 
p. 264; Scheffler, 2016, p. 55 et seqq.; Moritz, 2004, p. 372 et seqq.). In this context, 
      General Partner 
           Manager 
              Fund 
Carried Interest 20% of Profits 
Management Fee 1-2% of 
Commitment 
Limited 
Partners 
Investors 
RALF MAUER Page | 192 
 
 
tax transparency means that the proceeds from e.g. the disposal of shares in a port-
folio company are being considered within the framework of the partners and not 
at funds level (Deloitte, 2009, p. 2; Wallisch, 2009, p. 110 et seqq.). The company, 
therefore, is not taxable (Deloitte, 2009, p. 2; Wallisch, 2009, p. 110 et seqq.). Ergo, 
neither business tax is due (Deloitte, 2009, p. 2; Wallisch, 2009, p. 110 et seqq.). In 
the world’s largest Private Equity markets, the USA (Jesch, 2004, p. 141 et seqq.), 
and in Europe, the UK (Jesch, 2004, p. 157 et seqq.), this transparency principle ap-
plies, regardless of whether the business activity is commercial or not (Rapp, 2009, 
p. 65; BVK, 2009, pp. 1-2).  
Carried Interest 
The carried interest (Pinkerton & Tuminez, 2003, p. 702 et seqq.; Veith & Schade, 
2015) – also called carry – is a form of profit sharing of the fund company and its 
employees at the expense of the investors in a Private Equity fund (Pinkerton & 
Tuminez, 2003, p. 702 et seqq.; Veith & Schade, 2015; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Renz, 
2015, 26 et seqq.; Schalkowski, 2013, p. 28 et seqq.; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 27 et 
seqq.). Usually, the managers receive a share of up to 20% of the profit from the 
capital expenditure, the so-called Capital Gain (Deloitte, 2009, p. 43, Renz, 2015, 26 
et seqq.). In most cases, the carry is only payable, if a predefined minimum interest 
rate – the hurdle rate – of the capital employed by the investors has been reached 
(Pinkerton & Tuminez, 2003, p. 702 et seqq.; Veith & Schade, 2015; Deloitte, 2009, 
pp. 1-67; Renz, 2015, 26 et seqq.; Schalkowski, 2013, p. 28 et seqq.; Tcherveniachki, 
2007, p. 27 et seqq.). This minimum interest rate varies considerably, but in practice 
usually ranges between 6 to 8% per annum (Pinkerton & Tuminez, 2003, p. 702 et 
seqq.; Veith & Schade, 2015; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Renz, 2015, 26 et seqq.; 
Schalkowski, 2013, p. 28 et seqq.; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 27 et seqq.). Affecting the 
carry as well, significant differences in taxation within the Private Equity market 
and thus also within the European Union are to be recognized (Pinkerton & Tu-
minez, 2003, p. 702 et seqq.; Veith & Schade, 2015; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Renz, 
2015, 26 et seqq.; Schalkowski, 2013, p. 28 et seqq.; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 27 et 
seqq.). For example, in Germany, the carried interest (Pinkerton & Tuminez, 2003, 
p. 702 et seqq.; Veith & Schade, 2015; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Renz, 2015, 26 et seqq.; 
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Schalkowski, 2013, p. 28 et seqq.; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 27 et seqq.) is considered 
as income from self-employment pursuant to §18 para. 1 no. 4 EStG (Einkommen-
steuergesetz (Income Tax Act)). This income is subject to the so-called partial-in-
come method (Rapp, 2009, p. 50 et seqq.; Wellisch & Kroschel, 2012, p. 320, Birk, 
Desens, & Trappe, 2014, p. 232). This means that 60% of these gains are to be taxed 
at the personal tax rate (Wellisch & Kroschel, 2012, p. 320; Birk, Desens, & Tappe, 
2014, p. 232). However, Luxembourg differs between a general carry, which applies 
to employees of the AIF, and carry, assigned to a share or a stake in an AIF (Viard, 
2008, pp. 445-460; Meyers, Kernet, Zanev, Merkus, & Loyens & Loeff, 2010, pp. 257-
262). 
Tax Loss Carry-forward 
Also in regards to the possibility of offsetting tax losses in later years with then 
occurring profits, there are significant differences in among the respective coun-
tries.  For example, in France, tax loss carry-forwards at the level of corporations – 
e.g. target companies for Private Equity investment, only cease to apply, if the com-
pany in question actually switches to a different industry (Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 
165 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67, Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger, 2012, p. 
189). On the contrary, such an elimination of tax losses carried forward in the UK 
is only imminent, if a large part of the participations in the relevant company is 
transferred and beyond that, major modifications are made (Tcherveniachki, 2007, 
p. 165 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67, Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger, 2012, 
p. 189). Tax losses carried forward in Germany with regards to corporations are 
much more uncertain (Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 165 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-
67, Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger, 2012, p. 189). The current legal situation 
leads to a proportionate or complete elimination of tax loss carry-forwards, if 
shares of more than 25% respectively more than 50% are being acquired by states 
(Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 165 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67). With the European 
Union, Germany thus holds a significant locational disadvantage compared to 
those aforementioned Member States (Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 165 et seqq.; 
Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67). 
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Interest expense 
As Private Equity investments are relatively often connected with debt capital, the 
tax treatment of interest expense is an issue that is addressed in different ways in 
the European Union. So, under German tax law, the deductibility of interest ex-
penses (Ernst, 2015, p. 57; Eicke, 2009, p. 257) as business expense has been limited 
by introducing a so-called interest barrier (Bohn, 2009, p. 275 et seqq.; Deloitte, 
2009, pp. 1-67; Ernst, 2015, p. 57; Eicke, 2009, p. 257) under §4h EStG (Einkommen-
steuergesetz (Income Tax Act)). This interest barrier limits the tax interest expense 
deduction to 30% of the taxable earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization, the taxable EBITDA (Bohn, 2009, p. 275 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-
67; Ernst, 2015, p. 57; Eicke, 2009, p. 257). This regulation applies to both corpora-
tions and partnerships (Bohn, 2009, p. 275 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Ernst, 
2015, p. 57; Eicke, 2009, p. 257). Although the motives for the interest barrier are 
understandable – as it serves the avoidance of cross-border arrangements that used 
to allow companies to claim deductible interest expenses (Müller, 2009, p. 135), 
while the interest income had been recorded abroad – it poses a rather unfavorable 
issue for Private Equity (Bohn, 2009, p. 275 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Ernst, 
2015, p. 57; Eicke, 2009, p. 257; Müller, 2009, p. 135).  
France has taken a different path in regards to interest expenses (Marquart, 
2013, p. 144 et seqq.). Under French law, the interest subsidy is restricted by the 
adequacy principle and the regulations on shareholder debt financing (Bohn, 2009, 
p. 123 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Marquart, 2013, p. 144 et seqq.). Interest 
expenses that are paid to affiliated companies respectively to related parties are not 
tax-deductible (Müller, 2009, p. 135). This applies, if the underlying interest rate 
does not satisfy the arm’s lengths principle and therefore the expenses are unrea-
sonably high (Bohn, 2009, p. 123 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Marquart, 2013, 
p. 144 et seqq.). As far as interest expenses cannot be claimed for tax purposes, there 
is, within certain limits, the possibility of an interest carryforward to subsequent 
years (Bohn, 2009, p. 123 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Marquart, 2013, p. 144 et 
seqq.). Interest expense related to liabilities due to banks are always tax deductible 
without restrictions (Bohn, 2009, p. 123 et seqq.; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Marquart, 
2013, p. 144 et seqq.; Müller, 2009, p. 135)).   
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Sales Tax on Management Services 
In the United Kingdom, remunerations received by personally liable partners – that 
is, the General Partners – of a Private Equity Fund Limited Partnership, for man-
agement and consulting benefits received by the corporation, are basically struc-
tured as profit distributions and are as such not subject to VAT (Deloitte, 2009, pp. 
49-50). Also the management services, which are considered as special cases, to cer-
tain mutual funds in the form of special assets and the determination of divest-
ments, are exempt from VAT within the meaning of Article 135 para. 1, letter g and 
f of the VAT Directive (Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67). Outside the European Union – par-
ticularly in the USA – a sales tax on management services, which are provided by 
the General Partner to the Private Equity fund, is not charged. In Germany, the 
VAT treatment is complicated, especially in regards to managing services. First, it 
should be noted that in opinion of the Federal fiscal court and the tax authorities, 
the director activities are incurred in the context of a paid exchange of services and 
are thus subject to VAT (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, p. 579; Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67). 
Only thereafter does it have to be examined whether these are applicable for a VAT 
exemption (Deloitte, 2009, p. 37 et seqq.). For the development of a funds structure, 
that is to be uniformed in the fiscal area, the extremely different treatments in the 
countries pose a protruding issue (Achleitner & Everling, 2004, p. 200; Deloitte, 
2009, pp. 1-67). 
3.4 OVERVIEW AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF PRIVATE EQUITY 
IN GERMANY 
3.4.1 Performance Features: Private Equity in Germany 
3.4.1.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The German Private Equity market – or better investment location - is espe-
cially interesting for foreign investors (Köhler K. , 2015, p. 142; EuroActiv, 2014; 
Ernst & Young, 2012, pp. 1-32). This is not surprising, since Germany represents 
the largest national economy in the European Union (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 
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2010, p. 332; Beck H. , 2016, p. 245). This attracts investors from all over the world 
(Dencik & Spee, 2014, pp. 1-20). Figure 68 shows the Gross Domestic Product at 
market prices in Germany. 
Figure 68: Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices in 2015 in Germany 
 
Source: Owen representation based on Eurostat. 
Considering merely the share of Germany’s gross domestic product compared to 
the total volume of the European Union (Eurostat, 2016) clearly shows that Ger-
many is playing a prominent role in the European Union (EU). The importance of 
the Federal Republic of Germany in the European context and her significance can 
almost better be gathered from the diagram in figure 69. With more than 20 percent 
of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of the European Union, with 28 Member 
States after all, Germany is followed by France and the United Kingdom, each with 
15 percent. The top five are completed by Italy and Spain, with almost 12 percent, 
respectively, nearly 8 percent. In addition, it can be taken from this statistic that 
these five countries already account for approximately 70 percent of the total GDP 
in the European Union.  
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Figure 69: Germany´s Share in the European GDP in % 
 
Source: Own representation own calculation based on Eurostat. 
Figure 70: Gross Domestic Product per Capita in Germany 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
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As for the performance of Germany, a performance figure needs to be taken as a 
basis which will address the readiness to invest in Germany, but could affect the 
willingness of Germans to invest in other countries. This refers to the per capita 
domestic product (Eurostat, 2016).  
Taking into account the most important Private Equity countries of the Euro-
pean Union – considering how strong the total product of Germany is - Germany 
takes a surprisingly weak spot in the mid- ranks, which could be a slight indication 
of the lacking readiness to invest (figure 70).  
To gain some more clarity (Eurostat, 2016; Steuerwald, 2016, p. 224; Haas, 2010, p. 
6; Müller M. C., 2005, p. 19; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2015, p. 1), this 
is compared with the purchasing power standard (PPS) in figure 71. This fictitious 
monetary unit, independent from the national currency, eliminates distortions 
based on difference in price levels of different countries (Eurostat, 2016; 
Steuerwald, 2016, p. 224; Haas, 2010, p. 6; Müller M.C., 2005, p. 19; Bundeszentrale 
für politische Bildung, 2015, p. 1). The standard is based on average values and 
indexed at 100 in the European Union (Eurostat, 2016; Steuerwald, 2016, p. 224; 
Haas, 2010, p. 6; Müller M.C., 2005, p. 19; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 
2015, p. 1). A higher value indicates that a country has a higher purchasing power 
than the EU average and vice versa (Eurostat, 2016; Steuerwald, 2016, p. 224; Haas, 
2010, p. 6; Müller M.C., 2005, p. 19; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2015, p. 
1).  
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Figure 71: Purchasing Power Standard in Germany 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
Among the same participating counties, Germany, again, shows only a marginal 
improvement in this comparison to the per capita gross domestic product, remain-
ing in the middle ranks, so it must be stated that Germany, measured by per capita 
income and purchasing power and despite its supposed superior position in the 
European Union, seems not to be particularly suitable for investments in its own 
country or abroad.  
Naturally, foreign investors have a different point of view because Germany is an 
industrialized nation with extensive investment possibilities (Köhler K. , 2015, p. 
142; EuroActiv, 2014; Ernst & Young, 2012, pp. 1-32). 
3.4.1.2 Establishment of Private Equity in Germany 
At the end of 2013, the national umbrella organization of German Private Eq-
uity companies (Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften 
(BVK)) determined that of 178 investment companies, there were 9 less organized 
compared to the previous year (bvk, 2014). In 2014 there are 187. However, the 
number dropped again in 2015 roughly to the previous level. 
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Figure 72: History of Private Equity Fundraising in Germany to 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
Figure 73: PE Investments by Country of Private Equity Firms Germany 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
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In this, another approximately 60 relevant investment companies which are orga-
nized in the BVK have not been taken into account. Nevertheless, by these figures 
the conclusion can be drawn that in regards to the German investment companies 
in their entirety, the market rather stagnates.  
What this means in terms of collecting money – fundraising – is illustrated in figure 
72, in which the numbers are to be understood in thousands of euros (Invest 
Europe, 2016).  
After the crisis, the recovery of the Private Equity market in regards to fundraisings 
in 2011 and 2014 represents only a temporary phenomenon, so that Germany re-
mains at about the same level, however reasonably instable, as in 2009-2010. 
Fundraising represents currently only one parameter on the Private Equity 
market. In order to be capable of estimating the actual strength of the industry, 
investments and divestments need to be considered. As already explained, the in-
vestments are being assessed either from the point (location) of the investment 
company or the point (location) of the target company, depending on the point of 
view. The corresponding graph (figure 73) should provide an overview of the in-
vestment activities of Private Equity companies. In this figure as well, numbers are 
to be understood in thousands of euros.  
It does not actually appear that the Private Equity companies are less active, once 
less money is being raised. On the contrary, the investment activities have been 
constantly increasing since the crisis. It is already now noticeable, that the invest-
ment activity of German Private Equity companies is many times higher than the 
fundraising.  
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Figure 74: PE Investments by Country of Portfolio Company Germany 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
In figure 74, the investments in thousands of euros are being illustrated which are 
incurred in relation to the place of the portfolio company.  Also in view from the 
perspective of the target company, there has been an increase in activity after the 
crisis. However, there is currently a slight downward trend to be seen.  
Interpretation  
The nvestments were examined, specifically those which investment companies lo-
cated in Germany execute as well as those investments received by portfolio com-
panies in Germany. This data may only be correctly assessed by placing them in 
relation with other parameters. In this case, the gross domestic product (GDP) and 
the investment per capita is appropriate.  
While in Germany the portion of investments by German Private Equity companies 
still amounted to 0.322% in 2007, it decreased, as a result of the crisis, to only 0.107% 
in 2009 and now 0.216% in 2013.  In 2014 it was 0.203% and in 2015 0.198%. In 2007, 
100.38 € were invested per capita. In 2009 that figure amounted to 32.52 € and 73.38 
€ in 2013. In 2014 it was 73.20 € and in 2015 73.93 €. 
10.447.987
9.583.664
3.023.827 4.894.875
6.666.948 6.626.031
5.054.763
7.133.295
6.598.906
0
2.000.000
4.000.000
6.000.000
8.000.000
10.000.000
12.000.000
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Private Equity Investments - Market Statistics 
Germany 2007 - 2015
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN  SELECTED COUNTRIES  Page | 203 
 
 
In 2007, 0.416% of the GDP had been invested in Germany-based portfolio compa-
nies, in 2009 that number was 0.123% and in 2013 0.180% of the GDP. In 2014 it was 
0.245% and in 2015 0.218%. Per capita, 129.75 € were invested in 2007, in 2009 37.55 
€ and 61.19€ in 2013, in 2014 87.96 € and 2015 81.37 € in portfolio companies.  
Overall, it can be stated that the willingness for an investment in terms of 
Private Equity in Germany is at a low level. Although the numbers slowly recover, 
the value attained prior to the crisis is still far away. Strikingly noticeable is the 
reticence with regard to investments in German portfolio companies.   
Figure 75: PE Divestments by Country of the Private Equity Firm Germany 
 
Source: Own representation bases on Invest Europe, 2016. 
Also very important is the differentiation of the divestments in market and indus-
try statistics, in order to make investments and divestments comparable in the first 
place. Figure 75 shows in thousands of euros the divestments since 2007 up to the 
year 2015. 
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Figure 76: PE Divestments by Country of the Portfolio Company Germany 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
The course of divestment in the industry statistics is apparently very similar to the 
course of investments in industry statistics. According to both statistics, values 
have been continuously rising since the crisis. Figure 76 shows, for comparison, the 
market statistics. Unlike the investments, markets statistics shows the same curve 
with divestments as with the examination regarding the location of Private Equity 
firms.  
Early-stage financing 
The willingness to invest in the early stages (Schüle, 2015, p. 17; Kuntz, 2016, p. 12) 
of a Private Equity transaction, which is particularly interesting for entrepreneurs, 
is illustrated in the following figures (Hoffmann, 2014, p. 112 et seqq.; Schüle, p. 17; 
Kuntz, 2016, p. 12; Invest Europe, 2016). First, the graphic of investments (figure 
77)  based on the place of Private Equity firms is shown. 
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Figure 77: PE Investments by Country of Private Equity Firm – Seed Germany 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
Considering the investments in the very early stages in comparison to the total in-
vestments in this segment in figure 78, the blatantly low proportion of investments 
during this start-up phase and the – in quotation marks – high proportion of seed 
investments in the phase – 2009 –, during which the total investments were lowest, 
can be noticed (Rudolph, 1998, p. 222 et seqq.; Kuntz, 2016, p. 12 et seqq.; Hofmann 
& Schmolz, 2014, p. 131 et seqq.). It can therefore be assumed that Private Equity 
firms invest only little in total during this phase – the reasons for this have already 
been explained – and that these companies evidently spur the investments entail-
ing less risk in times of crisis in order to still remain in the field of Private Equity. 
Thus, the proportion of seed investment compared to the total investments in the 
sense of the Industry Statistic during its heyday in 2007 with 0.6% had been well 
below the value of 2009, when 2.4% of the total volume was invested in the seed 
segment. 
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Figure 78: Total PE Investments in Private Equity – Industry Statistics Germ. 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
Figure 79: PE Investments by Country of Portfolio Company - Seed 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
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It is also striking that in terms of Private Equity firms, the seed investments recover 
even slower than the total investments in Private Equity in Germany, and that the 
percentage share of seed investments in the total volume of investments has moved 
downward again, despite the supposed high level during the crisis and the weak 
level of overall investments. This means nothing else but that German portfolio 
companies were more quickly willing again to invest, however less in companies 
during their early stages of investment. In regards to the market statistics – thus the 
statistics by country of Portfolio Company (figure 80) – it can be stated that the 
curve progression is almost identical, however with a higher overall volume of in-
vestments.  
Figure 80: Total PE Investments in Private Equity – Market Statistics Germany 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
A very similar phenomenon at a slightly higher level can be observed with invest-
ments during the start-up phase (figure 81 and 82), whereas the curve differs 
slightly. In this segment as well, the propensity to invest during or immediately 
after the crisis is higher than before or thereafter.   
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Figure 81: Private Equity Investments Industry Statistics – Start-up Germany 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
Figure 82: Private Equity Investments Market Statistics – Start-up Germany 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
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For the entrepreneur in Germany, this denotes that he may only hope for limited 
support through Private Equity in Germany during the early stage of his enterprise. 
However, this support is usually reliably offered by companies located in Ger-
many.   
Figure 83: PE Investments in the Early Stage in % - Industry Statistics Germany 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
For German founders, this statistic also indicates that foreign companies – from 
Member States of the European Union – are hardly interested in investing in young 
companies, either because of lack of information, lack of revenue opportunities or 
lack of interest in overcoming asymmetries in terms of e.g. the fiscal regulations. If 
the two early stages – which are defined at this point in seed and start-up – are 
being cumulated (figures 83 and 84), it will hardly result in a better outlook for 
entrepreneurs in Germany. Just at the point at which the investments are most nec-
essary for founders, the willingness of portfolio companies to invest remains at a 
low level, whereas the investments during the early stages – according to market 
statistics -  in Germany-based enterprises has actually increased. 
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Figure 84: PE Investments in the Early Stage in % - Market Statistics Germany 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
As already indicated above, one reason for the restrained willingness to invest in 
Private Equity and therefore also in the early stages at all, could be that the Member 
States of the European Union are offering the most different tax conditions with 
respect to Private Equity funds. As the individual Member States have been forced 
by the AIFM Directive to act, Germany has reacted with the AIFM (Alternative In-
vestment Fund Manager) tax adaption act (Ortmann-Babel, Franke, Bolik, & Zöller, 
2013, p. 142 et seqq.). 
3.4.2 Promulgation of the AIFM Tax Adaption Act (AIFM-StAnpG) 
The AIFM Tax Adaption Act (AIFM-Steueranpassungsgesetz (AIFM-
StAnpG)) was passed by the German Federal Council (Deutsche Bundestag) and 
the Federal Council (Bundesrat) on November 28th and 29th, 2013 (Dißmann, 2015; 
Fabry & Kaluzna, 2013, pp. 1-5; Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 22 et seqq.; Weitnauer, 
Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 1649 et seqq.). The law was promulgated in the Fed-
eral Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl.)) on December 23rd, 2013 (BGBl. I 2013, p. 
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4318) so that the entire AIFM Tax Adjustment Act (AIFM-StAnpG) became yet ef-
fective in 2013 (Fabry & Kaluzna, 2013, pp. 1-5; Dißmann, 2015; Haase, 2014, p. 197; 
Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 22 et seqq.; Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 1649 
et seqq.).  
The Federal Council (Bundesrat) approved a proposed law for resubmission of the 
AIFM Tax Adaption Act (Bundesrat, 2013, pp. 1-137) on November 8th, 2013 (BR-
Drs. 740/13 B). Resubmission had become necessary because the parties were una-
ble to agree in the Conciliation Committee before the federal election (Simonis, 
Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22). Since the original bill for the AIFM Tax Adaption 
Act (AIFM-StAnpG) could not be adopted in the same legislative session which 
saw the introduction of the Federal Council (Bundestag), the bill expired due to the 
so- called factual discontinuity (Ortmann-Babel & Bolik, 2013, pp. 1-6).  
The AIFM Tax Adaption Act (AIFM-StAnpG) can be substantially viewed as an 
adjustment of the Investment Tax Act (Investmentsteuergesetz (InvStG)) to the 
Capital Investment Code (Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (KAGB)), which was created 
(BGBL. I 2013, o, p. 1981) by the AIFM Implementation Act (AIFM-
Umsetzungsgesetz (AIFM-UmsG)) and was promulgated on July 4th, 2013 and be-
came effective on July 22nd, 2013. It provides tax restrictions associated with the 
raising of hidden liabilities (Fabry & Kaluzna, 2013, pp. 1-5; Dißmann, 2015; Haase, 
2014, p. 197; Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 22 et seqq.; Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 
2014, p. 1649 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Ortmann-Babel & 
Bolik, 2013, pp. 1-6). The Act contains an amendment to the application regulation 
(Fabry & Kaluzna, 2013, pp. 1-5; Dißmann, 2015; Haase, 2014, p. 197; Haase & Dorn, 
2015, p. 22 et seqq.; Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 1649 et seqq.; Simonis, 
Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Ortmann-Babel & Bolik, 2013, pp. 1-6) from the 
Corporate Tax Reform Act (Unternehmenssteuerreformgesetz (UntStRefG)) of 
2012 (so-called VZ 2014 gap). In addition to the tax adjustments, the introduction 
of a Pension Asset Pooling Vehicle in Germany (Rhodius & Lofing, 2013, pp. 85-
133) is being implemented (Fabry & Kaluzna, 2013, pp. 1-5; Dißmann, 2015; Haase, 
2014, p. 197; Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 22 et seqq.; Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 
2014, p. 1649 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Ortmann-Babel & 
Bolik, 2013, pp. 1-6; Rhodius & Lofing, 2013, pp. 85-133). 
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3.4.3 Introduction of the Capital Investment Code (KAGB) 
The AIFM Directive (AIFMD) came into effect on July 21st, 2013, the legisla-
tive process for its implementation (Körber, 2014, p. 20; Ebel, 2015, p. 430) had to 
be completed by July 22nd, 2013 (Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 1; 
Körber, 2014, p. 20; Ebel, 2015; p. 430). With the adoption of the European AIFM 
Directive the previously existing Investment Act (Investmentgesetz (InvG)) is abol-
ished (Schindler & Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.) in Germany (Weitnauer, Boxbe-
rger, & Anders, 2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & Hindelang, 
2016, p. 54 et seqq.). Therein contained regulations have been integrated in the Cap-
ital Investment Code (KAGB) since July 22nd, 2013 (Weitnauer, Boxberger, & An-
ders, 2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et 
seqq.). The Act governs a total of 355 paragraphs, regulating open and closed-end 
funds and their manager for the first time (Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, 
p. 3; Weißflog, 2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.). It 
was and still is hoped that this will fundamentally transform the fund industry 
(Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 2015, p. 28 et seqq.; 
Schindler & Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.). These provisions are intended to fur-
ther develop the supervisory and regulatory framework conditions and to adapt 
them to the amended European requirements (Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 
2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.). 
The Capital Investment Code (KAGB) may thus provide a contribution to the 
achievement of the European single market in the investment fund sector (Weit-
nauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & 
Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.). Moreover, it can also protect investors through a 
uniformly high standard (Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 
2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.). So, for the first 
time, managers of closed-end funds must meet the same requirements which must 
be met longstanding by open-end funds (Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 
3; Weißflog, 2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.). 
The Capital Investment Code (KAGB) differs (BVI, 2015, p. 1) between (Weit-
nauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & 
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Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.; Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 6; BVI, 
2015, p. 1) investment assets, known as Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS), and Alternative Investment Funds (AIF). Equity 
and debt security funds are frequently such undertakings for collective investment 
in transferable securities (Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 
2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.; Weitnauer, Box-
berger, & Anders, 2014, p. 6; BVI, 2015, p. 1). Closed-end funds, however, are being 
classified as AIF (Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 2015, p. 28 
et seqq.; Schindler & Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.; Weitnauer, Boxberger, & An-
ders, 2014, p. 6; BVI, 2015, p. 1). For UCITS managers and AIF, different admission 
requirements and reporting obligations do apply to whose attendance does not 
seem necessary at this point (Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 
2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & Hindelang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.; Weitnauer, Box-
berger, & Anders, 2014, p. 6; BVI, 2015, p. 1). After the entry into force (Weitnauer, 
Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 3; Weißflog, 2015, p. 28 et seqq.; Schindler & Hin-
delang, 2016, p. 54 et seqq.; Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 6; BVI, 2015, 
p. 1) of the Capital Investment Code (KAGB) the previous Investment Companies 
(Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (KAGs)) became Capital Management Companies 
(Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaften (KVGs)). These differentiate themselves in 
UCITS and AIF KVG (Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft) according to the type of 
managed investment assets (Böttcher, 2014, pp. 401-402). 
3.4.4 Changes by the AIFM Tax Adaption Act 
In addition to the regulations, which are in direct context to the adjustment 
to the provisions of the Capital Investment Code (KAGB), the legislature has used 
the AIFM Tax Adaption Act (AIFM-StAnpG) to implement further individual 
measures, such as regulations for the ending of the so-called bond stripping (Grill, 
Gramlich, & Eller, 1995, p. 296; Mertes, 2015, p. 816; Ossenbrink, 2016, p. 266), for a 
first-time legal regulation of an appropriation sequence with disbursements, for an 
alternative allocation of professional expenses as well as in regards to non-invest-
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ment tax issues (Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Mardini, personal com-
munication, 2014, May 28; Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 1649 et seqq.; 
Grill, Gramlich, & Eller, 1995, p. 296; Mertes, 2015, p. 816; Ossenbrink, 2016, p. 266). 
The area of non-investment tax issues concerns the standards for the fiscal treat-
ment of commitment acquisitions, debt accessions and fulfillment commitments in 
terms of commitments, which were subject to approach prohibitions, restrictions 
or evaluations reserves under the original obligor issues (Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 
2014, pp. 16-22; Mardini, personal communication, 2014, May 28; Weitnauer, Box-
berger, & Anders, 2014, p. 1649 et seqq.; Grill, Gramlich, & Eller, 1995, p. 296; Mer-
tes, 2015, p. 816; Ossenbrink, 2016, p. 266). The legislative body had to quickly move 
forward with the implementation in agreement with the judicature of the Federal 
Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzhof (BFH)), if to yet prevent the resulting risks of high 
tax loss issues (Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Mardini, personal com-
munication, 2014, May 28; Weitnauer, Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 1649 et seqq.; 
Grill, Gramlich, & Eller, 1995, p. 296; Mertes, 2015, p. 816; Ossenbrink, 2016, p. 266). 
With the revision of the Investment Tax Act (InvStG), necessary adjustments were 
taken, which resulted from the national implementation of the AIFM Directive, 
thus as well from the Capital Investment Code (KAGB) issues (Simonis, Grabbe, & 
Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Mardini, personal communication, 2014, May 28; Weitnauer, 
Boxberger, & Anders, 2014, p. 1649 et seqq.; Grill, Gramlich, & Eller, 1995, p. 296; 
Mertes, 2015, p. 816; Ossenbrink, 2016, p. 266). As explained in the previous chap-
ter, the Capital Investment Code (KAGB) has replaced the Investment Act (Invest-
mentgesetz (InvG)) effective July 22, 2013 issues (Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, 
pp. 16-22; Mardini, personal communication, 2014, May 28; Weitnauer, Boxberger, 
& Anders, 2014, p. 1649 et seqq.; Grill, Gramlich, & Eller, 1995, p. 296; Mertes, 2015, 
p. 816; Ossenbrink, 2016, p. 266). 
3.4.4.1 Scope of the AIFM Tax Adaptation Act (AIFM-StAnpG) 
The Investment Tax Act (Investmentsteuergesetz (InvStG)) is to be applied to 
organisms (Raab, 2010, p. 25; Hagen, Groseta, Schilling, & Jenett, 2015, p. 676; Jesch 
T. , 2015, p. 46) for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as de-
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fined by §1 para. 2 Capital Investment Code (KAGB), as well as alternative invest-
ment funds (AIF) in §1 para. 2 clause 1 InvStG (Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 39 et seqq.; 
Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 2010, p. 25; Hagen, Groseta, Schil-
ling, & Jenett, 2015, p. 676; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.). Partial special 
assets (§96 para. 2, clause 1 KAGB) and sub funds, so-called sub fund assets, (§§ 
117, 132 KAGB) as well as comparable foreign, legally separate units are considered 
as UCITS, respectively AIF (Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 39 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & 
Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 2010, p. 25; Hagen, Groseta, Schilling, & Jenett, 2015, 
p. 676; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.).  
In the reversal of understanding, the concept AIF includes all investment assets, 
with the exception of UCITS (Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 39 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, 
& Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 2010, p. 25; Hagen, Groseta, Schilling, & Jenett, 2015, 
p. 676; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.). An accordant definition (Haase & 
Dorn, 2015, p. 39 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 2010, p. 
25; Hagen, Groseta, Schilling, & Jenett, 2015, p. 676; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et 
seqq.) can also be found in the Capital Investment Code (KAGB, §1 para. 1 no. 3 
KAGB). The German Federal Financial Supervisory Agency (Bundesanstalt für Fi-
nanzen (BaFin)) notes that the term organism in this context is neither concretized 
by the AIFM Directive nor by the Capital Investment Code (KAGB) and submits its 
opinion in its interpretative letter (BaFin, 2013) dated 14 June 2013 regarding the 
scope of the Capital Investment Code (KAGB) and the term of investment fund 
(Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 39 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 
2010, p. 25; Hagen, Groseta, Schilling, & Jenett, 2015, p. 676; Port & Steinlein, 2015, 
p. 79 et seqq.). To qualify as AIF, the following characteristics are required (Haase 
& Dorn, 2015, p. 39 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 2010, 
p. 25; Hagen, Groseta, Schilling, & Jenett, 2015, p. 676; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 
et seqq.): 
 
 Organism, 
 for collective investments. 
 collection of capital, 
 from a number of investors, 
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 defined investment strategy, 
 investment for the benefit of the investors, 
 and no company operating outside the financial sector (Simonis, Grabbe, & 
Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22). 
 
Although the Investment Tax Act (InvStG) should be unambiguous, it prevents a 
legally watertight tax law by including the non-definite terms AIF or UCITS, thus 
the lacking definition (Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 39 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 
2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 2010, p. 25; Hagen, Groseta, Schilling, & Jenett, 2015, p. 676; 
Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.) of organism and investment asset criticized by 
the Federal Institute of Finance (Bundesanstalt für Finanzen (BaFin)). At this point 
it is necessary for the determination of the scope of the Investment Tax Act (InvStG) 
at a national as well as European level, to resort (Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 39 et seqq.; 
Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 2010, p. 25; Hagen, Groseta, Schil-
ling, & Jenett, 2015, p. 676; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.) to the interpreta-
tions of the regulatory authorities BaFin and ESMA (European Securities and Mar-
kets Authority). 
Not included in this scope are corporate subsidiaries pursuant to §1a, para. 1 UBGG 
(Law on Investment Companies, Gesetz über Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesell-
schaften), which usually acquire, hold, manage or dispose of interests in companies 
(Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 39 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 
2010, p. 25; Hagen, Groseta, Schilling, & Jenett, 2015, p. 676; Port & Steinlein, 2015, 
p. 79 et seqq.). Furthermore, Venture Capital firms are excluded, which acquire in-
terests with equity capital or state assistance in the public interest (Haase & Dorn, 
2015, p. 39 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 2010, p. 25; 
Hagen, Groseta, Schilling, & Jenett, 2015, p. 676; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et 
seqq.). Even companies, which - in accordance with §1 para. 19 no. 36 KAGB – sole 
purpose is to conduct securitization business, are not implicated (Haase & Dorn, 
2015, p. 39 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Raab, 2010, p. 25; 
Hagen, Groseta, Schilling, & Jenett, 2015, p. 676; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et 
seqq.; Jesch T., 2015, p. 46). 
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3.4.4.2 Differentiation of Investment Vehicles 
Preliminary Remarks 
The Investment Tax Act (InvStG) now differentiates between vehicles (Höring J. , 
2016, p. 2; Otto, 2013, p. 253) that fulfill the fiscal criteria on so-called mutual funds 
pursuant to §1, para. 1b Investment Tax Act, and other investment funds in which 
these tight requirements are not given (Majcen, 2007, p. 47 et seqq.; Höring J., 2016, 
p. 2; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Otto, 2013, p. 253; Baumhoff, 
Drücker, & Köhler, 2010, p. 122). Since the amendment, which was transitioned by 
the AIFM Directive, the term investment trust is being used for investment funds 
pursuant to §1 para. 1c Investment Tax Act (Majcen, 2007, p. 47 et seqq.; Höring J., 
2016, p. 2; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Otto, 2013, p. 253; Baumhoff, 
Drücker, & Köhler, 2010, p. 122). The Investment Tax Act (InvStG) so far included 
only the so-called limited transparency principle (Baumhoff, Drücker, & Köhler, 
2010, p. 122) in regards to taxation (Majcen, 2007, p. 47 et seqq.; Höring J., 2016, p. 
2; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Otto, 2013, p. 253; Baumhoff, Drücker, 
& Köhler, 2010, p. 122). Now both, the taxation based on the limited transparency 
principle and the taxation for investment trusts are being regulated under the In-
vestment Tax Act (Majcen, 2007, p. 47 et seqq.; Höring J., 2016, p. 2; Simonis, 
Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Otto, 2013, p. 253; Baumhoff, Drücker, & Köhler, 
2010, p. 122). Only for such investment funds that meet the strict requirements of a 
mutual fund, the limited transparency principle applies in accordance with §1 para. 
1b clause 1 Investment Tax Act (Majcen, 2007, p. 47 et seqq.; Höring J., 2016, p. 2; 
Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Otto, 2013, p. 253; Baumhoff, Drücker, 
& Köhler, 2010, p. 122). For investment trusts that do not meet the restrictive fiscal 
requirements for their part, the legislative authorities have provided an innate form 
of taxation within the Investment Tax Act (Majcen, 2007, p. 47 et seqq.; Höring J., 
2016, p. 2; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Otto, 2013, p. 253; Baumhoff, 
Drücker, & Köhler, 2010, p. 122). The provisions hereto reverberate in §§18 and 19 
of the Investment Tax Act (InvStG) and are being largely treated in the process as 
ordinary partnerships or corporations in fiscal matters (Majcen, 2007, p. 47 et seqq.; 
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Höring J., 2016, p. 2; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Otto, 2013, p. 253; 
Baumhoff, Drücker, & Köhler, 2010, p. 122). 
3.4.5 Subsumption in Germany Tax Regulations according to the AIFM Tax 
Adaption Act 
3.4.5.1 Capital Investment Companies 
Capital investment companies according to the definition of §19 para. 1 
clause 1 InvStG (Investment Tax Act) are all companies including special assets 
characterized, which are in negative delimitation, not personal investment compa-
nies as defined in §18 InvStG (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; 
Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, 
Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22).  
Capital investment companies (Kapital-Investitionsgesellschaften) in the organiza-
tion form of a domestic special asset are considered special-purpose assets and are 
subject to full tax obligations (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; 
Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, 
Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22). Under certain circumstances, business tax is due 
as well (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, 
p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 
16-22). Thus, German special and mutual funds are not tax exempt a priori (Kleine, 
Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; 
Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22). Failure 
to discharge the exigencies for the characteristics as an investment fund poses a 
considerable tax risk (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & 
Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & 
Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22). This is also the case, if the investors themselves are exempt 
from tax (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, 
p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 
16-22). Foreign capital investment companies that are not corporations are consid-
ered as assets which may be subject to taxation with their domestic income as an 
individual tax subject (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & 
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Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & 
Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.) in accordance with §49 of the 
EStG (Einkommensteuergesetz (Income Tax Act)). Therefrom, four constructs can 
be derived (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 
2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, 
pp. 16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.):  
 
 Domestic Investment Corporation. 
 Domestic special assets. 
 Foreign special assets in corporate form. 
 Foreign special assets in contractual form (Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.).  
 
Wherein the Luxembourg or French Fond Commun de Placement (FCP) character-
izes such a contractually regulated construct in terms of a foreign investment fund 
(Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et 
seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; 
Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.). The current uncertainty regarding the qualification 
as a corporate tax subject was resolved by the AIFM Tax Adaption Act. Restric-
tively has to be noted that this regulation only applies to investment companies 
and by no means to investment funds (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 
et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Si-
monis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.).   
For investors this new regulation now means that although the taxation is basically 
pursuing existing fiscal legal standards, it is subject to a number of special provi-
sions (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 
79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-
22; Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.). The applicability of the provisions for the deter-
mination of tax-sheltered income pursuant to §3 no. 40 EStG and §8 Corporate Tax 
Act (Körperschaftsteuergesetz, KStG) regarding received dividends and capital 
gains is dependent on the fact that the investor of capital investment companies, 
which are located in the European Union or the European Economic Area, provides 
evidence that this company is subject to corporation income tax at their place of 
registration and is not exempt from paying (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 
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140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; 
Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.). If the 
capital investment company resides in a third country, the law requires the proof, 
that it is subject to taxation by at least 15% (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 
140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; 
Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.). It is not 
specifically regulated, whether it is to be based on the actual taxation or the nominal 
tax rate (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, 
p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 
16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.). Especially with accumulated losses or a dif-
ferent income determination, this can be significant (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 
2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et 
seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.). It 
stands to reason that the German legislature - in delimitation to the provisions of 
the Foreign Transactions Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz (AStG)), which will follow -  
did not want to  underlay the determination of the actual taxation according to 
German tax principles, by stating in its legislative intent that the capital investment 
company has to be subject  to “… a corporate tax rate of at least 15% if the residence 
is registered in a third country…” (Deloitte, 2014), in order to benefit from the fiscal 
advantages of §3 no. 40 EStG and §8b KStG (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 
140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; 
Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.).  
In regards to the taxation of foreign sourced income, this means that even if tax 
exemptions on dividends and capital gains are denied, an applicability of the Ger-
many Foreign Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz (AStG)) may occur (Kleine, Schulz, & 
Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 
2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 
56 et seqq.). The occasion for this applicability is the fact that for capital investment 
companies notwithstanding §7 para. 7 AStG (Moser, 2015, p. 102 et seqq.; Cortez, 
2013, p. 131 et seqq.), which generally declares that the Investment Tax Act (InvStG) 
takes priority over the Foreign Transaction Tax Act (AStG), the provisions regard-
ing the taxation of foreign sourced income shall remain applicable (Kleine, Schulz, 
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& Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 
2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 
56 et seqq.). To avoid a national double taxation in this context, the distributions 
and capital gains shall be tax-exempt in those cases where the Foreign Tax Act is 
applicable (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Port & Steinlein, 
2015, p. 79 et seqq.; Zetzsche, 2015, p. 466 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, 
pp. 16-22; Höring J., 2013, p. 56 et seqq.), however, a seven-year period must be 
observed for the exemption (Endres, 2014, pp. 86-87). 
3.4.5.2 Investment Partnerships 
Investment limited partnerships as well as comparable foreign legal forms 
which do not meet the provisions of §1 para. 1b InvStG (Investmentsteuergesetz 
(Investment Tax Act)) and therefore are subject to §18 clause 1 InvStG qualify as 
investment partnerships (Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 197 et seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & 
Krautbauer, 2015, p. 141 et seqq.; Zetsche, 2015, p. 467 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & 
Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22). Their taxation, respectively the taxations of their investors 
follows the general principles for partnerships and demands a separate and uni-
form establishment of earnings as well as a potential business tax (Haase & Dorn, 
2015, p. 197 et seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 141 et seqq.; Zetsche, 
2015, p. 467 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22).            
Due to the reference to investment limited partnerships and similar foreign legal 
forms §18 clause 1 InvStG contains a restricted admission, so that all other legal 
forms are considered as capital investment companies as defined in §19 of the 
InvStG (Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 197 et seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 
141 et seqq.; Zetsche, 2015, p. 467 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-
22; Dahm & Hamcher, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.; Moser, 2015, p. 102 et seqq.). The problem 
at this point is that if this rule would be taken very strictly, those closed-end funds 
which were launched in the form of a limited partnership (Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung & Companie Kommanditgesellschaft (GmbH & Co. KG)) 
with a limited liability company as general partner prior to the introduction of the 
Capital Investment Code (KAGB) and were not yet converted under supervisory 
regulations or enjoy grandfathering terms of their legal form, would have to be 
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classified as capital investment companies (Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 197 et seqq.; 
Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 141 et seqq.; Zetsche, 2015, p. 467 et seqq.; 
Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Dahm & Hamcher, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.; 
Moser, 2015, p. 102 et seqq.). The unusual case would arise, that a partnership, 
which represents a limited partnership (GmbH & Co. KG) with a limited liability 
company as general partner, would be classified as a capital investment company 
and thus would be subject to taxation of a corporation (Haase & Dorn, 2015, p. 197 
et seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 141 et seqq.; Zetsche, 2015, p. 467 et 
seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, pp. 16-22; Dahm & Hamcher, 2014, p. 60 et 
seqq.; Moser, 2015, p. 102 et seqq.). The legislative authorities do leave a desidera-
tum (Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, pp. 141-142) here as well (Haase & Dorn, 
2015, p. 197 et seqq.; Zetsche, 2015, p. 467 et seqq.; Simonis, Grabbe, & Faller, 2014, 
pp. 16-22; Dahm & Hamcher, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.; Moser, 2015, p. 102 et seqq.). 
3.4.5.3 Income Tax Treatment of Private Equity Funds 
Even after the implementation of the Capital Investment Code (KAGB) and 
the legal validity of the AIFM Tax Adaption Act (AIFM-StAnpG), Private Equity 
funds (Pelikan, 2007, p. 104 et seqq.) are usually constructed as a closed fund in the 
legal form of a partnership (Mardini, personal communication, 2014; February 27 
and May 28; Haase, 2014, p. 197 et seqq.; Pelikan, 2007, p. 104 et seqq.; Tcherveni-
achki, 2007, p. 43 et seqq.). Typically, the General Partner is not an actual person, 
but a legal person (Mardini, personal communication, 2014; February 27 and May 
28; Haase, 2014, p. 197 et seqq.; Pelikan, 2007, p. 104 et seqq.; Tcherveniachki, 2007, 
p. 43 et seqq.), the limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung 
(GmbH)). Thus, the fund can be constituted as a limited liability company with a 
limited partnership company (GmbH & Co. KG), in which – in addition to the gen-
eral provisions of the German Commercial Code  (Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB)) for 
the limited partnership – some regulatory specificities  by the Capital Investment 
Code (§§149 et seq. KAGB) are added (Mardini, personal communication, 2014; 
February 27 and May 28; Haase, 2014, p. 197 et seqq.; Pelikan, 2007, p. 104 et seqq.; 
Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 43 et seqq.). The investment limited partnership (Mardini, 
personal communication, 2014; February 27 and May 28; Haase, 2014, p. 197 et 
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seqq.; Pelikan, 2007, p. 104 et seqq.; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 43 et seqq.) can be 
marked as a supervisory modified special form of a normal limited partnership 
(with a limited liability company as general partner) according to the German Com-
mercial Code (§§161 et seq.  HGB). Through §18 Investment Tax Act (InvStG) the 
general tax regulations for partnerships are applied to a German investment lim-
ited partnership – and comparable foreign legal forms, in particular limited part-
nerships – as, for example, are applicable for normal limited partnerships (Mardini, 
personal communication, 2014; February 27 and May 28; Haase, 2014, p. 197 et 
seqq.; Pelikan, 2007, p. 104 et seqq.; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 43 et seqq.) with a lim-
ited liability company as general partners (Hechl, 2012, p. 13 et seqq.; Fehrenbacher 
& Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq., 74 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, pp. 17-
18). The general partner (limited liability company) can participate (Mardini, per-
sonal communication, 2014; February 27 and May 28; Haase, 2014, p. 197 et seqq.; 
Pelikan, 2007, p. 104 et seqq.; Tcherveniachki, 2007, p. 43 et seqq.; Hechl, 2012, p. 43 
et seqq.; Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 
2010, pp. 17-18) with all its assets or a portion thereof in the limited partnership 
(Kommanditgesellschaft (KG)). Assets in kind may also be contributed (Hechl, 
2012, p. 43 et seqq.; Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & 
Wagner, 2010, pp. 17-18). In the case of a conversion of an existing limited liability 
company (GmbH) to a limited partnership with a limited liability company as gen-
eral partner (GmbH & Co. KG) it could well be to only contribute the current assets 
(Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et seqq.; Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, 
Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, pp. 17-18) of the limited liability company (GmbH) to the 
limited partnership (KG) and to leave the capital assets with the limited liability 
company (GmbH). In all cases, no contribution of the limited liability company 
(GmbH) must be made (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et seqq.; Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, 
pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, pp. 17-18). The limited liability com-
pany (GmbH) could, as contribution to the limited partnership (KG) take over the 
management and the personnel (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et seqq.; Fehrenbacher & 
Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, pp. 17-18). On the 
part of the limited partners, the compulsory contribution denotes the amount a lim-
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ited partner has to contribute to the company (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et seqq.; Fehren-
bacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, pp. 17-18). 
This value, also entered into the commercial register, is at once the sum with which 
the respective limited partner is personally liable (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et seqq.; Feh-
renbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, pp. 17-
18). The limited partnership with a limited liability company as general partner 
(GmbH & Co. KG) is represented by the limited liability company (general partner), 
which typically (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et seqq.; Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 
et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, pp. 17-18) has the sole power (Lenz, 2015, 
p. 445 et seqq.; Rübenstahl, 2014, p. 1088 et seqq.) of management (§164 HGB). The 
limited partner is usually excluded from the management (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et 
seqq.; Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, 
pp. 17-18; Lenz, 2015, p. 445 et seqq.). Online, in exceptional business ven-
tures,(Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et seqq.; Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; 
Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, pp. 17-18; Lenz, 2015, p. 445 et seqq.; Rübenstahl, 
2014, p. 1088 et seqq.) he may exercise his veto right (§164 clause 1 HGB). This 
means, provided that there are not contractual agreements stating otherwise, that 
the director of the limited liability company (GmbH) is indirectly the managing 
director of the limited partnership (KG) as well (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et seqq.; Fehren-
bacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, pp. 17-18; 
Lenz, 2015, p. 445 et seqq.; Rübenstahl, 2014, p. 1088 et seqq.). None of the share-
holders in their own are entitled to these assets of the company (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 
et seqq.; Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 
2010, pp. 17-18; Lenz, 2015, p. 445 et seqq.; Rübenstahl, 2014, p. 1088 et seqq.). All 
partners are entitled to the assets in joint ownership (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et seqq.; 
Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, pp. 
17-18; Lenz, 2015, p. 445 et seqq.; Rübenstahl, 2014, p. 1088 et seqq.). A typical fea-
ture of the company is that the limited liability company (GmbH), as a general part-
ner, is not granted the participation in the sharing of assets (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et 
seqq.; Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, 
pp. 17-18; Lenz, 2015, p. 445 et seqq.; Rübenstahl, 2014, p. 1088 et seqq.). The treat-
ment of the assets is regularly part of contractual agreement (Hechl, 2012, p. 43 et 
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seqq.; Fehrenbacher & Tavakoli, 2014, pp. 20 et seqq.; Köllen, Vogl, & Wagner, 2010, 
pp. 17-18; Lenz, 2015, p. 445 et seqq.; Rübenstahl, 2014, p. 1088 et seqq.).  
The ultimate goal of constructors of a limited partnership with a limited lia-
bility company as general partner (GmbH & Co. KG) in the context of Private Eq-
uity funds is the classification as an asset management company. If the activities of 
the fund are to be qualified as a business, the profit shares of the shareholders be-
long among the current income deriving from business activities pursuant to §15 
para. 1, no. 2, clause 1 EStG (Bundesministerium für Finanzen, 2003; Zetsche, 2015, 
p. 464 et seqq.; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 141 et seqq.; Jesch, 2004, p. 157 et seqq.),   
 
- if individuals are involved in the fund and if the dividend of the share-
holder contains gains from the disposal of shares in corporations and divi-
dends, then such gains are liable to the reg method in pursuant with §3, no. 
40 EStG, 
- if an incorporation is involved in the fund, dividends and profits from the 
disposal of shares in capital companies are free from tax by 95% pursuant 
to §8b KStG, 
- and if taxpayers with a limited tax obligation are involved in a domestic 
Private Equity fund, the profits are to be participated as trading income 
pursuant to §49 para. 1, no. 2, letter a EStG (Bundesministerium für Finan-
zen, 2003; Zetsche, 2015, p. 464 et seqq.; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 141 et seqq.; 
Jesch, 2004, p. 157 et seqq.).  
 
The fund’s income is subject to trade tax (Bundesministerium für Finanzen, 2003; 
Zetsche, 2015, p. 464 et seqq.; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 141 et seqq.; Jesch, 2004, p. 157 et 
seqq.) in accordance with §2 para. 1 clause 2 Trade Tax Act (Gewerbesteuergesetz 
(GewStG)). This, naturally, does not apply for the targeted asset management com-
pany, which is exempt from trade tax (Bundesministerium für Finanzen, 2003; 
Zetsche, 2015, p. 464 et seqq.; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 141 et seqq.; Jesch, 2004, p. 157 et 
seqq.). If the occupations of the fund are classified as asset management in con-
formity with the overall picture of the operation, the current shares of the partici-
pants of the fund are classified as income deducted from §20 of the EStG, insofar as 
they are concerned with the bonus paid by the investee (Bundesministerium für 
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Finanzen, 2003; Zetsche, 2015, p. 464 et seqq.; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 141 et seqq.; Jesch, 
2004, p. 157 et seqq.). These profits (Bundesministerium für Finanzen, 2003; 
Zetsche, 2015, p. 464 et seqq.; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 141 et seqq.; Jesch, 2004, p. 157 et 
seqq.) require in procedural regards a single, separate determination pursuant to 
§179, respectively §180 of the General Tax Code (Abgabenordnung (AO)). 
If unlimited income tax payers are involved in the fund, which do not hold 
the participation in the fund in business assets, the sale of the investments in the 
portfolio companies only leads to taxable income, if it is a private disposal (§23 
EStG) or a participation pursuant to §17 EStG (Bundesministerium für Finanzen, 
2003; Zetsche, 2015, p. 464 et seqq.; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 141 et seqq.; Jesch, 2004, p. 
157 et seqq.). The dividend is in full amount subject to the withholding tax of 25% 
(Bundesministerium für Finanzen, 2003; Zetsche, 2015, p. 464 et seqq.; Bernhardt, 
2010, p. 141 et seqq.; Jesch, 2004, p. 157 et seqq.). 
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3.4.6 Fiscal Regulation Parameters for Private Equity Funds in Germany 
Table 1: Taxation at a Private Equity Fund Level 
TAXATION ON A PRIVATE EQUITY FUND LEVEL 
VAT ON MANAGEMT FEES PAYMENT YES RECLAIM YES 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX MIN 1,14% MAX 1,65% 
WITHHOLDING TAX 26,375%  
VALUE ADDED TAX  MAX 19% 
STAMP DUTIES OR 
TRANSACTION TAXES 
STAMP NO – TRANSACTION NO 
ANTI-ABUSE RULES YES 
Source: Own representation based on EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013. 
Table 2: Taxation at a Company Level 
TAXATION ON A COMANY LEVEL 
COMPANY TAX MIN 22,825% MAX 32,975% 
Source: Own representation based on EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013.  
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Table 3: Taxation of Employees 
TAXATION OF EMPLOYEES 
INCOME TAX MIN 0% MAX 47,475% 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX MIN 26,375% MAX 28,485% 
Source: Own representation based on EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013. 
In order to capture the taxation of such a structure, one has to make a distinction 
between the taxation at company level (table 2) and the taxation at fund level (table 
1). Herein, mainly the capital gains tax, the corporation tax, as well as the value 
added tax - which is responsible to management fees and amounts according to §12 
para. 1 UStG (Umsatzsteuergesetz (Value Added Tax Act)) 19% in Germany - and 
the withholding tax need to be observed (Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Bernhardt, 2010, 
p. 136 et seqq.). Since the GmbH & Co. KG (Limited Partnership with a limited 
liability company as general partner) represents a partnership, the taxation of the 
shareholders is undoubtedly interesting (Deloitte, 2009, pp. 1-67; Bernhardt, 2010, 
p. 136 et seqq.). The spreadsheets above require some explanation: for example, it 
needs to be added, that at fund level profit distributions are tax-free in accordance 
with §8b KStG (Körperschaftsteuergesetz (Corporate Tax Act)). However, in com-
pliance with §8b para. 3 KStG, this tax exemption is limited to 95% of the gross 
revenue (Grützner, 2014, p. 94 et seqq.). The figures relating to the capital gains in 
table 1 result from the corporate tax rate according to §23 para. 1 KStG of 15% plus 
a solidarity surcharge of 5.5% (Grützner, 2014, p. 94; EVCA, 2013, p. 84) and the 
trade tax at a tax rate between 7% and 17.15% (§16 GewStG –Gewerbesteuergesetz 
(Trade Tax Act)). To obtain the tax rates for capital gains (EVCA, 2013, p. 84), the 
result of corporate tax (EVCA, 2013, p. 84) plus solidarity surcharge must be mul-
tiplied by 5% and supplemented by the respective trade tax (15% * 5,5% + 7% = 
22,825% * 5% = 1,14% or the very + 17,15% trade tax = 32,975% * 5% = 1,65%). The 
fact that at this point the corporate taxes are higher than shown in chapter 3.3.3.5 is 
due to an almost unique principle (Collier, Schulemann-Adlhoch, Fresow, & 
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Bergup, 2012, p. 162 et seqq.) of a levy rate in Germany in accordance with §16 
GewStG (Grützner, 2014, p. 116 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 82-86). This municipal 
rate differs from city to city (Bergemann & Wingler, 2012, p. 694 et seqq.; Janson, 
2009, p. 108 et seqq.) and also changes the corporate tax rate. The calculation of the 
withholding tax, however, is quite simple. The base tax rate according to §32d para. 
1 EStG (Einkommensteuergesetz (Income Tax Act) of 25% will be supplemented by 
the solidarity tax already mentioned above, adding up to a rate of 26.375% (Birk, 
Desens, & Tappe, 2014, p. 238 et seqq.; Grützner, 2014, p. 94). The fiscal treatment 
at company level can be gathered from the previous elucidations (22,825%-
32,975%). Although individuals (table 3) will hardly be involved in such a transac-
tion, the tax rates shall be explained briefly for reason of comparison. The 47.475% 
results from the arithmetic operation of the top tax rate of 45% plus 5.5% solidarity 
surcharge (Wildmann, 2015, p. 210 et seqq.), whereas such a top tax rate is applied 
only for very high-income individuals.  
3.5 OVERVIEW AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR PRIVATE 
EQUITY IN AUSTRIA 
3.5.1 Performance Features: Private Equity in Austria 
3.5.1.1 Preliminary Remarks 
At first glance, Austria is not the first choice when it comes to undertaking 
investments. In this context, other countries are often mentioned as an economic 
and financial location.  Mostly Germany, the UK, France, Luxembourg, or outside 
the European Union (EU), Switzerland or the USA are identified. Funds, especially 
Private Equity funds are rarely associated with Austria (Boué A. R., 2013, p. 1; 
Haider, 2011, p. 1). However, considering the economic data, at least in terms of 
investment opportunities, a whole different picture presents itself. As a parameter 
for the economic performance of a country, the gross domestic product (GDP) is 
being applied. With its GDP of approximately 340 billion Euros at market prices, 
Austria does not approach the big five of the European Union, but competes within 
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the range of Member States such as Poland and Belgium in the lower third, alt-
hough these states achieve an even higher GDP (Eurostat, 2016). However, if the 
performance is considered from a more differentiated view – namely in relation to 
the GDP per capita – Austria is performing relatively well within the EU (figure 
85).  
Figure 85: Gross Domestic Product per Capita in Austria 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat, 2015. 
Figure 86: Purchasing Power Standard in Austria 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat, 2015. 
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With this indicated value, Austria takes one of the top places – apart from Luxem-
bourg – and does so relatively well ahead of the overall product leader Germany 
(Bergau, 2015, p. 2). Measured in purchasing power standard (PPS), Austria ranks 
even a bit better in the leading group of the entire European Union (figure 86).  
So based on these parameters and evaluated by its political-economic options, Aus-
tria is quite capable of turning towards the undisputedly growth-effective Private 
Equity transactions. Whether this succeeds in Austria shall be examined as part of 
a positioning. 
3.5.1.2 Positioning of Private Equity in Austria 
The leading players of the Austrian Private Equity industry are organized 
(Jungwirth, 2006, p. 95 et seqq.; AVCO, 2016 ) in the Austrian Private Equity and Ven-
ture Capital Organization (AVCO).  
Figure 87: History of Private Equity Fundraising to 2015 Austria 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
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The sums of money collected for their funds can be taken from figure 87, whereas 
the numbers are to be understood in thousands of euros.  
Also in Austria, fundraising recovered temporarily shortly after the crisis, just to 
crash in to near insignificance thereafter, compared to the pre-crises times 
(Komarek, 2011). In 2015, it was slightly better. Figure 88 presents the investment 
activities of the Private Equity firms since 2008 in terms of the industry statistics 
and market statistics. 
Figure 88: PE Investments Industry Statistics and Market Statistics Austria 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
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The approach from the perspective of the target companies also shows that 
there was growth in activity after the crisis. However, Austrian up- and downward 
movements are particularly due to individual investments. If it had not been for an 
investor from the United States in 2010, the trend towards fewer investments 
would have continued on (avco.at).   
Interpretation 
In 2008, the share of investments of Austrian holding companies in the gross do-
mestic product (GDP) in Austria amounted to a mere 0.139%. In the following years 
like the post-crisis year 2009 it was 0.05% and 2013 0.03%. In 2015 it was 0.032%. 
Thus, in 2008, 46.60 €, 16.59 € in 2009 and just 10.19 € in 2013 were invested per 
capita. In 2015 it was 12.66 €.  
In Austria-based portfolio companies, the share of investments in the GDP in 2008 
amounted to 0.321%, 0.06% in 2009 and 0.172% in 2013. In 2015 it was 0.321%.  Thus, 
in 2007, 107.14 €, 21.10 € in 2009 and 65.61 € in 2013 were invested per capita. In 
2015 it was 126.40 €. 
Figure 89: PE Divestments – Industry and Market Statistics Austria  
 
Source: Own representation bases on Invest Europe, 2016. 
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The initially discussed question whether Austria invests well in Private Equity due 
to its high per capita GDP and high productivity can be negated. This also elimi-
nates that Austria achieves such high marks in the above parameters due to its 
growth-pushing Private Equity engagement, and in conclusion, roams the market 
with even less commitment than Germany. Austria thus remains below its poten-
tial. The divestments shown in figure 89 rather do not have such a significant in-
formational value in the Austrian area, precisely because the few large players in-
vest in and out.  
Early-stage Financing 
It must be examined at this point whether the weak Private Equity market in Aus-
tria uses the few resources that are being provided at least in the Early Stage financ-
ing (figure 90). It was investigated how high the proportion of the total investment 
in the Early Stages in percent really is.  
Figure 90: PE Early Stage Financing – Industry Statistics in % Austria 
Source: Own representation based on own calculation. 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Seed 2,10 2,50 4,20 4,70 6,00 5,60 13,10 9,70 9,00
Start-up 4,00 4,50 9,50 3,60 5,00 6,70 5,60 4,40 11,70
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Figure 91: PE Early Stage Financing Market Statistics Austria in % 
 
Source: Own representation based on own calculation. 
In principle, it is observed that in Austria – if based on the total investments of the 
holding companies and those invested in portfolio companies – the investment be-
havior during the Early Stages seed and start-up – see figure 90 and figure 91 – is 
inversely related to the total investments. This means that the investments in the 
early stages increase as the overall willingness to invest decreases. It is particularly 
striking that – similar to Germany – there was an increase in investments during 
the crisis situation. It is well noticeable that last in 2013, Austrian investment com-
panies invested a great percentage of the total investments – 12.97% (in 2015, the 
number is with 9.0% slightly lower) of all investments, after all – in the seed phase 
of companies.  
For the Austrian entrepreneur this means that in Austria– provided that, de-
spite the low propensity to invest, he can organize the financing of his project via 
means of Private Equity at all – he generally must hope for a knock-on financing 
during the early stages of his business. In Austria, there is a pronounced uncer-
tainty regarding not only the tax regulation of Private Equity funds (Jud, Marchart, 
Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 18). 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Seed 0,80 1,60 3,60 0,90 4,50 3,30 2,00 3,60 0,90
Start-up 3,20 8,10 24,50 2,00 12,10 9,90 4,30 9,00 3,50
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3.5.2 Alternative Investment Fund Managers Act (AIFM-G) 
3.5.2.1 Preliminary Remarks 
Austria responded to the AIFM Directive and passed a bill just before the 
expiration of the deadline for the implementation of appropriate measures to reg-
ulate the managers of all alternative investment products, including Private Equity 
funds (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9). It was designed to implement this Directive. 
The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Act (Alternative Fonds Manager Ge-
setz (AIFM-G)) became effective on July 22, 2013 (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; 
Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 196) and organized 
the managers of alternative investment funds (AIF). It shall be repeated shortly that 
AIF represents all collective investments that are not undertakings (Majcen & 
Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, pp. 
1 et seqq.; Trübestein, 2012, p. 355) for collective investment in transferable securi-
ties (UCITS). UCITS are known in Austria as investment funds and are arranged 
by the Investment Funds Act (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; Jud, Marchart, Has-
linger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, pp. 1 et seqq.; Trübestein, 2012, p. 355; Bus-
ack & Kaiser, 2012, p. 614). The primary goal of the AIFMA is therefore, to regulate 
the aforementioned manager Act (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; Jud, Marchart, 
Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, pp. 1 et seqq.; Trübestein, 2012, p. 355; 
Busack & Kaiser, 2012, p. 614). This law requires managers of alternative invest-
ment funds to hold a specific AIFM concession with the Financial Market Supervi-
sion Act (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, 
& Peneder, 2012, pp. 1 et seqq.; Trübestein, 2012, p. 355; Busack & Kaiser, 2012, p. 
614). 
The scope of the AIFM-G is rather broad. There are quite occasional difficulties in 
distinguishing whether a product belongs to the area of application of the AIFM-G 
Act or to another regulation (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, 
Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, pp. 1 et seqq.; Trübestein, 2012, p. 355; Busack & 
Kaiser, 2012, p. 614). The scope includes highly liquid hedge funds as well as funds 
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that invest in illiquid assets such as real estate, infrastructure or indeed Private Eq-
uity Act (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, pp. 1 et seqq.; Trübestein, 2012, p. 355; Busack & Kaiser, 2012, p. 614). 
3.5.2.2 Scope of Application of the AIFM-G 
Right at the beginning of the AIFM-G, the AIF is defined; the AIF is consid-
ered as such if it is an undertaking for collective investment, not a UCITS and col-
lects capital from many investors who invest in it for the benefit according to a 
predetermined investment strategy without serving directly to the operating activ-
ities (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, pp. 1 et seqq.; Trübestein, 2012, p. 355; Busack & Kaiser, 2012, p. 
614). It makes no difference whether the AIF is constructed as an open- or closed-
end type, in which contractual form it was established and which legal structure 
the manager of the AIF has (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; Jud, Marchart, Has-
linger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, pp. 1 et seqq.; Trübestein, 2012, p. 355; Bus-
ack & Kaiser, 2012, p. 614).  
The most important features for the presence of an AIF (Gunter, 2007, p. 93) are 
that (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, pp. 1 et seqq.; Trübestein, 2012, p. 355; Busack & Kaiser, 2012, p. 614, 
Gunter, 2007, p. 93) 
 
 capital is collected from some investors, whereas there is no precise information 
about how many investors there may disire. If ergo no number designation is 
made, it can be assumed that even a small number of investors will suffice,  
 
 a predetermined investment strategy is followed for the gain of the investors, 
 
 the collected capital is not “directly” served in operating activities. The term 
“directly” clearly points out that the investments used to invest in turn in other 
projects do not constitute directness.  Consequently, a Private Equity fund is to 
be understood as AIF, since the directness is not given, 
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 it does not matter which legal form is at hand. Since this has been defined more 
than once, it can be assumed that exceptions should be rather excluded Fund 
Structures in Austria (Majcen & Bohrn, 2013, pp. 1-9; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, 
Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 1 et seqq.; Trübestein, 2012, p. 355; Busack 
& Kaiser, 2012, p. 614, Gunter, 2007, p. 93). 
 
3.5.2.3 Preliminary Remarks 
Venture Capital funds can be set in at least three different ways (Brechbühl 
& Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; Halbmeyer, 2014, p. 29 et seqq.) 
in Austria (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, 
Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Tojner & Mo-
ser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). Specifically, for Venture Capital activities an option was 
created. The others denote forms of company law, which are open to any company 
for the design of its fiscal and legal framework. Starting with the specific risk capital 
structure, the three alternatives involve (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-
Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 
2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 
2004, p. 37; Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; Halbmeyer, 2014, p. 29 et seqq.): 
 
 SME Financing Corporation (Mittelstandsfinanzierungsgesellschaft 
(MFG)), 
 Austrian Joint Stock Corporation (österreichische Kapitalgesellschaft) and 
the  
 Austrian Asset Management Partnership (österreichische vermögensver-
waltende Personengesellschaft). 
 
Which of these alternatives is particularly useful and beneficial for Private Equity, 
can be ascertained based on standards (Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 1 et seqq.). If these standards are checked, respectively applied in 
advance, then a compatibility will emerge. Accordingly, relevant standards for Pri-
vate Equity are (Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 1 et 
seqq.): 
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 Private Equity funds are usually limited partnership constructions, 
 organized as closed-end funds, 
 the cash flows of fund are following the principle of Capital Call and Return 
on Exit, 
 Private Equity funds are tax-efficient as far as possible and, 
 justify no permanent establishment for international investors (Jud, Mar-
chart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 1 et seqq.). 
 Corporate Governance provides executive committees (Jud, Marchart, Has-
linger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 1 et seqq.).  
 
Private Equity funds avoid undue restrictions of the investment activities (Boué, 
Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, 
Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.) 
3.5.2.4 SME Financing Corporation (MFG) 
To finally build a bridge to a Private Equity structure reasonable for the future, not 
only existing structures need to be investigated, but also former promising ap-
proaches. Such an approach (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 
58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et 
seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.) may 
have been the Austrian SME finance corporation (Mittelstandsfinanzierungsak-
tiengesellschaft (MiFiG)). It was regulated in the Corporate Tax Act (Körperschafts-
teuergesetz (KStG)) pursuant to §5 n. 14 in conjunction with §6b KStG (Körper-
schaftsteuergesetz old) and has existed in this form only in Austria. Created in 1993, 
the MiFiG once was the dominant fund structure in Austria, which was used by 
the vast majority of the Austrian Venture Capitalists (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonharts-
berger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 
2013, p. 13 et seqq.). One of its outstanding characteristics was that it was exempt 
from corporate taxation in regards to income from investments (Boué, Kehlbeck, & 
Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbich-
ler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & 
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Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). In addition, this structure possessed the concession of 
a start-up period for income from assessment of liquid assets, provided the various 
regulatory provisions and relations of §6b KStG, were adhered to in the course of 
the fund activities (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; 
Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; 
Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). Provided 
that certain conditions were met, an exemption from capital tax and the transaction 
fees for certain transactions flanked these benefits (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonharts-
berger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 
2013, p. 13 et seqq.).  
These advantages have also been noticed by the European Commission (Boué, 
Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, 
Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; 
Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). Already at the beginning of the new millen-
nium, this construct was under examination because it was suspected that it would 
violate the European State Aid Law (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 
2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 
141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). 
The assumptions and suspicions were confirmed and the European Commission 
and the Austrian authorities finally agreed to abolish the MiFiG (Boué, Kehlbeck, 
& Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesen-
bichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner 
& Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). There was a transition period until December 31, 
2013 for this construct (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et 
seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; 
Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). Simultane-
ously, with the State Aid Law-compliant SME Financing Corporation (MFG) a new 
vehicle was created (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; 
Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; 
Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). The new 
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regulation is based on the Community Guidelines on State Aid to deliver risk cap-
ital investments in small and medium-sized enterprises (Official Journal No. C 194 
of August 18, 2006), whose objectives are state aid risk capital to eliminate market 
failure (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Mar-
chart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & 
Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.).  
However, the MFG regulations provide for a tax exemption of income just as be-
fore. Nevertheless, some new regulatory provision in some aspects are restrictive 
(Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Has-
linger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, 
p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.): 
 
 Under company law, a MFG has to be arranged in the form of a corporation 
or a limited liability company (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 
2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 
2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, 
p. 13 et seqq.).  
 The acquisition or increase of holdings shall not exceed 1.5 million euros 
per year (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; 
Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; 
Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). 
 Investments may not be concluded committed to, as far as this predeter-
mined maximum extend has already been exhausted by participation in one 
or more SME financing companies or the provision of other aid (Boué, 
Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, 
Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & 
Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). 
 Investments may at maximum amount to 49% of the operating assets or the 
nominal capital of the investee and may not provide a dominant position 
(Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Mar-
chart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl 
& Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.).   
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 Investments may not be provided to companies in difficulties according to 
the Guidelines on State Aid for rescuing and restructuring of firms in diffi-
culty, as well as to enterprises in the fields of shipbuilding, coal and steel 
(Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Mar-
chart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl 
& Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.).  
 Shares may only be acquired in unlisted small and medium-sized enter-
prises with residence in Member States of the European Union or States of 
the European Economic Area under observation of certain investment pro-
vision (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, 
Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; 
Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.).  
 Furthermore, the MFG and the MFG Law 2007 do not constitute a perpetual 
right, because the provisions were only effective until the end of 2013, re-
spectively for investments existing at this time until the first fiscal year be-
ginning after December 31, 2018 (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-
Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & 
Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.).  
 
Now that those provisions are interwoven with the previously described standards 
for risk capital activities, it is clear that there are merely some cases that produce 
compatibility (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, 
Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & 
Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). While usually, the forms 
of Private Equity funds are limited partnerships, MFG must be constructed as cor-
porations (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Mar-
chart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & 
Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). More important in this 
context however is that corporations are characterized by the maintenance of capi-
tal principle, which is why a Capital Call and Return on Exit can only be prepared 
with difficulty (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, 
Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & 
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Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). Dividend distributions 
are possible only after a shareholders’ meeting and only where there is a cumula-
tive profit at the previous reporting date and not after each conducted exit, as is 
customary in Private Equity funds (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 
2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 
141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). 
Capital injections require a considerable administrative effort and are not easily 
used for management fees or the financing of a planned Venture Capital transac-
tion (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, 
Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 
2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.).   
A well-nigh fulminant downside is that corporations are not, as already neg-
atively noted in regard to German constructions, tax transparent, but pose at the 
level of the fund a taxable entity (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, 
p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et 
seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). 
Through the additional regulation, that the income from investment is tax-exempt, 
this is mitigated to some extent (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, 
p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et 
seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.).  
The above-mentioned management fee is first and foremost to be charged 
with the sales tax (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; 
Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; 
Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). Just as the 
MiFiG, the MFG provides no special provisions for VAT (value added tax (VAT), 
Umsatzsteuergesetz (UStG)) exemption in this regard (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leon-
hartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 
2013, p. 13 et seqq.). The fiscal authority causes some legal uncertainty regarding 
the VAT handling of management fees, as it has become – contrary to previous 
practices to grant sales tax exemptions under §6 para. 1 no. 8 respectively, §6 para.1 
no. 28 UStG – increasingly critical (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 
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2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 
141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). 
Mainly affected are the fund managers who usually charge this as a fixed fee (Boué, 
Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, 
Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; 
Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). This fragile handling causes a relative plan-
ning and legal uncertainty (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 
et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; 
Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). 
These described restrictions create on one hand corresponding additional fi-
nancial expenditures for the fund management which has to be absorbed (Boué, 
Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, 
Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; 
Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). On the other hand, substantial difficulties 
arise due to the limitations of the current investment activities under the MFG-
structure corresponding to the European legal provisions regarding state aid (Boué, 
Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, 
Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; 
Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). Additionally, there are also the time con-
straints due to the expiry of the MFG regulations (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonharts-
berger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 
2013, p. 13 et seqq.). To establish an order of magnitude for individual holdings, 
specific activity segments or even regional areas for investment companies means 
to significantly limit the scope of action for Private Equity, respectively for the in-
vestors (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Mar-
chart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & 
Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.).  
If a fund management risks an investment with its investment strategy despite all 
those regulations and restrictions, it cannot respond in situations where a portfolio 
company requires an increase in capital (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-
Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 
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2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 
et seqq.). Even if a syndication with a company that is not a MFG is theoretically 
possible, the risk remains to weaken its own position under company law in the 
course of an increase in capital (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 
58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et 
seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). If the 
corporation is a MFG, however, syndication is not possible (Boué, Kehlbeck, & 
Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbich-
ler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & 
Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). A key point in the consideration of this construct is, 
that by the minority interest rule, whereas the interest may not be higher than 1.5 
million euros, as listed above under the new regulations, a restriction on funding 
opportunities will be made in a target company (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leonharts-
berger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 
2013, p. 13 et seqq.). This may carry glaring drawbacks for the evolution and 
growth of these start-up enterprises and for the investors (Boué, Kehlbeck, & Leon-
hartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & Moser, 
2013, p. 13 et seqq.). Thus, if a Private Equity investor would want to setup an MFG 
in Austria, he would experience difficulties in fundraising (Boué, Kehlbeck, & 
Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbich-
ler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & 
Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.). Through the accumulation of all these constraints it is 
likely that the willingness to invest in terms of such a construct will be rather mod-
est, since these regulations and restrictions do not lead to a fund management being 
able to establish itself  or to deliver a brilliant performance (Boué, Kehlbeck, & 
Leonhartsberger-Heilig, 2012, p. 58 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbich-
ler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 141 et seqq.; Brechbühl & Wooder, 2004, p. 37; Tojner & 
Moser, 2013, p. 13 et seqq.).  
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Conclusion: The MFG or MiFiG (both names are used interchangeably from Jud, 
Marchart, Friesenbichler, & Peneder) is not well received in Austria. The new reg-
ulations, such as the funding restrictions or the lack of syndication possibilities 
cause mistrust in this type of legal form and hardly lead to the willingness to invest 
(Tojner & Moser, 2013, pp. 15-16). 
3.5.2.5 Austrian Joint Stock Corporation 
In principle, the Austrian Joint Stock Corporation (österreichische Kapitalge-
sellschaft) is structurally for Private Equity funds to be rated the same as the MFG 
(Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 
2012, p. 145). This, however, is also true for the administrative difficulties with the 
preservation of capital (Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Frie-
senbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 145). The difference is that the Austrian Joint Stock 
Corporation, as opposed to the MFG, is not exempt from taxes (Brähler, 2006, p. 
230 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 145). It 
would be more advantageous, however, that this legal form is not restrictively af-
fected by restrictive regulations and therefore can invest in conceivable businesses 
(Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 
2012, p. 145). It could also utilize general tax advantages, such as the international 
intercorporate privilege (Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, 
Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 145). As this corporation lacks tax transparency 
and is thus often subject to withholding tax, it cannot be said that it is – especially 
for international investors – worth investing in such forms (Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et 
seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 145). Some bar-
riers shall be mentioned here (Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Has-
linger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 145):  
 
 Equity injections cause 1% corporation tax on the proprietary equity invest-
ment (Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbich-
ler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 145). 
 The management fee for independent management companies is VAT-
burdened and increases the costs of the fund management by 20%, since the 
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fund vehicle has no or only limited tax deduction (Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et 
seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p.).  
 Company law provisions provide significant discrepancies with the Corpo-
rate Governance Standards of Private Equity business (Brähler, 2006, p. 230 
et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 145).  
 
As part of a joint-stock company, the supervisory board has in contrast to the ad-
visory board significant decision-making authority, which in particular involves 
the obligation to obtain consent to corporate investments (Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et 
seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 145). As part of 
a limited liability company, the management or in case of Private Equity funds, the 
fund management, is bound by instructions to the owners, respectively the inves-
tors (Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 145). These company law provisions are in contradiction to the 
separation of decision and control usually found in Private Equity business 
(Häberle, 2008, p. 661).  
Conclusion: Although the Austrian corporation may invest in all companies regard-
less of size or type, it holds major disadvantages caused by lack of tax transparency 
(Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 
2012, p. 145). The fact that restrictive regulations impede the work, complicates 
matters even more so that this type of legal from for Private Equity transactions is 
rather unattractive from the standpoint of an investor (Brähler, 2006, p. 230 et seqq.; 
Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 145). 
3.5.2.6 Austrian Asset Management Partnership 
Internationally, being a Limited Partnership (LP), describes the Austrian 
partnership in form of a Private Limited Partnership (KG) in Austria (Jud, Mar-
chart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 146 et seqq.). As in Germany it 
operates usually as a GmbH & Co. KG (Baumann, Raab, & Simader, 2013, p. 291; 
Brinskele, 2011, p. 10 et seqq.). Like the Limited Partnership (Boué, Kehlbeck & 
Leonhartsberger-Heilig), the Austrian Asset Management Partnership (öster-
reichische vermögensverwaltende Personengesellschaft) is characterized by the 
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principle of capital maintenance (Frank, 2009, p. 35) so it can be designed as a closed 
–end fund without major administrative expenses in which the cash flows are or-
ganized according to the Capital Call and Return on Exit system (Baumann, Raab  
& Simader, 2013, p. 292).  The Corporate Governance can be set according to the 
usual principles of the Private Equity business (Sullivan & Lim, 2014), because it 
allows for the relations between the stakeholders and the processes within a part-
nership to be designed by contract and the investment activities of the investors are 
not restricted by special provisions (Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 146).  
Partnerships are tax transparent according to Austrian income tax principles 
(Bendlinger & Kofler, 2005). The problem regarding permanent establishment 
could still occur. This, however, applies only to foreign investors. A permanent es-
tablishment exists, if the partnership qualifies as commercially active and not only 
as asset management. The Austrian Income Tax Regulations only provide a general 
abstract guidance for distinguishing between commercial operations and asset 
management (Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 146). 
3.5.2.7 Income Tax Treatment of Private Equity Funds 
The Income Tax Directive (Einkommensteuerrichtlinie - EStR Rz 5418 et 
seqq.) reads:  
Asset management occurs if assets are used and defines an activity directed at collecting 
benefits from intrinsic values which are to be maintained (Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, 
Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 146). Operative activities based in the assets are 
characterized by exploitation of substantial assets through reallocation or through addi-
tional activities and services beyond the duties and responsibilities of the administration 
(Österreichischer Steuerverein, 2015).  
There is a significant legal uncertainty – as in Germany (Zagl, 2010, p. 922) – in the 
assessment whether it is a commercial activity or straight asset management (Rapp, 
2009, p. 58). In Austria it is handled in such a way that in assessing the facts, the 
appropriate tax office is called upon in advance to discuss the situation (Jud, 
Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 146). It has been shown 
that the tax offices in Austria react very differently to this subject (Österreichischer 
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Steuerverein, 2015; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 
146 et seqq.; Zagl, 2010, p. 922 et seqq.). As an appealable information notice in 
accordance with §118 Federal Tax Code (Bundesabgabenordnung (BAO)) cannot 
be obtained, it results in the unsatisfactory situation that the fund initiator would 
have to hope on a tax office to act in his favor (Österreichischer Steuerverein, 2015; 
Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 146 et seqq.; Zagl, 
2010, p. 922 et seqq.). 
It is possible that capital gains from investments in foreign target companies 
are tax-exempt (Varga, 2005, p. 1) for Austrian investors (Österreichischer 
Steuerverein, 2015; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 
146 et seqq.; Zagl, 2010, p. 922 et seqq.). This is the case, if an investor, for example, 
holds a share of 20% in a fund designated as Austrian asset management limited 
partnership and this fund in turn holds 50% in a holding company (Öster-
reichischer Steuerverein, 2015; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 
2012, p. 146 et seqq.; Zagl, 2010, p. 922 et seqq.). Then, the stake in the company 
calculated through the tax-transparent partnership would be 10%, which in turn 
corresponds to the minimum contribution for the application of the international 
intercorporate privilege (Österreichischer Steuerverein, 2015; Jud, Marchart, Has-
linger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 146 et seqq.; Zagl, 2010, p. 922 et seqq.). 
The sale proceeds of any such participation ratio would thus be tax-exempt for the 
concerned investor, if the other requirements of §10 KStG are met (Österreichischer 
Steuerverein, 2015; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 
146 et seqq.; Zagl, 2010, p. 922 et seqq.). For instance, if the partner with unlimited 
liability would plead a management fee with regard to the fund (EVCA, 2013, pp. 
33-37), which founded as a limited partnership, it would be free from VAT so that 
this criterion of tax optimizing (Beiser, 2009, pp. 268-274) would also be discharged 
(Beiser, 2009, pp. 268-274; EVCA, 2013, pp. 33-37). In such an approach, the man-
agement company accepts full liability for the liabilities of the fund (Öster-
reichischer Steuerverein, 2015; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 
2012, p. 146 et seqq.; Zagl, 2010, p. 922 et seqq.).  
If such a fund is designed as a GmbH & Co. KG, it is liable to corporation tax 
and thus not entirely tax transparent (Österreichischer Steuerverein, 2015; Jud, 
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Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 146 et seqq.; Zagl, 2010, p. 
922 et seqq.).  Similar as in Germany, this structure is quite well a suitable medium 
for Private Equity (Sauermann, 2010, p. 15). Also in Austria, it takes a negative ef-
fect that significant legal uncertainties arise in regard to the assessment of the fund 
as commercially active or asset management (Österreichischer Steuerverein, 2015; 
Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 146 et seqq.; Zagl, 
2010, p. 922 et seqq.; Sauermann, 2010, p. 15).  
Conclusion: The Austrian Asset Management Partnership has, as in Germany, the 
best basis constellation for the Private Equity business (Österreichischer Steuerver-
ein, 2015; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & Peneder, 2012, p. 146 et seqq.; 
Zagl, 2010, p. 922 et seqq.; Sauermann, 2010, p. 15). The simple design of a closed-
end fund is part of this as it is the fiscal transparency regarding income taxation 
(Österreichischer Steuerverein, 2015; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 146 et seqq.; Zagl, 2010, p. 922 et seqq.; Sauermann, 2010, p. 15). 
As an obstacle for extensive Private Equity commitments could be the legal uncer-
tainty, which is even greater than in Germany, regarding the assessment of the fund 
(Österreichischer Steuerverein, 2015; Jud, Marchart, Haslinger, Friesenbichler, & 
Peneder, 2012, p. 146 et seqq.; Zagl, 2010, p. 922 et seqq.; Sauermann, 2010, p. 15). 
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3.5.3 Fiscal Regulation Parameters for Private Equity Funds in Austria 
 Table 4: Taxation at a Private Equity Fund Level 
TAXATION AT A PRIVATE EQUITY FUND LEVEL 
VAT ON MANAGEMT FEE PAYMENT YES RECLAIM NO 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX 25%  
WITHHOLDING TAX 25%  
VALUE ADDED TAX  MAX 20% 
STAMP DUTIES OR 
TRANSACTION TAXES 
STAMP YES – TRANSACTION NO 
ANTI-ABUSE RULE YES 
Source: Own representation based on EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013. 
 Table 5: Taxation at a Company Level 
TAXATION AT A COMANY LEVEL 
COMPANY TAX 25%  
Source: Own representation based on EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013. 
Table 6: Taxation of Employees 
TAXATION OF EMPLOYEES 
INCOME TAX MIN 0% MAX 50% 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX 25%  
Source: Own representation based on EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013. 
In order to capture the taxation of such a structure, one has to make a distinction 
between the taxation at company level (table 5) and the taxation at fund level (table 
4). Herein, mainly the capital gains tax, the corporation tax, as well as the value 
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added tax – which is applicable to management fees and amounts in according to 
§10 UStG (Umsatzsteuergesetz (Value Added Tax Act)) 20% in Austria (Kailer & 
Weiß, 2014, p. 166 et seqq.) – and the withholding tax need to be observed. Alt-
hough the taxation in Austria is comparatively simple, the origin shall be briefly 
explained. Thus, capital gains achieved by corporations are subject to the Corporate 
Tax Act with a tax rate in compliance with §22 KStG (Körperschaftsteuergesetz 
(Corporate Tax Act)). At fund level, this applies to both, capital gains as well as the 
withholding tax, which also is based at a tax rate of 25%. The Austrian fiscal au-
thority is restricted to this tax rate even at company level (Lang, Schuch, & 
Staringer, 2009, p. 50 et seqq.). Workers (table 6) are subject relatively early to the 
top tax rate of 50% (55% for income above one million Euro) in accordance to §33 
para. 1 Income Tax Act (Rogall, 2013, p. 328 et seqq.).  
3.6 OVERVIEW AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF PRIVATE EQUITY 
IN LUXEMBOURG 
3.6.1 Performance Features: Private Equity in Luxembourg 
3.6.1.1 Preliminary Remarks 
Luxembourg is considered the flag ship country of the Private Equity scene 
in the European Union. Therefore, Luxembourg is understood as the first address 
for funds of all kinds – and thus also for Private Equity funds. Beyond that, the 
economic capacity of this Member State of the European Union is of special interest 
(Bernhard, 2010, p. 214). At first glance, this small county, spanning merely 2.586 
km², with its little more than 500.000 inhabitants has (gouvernement, 2015) com-
pared to the big five – Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy and Spain - a relatively 
low gross domestic product (GDP). This impression is clearly invalidated by the 
study of per capita GDP, as figure 92 proves (Eurostat, 2016).  
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Figure 92: Gross Domestic Product per Capita in Luxembourg 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
Figure 93: Purchasing Power Standard in Luxembourg 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
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Considering the most significant Private Equity countries of the European Union, 
Luxembourg takes first place by a large margin. In other words, in terms of per 
capita income of its citizens, Luxembourg is the richest country of the EU. Much 
responsible for this result is the main industry of Luxembourg - the financial and 
insurance industries (debelux, 2016; Auswärtiges Amt, 2016).  
Therefore, the high purchasing power of the country does not come as a sur-
prise. The purchasing power standard (PPS) is, as already explained in chapter Per-
formance features: Private Equity in Germany, a fictitious monetary unit that elim-
inates distortions from different countries and states 100 as reference (Eurostat, 
2016). The higher this value, the higher the purchasing power is above average 
(Gumpert, 2013, p. 16 et seqq.; Rippl & Seipel, 2008; eurostat, 2015). Luxembourg 
has the above-average value of 271 (see figure 93).  
Whereas the overall GDP was still moderate, the more meaningful GDP per 
capita and, as shown in figure 93, the purchasing power in Luxembourg are far 
above those of the countries studied, and thus takes a prominent position in the 
EU. Is that why Luxembourg holding companies invest a great deal and invest-
ments in portfolio companies in Luxembourg are particularly high? According to 
the per capita income the Luxembourgers could also invest strongly per capita. As 
part of the positioning, this will be examined. 
3.6.1.2 Positioning of Private Equity in Luxembourg 
Since 2010, the interests of the Private Equity branch in Luxembourg have 
been represented by the Luxembourg Private Equity & Venture Capital Association 
as part of a membership (LPEA, 2015). Among these members are – besides con-
sultants – Private Equity firms. The sums of monies collected by them for their 
funds can be taken (BVK, 2010, p. 3) from figure 94, whereas the numbers 
(investeurope, 2016) are to be understood in thousands of euros.  
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Figure 94: History of Private Equity Fundraising to 2015 Luxembourg 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
Figure 95: PE Investments Industry Statistics and Market Statistics 2015 Lux. 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
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After the crisis, the recovery of the Private Equity market in regards to fundraising 
in 2011 represents only a temporary phenomenon. The progress of the curve is sim-
ilar to that of the German fundraising with the difference that the fundraising ap-
pears to be recovering in Luxembourg. However, there are wide variations. An 
overview of the investments by holding companies and in portfolio companies is 
given by figure 95. Whereas the numbers are to be understood in thousands of eu-
ros. 
Regardless of the collected capital, especially during the crisis years, invest-
ments were quite high. This is true for the holding companies in 2008 as well as for 
the investments in portfolio companies, which reached its peak in 2009. This is in 
stark contrast to the German market, which plummeted during the crisis. Overall, 
investments range more in the context of fundraising than it is the case, for exam-
ple, in Germany.  
Interpretation 
Under examination were the investments executed by Luxembourg-based holding 
companies and those investments received by portfolio companies in Luxembourg. 
The Luxembourg data as well are based on the gross domestic product (GDP) and 
the per capita investment.  
While in 2007 the share of investments by Luxembourg holding companies 
in Luxembourg amounted to 0.188%, the result for 2009 showed a figure of 0.228% 
and 0.156% in 2013. In 2015 it was 0.14%. Investments per capita amounted to 
125.05 € in 2007, 152.32 € in 2009 and 130.95 € in 2013. In 2015 it was 130.60 €. 
In 2007, 1.91% of the GDP were invested in Luxembourg-based portfolio compa-
nies, in 2009 2.53% and in 2013 the percentage amounted to 0.35%. In 2015 it was 
1.25%. In 2007, 1272.88 €, in 2009 1689.67 € and 291.71 € in 2013 were invested per 
capita. In 2015 it was 1.153,10 €. 
Overall, it can be stated that the willingness to investment within the mean-
ing of Private Equity is at a higher level in Luxembourg than the Member States 
previously considered. The percentage of GDP is not strikingly different from, for 
example, Germany, which is said to show a lower Private Equity commitment. 
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However, the per capita investments are appreciably higher than in Austria and 
Germany.  
For completion, the divestments shall be shown in figure 96, presenting all 
divestments in the years from 2007 through 2015 and is also to be understood in 
thousands of euros.  
Figure 96: PE Divestments – Industry Statistics and Market Statistics Luxemb. 
 
Source: Own representation bases on Invest Europe, 2016. 
The divestments – relating to the industry statistics – are stable (see figure 96). This 
figure follows the investments of the holding companies in Luxembourg.  
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2007, p. 18 et seqq.; Lerch, 2011, p. 13 et seqq.). The data relating to the industry 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Ind. S. 24.366 11.846 19.277 66.884 68.858 29.845 101.664 143.442 44.203
Mar. S. 210.751 44.217 79.488 131.114 915.385 88.359 532.146 78.635 444.166
44.203
210.751
44.217 79.488
131.114
915.385
88.359
532.146
78.635
444.166
0
100.000
200.000
300.000
400.000
500.000
600.000
700.000
800.000
900.000
1.000.000
Private Equity Divestments in € thousands 
Luxembourg
Ind. S. Mar. S.
RALF MAUER Page | 258 
 
 
statistics are shown in figure 97, the data regarding the Luxembourg-based portfo-
lio companies in figure 98.  
Figure 97: PE Early Stage Financing Industry Statistics Luxembourg 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest-Europe, 2016. 
Figure 98: PE Early Stage Financing Market Statistics Luxembourg 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
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In principle, it can be observed that in Luxembourg – if based on the total invest-
ments of the holding companies and those invested in portfolio companies – the 
investment behavior during the early stages, seed and start-up, is similar to the 
total investments with a slight recovery trend after the interim low in 2012.  Partic-
ularly striking, yet at the same time little surprising just like the low proportion of 
investments in the seed stage, is the stronger commitment in the start-up phase. 
Especially in 2011, divestments were at a higher level, consequently knock-on fi-
nancing increased and the start-up are received more attention. As Luxembourg is 
not an industrial country in the classical sense of production and trade, the early 
stage financings in the country are spread especially among the areas of communi-
cations and computer & consumer electronics (OECD, 2010, p. 120).  
For the Luxembourg entrepreneur this means, that he has good chances in 
Luxembourg – provided that he belongs to one of the above mentioned branches – 
to accomplish his financing through Private Equity. Otherwise, investments – even 
in the early stage – will probably be targeted abroad. Although the regulations and 
fiscal environment in Luxembourg may be perceived as exemplary from the out-
side, Luxembourg was forced to implement the AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU of the 
European Parliament and Council (Braun K. , 2014, p. 1).  
3.6.2 Alternative Investment Fund Manager Act (AIFM-A) 
3.6.2.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The Börsen-Zeitung reported already on November 23, 2013, that Luxem-
bourg implemented the AIFMD directive on July 10, 2013 as one of the first finan-
cial centers in Europe (Kriegmann & Warny, 2013, p. B 7). This early approach – ie 
the realiziation of the AIFM Directive into Luxembourgian law – was  intended to 
provide transparent and predictable basis for all market participants (Kriegmann 
& Warny, 2013, p. B 7). In addition, Luxembourg has taken the opportunity to ar-
range some other parameters. The current laws around the undertakings for collec-
tive investment, the funds and the companies for investment in venture capital 
were basically adapted and the fiscal framework for the established limited part-
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nership was not only modernized, it was introduced to a new special limited part-
nership, which was then without legal personality (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, p. 1). The 
new regulations, which caused the AIFM Directive, dealing especially the manager 
of the fund companies, so that in this context the tax interpretation of profit sharing 
was clarified (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, p. 1). An essential point of the AIFM Directive 
is the depositing of assets (Dietrich, 2016, p. 638 et seqq.). Much of the assets repre-
sent in Luxembourg alternative investment funds (Arendt & Medernach, 2015, pp. 
23-24), which are not financial instruments, so new regulations were introduced 
(Loyens & Loeff, 2013, p. 1). 
3.6.2.2 Implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Manager Act (AIFM-A) 
In order to assess the implementation of the AIFM Directive 2011/61/EU in 
Luxembourg, it must first be clarified once again, what an AIF and the trustee or 
manager of such an AIF means. According to Article 4 para. 1 letter a no. i and ii 
Directive 2011/61/EU investment funds are undertakings for collective investments 
which collect money from investor and invested for the benefit of investors (Loyens 
& Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; Ende, Niedner, Renner, & Schwabe, 2013, pp 1-69; Kinsch 
& Nell-Breuning, 2010, p. B4). Beyond this definition, this fund does not require an 
authorization pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 2009/65/EG, because this authori-
zation is limited to UCITS (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; Ende, Niedner, Renner, 
& Schwabe, 2013, pp 1-69; Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 2010, p. B4). This opens up the 
negative delimitation, which has already been discussed elsewhere, also techni-
cally (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; Ende, Niedner, Renner, & Schwabe, 2013, pp 
1-69; Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 2010, p. B4). The Luxembourgian law firm Loyens & 
Loeff is in their article on the implementation of the AIFM Directive by definition 
beyond the explanation of the manager of alternative investment funds, that the 
Directive (Article 4 para. 1 letter b Directive 2011/61/EU) has to offer, and accord-
ingly states that such a manager can be any legal entitiy which deals mainly with 
the administration of the above fund. Loyens & Loeff believe that such a manager 
can be both (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; Ende, Niedner, Renner, & Schwabe, 
2013, pp 1-69; Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 2010, p. B4), 
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 a legal person who has been commissioned by the fund with the manage-
ment of the fund, i.e. coming from outside, or 
 the fund itself occurs as a manager. However, the fund must have the legal 
conditions for such internal management (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; 
Ende, Niedner, Renner, & Schwabe, 2013, pp 1-69; Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 
2010, p. B4). 
 
Interestingly, the makers of the directive have asked for exceptions in its rules, be-
fore the definitions (Article 3 Directive 2011/61/EU). According to Article 3 para. 1 
Directive 2011/61/EU, this directive does not apply to managers who manage one 
or more funds and are even the single investor (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; 
Ende, Niedner, Renner, & Schwabe, 2013, pp 1-69; Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 2010, 
p. B4). This also applies to structures with parent companies or affiliates of the man-
ager. As an exception, even those managers can apply, managing the funds, whose 
(Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; Ende, Niedner, Renner, & Schwabe, 2013, pp 1-69; 
Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 2010, p. B4). 
 
- administrated assets do not exceed a threshold of 100 million euros, or 
- whose administrated assets do not exceed a threshold of 500 million euros, 
do not consist of leveraged funds, and may not exercise any redemption 
rights for a period of five years from the date of the initial investment in 
each of such AIF (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; Ende, Niedner, Renner, & 
Schwabe, 2013, pp 1-69; Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 2010, p. B4). 
 
The manager could cancel the exception regarding the thresholds, unless he fully 
submits the provisions of the directive to Article 3 para. 4 Directive 2011/61/EU 
(Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; Ende, Niedner, Renner, & Schwabe, 2013, pp 1-69; 
Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 2010, p. B4). The fact, that the implementation law has 
extended the Luxembourgian company law to a special limited partnership, is the 
most spectacular phenomenon (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; Ende, Niedner, Ren-
ner, & Schwabe, 2013, pp 1-69; Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 2010, p. B4).  
If he does not, however, he is committed to register with the competent authority 
– in this case the CSSF (Commission de Surveilance du Secteur Financier. During 
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this registration, information is given as (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; Ende, 
Niedner, Renner, & Schwabe, 2013, pp 1-69; Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 2010, p. B4): 
 
- name and number of funds, 
- investment strategy of the fund,  
 
which are incidentally reviewed regularly for their risks (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 
1-10; Ende, Niedner, Renner, & Schwabe, 2013, pp 1-69; Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 
2010, p. B4). The implementation itself is divided into two parts, in which the sec-
ond part – the change in the laws on UCITS, SIF, SICAR and on commercial com-
panies – has been already discussed in the preliminary remarks. Luxembourg has 
taken very stringent in its implementation and has implemented the AIFM Di-
rective literally (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10; Ende, Niedner, Renner, & Schwabe, 
2013, pp 1-69; Kinsch & Nell-Breuning, 2010, p. B4). 
3.6.2.3 Adjustment SIF Act and SICAR Act 
The implementation of the AIFM Directive in respect of all SIFs - Specialized 
Investment Funds - (Brown & Snyder, 2012, p. 277) brought the following regula-
tions with it and applies for all special funds managers in accordance with the 
AIFM Directive (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10): 
 
1. The Commission (CSSF) may approve a SIF (cssf, 2015), whose central man-
agement is not located in Luxembourg, if it has appointed an AIFM with its 
administration who is in compliance with the requirements according 
(Majcen, 2007, p. 44) to the AIFM Act (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, p. 1-10; Majcen, 
2007, p. 44), 
2. the valuation principles of the AIFM Act apply together with the current 
valuation principles of the SIF Act (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, p. 5), 
3. the contents of the annual report (Elvinger, Hoss, & Prussen, ehp.lu, 2007, 
p. 14) of a SIF must completely concur with the AIFM Act (Loyens & Loeff, 
2013, p. 1-10), 
4. the information to be conveyed to the SIF investors must concur with the 
exigencies of the AIFM Act (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, p. 5), 
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5. for the SIF, the swap rules contained in the AIFM Act are in force in addition 
to the regulation on delegation in Art. 42 SIF Act (fdc, 2015, pp. 1-27), 
6. he benefits from the AIFM marketing pass (Marjcen, 2013), and 
7. he has to adapt his custodian bank regime to the AIFM Act (Saluzzi, 
Weiland, Bock, & Schäfer, 2013, pp. 1-47). 
 
The amendments to the SICAR Act go hand in hand with the creation of two types 
of SICARs (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 1-10): 
a. A SICAR (Busack, 2006, p. 654) managed by a fund manager and 
b. a SICAR not managed by a fund manager (Loyens & Loeff, 2013, pp. 4-8). 
Otherwise, the amendments of the SICAR Act are substantially the same as for the 
SIF Act. 
3.6.3 Fund Structures in Luxembourg 
3.6.3.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is the leading fund center in Europe, thus 
naturally in the European Union, and to United States the second largest in the 
world (Muggli, 2014, pp. 79-80; Kinsch, Nell-Breuning, & Lakebrink, 2014, p. B5). 
UCITS, which are marketed to approximately 75% world-wide out of Luxembourg, 
are established globally as a regulated fund vehicle for decades (Kinsch, Nell-
Breuning, & Lakebrink, 2014, B5; Kaiser, 2004, p. 41; Port & Steinlein, 2011, p. 83; 
Rehkugler, 2009, p. 572; Götzenberger, 2008, p. 147). For the investment type Pri-
vate Equity and Venture Capital, Luxembourg is positioned in a leading role in the 
area of regulated fund vehicles since the Act of June 2004 on Venture Capital com-
panies – the SICAR Act – February 2007 on Specialized Investment Funds – the SIF 
Act (Kinsch, Nell-Breuning, & Lakebrink, 2014, B5; Kaiser, 2004, p. 41; Port & 
Steinlein, 2011, p. 83; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 572; Götzenberger, 2008, p. 147). In the 
field of unregulated Private Equity structures, Private Equity firms from around 
the world have been utilizing financing and investment companies from Luxem-
bourg for decades (Kinsch, Nell-Breuning, & Lakebrink, 2014, B5; Kaiser, 2004, p. 
41; Port & Steinlein, 2011, p. 83; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 572; Götzenberger, 2008, p. 147).  
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With the provision of regulated investment companies – FCP, SICAV, SICAR – and 
unregulated holding companies – SOPARFI – for alternative asset classes, Luxem-
bourg has designed lucrative structures (Kinsch, Nell-Breuning, & Lakebrink, 2014, 
B5; Kaiser, 2004, p. 41; Port & Steinlein, 2011, p. 83; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 572; Götzen-
berger, 2008, p. 147).  
 
 FCP – the Fonds Commun de Placement (Kaiser D. G., 2004, p. 41; München, 
2016, p. 511) is an investment fund founded under French or Luxembourg 
law (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132; Kaiser, 2004, p. 41), 
 SICAV – the Société d’Investissement à Capital Variable (Port & Steinlein, 
2011, p. 83) is an investment company with mutable capital founded under 
French, Belgian, Luxembourg, Swiss, Maltese or Italian law (EVCA, 2013, 
pp. 124-132; Port & Steinlein, 2011, p. 83),  
 SICAR – the Société d’Investissement en Capital à risqué (Rehkugler, 2009, 
p. 572) is an investment company for engagement in Venture Capital 
(EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 572),  
 SOPARFI – the Société de Participations Financieres is not a new form of 
corporation. It is applied on corporations with financial participations 
(Götzenberger, 2008, p. 147; EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). 
  
Under the Act on Alternative Investment, fund managers of  July 12, 2013, the Lim-
ited Partnership, anchored in the Luxembourg Trade Act for nearly 100 years was-
significantly reformed and the so-called SCSp (société en commandite spéciale 
(Special Limited Partnership)) was created as a specialized partnership (Kinsch, 
Nell-Breuning, & Lakebrink, 2014, B5; Kaiser, 2004, p. 41; Port & Steinlein, 2011, p. 
83; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 572; Götzenberger, 2008, p. 147). The SCSp is based on the 
Anglo-Saxon model of a Limited Partnership and offers its flexibility now to Private 
Equity companies in Luxembourg as well (Kinsch, Nell-Breuning, & Lakebrink, 
2014, B5; Kaiser, 2004, p. 41; Port & Steinlein, 2011, p. 83; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 572; 
Götzenberger, 2008, p. 147). In the unregulated form, the specialized partnership 
may optionally be set up with or without legal personality (Kinsch, Nell-Breuning, 
& Lakebrink, 2014, B5; Kaiser, 2004, p. 41; Port & Steinlein, 2011, p. 83; Rehkugler, 
2009, p. 572; Götzenberger, 2008, p. 147). In the regulated form, the SCSp may be 
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equally used in the form of a SICAR or a specialized fund – SIF (Coekelbergs & 
Lakebrink, 2014).  
3.6.3.2 SIF – Specialized Investment Funds 
Preliminary Remarks 
The Specialized Investment Funds – SIF – were first introduced with a law of 
February 13, 2007 regarding Specialized Investment Funds – the SIF Act (Elvinger, 
Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, 2012, p. 4). Since then, this instrument (Elvinger, Reu-
ter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47) 
is extremely favorable, because of its flexibility in conditions of structuring and op-
portunity set and it profits from economical tax regulations and an ordinary super-
vision (Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47). The group of suitable investors does not include 
intuitional financer, but any other categories of investors – which however must 
demonstrate competence – and private investors, which preferably are also re-
quired to bring forth expertise, respectively experience with such instruments (Elv-
inger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schirmacher, 
2008, p. 47). These SIF regulations have been changed by a law of March 26, 2012, 
which got legal validity on 1 April 2012 (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 
4; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47). It brought forth some 
changes offering even more flexibility in terms of structuring and operation of SIFs 
(Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schir-
macher, 2008, p. 47). Other changes, however, extend the regulatory powers of the 
aforementioned commission – the CSSF (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 
4; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47).  New duties of the SIFs 
according to the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers – the AIFM 
Directive – were already inwrought in this (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, 
p. 4; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47).  
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Scope of Application 
The SIF regime finds application to Undertakings for Collective Investment – UCI 
– whose shares are only for one or more qualified investors and whose constitu-
tional documents are subjected to the SIF regime (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Bur-
gener, p. 4 et seqq.; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47; Dietrich 
M., 2016, p. 12 et seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq., Götzen-
berger, 2008, p. 119 et seqq.).  
 
 Undertakings for Collective Investment (Dietrich M. , 2016, p. 12 et seqq.) 
 
SIFs are a particular class of UCI, underlying to the convention of balancing of port-
folio. This status may be relevant, in particular in view of the non-application of 
various European Directives – such as the Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC (Elv-
inger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schir-
macher, 2008, p. 47). 
 
 Qualified Investor (Majcen, 2007, p. 42, et seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & Kraut-
bauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq.; Götzenberger, 2008, p. 119 et seqq.) 
 
SIFs are only for qualified, competent investors, which are capable of adequately 
assessing risks in connection with investments in such an investment vehicle (Elv-
inger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schir-
macher, 2008, p. 47; Dietrich M., 2016, p. 12 et seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 
2015, p. 140 et seqq., Götzenberger, 2008, p. 119 et seqq.). 
 
 Optional Regime (Elvinger, Hoss & Prussen, 2012, p. 4 et seqq). 
 
The submission to the SIF regime is optional (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burge-
ner, p. 4 et seqq.; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47; Dietrich M., 
2016, p. 12 et seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq., Götzenber-
ger, 2008, p. 119 et seqq.). If this option is taken, it must be noted in the constitu-
tional documents, thus at least in the statutes and in the sales documents (LCG, 
2013, pp. 1-6) for this investment (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et 
seqq.; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47; Dietrich M., 2016, p. 12 
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et seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq., Götzenberger, 2008, p. 
119 et seqq.).  
Investment Rules 
The SIF Act allows for UCI to pursue the traditional investment as well as alterna-
tive investment strategies (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; 
Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47; Dietrich M., 2016, p. 12 et 
seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq., Götzenberger, 2008, p. 
119 et seqq.). With the SIF regime – not exhaustively – real estate funds, hedge 
funds, microfinance funds, environmental funds and, indeed, Private Equity fund 
can be designed and it therefore offers great variability in matters of investments, 
in which a SIF may invest (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; 
Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47; Dietrich M., 2016, p. 12 et 
seqq.; Kleine, Schulz, & Krautbauer, 2015, p. 140 et seqq., Götzenberger, 2008, p. 
119 et seqq.).  
A SIF must correlate with the convention of balancing of portfolio. The CSSF 
(Muller & Ruttiens, 2013, p. 35) has issued regulatory guidelines in this respect 
(Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; 
Schirmacher, 2008, p. 47; Muller & Ruttiens, 2013, p. 35) 
 
A. The fund is limited in its investment. The fund cannot invest more than 30% 
(CSSF, 2007, pp. 1-2) of its assets in securities of the same type. However, 
this does not apply to securities issued by a Member State of the OECD – 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – or the EU. 
Moreover, this does not apply to investments, which are similar to the SIF 
(Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; CSSF, 2007, pp. 1-2).  
B. Bear sales may never implicate in the SIF keeping an open post in commer-
cial papers of the equal kind and by the same emitter, which constitute more 
than 30% of its assets (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; 
CSSF, 2007, pp. 1-2).  
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C. If derivative financial instruments – see derivates – are to be used as SIF, a 
comparable risk diversification must be ensured by an adequate distribu-
tion of underlying assets (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et 
seqq.; CSSF, 2007, pp. 1-2).  
Available Legal Structures 
The SIF Act expressly mentions investment funds – FCP – and investment 
companies with changeable capital – SICAV – but therewith does not construct the 
types of legal frameworks a SIF may have (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, 
2012, p. 6). It is therefore conceivable and possible to use other legal forms (Elv-
inger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; CSSF, 2007, pp. 1-2; Majcen, 2007, 
p. 42 et seqq.; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 574; Müller N., 2016, p. 125 et seqq.). 
A FCP (Müller N. , 2016, p. 125 et seqq.) is not an incorporated enterprise, but con-
sists of special assets, which is held and managed for commitment of its joint-own-
ers by a corporation of administration (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 
et seqq.; CSSF, 2007, pp. 1-2; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 574; 
Müller N., 2016, p. 125 et seqq.). This is either a corporation of administration 
whose corporate purpose includes not only the management of the SIF, but also the 
administration of at least one UCITS – Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities – or a corporation of administration, which exclusively 
manages SIFs (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; CSSF, 2007, pp. 
1-2; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 574; Müller N., 2016, p. 125 et 
seqq.). On the other hand, a SIF can either be founded as a mutual fund with its 
own legal personality, ergo a legal person (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, 
p. 4 et seqq.; CSSF, 2007, pp. 1-2; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 
574; Müller N., 2016, p. 125 et seqq.). A mutual fund which is succumbed to the SIF 
regulations, may be equipped with either changeable capital –  SICAV – or with 
constant capital – SICAF (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; CSSF, 
2007, pp. 1-2; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 574; Müller N., 2016, 
p. 125 et seqq.). Basically, mutual funds are succumbed to the regulations of the 
Luxembourg Corporate Law, unless the SIF Act provides otherwise (Elvinger, Reu-
ter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; CSSF, 2007, pp. 1-2; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et 
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seqq.; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 574; Müller N., 2016, p. 125 et seqq.). The SIF Act provides 
other provisions, if for no other reason than to preserve flexibility of the corporate 
law framework (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.; CSSF, 2007, 
pp. 1-2; Majcen, 2007, p. 42 et seqq.; Rehkugler, 2009, p. 574; Müller N., 2016, p. 125 
et seqq.). Incidentally, the SIF Act expressly provides the possibility to build a SIF 
with multiple sub-funds (gruenderportal-luxemburg.com, 2015).  
Regulatory Characteristics 
As a regulated investment vehicle, SIFs are succumbed to the control of the 
CSSF (Müller N., 2016, p. 196 et seqq.; Majcen, 2007, p. 43; Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, 
& Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.) which however, is not constructed as restrictively as other 
UCI, because qualified and competent investors do not need such protection as re-
tail investors (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, 2012, p. 9). Since April 1, 2012, 
a SIF must obtain the approval of the CSSF prior to beginning its placement and 
investment activities (Müller N., 2016, p. 196 et seqq.; Majcen, 2007, p. 43; Elvinger, 
Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.). The CSSF has to approve the constitu-
tional documents, the election of managing directors and executive directors, the 
responsible persons for the portfolio management, the Central Administration 
Agent, the depositary and the auditor of the SIF (Müller N., 2016, p. 196 et seqq.; 
Majcen, 2007, p. 43; Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.). If changes 
need to be made, these must also be approved (Müller N., 2016, p. 196 et seqq.; 
Majcen, 2007, p. 43; Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, p. 4 et seqq.). In order 
to concur with the AIFM Directive, newly established SIFs are succumbed to par-
ticular instructions concerning the assignment of functions since April 1, 2012 (Mül-
ler N., 2016, p. 196 et seqq.; Majcen, 2007, p. 43; Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Bur-
gener, p. 4 et seqq.). Most notably, a new SIF may delegate its administrative task 
only to asset managers, which are accredited for portfolio management and are 
succumbed to control by a regulatory agency (Fischer & Friedrich, 2012, pp. 386-
393), which cooperates with the CSSF (Fischer & Friedrich, 2012, pp. 386-393; 
EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). 
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3.6.3.3 SICAR 
The Société d´Investissement en Capital à Risqué – SICAR (Dietrich M. , 2016, 
p. 211 et seqq.) – is a Luxembourg investment company (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 
653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; Höring, 2013, p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 
43 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). However, it does not illustrate a recent kind 
of corporation. Rather, it is a tool for investing exclusively in Venture Capital (Bus-
ack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; Höring, 2013, p. 128 
et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). This investment company is regulated by the 
SICAR Act with its own legal personality separated from its investors, which pur-
pose is to invest its funds in risk assets aimed at distributing the earnings generated 
among qualified investors in compensation for the risk it bears (LCG, 2013, p. 3). 
The SICAR is only permitted in Venture Capital investments (Busack & Kaiser, 
2006, pp. 653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; Höring, 2013, p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 
2013, p. 43 et seqq.). Whereas in this context, risk capital describes that contribution 
which directly or indirectly benefits a company – Private Equity. If property or real 
estate is to be permitted as an investment, certain conditions need to be fulfilled 
(Busack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; Höring, 2013, 
p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). Thus investments are possible only as 
indirect investments through companies which invest in or hold venture capital in 
real estate assets as well as capital investment in real estate companies (Busack & 
Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; Höring, 2013, p. 128 et 
seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). Completely ruled out, however, is the direct hold-
ing of property (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; 
Höring, 2013, p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). Unlike other corporate or 
fund forms, the SICAR in Luxembourg is under no obligation to observe the prin-
ciple of diversification in their choice of investment and may invest in one or more 
undertakings (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; 
Höring, 2013, p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). If the financing constitutes 
a Venture Capital investment, any type of financing like (LCG, 2013, p. 3) 
 
 Bonds, 
 Bridging loans, 
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 Capital contributions, 
 Mezzanine capital, etc. 
 
are permissible (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; 
Höring, 2013, p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.).  
The Luxembourg investment vehicle SICAR is reserved for qualified and 
competent investors in the sense of professional investors as well as institutional 
investors such as banks and insurance companies (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-
654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; Höring, 2013, p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 
et seqq.). However, it is possible for natural persons with a certificate of compe-
tence, investing a minimum of 125.000 Euro, to obtain access (Eicke, 2009, p. 154).   
Available Legal Structures 
A Luxembourg SICAR is established as a corporation or partnership (Busack 
& Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; Höring, 2013, p. 128 et 
seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). It may not be organized in contractual form, i.e. as 
a mutual fund managed by a corporation of administration – the FCP. Accordingly, 
the following legal forms can be considered for the SICAR (LCG, 2013, p. 4):  
 
 Stock Corporation (société Anonyme (SA)), 
 Limited Liability Company (société à responsabilité limitée (SARL)), 
 Partnership Limited by shares (société en commandite par actions (SCA)), 
 Cooperative in the organization form of a stock corporation (société coop-
erative d`actions (SCOSA)) and the 
 Limited Partnership (société en commandite simple (SECS)) – (EVCA, 2013, 
pp. 124-132). 
 
In addition, it is possible to structure a Luxembourg SICAR as a fund of funds with 
several sub-funds, each with its own specific investment strategy and investment 
manager, independent from each other (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; Die-
trich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; Höring, 2013, p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). 
There is so far a similarity to the structuring possibilities of the Luxembourg special 
fund SIF (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; 
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Höring, 2013, p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). Home and head office of 
the SICAR must be located in Luxembourg (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; 
Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 et seqq.; Höring, 2013, p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et 
seqq.). This includes the preparation and safekeeping of all documents intended 
for the investors and the execution of the issuance and redemption of shares, re-
spectively participations (Busack & Kaiser, 2006, pp. 653-654; Dietrich, 2016, p. 2011 
et seqq.; Höring, 2013, p. 128 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). The SICAR com-
pany has to carry the abbreviation SICAR in its name (Trübestein, 2012, p. 326).  
Regulatory Characteristics 
It can well be considered as an advantage that the SICAR, unlike other regu-
lated investment vehicles in Luxembourg, are subject to much less stringent (LCG, 
2013, p. 5) supervisory rules (Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 196; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 216; 
Zetsche, 2015, p. 373 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). The SICAR is under the 
constant supervision of the Financial Market Authority – the CSSF – and requires 
their prior approval (Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 196; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 216; Zetsche, 
2015, p. 373 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). Following the admission by the 
CSSF, the SICAR may be quoted on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange – as long as 
they will operate as SA (Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 196; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 216; 
Zetsche, 2015, p. 373 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). The year-end accounts of a 
Luxembourg SICAR must be audited by an independent auditor and published 
within the next half year in the new fiscal year (Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 196; Bern-
hardt, 2010, p. 216; Zetsche, 2015, p. 373 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). Further-
more, the Luxembourg SICAR must prepare a prospectus with all essential data – 
which incidentally must contain the constitutional documents – so that it is feasible 
for investors to be able to carry out an informed assessment of the capital asset and 
the risks (Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 196; Bernhardt, 2010, p. 216; Zetsche, 2015, p. 
373 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.).  
3.6.3.4 Income Tax Treatment of Private Equity Funds 
The Luxembourg special fund – SIF – is exempt from Luxembourg income 
tax. There will be no tax imposed on income and capital gains (Dietrich & Müller, 
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2016, p. 220 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). The SIFs are succumbed to yearly 
standing order duty – the so-called taxe d’abonnement – of 0.01%, which is charged 
adapted from the net assets each calendar quarter (Elvinger & Prussen, 2015, p. 16; 
Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 220 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). In this point as 
well, the SIF clearly differs from other UCI, which is typically subject to a tax of 
0.05% (Elvinger, Reuter, Juncker, & Burgener, 2012, p. 10). The part of the assets, 
which are investing in other Luxembourg UCI which are already subject to this tax 
as well as certain institutional money market funds, microfinance funds and pen-
sion funds, are exempted from the subscription tax under the SIF Act (Dietrich & 
Müller, 2016, p. 220 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). Furthermore, individual 
sub-funds or classes, serving as retirement provisions, can be tax-exempt (Dietrich 
& Müller, 2016, p. 220 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.).  
Concerning the withholding tax, it is to be emphasised that the Luxembourg 
SIF does not plan deduction at source for the distributions of a SIF to investors and 
the disbursements of the earnings on redemption shares, respectively participa-
tions (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 220 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.).  
Special funds – SIF – which have been founded in the legal status of an in-
vestment corporation – SICAF or SICAV – do fall within the area of the so-called 
Savings Directive – Directive 2003/48/EC, whereas SIFs in form of a FCP are well 
succumbed to the same (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 220 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 
et seqq.). With regard to the Luxembourg SICAR corporation, it is in principle sub-
ject to an income tax of 29.22%, composed of the corporate tax – 21% for income 
over 15.000 euros, respectively 20% for income up to 15.000 euro – and is increased 
by 7% unemployment fund and trade tax of 6.75% (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 220 
et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). Income from securities of a Luxembourg SICAR 
as well as income resulting from the sale, transfer or liquidation of its securities do 
not substantiate taxable income (LCG, 2013, p. 4). If the creation of a Luxembourg 
SICAR is established in the form of a limited partnership, it will be treated fiscally 
transparent and is not subject to corporation and trade tax, whereas the tax trans-
parency – as above – implies that the limited partnership itself is not a taxable entity 
subject to income tax and the investors are being taxed in the country of their resi-
dence (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 220 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.).  
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Analyzing all individual considerations, it can be quickly realized that the Lux-
embourg model appears to offer the best opportunities for Private Equity transac-
tions (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 220 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). The figures 
regarding the per capita gross domestic product in relation to the Private Equity in-
volvement alone clearly shows that the two other countries examined – Germany 
and Austria – are clearly lagging behind with their regulations, especially fiscal reg-
ulations (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 220 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). The 
opacity of regulations appears to be a reliable indicator of an ailing Private Equity 
market in the European Union – not only in Germany and Austria, by the way (Die-
trich & Müller, 2016, p. 220 et seqq.; LCG, 2013, p. 43 et seqq.). If there is an agree-
ment – and there will be little doubt on that – that growth can be achieved especially 
through entrepreneurs, because they create jobs and promote synergy in terms of 
suppliers, consultants, banks and state; the financing of entrepreneurs should be en-
sured by the appropriate instruments (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 220 et seqq.; LCG, 
2013, p. 43 et seqq.).  
3.6.4 Fiscal Regulation Parameters of Private Equity Funds in Luxembourg 
Table 7: Taxation at a Fund Level 
 
TAXATION AT A PRIVATE EQUITY FUND LEVEL 
VAT ON MANAGEMT FEES NO  
CAPITAL GAINS TAX MIN 0% MAX 29.22% 
WITHHOLDING TAX MIN 0% MAX 35% 
VALUE ADDED TAX  17% 
STAMP DUTIES OR 
TRANSACTION TAXES 
STAMP YES – TRANSACTION NO 
     ANTI-ABUSE RULES YES 
Source: Own representation based on EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013. 
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Such an instrument could be a fund which applies for the European Union and cre-
ates, above all, a uniform tax environment, so that the access for investors and thus 
for entrepreneurs could be facilitated (LCG, 2013, pp. 1-6). 
 Table 8: Taxation at a Company Level 
TAXATION ON A COMANY LEVEL 
COMPANY TAX MIN 28.15% MAX 29.22% 
Source: Own representation based on EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013. 
 Table 9: Taxation of Employees 
TAXATION OF EMPLOYEES 
INCOME TAX MIN 0% MAX 43.6% 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX MIN 0% MAX 43.6% 
Source: Own representation based on EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013. 
In order to capture the taxation of such a structure, one has to make a distinction 
between the taxation at company level (table 8) and the taxation at fund level (table 
7). Herein, the value added tax –  neither for SICAR nor for SIF management ser-
vices are subject to VAT (LCG, 2013, p. 6; LCG, 2013, p. 5) – and the withholding 
tax need to be observed. In Luxembourg, there are two preferred fund structures 
with different fiscal observation periods (Richards D. , 2013, p. 1). The investment 
company SICAR is charged with income tax, mainly the capital gains tax, the cor-
poration tax, amounting to 29.22% (Gruenderportal-Luxemburg, 2016, p. 1). The 
tax rate is calculated from the base rate of the corporation tax of 21% (LCG, 2013, p. 
6) and the unemployment fund of 7% (yields 22.47%). Moreover, the business tax 
at rate of 6.75% (Dietrich, 2016, p. 221) is applied (22.47% + 6.75% = 29.22%). The 
SICAR is not subject to corporate tax and trade tax if established in the form of a 
limited partnership and therefore is tax transparent (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). 
However, the SICAR is exempt from the withholding tax (Dietrich, 2016, p. 211 et 
seqq.). Unlike the mutual fund SICAR, the special fund SIF is free from income tax 
and withholding tax (LCG Luxembourg, 2016; EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). Basically, 
RALF MAUER Page | 276 
 
 
the exemption from withholding tax (which otherwise amounts to 15% and may 
increase to a 20% rate on Supervisory or Management Board Remunerations) on 
the distribution of dividends applies only for non-resident investors (EVCA, 2013, 
p. 124-132). However, it will be succumbed to the Tax d’Abonnement amounting 
to 0.01% of the net assets (Dietrich, 2016, p. 221), which is payable annually. The 
taxation at company level results from the calculation already made above – the 
combination of corporate tax plus unemployment fund and the business tax – and, 
consequently, amounts to 29.22% respectively 28.15% as long as the lower tax rate 
of 20% is used as a basis, which is the case if the taxable base falls short of 15.000 
Euros (LCG, 2013, p. 6). The taxation of the employees is shown in table 9.  
 
   
4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE “FUND EUROPAEA”  
4.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE EMIPIRICAL STUDY 
It shall be the objective of this study to empirically determine the impact and 
effect of different parameters on the investment behavior of those countries of the 
European region, respectively of the European Union, which currently hold a sig-
nificant Private Equity market, and to develop a fund which will be a novelty in 
regards to fiscal regulations from these findings - see also “Private Equity in den 
USA” from Jesch (2004, p. 157)14. Taxes are an important criterion for the place of 
business of a company (Bungartz, 2012, p. 409 et seqq.; Dowling & Drumm, 2003, 
p. 59). The goal – a tax-optimized model – for Private Equity firms, their funds and 
therefore for the entrepreneurs, is achieved, when the fiscal regulations overcome 
the language barriers, personal interests, and national borders. The current formal-
ities – as exemplary and in detail examined by the examples of Germany, Austria, 
and Luxembourg – are neither rudimentary uniform, even if the European Union 
(EU) strives for a tax harmonization, nor understandable. The very fact that there 
is no consensus among the Member States of the EU as to whether and in what 
form a tax transparency should be accepted, reduces the chances of success for Pri-
vate Equity transactions. In some countries, the management fee is succumbed to 
sales tax, while in other countries this is not possible (Buge, 2016, p. 1). National 
occurrences prevent access to this growth potential (exemplary in Austria (Tojaner 
& Moser, 2013, p. 34)).  
Constrictively, it has to be respected that the fiscal regulations are not solely 
responsible for the lack of commitment in Private Equity. It is rather the totality of 
regulations and the standing of the different countries of the European Union, 
                                                     
14 Jesch stated that taxation in the United States is easier than it is in the European Union (EU). In 
the EU, the players have to deal with issues such as trade and asset management, tax harmonization, 
tax treaties and domestic taxes, althougt uniformity would represent a significant simplification in 
terms of Private Equity. Simple and above all uniform rules regarding Private Equity would mean 
more exposure to young innovative enterprises, which in turn would ensure growth in the right 
direction. 
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pushing that readiness or not (Hinrichs & Schatz, bvkap.de, 2015, pp. 1-20). Inter-
relations, as between the gross domestic products and the readiness to invest, could 
already be sufficiently substantiated in this research study. The performance of a 
country is not necessarily dependent only on the amount of the total domestic 
product, rather the per capita domestic product is crucial for the readiness to invest; 
this performance figure plays a prominent role.  
Figure 99: Share of PE Investments in the GDP – Industry and Market Statistics  
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat and Invest Europe. 
If taking the gross domestic product as reference, the Big Five would protrude in 
terms of risk capital. How different the perception is with a per capita analysis (for 
example for the three countries mentioned above), is shown with figures 99 and 
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100, which feature Luxembourg in the far lead with its high gross domestic product 
per capita. The aim of this study is to extract optimized tax conditions. The corre-
sponding hypothesis is if the gross domestic product per capita increases, the will-
ingness to invest per capita is also higher. 
One can see the data (Eurostat, 2016; Invest Europe, 2016) resulting from the arith-
metic operation investments in total * 100 / GDP (gross domestic product), or from 
the operation investment / population. 
Figure 100: PE Investments per capita – Industry and Market Statistics 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat and Invest Europe. 
The analysis of the effect of the parameters investments, fundraising, taxes, gross 
domestic product, gross domestic product per capita on the propensity to invest in 
Venture Capital is differentiated and carried out according to the individual char-
acteristics of these parameters. The research results shall allow the reader to iden-
tify potential influence and to anticipate the consequential prospective success.  
The investment in venture capital (venture capital) per capita occupies a prominent 
position in this study. The per capita investment is € 13.51 per annum (taking into 
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account all 22 countries surveyed) and € 8.79 for the Market Statistic. This makes a 
total investment in this sector of € 22.30. The initial value was 279.23 euros for the 
Industry Statistic and 193.42 euros for the Market Statistic total per year. The aim 
of this study is to extract optimized tax conditions for venture capital: the associ-
ated hypothes is that if there are tax-optimized conditions for venture capital, in-
vestment in this area would also be higher. 
4.2 DESIGN OF THE EXAMINATION 
The selection initially requires – as already described above in the chi-square 
analysis – a factual, spatial and temporal differentiation of the population. This re-
fers to the amount of investigation units, about which the statements are to be 
made. An investigation unit is to be interpreted as an object on which measures are 
to be taken. In spatial terms, a limitation on the European Union – with a little ex-
curse to the European neighborhood – is to be carried out, in order to reduce the 
data collection effort to a reasonable level on one hand and on the other to clarify, 
which market is being observed (Bourier, 2014, p. 5 et seqq.; Kuß, Wildner, & Kreis, 
2014, p. 67 et seqq.). In terms of time, the population is set to the year 2015. Changes 
in population were not to be expected and therefore not taken in to consideration, 
which also applies to the data after December 31, 2015. In factual terms, the popu-
lation principally encompasses all countries of the European Union and, beyond 
that, in Europe. Total registration, however, is fraught with considerable difficul-
ties. Not all Member States have an adequate Private Equity market, so that in the 
presentation major outliers would occur.  Thus, the Baltic States, as well as the for-
mer Yugoslavia and some others are underrepresented. The author therefore refers 
to those Member States that have a significant Private Equity market or, like Greece, 
seem to be important based on their particularly difficult situation, so that ulti-
mately 22 countries have been selected for the study.  
The collection of data is carried out via the relevant literature from the ranks of the 
European Union, the national Private Equity and Venture Capital Associations, the 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), currently Invest Europe, the na-
tional legislations and the accompanying literature. Accompanied and discussed 
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was the provision of data from and with the heads of relevant organizations, in 
their own environment – crowdfunding, economic and tax advice. 
The analysis of the data was performed within a descriptive analysis. The statistical 
analysis and presentation of the research results is carried out by means of Statistics 
R as part of a cluster analysis and Microsoft Power View / Pivot.  
4.3 ANALYSIS INSTRUMENT: CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
4.3.1 Preliminary Remarks 
It is the objective of the cluster analysis to create clusters of observation units, 
in which clusters are groups of observation units, which are usually described by 
many variables. This grouping should of course happen in a way that (Hatzinger, 
Hornik, & Nagel, 2011, p. 416). 
 
 The members of a group are similar to each other, thus displaying a homo-
geneity and 
 the groups differ from each other as much as possible, therefore creating a 
heterogeneity between the groups.  
 
A multitude of possibilities to measure similarities between clusters is given here 
as the possibility to allow for the most different interpretations within the clusters 
where necessary.  
In essence, the accumulation of clusters, thus groups, can be formed by partitioning 
method or hierarchically. In hierarchical clustering, the clusters are composed of 
sub-clusters, so that a tree structure is created. In order to summarize the objects 
into clusters, they must be divided at an appropriate position, wherein the number 
of clusters is not set at this point.  
In the partitioning method, the number of clusters is already defined at the begin-
ning of the examination. In order to obtain adequate, intentional or different re-
sults, the objects are moved within the individual clusters (Bacher, Pöge, & Wenzig, 
2010, pp. 15-32). 
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4.3.2 Hierarchical Clustering Methods 
In the hierarchical method, a hierarchical structure is established, in which 
clusters are composed of sub-clusters (Bühl, 2008, p. 550 et seqq.). There are two 
kinds of methods (Bühl, 2008, p. 550 et seqq.; Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.). On the 
one hand, there is the agglomerative method (bottom-up), in which each object 
constitutes an individual cluster at the beginning (Bühl, 2008, p. 550 et seqq.; 
Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.). The most similar clusters are being iteratively – thus 
gradually converging – grouped into larger clusters remains (Behnisch, 2007, p. 49). 
At the end, only a single cluster remains (Bühl, 2008, p. 550 et seqq.; Behnisch, 2007, 
p. 49 et seqq.).  
The second procedural tool are the divisive methods (top-down) starting with a 
single cluster which contains all objects (Bühl, 2008, p. 550 et seqq.; Behnisch, 2007, 
p. 49 et seqq.). Henceforth, these are then again (Behnisch, 2007, p. 49) split into 
sub-clusters.  
In these processes, a tree structure is being obtained that must be split at an appro-
priate point in order to obtain an adequate clustering (Bühl, 2008, p. 550 et seqq.; 
Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.). Depending on where this is done, various clustering 
are possible (Bühl, 2008, p. 550 et seqq.; Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.). Usually, it is 
divided where two merged clusters are relatively dissimilar (Bühl, 2008, p. 550 et 
seqq.; Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.). The dendrogram represents a tool for finding 
those positions. Figure 101 shows which clusters are being merged and where a 
division can take place if necessary. The length of the edges from a node to its 
branches provides information on how similar the clusters are that are merged into 
this one cluster. It concerns the analysis of investments by European Member States 
in Venture Capital per capita, considering the per capita gross domestic product in 
compliance with industry statistic. The dendrogram shows well, that an outlier 
slightly blocks the view. Under certain circumstances, these outliers are responsible 
for distortions and where appropriate, should be removed for the examination. 
Nevertheless, a classification into two clusters is necessary and appropriate for the 
present purpose. To make this clear, an auxiliary line, as can be seen in the figure, 
could create an even clearer demarcation. A division in five clusters, shown below 
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beneath the dashed line, could be possible as well. For this purpose, however, num-
ber 15, the outlier, would have to be removed. 
For the presentation of the dendrogram in the context of this process, the selection 
of an appropriate reference for the similarity of clusters is of paramount importance 
(Bühl, 2008, p. 550 et seqq.; Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.).  
Figure 101: Exemplary Dendrogram  
 
Source: Own representation created with Statistics R. 
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These reference methods differ in part considerably (Bühl, 2008, p. 550 et seqq.; 
Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.; Schendera, 2010, p. 23 et seqq.; Bortz, 1985, p. 697 et 
seqq.). The common feature of these methods is the measurement of the distance 
(Schendera, 2010, pp. 23-33). One method (Götze, Deutschmann, & Link, 2002, p. 
340; Püschel, 2011, pp. 58-59) measures the minimum distance (single linkage), the 
other the maximum distance (complete linkage) of the cluster or, as in figure 101 
(arrow), the ward method (Bortz, 1985, p. 697), also called minimum-variance-
method, calculates the quadratic Euclidean distance between all objects (Bühl, 2008, 
p. 550 et seqq.; Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.; Schendera, 2010, p. 23 et seqq.; Bortz, 
1985, p. 697 et seqq.). 
Figure 102: Distance Measurements – Cluster Analysis 
 
Source: Own representation based on Püschel, 2011, pp. 58-59. 
 Single linkage 
  Complete linkage 
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There are other methods (Behnisch, 2007, p. 49), which are not considered at this 
point. As an example here, the single and complete linkage methods are pictorially 
shown (figure 102). 
4.3.3 Partitioning Cluster Method 
In the partitioning method, a number of start clusters are predefined, to 
which the objects to be grouped are being assigned according to the applied dis-
tance measure (Kudraß, 2007, p. 463). Subsequently, it is being interactively tried 
to improve the respective grouping by moving individual objects from one cluster 
to another (Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.; Kudraß, 2007, p. 463 et seqq.; Fett, 2008, 
p. 26 et seqq.). The process ends when a group can no longer be improved by fur-
ther repositioning of objects (Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.; Kudraß, 2007, p. 463 et 
seqq.; Fett, 2008, p. 26 et seqq.). With this method, the assignment of an object to a 
cluster is not final, but may be changed as often as desired (Fett, 2008, pp. 26-27). 
In order to be able to measure the quality of the computed cluster solutions, a num-
ber of criteria are available to select from (Behnisch, 2007, p. 49 et seqq.; Kudraß, 
2007, p. 463 et seqq.; Fett, 2008, p. 26 et seqq.): 
 
 The variance criterion or inverse square criterion calculates for each cluster 
the squared deviations of the objects of a cluster from the cluster centroid 
and adds these deviations on all clusters together, whereas that portioning 
is sought, for which the sum of squared deviations is minimal, 
 the trace criterion, which aims to maximize inter-group heterogeneity, and 
 the Wilks Lamda criterion or the determinant criterion, which achieves par-
ticularly good results with correlated characteristics (Fett, 2008, pp. 26-28).  
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4.4 INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS 
4.4.1 Preliminary Remarks 
In this paper, the hierarchical cluster analysis has been applied, in which in 
addition to the national data – such as population number, size of the country, pop-
ulation per square kilometer and Euro membership – of the selected Member States 
of the European Union, the following parameters as variables – 63 parameters in 
total were examined – have been investigated in terms of correlations: 
In general 
- Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
- Gross Domestic Product per capita, 
- Unemployment rate, 
- Purchasing power.  
Specifically, Private Equity 
- Fundraising, 
- Fundraising, measured by GDP, 
- Fundraising per capita, 
- Investments industry statistics, 
- Investments industry statistics per capita, 
- Investments industry statistics venture capital, 
- Investments industry statistics venture capital per capita, 
- Investments industry statistics others (buy out, growth etc.), 
- Investments industry statistics others per capita, 
- Investments market statistics, 
- Investments market statistics per capita, 
- Investments market statistics venture capital, 
- Investments market statistics venture capital per capita, 
- Investments market statistics others (buy out, growth etc.), 
- Investments market statistics others per capita. 
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Taxes 
- Value Added Tax, 
- Corporate Income Tax, 
- Total Corporate Income Tax, 
- Capital Gains Tax, 
- Withholding Tax, 
- Sales Tax on Management Fees, yes or no. 
The countries examined were (these countries must have numbers to find it again in the 
dendrogram): 
1.  Spain,   
2.  Portugal, 
3.  Italy, 
4.  Bulgaria, 
5.  Ireland, 
6.  France, 
7.  Finland, 
8.  Poland, 
9.  Belgium, 
10. Sweden, 
11. Hungary, 
12. Romania, 
13. Denmark, 
14. Netherlands, 
15. Luxembourg, 
16. United Kingdom, 
17. Czech Republic, 
18. Austria, 
19. Germany, 
20. Greece, 
21. Norway, and 
22. Switzerland. 
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All data have been used for finding similarities among Member States of the Euro-
pean Union, in order to relate them in interpretations to the above, already as im-
portantly recognized, gross domestic product and finally to taxes again. Since there 
is a multitude of different data, these were partially standardized. For the individ-
ual studies, fundraising remained unconsidered. In the following sections only the 
analyses which are important for this work are shown. These are above all the ven-
ture capital investments per capita, while taking into account GDP per capita as 
well as venture capital investments per capita, while also taking into account capi-
tal gains taxes and withholding taxes. Nevertheless, the total investment (also per 
capita) was analyzed at this point, while taking into account the GDP (also per cap-
ita). These analyzes serve, firstly, to recognize that the analyses with the total vol-
ume produce completely different results than the per capita view, and secondly 
to look at whether, according to the consideration of private equity (ie all invest-
ments) per capita countries which are not expected there. All of these analyses are 
carried out individually. Only in the final analysis are the venture capital invest-
ments per capita taking into account the relevant taxes (ie the above-mentioned 
capital gains taxes and withholding taxes still company taxes and the respective 
minimum and maximum values), the gross domestic product per capita and the 
purchasing power standard (PPS) considered as a whole. In the end, the venture 
capital investment is the main reason for the fact that venture capital is essential for 
the financing of target companies in the early stages. Since venture capital per def-
inition is a part of private equity in this development, the results and statements 
are to be understood as analogous. 
4.4.2 Investments under Consideration of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
4.4.2.1 Total Investments of Countries under Consideration of the Gross Domestic Prod-
uct – Industry Statistics 
The total investments of the holding companies of the countries under con-
sideration of the GDP represent the investment behavior, thus whether the invest-
ments depend on the gross domestic product (figure 103).  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE  “FUND EUROPAEA”  Page | 289 
 
 
Figure 103: Scatter Diagram Total PE Investment – Gross Domestic Product 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation created with Statistics R. 
Due to the fact that British (16) holding companies invest significantly more com-
pared to those of other European countries, there is indeed a slight distortion, but 
is also well recognized that most of the observed countries remain in a group, such 
as the position of the five largest economies of the EU – Spain (1), Italy (3), France 
(6), Germany (19) and the United Kingdom (16). However, it can already be noted 
that Sweden (10), Denmark (13), the Netherlands (14), Belgium (9) and – outside of 
the European Union – Switzerland (22) do play a role in part even ahead of Italy 
and Spain in regards to the investments of holding companies.  
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Figure 104: Total PE Investment – Gross Domestic Product / Industry Statistic 
 
The clustering process in the single linkage method (figure 104) has clearly than 
e.g. the ward method of outliers. Refering to the distances, there are mainly simi-
larities between Germany (19) and France (6). They form a cluster. Their willing-
ness to invest is similar. This similarity can also be seen between Italy (3) and Spain 
(1). 
Source: Own representation created with Statistics R. 
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4.4.2.2 Per Capita Investments under Consideration of the Gross Domestic Product per 
Capita – Industry Statistics 
Preliminary studies have shown that examinations with aggregates such as 
the gross domestic product (GDP) do not make sense.  
Figure 105: Per Capita Private Equity Investments – Industry Statistics 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
A high GDP does not demonstrate the actual performance of a country. Only the 
GDP per capita – thus the division of the gross domestic product by the number of 
inhabitants – or the purchasing power standard are showing how resilient the in-
dividual is within the Union. Therefore, the gross domestic product per capita of a 
country is applied for further examinations from now on. In addition, the purchas-
ing power standard is sided with the Gross Domestic Product. Chapter 4.4.2.1 only 
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served for the classification of the major economies of the European Union and al-
ready permitted to draw conclusions that a high GDP in relation does not yet result 
in a readiness to invest by itself.   
The indicators per-capita-investments under consideration of the per capita gross 
domestic product and the purchasing power (see later) standard are therefore sig-
nificant. Figures 105 and 106 show the corresponding data graphically resolved. 
Figure 106: GDP per Capita EU-Members – Industry Statistics 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on Eurostat. 
When consulting the per capita parameters, the result shows that completely dif-
ferent players reach top positions. Thus, Denmark is one of the top-three in the list 
of per capita investments – reminiscing of chapter 2.3.2, where Denmark was well 
forward in the percentage charts of total investments in the GDP – and Luxem-
bourg is taking the far lead on the list of per capita gross domestic product. 
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Figure 107: Per Capita PE Investments – GDP per Capita / Industry Statistics 
 
Source: Own representation created with Statistics R. 
In order to determine groups with similar parameters among the 22 states, an ag-
glomerative hierarchical clustering method has been applied. The dendrogram in 
figure 107, indicating the cluster merging process, suggests a stop at a height of 
either about 2.5 or 4. This corresponds to an allocation of either three, four or six 
clusters. Another step would lead to significantly more heterogeneous clusters. The 
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downward shift, however, is not necessary as it can be well noted that a very dif-
ferent picture presents itself (Bacher, Pöge, & Wenzig, 2010, p. 237 et seq.). With 
three clusters, distinct structures are already visible. There are almost exclusively 
the East European countries plus Greece and Portugal, which are showing similar-
ities to each other in cluster 2. Cluster 3 contains the actual surprises. Thus, regard-
ing their investment activities of domestic affiliated companies with respect to the 
per capita gross domestic product, Spain and particularly Italy are perceptively less 
connected with Germans and French People, both perceived as particularly 
wealthy. The Scandinavian countries – excluding Finland – are grouped together 
in cluster 1, which suggests a strong similarity in the context of investments per 
capita and per capita GDP from holding companies domiciled domestically. It can 
be interpreted in such a way that the readiness to invest is not as pronounced in 
structurally weaker countries as it is in structurally strong countries. Two outliers 
are to be noted. Although Sweden would form its own cluster together with Den-
mark – with an even more expansive resolution – it is a positive example that with 
a medium high per capita income, the readiness to invest in Private Equity is par-
ticularly high. In Austria, the investments measured by GDP per capita, are partic-
ularly low for a Western country. Otherwise, there are quite some indications, that 
the GDP per capita is significantly involved in the willingness to invest.  
4.4.2.3 Venture Capital Investments per Capita under Consideration of the per Capita 
Gross Domestic Product – Industry Statistics 
The consideration of Venture Capital investments is especially important for 
the entrepreneurs. The founders and developers of a company are an indicator for 
the growth of a corporation. Again, especially the major economies – see figure 108 
– are largely responsible for the highest total investments in the Venture Capital 
field.  
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Figure 108: Venture Capital Investments – Industry Statistics 2015   
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe, 2016. 
Figure 109: Per Capita Venture Capital Investments – Industry Statistics  
 
Source: Own representation based on own calculation. 
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Even if the three largest economies, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
account for a large proportion of the Venture Capital investments in the European 
Union, it does not warrant the same facts for the per capita investments, as is 
proven in figure 109. On the contrary, France, Germany, and Great Britain clearly 
fall short of the top positions.  
Figure 110: VC Investments / per Capita GDP – Industry Statistics 
 
Source: Own representation created with Statistics R. 
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In order to determine groups with similar key figures among the 22 states, an ag-
glomerative hierarchical clustering method has been applied at this point as well. 
The dendrogram of figure 110, indicating the cluster merging process, suggests a 
stop at either about 4 or approximately 8. This corresponds to an allocation of either 
two or three clusters. Everything beyond this shifts the similarities towards a 
greater heterogeneity, however in this examination it could make sense for clusters 
1 and 2. A high resolution towards more clusters seems appropriate. Those coun-
tries classified as rather structurally weak are roughly grouped together in cluster 
1. Their similarities among each other are also explicit in relation to the Venture 
Capital investments. Equally clear are Germany and Great Britain relatively close 
together within a cluster. Particularly striking are the similarities, which are appar-
ently shared by Luxemburg and Denmark with regard to the total investment in 
the Venture Capital area. In this field, the most important one to entrepreneurs – 
the per capita Venture Capital investments concerning the per capita GDP – those 
two candidates are significantly close to each other in their similarities, as has al-
ready been noted at some other point. The conditions for investments in the early 
stages of such a transaction seem to be especially good in Luxembourg and Den-
mark.  
4.4.2.4 Per Capita Investments under Consideration of the per Capita Gross Domestic 
Product – Market Statistics 
The following examinations apply to those investments executed in domestic 
portfolio companies. It is applicable to speak in this context of a willingness to in-
vest in companies, which are domiciled in their own country. In figure 111 the over-
all investments in portfolio companies are presented and compared to the per cap-
ita investments in figure 112. The higher the willingness, the more favorable – with 
few exceptions – the conditions for these investments seem to be. The figures at this 
point are also in thousands of euros.  
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Figure 111: Private Equity Investments – Market Statistics 2015 EU Members 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe. 
Figure 112: Per Capita Private Equity Investments – Market Statistics 2015 
 
Source: Own representation based on own calculation. 
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In order to build a bridge to the per capita investments in domestic portfolio com-
panies and to further raise awareness of the distortion caused by global figures, the 
total investments in this segment were investigated. The three largest economies 
are back at the top of the investments. That this representation reflects itself also in 
the per capita analysis may already be doubtful now, because the smaller economy 
of the Netherlands exposes itself in the front of the field. 
Overall, the Scandinavian countries are in the lead again. Norway, as a non-
EU member has established itself alongside the Danes, who obviously have a 
strong interest in investing in companies domiciled domestically; they make that 
quite clear by showing an increased commitment in Private Equity. Luxembourg 
completes the trio although Luxembourg – given its size – should have actually less 
investment potential in those companies. This shows the weakness of the French 
that much clearer and even more blatantly that of Germany, which falls back be-
hind Austria in the per capita statistics, which had been noticed as less willing to 
invest. So, cautiously expressed, this leads to the reversal conclusion, that the will-
ingness to invest in companies requiring domestic capital – Great Britain excepted 
at this point – is not particularly high with the big players and especially in Ger-
many.  
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Figure 113: PE Investments per Capita / GDP per Capita – Market Statistics 
 
 Source: Own representation created with Statistics R. 
Groups were sought that show similarities in terms of their willingness per capita 
to invest in domestic-based portfolio companies considering the per capita gross 
domestic product. The agglomerative hierarchical clustering method used in figure 
113 shows through merger processes in the corresponding dendrogram that a stop 
at the level of about 2 or about 4 seems likely. This corresponds to a division in 
either two or six clusters. Everything beyond this shifts the similarities towards a 
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greater heterogeneity. However, Luxembourg could also be viewed as a separate 
cluster – therefore, four clusters are also labeled in the illustration – since the dis-
tance to the next level of similarity is apparently relatively large. This confirms the 
investigation of the total investments in this sector and emphasizes the trend that 
the conditions for investments in Luxembourg in the Private Equity field are par-
ticularly good. In cluster 1, the structurally weaker countries are represented, while 
in cluster 2 those countries are showing similarities among each other, which be-
long to the western and northern European sphere. The fact, that Norway is show-
ing strong similarities to the Switzerland can be regarded just as remarkable as the 
fact that Germany has more similarities with Austria or Belgium. This in turn, due 
to the weaker investment propensity of Austrians and the current general struc-
tural weakness of Belgium, does not provide a positive signal in regards to the will-
ingness to invest Venture Capital in own companies.  
4.4.2.5 Per Capita Venture Capital Investments under Consideration of the per Capita 
Gross Domestic Product – Market Statistics 
Since the Venture Capital activities are of particular interest and importance 
in connection with entrepreneurs, the investigative studies of the same in regards 
to similarities are of equal importance in order to determine where the breeding 
ground for the investments in young companies with risk-carrying capital will be 
most productive.  In this, the total investment volume needs to be considered, alt-
hough it does not reflect the willingness to invest, but does convey an impression 
of what could be possible when considering the potential.  
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Figure 114: Venture Capital Investment – Market Statistics EU-Members 
 
Source: Own representation based on Invest Europe. 
Figure 115: Venture Capital Investments per Capita – Market Statistics 
 
Source: Own representation based on own calculation. 
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The graph in figure 114 shows United Kingdom as the top leader in terms of 
Venture Capital investments in domestic portfolio companies. Not only are France, 
and Germany in the statistics very close by, but it is already clear at this point that 
these statistics do not represent the true performance of a country. It is also from 
this thesis that Germany is significantly more populous than France is. Neverthe-
less, the two EU Member States, with respect to investments in young companies, 
are tight by a narrow margin. This already suggests that the major economies do 
not move as much in this segment, as can be seen in figure 115. 
Concerning the investments in young companies in the own country, the 
Scandinavian countries are positioning themselves at the forefront with Finland, 
and Sweden taking the lead behind the Switzerland. Almost on par, Ireland pre-
sents itself – an EU Member State who was not too long ago operating under the 
EU bailout fund. Ireland as well had been the first country to leave this rescue fund 
again. When considering investments in young companies domiciled domestically, 
it appears as if Ireland has done many things right with its program and that there 
is a relationship between the outstanding positioning in these statistics and the 
overall economic revival. It is quite noticeable that the three largest economies – led 
by Germany and France– do not score well at all.  
Sweden, Finland and Ireland are very similar in their investment behavior 
and therefore from a separate sub cluster - in cluster 1. To find even other groups 
among the 22 states with similar operating figures, an agglomerative hierarchical 
clustering method was used. The dendrogram of figure 116, indicating the cluster 
merging process, suggests a stop at a height of either a little above 1 or at approxi-
mately 2. This corresponds to a division into four or five or six clusters. A higher 
resolution would be possible as well, but is not necessary since it becomes already 
clear which countries undertake special efforts with regard to Venture Capital ac-
tivities that benefit domestic enterprises. The similarities that Sweden, Finland and 
Ireland and Luxembourg and Norway are bearing concerning the Venture Capital 
investments under consideration of the per capita gross domestic product are quite 
large. Also, the distances to the following countries are large enough to allow for 
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the statement that for these countries, which are executing for entrepreneurs out-
standingly important investments in young companies, applies that the conditions 
prevailing there are significantly better than in other countries of Europe. 
Figure 116: VC Investments per Capita / GDP per Capita – Market Statistics 
 
Source: Own representation with Statistics R 
However, Norway is not a EU member and can therefore be considered only con-
ditionally. 
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4.4.2.6 Interim Conclusion I 
The previous studies have clearly shown that the investment activities of do-
mestic investment companies also significantly depend on the gross domestic 
product of each country. Thus, the three largest economies also house the three 
largest investment volumes of the European Union and even Europe. The more 
meaningful performance figure gross domestic product per capita however, does 
recalibrate the circumstances. In the industry statistics, Denmark is very far for-
ward in per capita investments. Overall, the Scandinavian countries present them-
selves at the top, framed by Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.  In terms of per 
capita investments of the above-mentioned holding companies in the early stages 
of financing, the Scandinavian countries are once again among the top players - 
with Luxembourg taking the lead now and joined by Ireland, which is obviously 
making strong efforts to support their founders. All of them are, in part clearly, 
ahead of alleged tradition markets of France, Germany or even Great Britain, which 
afford to jointly bring up the rear of the upper half together with Germany. Ironi-
cally, the three big players show an ailing interest concerning entrepreneurs.  Since 
it has been shown during the recent analysis that these three countries – examining 
the investments under consideration of the per capita gross domestic product – 
have found themselves usually in one cluster, it can be already concluded at this 
point, that the much-discussed basic conditions play little or no role, or else that 
they are significantly worse in these countries compared to the Scandinavian coun-
tries, Luxembourg or Ireland. During the previous studies in and around this thesis 
it could not be determined that particularly the Venture Capital transactions in 
Great Britain, Germany or France were at a disadvantage compared to the other 
transactions. On the contrary, the tax environment for Private Equity as a generic 
term do also apply to Venture Capital. Only special legal arrangements, such as in 
Germany the distinction between commercial and asset management, or the treat-
ment of loss carry forwards could be an obstacle in this regard. Otherwise it is nec-
essary, to take into account those taxes that apply to Private Equity as well as Ven-
ture Capital funds. To be considered, and therefore to be examined at a later point 
are the already mentioned taxes listed below: 
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- Capital Gains Tax, 
- Withholding Tax, 
- VAT and Corporate Income Taxes. 
 
It is especially important to investigate whether there is relevant evidence that 
these taxes, individually or in total, affect the willingness to invest in the form of 
volume or not.  
First, however, the investment activities in portfolio companies under considera-
tion of the per capita domestic products shall be analyzed. As far as the market 
statistics are concerned – thus the willingness of the countries, or rather the will-
ingness of the inhabitants of these countries, to invest in domestic portfolio compa-
nies – it can be stated that in the sense of the total volume, the three largest econo-
mies once again take the lead, while the so-called little ones seem to be underrepre-
sented; this changes completely with the per capita. Denmark is one of the tops of 
the statistics for those countries that invest in domestic portfolio companies. In the 
Venture Capital field, however, this turns out differently. Where founders are par-
ticipating the most – i.e. the commitment of the responsible heads in young com-
panies in a country, which are in one of the early stages of the financing needs – 
Denmark is still found in the upper third, however, it has strong competition from 
the field of EU Member States with Sweden, Ireland and Finland.  
The three latter countries were able to convince by far and are initially the first 
choice for the examination of appropriate fiscal framework. Since the Scandinavian 
countries – plus Ireland – collectively perform strong, and according to previous 
finding, a selection of their fiscal parameters in favor of a new fiscal treatment of 
Private Equity funds and their operators could make sense, provided that favorable 
tax conditions positively affect the investment behavior. The investigation of tax 
parameters as an influencing factor will be conducted following the examination of 
the investment behavior of countries under consideration of the purchasing power. 
In the process, the coherencies between the purchasing power and the investment 
will be examined to the effect that exclusively the per capita Venture Capital in-
vestments of holding companies within the country and the Venture Capital in-
vestments in domestic portfolio companies are put in relation to the purchasing 
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power. This serves to make it clear that especially the early-stage financing is im-
portant for growth. It is demonstrated adequately and convincingly that the condi-
tions apply to all financing stages, so that the different results from the industry 
statistics and the market statistics are not exclusively attributed to them.  
4.4.3 Investments under Consideration of the Purchasing Power Standard 
(PPS) 
4.4.3.1 Per Capita Venture Capital Investments under consideration of the Purchasing 
Power Standard (PPS) – Industry Statistics 
Since the ranking of countries examined in terms of purchasing power stand-
ard differs only insignificantly from that of the per capita gross domestic product, 
the investments under consideration of the PPS will be examined only in terms of 
Venture Capital. The purchasing power standard is to eliminate the distortions that 
occur due to different price levels in different countries. The data for Venture Cap-
ital can be found in the previous chapters.  
The dendrogram of figure 117, indicating the cluster merger process, suggests a 
stop either at a level of about two or at approximately four. This corresponds to a 
division into four or five clusters. In this case, a higher resolution is inconceivable.  
If the indicators – thus the ratio of the two parameters to each other – Venture 
Capital investments per capita are being viewed in relation to the purchasing 
power standard, the result is a clustering in pure form as expected. Taken the pre-
vious results into account, the fact elucidates itself that the conditions for Venture 
Capital concerning the domestic holding companies are particularly well suited for 
Denmark, Norway and Switzerland and that the Scandinavian countries and Ire-
land linger in close proximity. Luxembourg belongs in this series. Because Luxem-
bourg has an extremely high PPS, this country is displayed as an outlier. So far, a 
difference from the parameter gross domestic product per capita is barely visible. 
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Figure 117: VC Investments per Capita / PPS –Industry Statistics 
 
Source: Own representation created with Statistics R. 
This in turn leads to the conclusion that the gross domestic product per capita is 
not only permissible, but also advisable as an appropriate instrument to conduct a 
subsequent examination under consideration of taxes.  
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4.4.3.2 Per Capita Venture Capital Investments under Consideration of the Purchasing 
Power Standard (PPS) – Market Statistics 
The more interesting variant of consideration for entrepreneurs – that is, the 
investments in target companies – shall at this point be illustrated through the for-
mation of groups within the meaning of Venture Capital investments under con-
sideration of the purchasing power standard (PPS).  This investigation shall con-
firm or refute that the investments in the early stages of a Private Equity financing 
is consistent with the previous findings. Therefore, whether, as in this case, an 
above-average Purchasing Power leads to an above-average Venture Capital com-
mitment per capita.  
The dendrogram of figure 118, indicating the cluster merger process, suggests 
a stop either at a level of about two or at approximately four or six. This corre-
sponds to a division into four or five clusters. A higher resolution in this case is 
conceivable and, in the case of Denmark, desirable. Nevertheless, even now, a clear 
tendency could be made visible. This examination has confirmed, which was al-
ready illustrated with the examination of the Venture Capital activities under con-
sideration of the per capita gross domestic product. Sweden, Ireland and Finland 
are from one group when it comes to willingness to invest in target companies. 
They do so at such a high level that the gap to the next group is clearly significant. 
The fact that Switzerland is a member of a group with Luxembourg indicates con-
ditions that can also be found outside the European Union. 
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Figure 118: VC Investments per Capita– PPS – Market Statistics 
 
Source: Own representation created with Statistics R. 
There are apparently no sufficiently enough differentiated basic conditions for 
Venture Capital within the Union.  
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4.4.3.3 Interim Conclusion II 
So far, the investment behavior was analyzed based on the gross domestic 
product. The expansion of the investigation on to the purchasing power standard 
can be viewed as an attempt to support the previous studies. If the purchasing 
power standard is considered in itself, it is noticeable that none of the countries, 
which are regarded as one of the major economies in the European Union, are 
among the top three countries having the highest purchasing power standard. That 
the Scandinavian countries, Ireland and Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg) are far ahead has been noticed in other evaluation horizons. 
When now consulting the data, which are related to the purchase price standard, 
so it has to be stated that the Scandinavian countries exposes themselves in every 
respect.  
However, it is not true that those Scandinavian countries, which are taking 
the lead in regards to investments of domestic holding companies, are also leading 
the board in the field of investments in domestic target companies. Rather, Den-
mark is investing strongly in terms of their holding companies; while it is Sweden, 
whose target companies are very benefitting from the investments. It must be taken 
in to consideration that for the two forms of statistics – the industry statistics and 
the market statistics – in all previous investigations no distinction had been made, 
whether and to what extent the investments derive from abroad. Thus, it is espe-
cially the market statistics, which is at some risk to be misinterpreted. It involves, 
for example, investments that are aimed at domestic target companies. It is not only 
feasible, but a fact that of course foreign holding companies invest in target com-
panies which are declared domestic in this thesis. On the other hand, the high pro-
pensity, respectively the medium-high willingness to invest, will be dependent on 
the particular parameters of the countries under review, so it is safe to assume that 
holding companies, domiciled domestically will be the first to perceive a good mar-
ket in that country. This means: if the conditions in a country are good, then they 
will be preferably so for nationals and foreigners. As it has turned out that the two 
examination parameters, gross domestic product per capita and purchasing power 
standard, have not led to significantly different results; it can be safely assumed 
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that investments, in whatever direction, clearly depend on the gross domestic prod-
uct, respectively the purchasing power.  
Figure 119: VC Investments / PPS / GDP - per Capita  
 
Source: Own representation with Statistics R. 
A high standard leads to high investments. However, in this study it is to be 
made clear that the efforts of a country are mainly recognized by how much the 
individual is willing to support these efforts. This is done by the observation per 
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capita. If the investments depend on the above parameters, it is just as certain that 
investments can produce variable results through taxes, which rightly assumes that 
taxes can reduce the gross domestic products per capita or the standard. To do so, 
the investments under consideration of the already listed fiscal parameters are be-
ing investigated hereinafter. Prior to that, however, it is being examined which 
groups form under consideration of all previously, in detail investigated parame-
ters relating to Venture Capital. Thus, this cluster analysis incorporates the fund-
raising per capita – which was not examined separately – the Venture Capital in-
vestments per capita in regards to the purchasing power standard and the gross 
domestic product per capita. With this analysis, the above-mentioned variables are 
taken into account both in the industry statistics and the market statistics. Natu-
rally, the data were again standardized because of their existing diversity.  
A clustering (figure 119) in two or four groups does not seem to be indicated at this 
point, since the exposed position of the countries Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Swit-
zerland, and Finland would be somewhat dissolved by it. Rather, particularly these 
five countries showed clear similarities in the previous examinations. The three EU 
countries Denmark, Ireland and Finland did this at such a high level that it can be 
suggested that obviously conditions can be found there which seem to appear par-
ticularly favorable even with respect to several variables. Since this analysis is di-
vided very delicately – in five clusters – it is rather not necessary to present the 
stops in detail. On the contrary, clusters can be merged again.  
Therefore, clusters 1 and 2 – also from the experience of previous investiga-
tions – can be merged again. The similarities overall between the eastern and south-
ern European countries are significant. Applicable here as well: the structurally 
weaker Member States of the European Union are also very similar to each other in 
terms behavior regarding the Venture Capital commitment. Particularly striking is 
the fact that – under consideration of all Venture Capital parameters and their ref-
erence variables – two of three of the largest economies of the EU eventually group 
together again. Flanked by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria the conditions – 
despite different assessments in some areas – seem to very similar for Venture Cap-
ital, which is proven by the small gaps.  
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4.4.4 Investments under Consideration of Taxes 
4.4.4.1 Per Capita Venture Capital Investments Taking into Account Capital Gains 
Taxes 
Capital gains taxes are taxes on income (Eggert, 2016, p. 1). This means that 
when a sale of assets occurs – which of course also includes investments – a tax is 
payable on the appreciation (Eggert, 2016, p. 1). This form of taxes is perceived very 
differently in the countries of the European Union (EU). So, in some countries of 
the EU such as Italy, Finland, and the UK there is no approach for this type of taxes, 
while other countries provide quite a taxing of the profit shares (EVCA Tax Bench-
mark Study, 2013). If the capital gains taxes of the countries examined above, Ger-
many, Luxembourg, and Austria, are being considered, distinct differences are to 
be noted already (EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013).   
Germany 
Five percent of the capital gains are not deductible operating expenses, which affect 
the corporate income tax and the trade tax of the particular corporation (Braun, 
Dennerlein, & Wünsche, 2012, p. 137 et seqq.; Graw, 2009, p. 30 et seqq.; Büsching, 
2014, p. 14 et seqq.; Grützner, 2014, p. 55 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 82-86). This re-
sults in effective tax rates between 1.14% and 1.65%, whereas this is being calcu-
lated (see 3.4.6 Fiscal Regulation Parameters of Private Equity Funds in Germany) 
as follows (Braun, Dennerlein, & Wünsche, 2012, p. 137 et seqq.; Graw, 2009, p. 30 
et seqq.; Büsching, 2014, p. 14 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 82-86; Grützner, 2014, p. 55 
et seqq.): 
The output variables are: corporate income tax of 15% in addition to 5.5% solidarity 
surcharge and trade tax (EVCA, 2013, pp. 82-86), varying from 7.0% to up to 
17.15%. 15% plus 5.5% result in 15.825%. By adding the trade tax of either 7.0% or 
even 17.15%, it results in a percentage of 22.825% or 33.035%. 5% of which are those 
1.14% respectively 1.65% (Braun, Dennerlein, & Wünsche, 2012, p. 137 et seqq.; 
Graw, 2009, p. 30 et seqq.; Büsching, 2014, p. 14 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 82-86; 
Grützner, 2014, p. 55 et seqq.). 
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Luxembourg 
Luxembourg does not have any specific form of taxation of this type (Merten, 2004, 
p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 172 et seqq.; Fort, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.). How-
ever, it is feasible that the profits on realization that are reached by resident or non-
resident Luxembourg investors will be succumbed to income tax or corporation tax 
(Fort, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.; Merten, 2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 172 
et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). If a nonlocal shareholder has his tax domicile in 
a state that has a double-tax agreement with Luxembourg, so generally, the taxa-
tion characteristics of the nation of domicile of the financers apply (Fort, 2014, p. 21 
et seqq.; Merten, 2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 172 et seqq.; EVCA, 
2013, pp. 124-132). If the external participator has his tax domicile in a state that has 
no double-tax agreement with Luxembourg, the capital gains from the disposal of 
shares in a Luxembourgian corporation are assessable in Luxembourg. If the non-
local shareholder – equal well whichever way – owns an equity holding of more 
than ten percent as a participation in a Luxembourgian corporation and if one of 
the succeeding terms are fulfilled (Fort, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.; Merten, 2004, p. 48 et 
seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 172 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132): 
 
- if the investor abolishes its holdings within a period of a half year after the 
acquisition, 
- if the investor for more than fifteen years pays taxes in Luxembourg. How-
ever, it can give deductions at this point in connection with the disposal of 
the shares - see 3.6.4 Fiscal Regulation Parameters of Private Equity Funds 
in Luxembourg.  
 
Profit on realization from a completely assessable company, which has its domicile 
in Luxembourg, is essentially succumbed to corporate taxes with a composed tax 
rate of 29.22% (Fort, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.; Merten, 2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & 
Höring, 2010, p. 172 et seqq.; EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013, pp. 124-132). Cap-
ital gains of these companies may be exempted from the corporate income tax and 
from municipal tax (Fort, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.; Merten, 2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & 
Höring, 2010, p. 172 et seqq.; EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013, pp. 124-132).  
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Austria 
Profit on realization that are realized by private financiers are succumbed to capital 
gains tax (Gierhake, 2014, p. 251 et seqq.; Dziurdz, 2014, p. 80 et seqq.; Kirchmayr, 
2014, p. 33 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 33-37). Regulated by the kind of capital asset, 
the deduction is mandatory (Kirchmayr, 2014, p. 33 et seqq.; Gierhake, 2014, p. 251 
et seqq.; Dziurdz, 2014, p. 80 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013; pp. 33-37). Profit on realization 
realized by corporations are succumbed to corporate income tax at a standard rate 
of 25% (Kirchmayr, 2014, p. 33 et seqq.; Gierhake, 2014, p. 251 et seqq.; Dziurdz, 
2014, p. 80 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013; pp. 33-37). However, there are exceptions for qual-
ified international investments (Kirchmayr, 2014, p. 33 et seqq.; Gierhake, 2014, p. 
251 et seqq.; Dziurdz, 2014, p. 80 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013; pp. 33-37). Otherwise, there 
are no further taxes on capital gains (Kirchmayr, 2014, p. 33 et seqq.; Gierhake, 2014, 
p. 251 et seqq.; Dziurdz, 2014, p. 80 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013; pp. 33-37). Domestic div-
idends between Austrian companies are tax-exempt (Kirchmayr, 2014, p. 33 et 
seqq.; Gierhake, 2014, p. 251 et seqq.; Dziurdz, 2014, p. 80 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013; pp. 
33-37). Capital gains of Austrian companies from the disposal of another corpora-
tion are also succumbed to a tax rate of 25% (Kirchmayr, 2014, p. 33 et seqq.; Gier-
hake, 2014, p. 251 et seqq.; Dziurdz, 2014, p. 80 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013; pp. 33-37). 
The market is very dynamic (Paul H. , 2013, p. 1) and thus is the legislation of the 
individual countries of the EU. Although there are or should be national variations 
in regards to the Private Equity vehicles and their treatment, the tax treatment 
within the European Union is far from being uniform as can be seen based on the 
above considerations. Only three of the Member States have been touched and ex-
amined. The inconsistency – case with respect to the capital gains taxes – became 
evident in the preliminary assessment. At this point, an investigation is necessary, 
which looks in to the per capita Venture Capital investments in relation to the cap-
ital gains taxes. Initially the highest conceivable tax rate is taken into account.  
The dendrogram of figure 120, indicating the cluster merging process, suggests a 
stop at a level of either about 1.8, 3.8 or – which is hardly helpful – close to about 8. 
This corresponds to a division in to five groups. A different resolution (in six or 
seven groups) would be feasible, but is neither required nor appropriate, since the 
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resolution in five clusters – or six, when taking Switzerland as an outlier into ac-
count – already confirms similarities of groups which have already resulted from 
the investigations without the consideration of taxes.  
Figure 120: Per Capita VC Investments / Capital Gains Taxes 
 
 
Source: Own representation with Statistics R. 
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Therefore, the countries Denmark, Luxembourg and Switzerland are very close to 
each other even when taking the capital gains tax into account and form their own 
cluster. The two very strong Venture Capital states, by volume, Germany and Great 
Britain are forming a group.  
The amount of investments of domestic investment companies in Venture Capital 
and the Venture Capital activities in domestic portfolio companies has already been 
examined elsewhere in this paper. It turned out that the countries of Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Sweden are each among the top 5 of the EU Member States in 
regards to the willingness to invest. Their proximity to one another, even after the 
investigation including any capital gains taxes, shows that the conditions for the 
participation in Venture Capital for investment companies from these countries 
and investments in domestic portfolio companies is particularly good and stable. 
If the gross domestic product per capita of these countries is consulted, it is 
striking that the countries named at this point are among the best which allows for 
the thesis that a high per capita gross domestic product promotes a high propensity 
to invest, but also that a high willingness to invest attracts a high gross domestic 
product per capita. 
4.4.4.2 Per Capita Venture Capital Investments under Consideration of the Withholding 
Taxes 
In addition to the capital gain taxes, the withholding taxes and the VAT on 
management fees are the most important taxes in the consideration at fund level. 
For withholding taxes, the same conditions apply as for the capital gains taxes. 
There is a minimum value and a maximum value. While it remains unchanged in 
Germany with 26.375% and in Austria with 25%, in Luxembourg there are either 
0% or 35% withholding tax (Jarass & Obermair, 2015, p. 70 et seqq.; EVCA Tax 
Benchmark Study, 2013). The data have been standardized for the analysis, because 
Luxembourg is relatively far off with the per capita Venture Capital investments of 
domestic holding companies and there might be no withholding tax (Jarass & 
Obermair, 2015, p. 70 et seqq.). The standardization changes the dendrogram only 
insignificantly, however, puts the outlier Luxembourg closer to the visible range of 
the analysis.  
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The dendrogram in figure 121, indicating the cluster merging process, sug-
gests a stop at a level of about four. A different resolution is hardly conceivable, 
since the distances to each other are too big. This results in four clusters.  
Figure 121: Per Capita VC Investments / Withholding Taxes  
 
Source: Own representation created with Statistics R. 
A particular prominence is the gathering of Ireland and Switzerland, both of which 
are known for their strong Venture Capital commitment, but also possibly impose 
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high tax burdens on companies. The second unusual event is that the withholding 
taxes unites the Scandinavian countries. Denmark and Sweden which show great 
similarities in Venture Capital investments under considerations of the withhold-
ing tax and thus move more and more into the focus of interest in regards to opti-
mized – now also in a fiscal aspect – conditions, are now joined by Finland, which 
presents quite some similarities to the above-mentioned countries. Finland had 
moved closer to the best, but is an outlier in this analysis. This can be explained, 
however, with the extremely low withholding taxes. Other countries with large 
similarities and higher per capita income, tend to have higher tax rates. 
However, a balanced ratio, and therefore a balanced fiscal framework is sought, as 
is being suggested in Sweden and Denmark.  
4.4.4.3 Per Capita Venture Capital Investments under Consideration of the Relevant 
Taxes and the Reference Parameter GDP and PPS 
The finale of this detailed study presents the analysis of Venture Capital 
investments under consideration of the tax variables, the gross domestic product, 
the purchasing power standard and the fundraising. To be more specific: 
 
- Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPPC), 
- Purchasing Power Standard (PPS), 
- Fundraising per capita (FPC), 
- Corporate income taxes in % (CITax%), 
- Total corporate income taxes in % (TCITax%), 
- Value added tax in % (VAT%), 
- Capital gains tax max in % (CGtax%max), 
- Capital gains tax min in % (CGtax%min), 
- Withholding tax max in % (WHtax%max), 
- Withholding tax min in % (WHtax%min). 
 
The question to this investigation under consideration of all parameters (variables) 
has to be: 
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Which countries within the European Union and beyond are measurably successful in 
regards to Venture Capital investments and have such similiarities among each other that 
their conditions for optimized fiscal conditions may taken under consideration? 
Figure 122: Per Capita VC Investments / all relevant Taxes 
 
Source:  Own representation created with Statistics R. 
The dendrogram in figure 122, indicating the cluster merging process, suggests a 
stop at a level of approximately 9. This corresponds to a division into four clusters. 
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Other resolutions are possible, but not expedient for the planned tax optimization. 
All countries involved in cluster 1 have dominated in part during this investigation 
and have always had a close proximity to each other. Thus, it was stated that 
Ireland and Norway overall display a strong Venture Capital commitment and 
Luxembourg is showing a particularly strong willingness to invest in Venture 
Capital when it comes to domestic holding companies. Sweden, Denmark and 
Switzerland agree in regards to investment, also when it involves the consideration 
of capital gains tax. Great Britain is located, in each case, in the upper middle, in 
regards to the per capita Capital Venture investments; it joins in with Sweden in 
particular and the others mentioned in the overall context and therefore seems to 
do something right when it comes to investing in entrepreneurs. 
4.4.4.4 Interim Conclusion III 
Taking into account the capital gains tax, withholding tax, corporate income 
tax and value added tax, it has been shown that in regards to the fiscal framework 
especially the Scandinavian countries expose themselves, where they are being 
flanked by Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Great Britain. Of the three major econo-
mies which accounted for the largest share of the Private Equity transactions at the 
beginning of the investigation, only the United Kingdom remains as a traditional 
market for Private Equity and in particular for Venture Capital. Germany and 
France seem not to offer themselves to contribute to the development of an opti-
mized tax regime in regards to Private Equity, respectively Venture Capital.  
Ireland has earned the participation in the design recommendations in such a way 
that this country has, after its own crisis – up to EU aid – found means to return to 
good growth. This is confirmed by the now good gross domestic product per capita 
and is obviously owed to the strong commitment in companies. This commitment 
is to be observed particularly distinctively during the early phases of companies, 
so that at this point the relationship between the participation of companies in en-
trepreneurs and the growth of an economy is significantly noticeable. The goal of 
this paper is to create tax structures for a fund that holds universal validity for all 
investments in this segment. The target is to optimize those taxes, which are rele-
vant on the level of a Private Equity fund in such a way that an average tax rate 
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arises, promising a good investment readiness. In the design recommendations, 
those optimizations are being conducted.  
4.5 DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PRIVATE EQUITY FUND 
4.5.1 Preliminary Remarks 
The design recommendations for a tax-optimized Private Equity fund are 
principally targeted at determining the average tax rates at fund level and company 
level and to adjust them in such a way, that the desired result – namely, the creation 
of a tax-uniform fund, which has general validity throughout the European Union 
– occurs. In order to obtain the relevant data, those countries of the European Union 
were determined via a series of cluster analyses, which are similar in their behavior. 
For the derivation of design recommendations, the fiscal particularities, respec-
tively, the fiscal framework at fund level and company level of the individual coun-
tries need to be taken into account, of which it can be expected that they will in-
crease the economic growth in the European Union. The further this influence and 
the effect of the measures of fiscal adaptations are apart from each other, the more 
important, but also the more difficult is the anticipation of the relation between 
affect and effect. In addition, the expected relations could change over time of a 
Private Equity transaction, so that the expected effects are subject to change. There-
fore, design recommendations need to have sufficient flexibility in order to be able 
to make necessary changes in design, if those are required and called for. So with 
the creation of a fund it must be observed for tax purposes, that average tax rates 
thus are changeable when the chosen national states change their tax rates or are 
no longer within the circle of those countries that hold a high level of similarities to 
each other. This could be counteracted through a binding commitment of states. 
The fund EUROPAEA is thereby rendered immune to changing trends such as in-
tra-European changes. This focus of this study was to extract those countries that 
are similar in objective success, in spite of many different parameters. The design 
recommendations for a tax-efficient Private Equity fund are therefore focused to 
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consolidate the best of the guild. It is expected that such an association will contrib-
ute to a positive development of the market, because it is certain that growth means 
to learn from others. If those countries with the best conditions for Venture Capital 
funding serving as a model, then the mixture of the best results in a – urgently 
needed – positive development of the market. In this respect, design approaches 
subsequently should be derived based on the theory-driven findings and empirical 
investigations – the situation itself should change – can be adjusted variably. 
According to the last study unit, the following countries (figure 123) lend them-
selves to tax optimization: 
Figure 123: Qualified Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own representation created with Statistics R. 
 
The country codes are already listed elsewhere, but should be listed – only the eli-
gible – again for clarity.  
Norway and Switzerland will have to be left out of the design recommendations. 
There are no members of the European Union (EU). However, they form a common 
cluster with the above states of the EU with regard to the similarities in the inves-
tigation of Venture Capital investments. 
5 - Ireland 
10 - Sweden 
13 - Denmark 
15  - Luxembourg 
16  - United Kingdom 
21 - Norway 
22  - Switzerland 
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4.5.2 Design Recommendation: Capital Gains Tax 
Parameter Ireland 
Ireland imposes capital gains tax of 33% on the sale of assets (Revenue, 2016, p. 1; 
Tipp, 2014, p. 19 et seqq.). A domestic investor agrees to pay the capital gains tax 
of 33%, if it is a direct investment or an investment with a transparent structure 
(EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106; Revenue, 2016, p. 1; Tipp, 2014, 19 et seqq.). Another tax 
liability amounting to 36% is produced in a UCITS / QIF (EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106; 
Revenue, 2016, p. 1; Tipp, 2014, 19 et seqq.).  Non-domestic investors which invests 
in assets that are not income-taxable subjects have to pay the capital gains tax only 
on particular investments (EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106; Revenue, 2016, p. 1; Tipp, 2014, 
19 et seqq.). This includes the Irish real estate (EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106; Revenue, 
2016, p. 1; Tipp, 2014, 19 et seqq.).  
If a holding corporation in a distributive group is holding a corporation not less 
than five percent of the capital stock for minimum one year, an exemption is possi-
ble for this participation, if certain terms are fulfilled (EVCA, pp. 99-106; Revenue, 
2016, p. 1; Tipp, 2014, 19 et seqq.). This enables a company, having achieved a cap-
ital gain from the sale to realize the same without capital gains tax (EVCA, 2013, 
pp. 99-106; Revenue, 2016, p. 1; Tipp, 2014, 19 et seqq.). However, should the shares 
derive their price or the majority of their price from these investments as specified 
– be it directly or indirectly – they no longer qualify for this type of exemption 
(EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106; Revenue, 2016, p. 1; Tipp, 2014, 19 et seqq.).  
Parameter Sweden 
Generally, all earnings realized by an internal investor are taxable with corporate 
income tax (Polster, 2016, p. 168 et seqq.) amounting to 22% (Polster, 2016, p. 168, 
et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 182-186). The Swedish law has created for shares in un-
listed corporations an exemption stating that participation, profit on realization 
and all bonuses are tax-free (Polster, 2016, p. 168, et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 182-
186). Swedish investors and foreign limited partnerships also benefit from this ex-
emption (Polster, 2016, p. 168, et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 182-186). Capital gains of 
partnerships in the European Economic Area are exempt from tax, if they are held 
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by a qualified investor (Polster, 2016, p. 168, et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 182-186). 
Capital gains are for partnerships in Sweden not always a tax problem. It achieves 
namely the partnership gains from the sale of its shares; these gains may be free 
from tax. The situation is similar with distributions, which a partnership received.  
(EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013, pp. 182-186). They behave quite differently in 
terms of capital gains and dividends, in relation to the tax rules in Sweden for in-
dividuals. Although there are a number of special tax rules for certain types of tax-
payers, normally a tax rate of 30 percent on income from above applies (EVCA, 
2013, pp. 182-186). There are separate rules in this context of mutual funds and in-
surance (EVCA, 2013, pp. 182-186). Investors who do not come from Sweden and 
are not established there, but investing for capital gains there, are not subject to 
taxation (EVCA, 2013, pp. 182-186). These investors achieve beyond dividends, 
while the withholding tax must be paid (EVCA, 2013, pp. 182-186).  
Parameter Denmark 
Domestic institutional investors holding under ten percent of the shares in a listed 
company are being taxed (Schulze, 2014, p. 37 et seqq.) at a tax rate of 25% when 
selling the shares (Schulze, 2014, p. 37 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 60-64). The sale of 
unlisted shares is tax-free (Schulze, 2014, p. 37 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 60-64). For 
a Danish investor, the tax debt will not change if the profit is not obtained from an 
immediate investment, but from an engagement in a Danish internal or external 
fund, which is tax-transparent, and allocates the receipts of the profits to the Danish 
investor (Schulze, 2014, p. 37 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 60-64). 
Parameter Luxembourg 
The capital gains tax parameter in Luxembourg have already been dealt with in 
chapter in 3.6.4 and in 4.4.4.1 and are not to be summarized again at this point. It 
should be recalled, that Luxembourg has no special tax of this kind. 
It is possible that the profit on realization achieved by residential or non-residential 
investors in Luxembourg will be succumbed to income tax or corporation tax (Fort, 
2014, p. 21 et seqq.; Merten, 2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 172 et 
seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). Generally, the taxation characteristics of the state 
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of domicile of the participator are being relegated to, if the nonlocal participator 
has his tax domicile in a state that has a double-tax arrangement with Luxembourg 
(Fort, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.; Merten, 2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 172 
et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). If the external participator has his fiscal resi-
dence in a country not holding a double taxation agreement with Luxembourg, the 
profit on realization kept from the disposal of participations in a Luxembourgian 
corporation are assessable in the inland, if the non-residential shareholder holds a 
participation in a Luxembourgian company of ten percent or more and if the par-
ticipator has again sold the participations within a distance of half a year after the 
acquisition or the investor has a fiscal residency over fifteen years (Fort, 2014, p. 21 
et seqq.; Merten, 2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 172 et seqq.; EVCA, 
2013, pp. 124-132). 
Profit on realization from an assessable company, which has its residency in Lux-
embourg, are generally succumbed to corporate taxes (Fort, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.; 
Merten, 2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 172 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 
124-132).  The rate is consolidated and has an amount of 29,22 percent (Fort, 2014, 
p. 21 et seqq.; Merten, 2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 172 et seqq.; 
EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). This tax rate is calculated by the corporate tax of 21% 
and the contract for unemployment fund for corporate tax 1.07% and trade tax of 
7% (Fort, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.; Merten, 2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 
172 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). Profit on realization of these companies may 
be free from corporate income tax and trade tax (Fort, 2014, p. 21 et seqq.; Merten, 
2004, p. 48 et seqq.; Höhn & Höring, 2010, p. 172 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). 
Parameter United Kingdom 
ELPs (English Limited Partnerships) and SLPs (Scottish Limited Partnerships) are 
usually transparent in the sense of the British taxation of income (Alberts, 2014, p. 
34 et seqq.) and capital gains (Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-
201). Investors are being taxed addicted on the kind of the profits of the fund (Al-
berts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). British corporations and also 
private persons – are subject to capital gains tax (Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 
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2013, pp. 194-201). In essence, the British taxation does not distinguish between in-
dividuals and companies, however, individuals are as opposed to companies di-
rectly charged with capital gains taxes (Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, 
pp. 194-201). United Kingdom companies are liable for corporate income tax (Al-
berts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). This is collected at the relevant 
tax rate (Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). In 2013, the relevant 
tax rates amounted to 24% for large corporations and 20% for small enterprises 
(Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). In April 2014, this tax rate 
was reduced to 21% and in April 2015 (Polster, 2016, p. 163) to 20% (Alberts, 2014, 
p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201; Polster, 2016, p. 163). 
Certain items, like British pension funds are free from the assessment of tax-
able gains (Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). Contingent on 
the circumstances, British investors keeping shares of minimum ten percent in a 
company over a distance of minimum one year may suitable for tax-exemption of 
profits (Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201).  
For individual British partipants, profits on realization are not to be treated 
with the identical tax rate as dividends (Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, 
pp. 194-201). Also, from the situation, earnings from distributions may be free from 
taxes for British institutional investors (Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, 
pp. 194-201). This income would be burdened with the tax rate of the corporation, 
if this income would not be exempt (Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 
194-201). In addition, no municipal, local, social or business tax in the sense of the 
British fiscal law is levied on taxable profits (Alberts, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; EVCA, 
2013, pp. 194-201).  
Design Recommendations 
As already noted earlier, the taxation of capital gains shows distinct differences. In 
order to obtain a uniform tax rate, the capital gains taxes of those member states of 
the European Union that have offered themselves suitable after the in-depth inves-
tigation - thus, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Great Britain – were 
determined, added and divided by the number of positions.  In this – to obtain a 
representative average – the maximum and minimum tax rates have been recorded. 
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Considering all capital gains tax of these countries, a tax rate of 14.288% has 
been determined (table 10). In order to obtain an average willingness to invest, this 
results in a recommended tax rate of 14.29% for the assessment of capital gains. At 
this point, the investments per capita industry statistic and their positions in inter-
European comparison (EU) in Venture Capital of domestic affiliated companies are 
included as an example.  
 
 Table 10: Capital Gains Taxes of the qualified Countries in % 
  Capital Gains Tax max. Capital Gains Tax min. IISVCpc Pos. 
Ireland 33.33 33,33   19.17 € 4 
Sweden 22.00   0.00   15.40 € 7 
Denmark 25.00   0.00   51.28 € 2 
Luxembourg 29.22   0.00   73.35 € 1 
United King-
dom 
 0.00   0.00   12.86 € 9 
Interim result                  109.55 33.33 164.70 €  
Total                  142.88       
On average                  14.288     34.41 € 4,6 
Source: Owen representation. 
4.5.3 Design Recommendations: Withholding Tax 
Parameter Ireland 
Ireland imposes withholding taxes in the amount of 20% on dividends (Tipp, 2014, 
p. 26 et seqq.), interest and licence fee (Tipp, 2014, p. 26 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 
99-106). There is a quantity of exonerations from tax for non-residential companies 
regarding the withholding tax (Tipp, 2014, p. 26 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). 
This is particularly applicable for in Ireland non-resident companies holding their 
residency in a state with which the inland has entered a double-tax arrangement 
(Tipp, 2014, p. 26 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). Ireland may well be regarded 
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as the surprise in this study. The strong venture capital commitment and the high 
per capita domestic product shows that they do things right. This correlates in most 
cases with good and manageable control agreements. Those companies – non-resi-
dent – can usually retrieve the withholding tax on dividends in their country of 
residence, provided that the company in question is not being controlled by an Irish 
corporation (Tipp, 2014, p. 26 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). The same applies, 
if the control is with a company listed at a recognized stock exchange (Tipp, 2014, 
p. 26 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106).  
In case those withholding taxes are being imposed in the context of payments 
to transparent companies, for example a limited partnership, problems in retriev-
ing the tax may occur (Tipp, 2014, p. 26 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106).  Further 
taxes on outbound payments do not exist in Ireland (Tipp, 2014, p. 26 et seqq.; 
EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106).  
Parameter Sweden 
Sweden appears to be more balanced than Ireland. Nevertheless, this country also 
shows strong efforts in venture capital and presents itself otherwise very well. That 
apparently works even if the withholding tax is higher. Sweden levies a withhold-
ing tax of 30 percent on dividends of foreign investors (EVCA, 2013, pp. 182-186). 
For income from interest, the tax is not applicable (EVCA, 2013, pp. 182-186). In 
cooperation with other countries of the European Union thes taxes are often not 
charged. Due to the fact that the withholding tax may be reduced or omitted en-
tirely on double-tax agreement, the high rate is relativized (EVCA, 2013, pp. 182-
186).  
Parameter Denmark 
Dividend income (boerse.de, 2016) is succumed to a withholding tax of 27 percent 
(EVCA, 2013, pp. 60-64). However, a withholding tax of 25% may be levied on cer-
tain Danish investors (EVCA, 2013, pp. 60-64). It is possible, that 15% of these taxes 
can be retrieved, if an individual request is made at investor level (EVCA, 2013, pp. 
60-64). If the Danish tax authorities agree, a reduction at source is possible (EVCA, 
2013, pp. 60-64). The Danish Tax Law provides that companies that hold at least 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE  “FUND EUROPAEA”  Page | 331 
 
 
ten percent of the capital of a Danish company, not be burdened with the withhold-
ing tax (EVCA, 2013, pp. 60-64). The prerequisite is that the company that obtains 
this revenue has a tax agreement with Denmark (EVCA, 2013, pp. 60-64). The com-
panies from the countries in the European Union basically fall under this regula-
tion, shows that the outstanding efforts regarding venture capital in Denmark are 
not limited to the national territory (EVCA, 2013, pp. 60-64). 
However, Denmark supports some particularities of withholding tax. For ex-
ample, interest could arise from a loan that was awarded within a company, which 
is subject to such tax (EVCA, 2013, pp. 60-64). When considering these guidelines 
and agreements, it is possible that the tax burden may fall to zero percent (EVCA, 
2013, pp. 60-64). Such regulations have simpler provisions, which can help the Ven-
ture Capital industry. These simplified rules can help the entrepreneurs as well. 
Parameter Luxembourg 
If a Luxembourgian company is paying dividends, these dividends are in principle 
subject to a dividend (Lipp, 2014, p. 269 et seqq.) withholding tax rate of fifteen 
percent (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). This tax rate may be reduced by an applicable 
double taxation agreement or are subject to the participation exemption of Luxem-
bourg (Fort, 2014, p. 48 et seqq.).  
The exemption from withholding tax in Luxembourg is dependent on several 
conditions. Dividends from unlimited taxable corporations reduce this burden 
when (EVCA Tax Benchmark Study, 2013, pp. 124-132): 
 
 the respective company has its headquarters in a European Union country 
and falls under Article 2 of the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive15 (European 
Commission, 2015). This also applies to companies, which are taxable in 
Luxembourg. Moreover, that is applicable in limited companies whose seat 
                                                     
15 Council Directive 2003/123/EC of December 2003 amending Directive 90/435/EEC on the com-
mon system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies ans subsidiaries of different 
Member States. It is essentially a matter for Member States to notify the Commission of their 
national laws. 
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lies in a country within the European Economic Area (including Switzer-
land). In addition, there are special agreements with countries that have 
similar tax regulations in their country. Smaller companies are unfortu-
nately not addressed here,  
 the respective company has a minimum ten percent share (this does not ap-
ply if the acquisition value exceeds 1.2 million euros) on a tax-transparent 
company, 
 or the respective company holds the participation without interruption for 
a period of at least one year (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132).  
 
As opposed to a SIF (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.), the entitlement to 
dividends from a company fully taxable in Luxembourg are free from withholding 
tax on dividends with a SICAR (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.), if the min-
imum requirement for the investment income taxation are fulfilled (EVCA, 2013, 
pp. 124-132).  
With insecurities about the soaking time, it is feasible to raise the mandatory with-
holding tax and seek reimbursement later, if the at least soaking time (Mach, 2008, 
p. 111 et seqq.) has actually been fulfilled because the distribution has been dis-
bursed (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132).  
If the Luxembourgian fund structures SIF or SICAR distribute money, then 
those revenues mostly are not subject of the withholding tax (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-
132). In this case, it does not matter where the company that gets money, has its 
headquarters (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). 
Local companies that do not have interest income are not subject to this tax 
(EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). Exceptions are the revenues from profit sharing bonds 
and payments to silent shareholders (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). Furthermore, con-
structive dividends must be taxed (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). The tax rate is then 
fifteen percent (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). But also in this case is a reduction in 
control conceivable (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132), which is always the case when there 
are agreements with the respective countries (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). For covert 
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dividend, there is the possibility to get on the box privilege Luxembourg advan-
teges (Fort, 2014, p. 48 et seqq.) This instrument is partly responsible for the popu-
larity of Luxembourg as a financial location (Schaffner, 2007, p. 1).  
Although Luxembourg is considered the motherland of private equity in Eu-
rope, there are a lot of regulations. Thus Luxembourg is subject to the provisions 
of chapter 3 of the EU Savings Directive 2003/48/EC (Kudert & Kopec, 2014, p. 1), 
the aim of which is, taxing income from interest payments effectively taxing 
(EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). Special constructions like paying agents must pay tax 
on income from interest in Luxembourg (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). After the legal 
situation of the investigation from the EVCA (2013) dividends distributed by SIF 
or SICAR, are not subject by this directive (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). However, 
fonds commun de placement are at risk and could under certain conditions fall 
under this taxation (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). 
With the Luxembourgian law of December 23, 2005 (Spuerkeess, 2015, pp. 1-19), a 
withholding tax of 10% was imposed on interest income made by Luxembourg 
paying agents to Luxembourg-established resident individuals (EVCA, 2013, pp. 
124-132).  
It should also be noted that companies do not have to pay taxes for licensing fees 
(Jarass & Obermair, 2015, p. 70 et seqq.). It is noteworthy, that remunerations of 
members of a supervisory board or the directors of a supervisory board are subject 
to a withholding tax of 20% (EVCA, 2013, pp. 124-132). 
Parameter United Kingdom 
Great Britain is the largest volume Private Equity market in the European Union 
and in Europe. As the exit of Britain affects this market and how the tax parameters 
react remains to be seen. 
Should corporations in Great Britain distribute dividends, the receiver shall not ex-
pect that withholding tax is charged initially. (Alberts, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.). How-
ever, a tax rate (Alberts, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201) applies to 
distributions under the UK Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). On certain roy-
alties, a tax rate of 20% may be applied (Alberts, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, 
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pp. 194-201). This includes patents and some copyrights (Alberts, 2014, p. 60 et 
seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). All proceeds from bank loans are provided with a 
tax rate of 20 percent (Alberts, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). This 
20% also applies to interest income from corporate bonds (Alberts, 2014, p. 60 et 
seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). The United Kingdom makes an exception (2013) 
for interest income from qualified Euro bonds, these bonds are tax-free (Alberts, 
2014, p. 60 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). A tax rate of 20% is available for 
interest income on bank deposits (Alberts, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-
201). It may be stated that the UK takes control of 20 percent, where it is not free, 
while the same goes for income from the rental of buildings or other objects (Al-
berts, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). However, this remains limited 
to nonlocal companies (Alberts, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201).  
Although there are a number of regulations that classify the tax, it is equally 
feasible that corporations are free from withholding tax (Alberts, 2014, p. 60 et 
seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). This could be done through national law or 
through agreements with the concernced countries (Alberts, 2014, p. 60 et seqq.; 
EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). 
Design Recommendations 
The withholding taxes in the states of the European Union are also assessed quite 
differently (EVCA, 2013). There are fluctuations noted ranging from no taxes at all, 
over a variety of design options to tax rates above 30% (EVCA Tax Benchmark 
Study, 2013). In order to obtain a uniform tax rate, the withholding taxes of those 
member states of the European Union that have offered themselves suitable after 
the in-depth investigation – thus, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg, and 
Great Britain – were determined, added, and divided by the number of positions.  
In this – to obtain a representative average – the maximum and minimum tax rates 
have been recorded.  
Considering all withholding taxes of these countries, a tax rate of 14.60% has been 
determined. Calculation: all withholding taxes – minimum and maximum – of the 
five countries, give a factor of 146.00%, divided by 10 (five maximum withholding 
taxes and five minimum withholding taxes), gives an average tax rate of 14.60%. In 
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order to obtain an average willingness to invest (all investments in Venture Capital 
per capita = 81.06 € divided by 5 = an average investment of 16.21 € per capita), this 
results in a recommended tax rate of 17.90% for the taxation at source.  
Table 11: Withholding Taxes of the qualified Countries in % 
 
  Whtax max Whtax min IMSVCpc Pos. 
Ireland 36.00   0.00 16.36 € 4 
Sweden 30.00   0.00 16.72 € 3 
Denmark 25.00   0.00 13.75 € 5 
Luxembourg 35.00   0.00   9.57 € 12 
United Kingdom 20.00   0.00 13.25 € 6 
Interim result           146.00   0.00        69.65 € 
 
 Total         146.00     
On average           14.60 13.93 € 6.0 
Source: Own representation.  
At this point, the investments and their positions in inter-European comparison 
(EU) in Venture Capital of domestic affiliated companies are included as an exam-
ple.  
4.5.4 Design Recommendations: Company Tax 
Parameter Ireland 
The corporation tax rate (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 152 et seqq.) for 
trading activities of the companies is 12.5% (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, 
p. 152 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). Income that is not due to the original ac-
tivities of the company will be taxed at 25% (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, 
p. 152 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). Examples include rental income, capital 
gains or interest income (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 152 et seqq.; 
EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). In certain cases, there is a surcharge of 20% (Tipp, 2014, 
p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 152 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). Dividends paid 
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between two Irish companies (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 152 et 
seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106) are free from corporate income tax (CIT). There are 
a number of different types of gains. Depending on the kind, the domestic company 
makes profits and will turn the tax burden for the company when it receives income 
from dividends from abroad (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 152 et seqq.; 
EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). Dividends from trading profits are taxed at 12.5% (Tipp, 
2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 152 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). When 
these incomes are not from trading profits, the tax rate amount to twenty-five per-
cent (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 152 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-
106). Somewhat more complicated is the treatment of the so-called portfolio divi-
dends. These distributions come from a holding in a company that is less than five 
percent. Conditions for an exemption for these distributions is that this company 
either comes from an EU member state, or has other tax agreements with Ireland 
(Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 152 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106).  
The local authorities in Ireland impose a little fee adapted from the area and 
the location of the business premises (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 152 
et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). With the exception of local property taxes, no 
other taxes are levied besides these taxes (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, 
p. 152 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). Like almost everywhere property taxes are 
also levied (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 152 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 
99-106). This tax is calculated in Ireland on the value of the building or dwelling, 
the market is currently willing to pay (Tipp, 2014, p. 34 et seqq.; Lorenz, 2014, p. 
152 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 99-106). 
Parameter Sweden 
Corporate income tax is being levied with a flat rate of 22% (EVCA, 2013, p. 184; 
Berndt, Fantapié Altobelli, & Sander, 2016, p. 40 et seqq.). 
Parameter Denmark 
In Denmark, a corporation tax of 25% is being applied (Schulze, 2014, p. 61/1 et 
seqq.; Berndt, Fantapié Altobelli, & Sander, 2016, p. 40 et seqq.). There are no fur-
ther municipal, local, social or business taxes (Schulze, 2014, p. 61/1 et seqq.; EVCA, 
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p. 60-64). There is no special tax rate for small or medium-sized enterprises (SME), 
which are defined according to the EU legislation or for other small enterprises 
according to other criteria (Schulze, 2014, p. 61/1 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, p. 60-64).  
Parameter Luxembourg 
The total corporate tax rate (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, 
p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.), including trade tax (Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.), 
in Luxembourg is 29.22% (corporate income tax base 21%, plus employment fund 
surcharge 1.47%, plus municipal business tax 6.75%, see below). There is an allow-
ance of 17.500 euros and for tax transparent corporations 40.000 euros to be re-
moved from the basis for the dimensioning of the control (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, 
p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.). 
The tax rate from above is calculated from different parts (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, 
p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.). On the one hand, 
to the corporation tax itself and on the other side from a kind of pension fund (Die-
trich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et 
seqq.). Moreover, Luxembourg is considered one of the only countries in the world 
and European Union that elevates trade taxes (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et 
seqq.; EVCA, 2013, p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.). A prominent example of 
the elevation of commercial control is Germany (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et 
seqq.; EVCA, 2013, p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.). In Luxembourg, there is a 
21 percent (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, p. 124-132; Fort, 
2014, p. 43 et seqq.) corporation tax (if the base is less than 15.000 euros). If this 
value is higher, this rate drops to 20 percent (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.; 
EVCA, 2013, p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.). The payment to the pension fund 
is calculated from corporation tax (7 percent of the corporation tax) and trade tax 
amounts to 6.75 percent (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, p. 
124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.). 
The lowest tax is 3.000 euros, which – together with the fund of 7% - adds up 
to 3.210 euros (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, p. 124-132; Fort, 
2014, p. 43 et seqq.). This applies to companies whose assets consist of more than 
90% of financial assets, intercompany receivables, cash and cash equivalents, bank 
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balances and bank deposits (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, 
p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.). Nevertheless, if companies are not included 
in the area of application, then the have to pay at least 500-20.000-euro tax depend-
ing on the corporate valuation (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, 
p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.). Elvinger, Hoss & Prussen (2012, p. 1) comment 
on the recent Luxembourgian law-environment to the effect that the carrying value 
of investments whose returns are not taxed in Luxembourg (Dietrich & Müller, 
2016, p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.) are found in 
accordance with the applicable concluded by Luxembourg double-tax arrange-
ment, that the minimum CIT does not apply (pwc, 2012, pp. 1-2). The minimum 
CIT represents a tax prepayment for future fiscal years. A tax refund is not pro-
vided, rather a tax credit is granted (Dietrich & Müller, 2016, p. 221 et seqq.; EVCA, 
2013, p. 124-132; Fort, 2014, p. 43 et seqq.).  
Parameter United Kingdom 
The main tax rate of the corporation tax was 24% with effect of April 1, 2012 (Kania, 
2013, p. 177 et seqq.; Alberts, 2014, p. 65 et seqq.; Rödl & Partner, 2015, pp. 1-82). 
This rate was reduced to 23% effective on April 1, 2013 (Kania, 2013, p. 177 et seqq.; 
Alberts, 2014, p. 65 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201; Rödl & Partner, 2015, pp. 1-
82). This rate was again reduced to 21% on April 1, 2014. On April 1, 2015 (Schmidt-
Soltau & Altmann, 2016, pp. 1-26), this rate was again reduced to 20% (Kania, 2013, 
p. 177 et seqq.; Alberts, 2014, p. 65 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201; Rödl & Part-
ner, 2015, pp. 1-82).  
Companies with a converted profit over 1.7 million euros are succumbed to 
the basis rate of these tax (Kania, 2013, p. 177 et seqq.; Alberts, 2014, p. 65 et seqq.; 
EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). Small enterprises, balancing a profit of less than 350.000 
euros are succumbed to the rate of twenty percent (Kania, 2013, p. 177 et seqq.; 
Alberts, 2014, p. 65 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201). The threshold of 1.7 million 
euros and 350.000 euros reduced itself according to the quantity of aggregated cor-
porations in that group (Kania, 2013, p. 177 et seqq.; Alberts, 2014, p. 65 et seqq.; 
EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201).  
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Companies, making a profit between 300.000 and 1.5 million pounds are 
bound to the main tax rate and can undergo minor tax relief (Kania, 2013, p. 177 et 
seqq.; Alberts, 2014, p. 65 et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201).  
As in Ireland and in the UK there are no efforts to secure additional revenues from 
communal taxes or business taxes. (Kania, 2013, p. 177 et seqq.; Alberts, 2014, p. 65 
et seqq.; EVCA, 2013, pp. 194-201).   
Design Recommendations 
The company taxes in the countries of the European Union are also assessed quite 
differently. There are fluctuations noted ranging from no taxes at all, over a variety 
of design options to tax rates above 30%.  In order to obtain a uniform tax rate, the 
company taxes of those member states of the European Union that have offered 
themselves suitable after the in-depth investigation – thus, Ireland, Sweden, Den-
mark, Luxembourg, and Great Britain – were determined, added and divided by 
the number of positions.  In this – to obtain a representative average – the maximum 
and minimum tax rates have been recorded. 
 
 Table 12: Company Taxes of the qualified Countries in % 
  TCITax min. TCITax max.  IMSVCpc Pos. 
Ireland 12.50 25.00  16.36 € 4 
Sweden 22.00 22.00  16.72 € 3 
Denmark 25.00 25.00  13.75 € 5 
Luxembourg 28.15 29.22    9.57 € 12 
United Kingdom 20.00 20.00  13.25 € 6 
Interim result           107.65       121.22 69.65 € 
 
 Total           228.87        
On average           22.887   13.93 € 6.0 
Source: Own representation.  
Considering all company taxes of these countries, a tax rate of 22.887% has been 
determined. In order to obtain an average willingness to invest, this results in a 
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recommended tax rate of 22.89% for the taxation at source. At this point, the invest-
ments and their positions in inter-European comparison (EU) in Venture Capital of 
domestic affiliated companies are included as an example.  
Design Recommendation: Summary 
If the design recommendations are summarized, the result shown in table 13 pre-
sent themselves. 
 Table 13: Summary Tax Rates 
  
Capital Gains Tax 
 in % max. 
Capital Gains Tax 
 in % min. 
Ireland 33.33 33.33 
Sweden 22.00 0.00 
Denmark 25.00 0.00 
Luxembourg 29.22 0.00 
United Kingdom 0.00 0.00 
Interim result 109.55 33.33 
Total 142.88  
On average 14.288   
   
  TCITax in % min. TCITax in % max. 
Ireland 12.50 25.00 
Sweden 22.00 22.00 
Denmark 25.00 25.00 
Luxembourg 28.15 29.22 
United Kingdom 20.00 20.00 
Interim result 107.65 121.22 
Total 228.87  
On average 22.887   
  
  Whtax max in % Whtax min in % 
Ireland 36.00 0.00 
Sweden 30.00 0.00 
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Denmark 25.00 0.00 
Luxembourg 35.00 0.00 
United Kingdom 20.00 0.00 
Interim result 146.00 0.00 
Total  146.00 
On average  14.60 
Source: Own representation. 
If, in regards to the taxable management fees, the sales tax rates (VAT) would be 
taken into consideration as well, the average value would amount to 24.00% (Swe-
den 25.00% and Ireland 23.00% = 48.00/2 = 24.00%). However, this average value is 
not representative, as Luxembourg, Denmark and the United Kingdom to not im-
pose sales tax on management fees, while Ireland and Sweden certainly do raise 
this tax.  
At tax rates of 14.29% capital gains tax, 14.60% withholding tax and a company tax 
of 22.89%, the below shown, statistical values are being expected. In that, a wholly 
owned dependence of the investments, the gross domestic product and the pur-
chasing power are being assumed. This, of course, is not the case. However, a ten-
dency can be deduced from these figures, since the taxes do influence the gross 
domestic product, and the gross domestic product is significantly involved in the 
willingness to invest in Venture Capital.  
 
 Table 14: Average Figures Investments, GDP and PPS 
  IISVCpc in € Pos. IMSVCpc in € Pos. 
Ireland 19.17 4 16.36 4 
Sweden 15.40 7 16.72 3 
Denmark 51.28 2 13.75 5 
Luxembourg 73.35 1  9.57 12 
United Kingdom 12.86 9 13.25 6 
Total           172.06 23 69.65 30 
On average 34.41 4,6 13.93 6.0 
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  GDPpc in € Pos. PPS Pos. 
Ireland 46.200 4 145 4 
Sweden 45.400 6 123 9 
Denmark 45.900 5 124 8 
Luxembourg 91.600 1 271 1 
United Kingdom 39.500 8 110 11 
Total          268.600 24 773 33 
On average 53.720 4.8 154.6 6.6 
 
  IISVC/GDP  Pos. IMVC/GDP Pos. 
Ireland 0.04% 3 0,04% 2 
Sweden 0.03% 4 0,04% 1 
Denmark 0,11% 1 0,03% 3 
Luxembourg 0,08% 2 0,01% 5 
United Kingdom 0,03% 5 0,03% 4 
Total 0,29% 15 0,15% 15 
On average         0,0599% 3      0,0292% 3 
     
    Total Pos. Total Inv.pc Pos.  
Ireland   5 0.0769% 2,5 
Sweden   5 0.1047% 2,5 
Denmark   4 0.1416% 2 
Luxembourg   7 0.0905% 3,5 
United Kingdom   9 0,0661% 4,5 
Total   30 0,4459%   
On average   6 0,0891%   
Source: Own representation. 
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In view of the overall economic growth, the permanent deployment of about 0,09% 
of gross domestic product (GDP) in Venture Capital investments is necessary to 
increase the wealth of nations within the European Union (EU). Denmark and Swe-
den have exposed themselves in such a way, that they – on a national basis – could 
be further leading the way in the future.  
The investigation extracted those countries, which essentially show the most 
similarities to each other regarding the willingness to invest in the context of Pri-
vate Equity and Venture Capital in particular under consideration of the gross do-
mestic product per capita and the relevant taxes. Average figures were determined. 
It makes sense, that for portfolio companies from a country with a low purchasing 
power, a set of harmonized tax is not necessarily helpful, if the money for the in-
vestment is not available. It is conceivable to make an adjustment within the mean-
ing of the code. This figure could be a kind of distribution key for the Member 
States.  To achieve this goal – an equal per capita domestic product in all countries 
– the states have been paying into these “relief fund for investment” in accordance 
with this allocation. The countries that received the money have to repay this in-
vestment help. The repayment of this money is interest and tax-free or adapted to 
the particular key interest rate. If that is the care, it can be expected that the growth 
rate of the national markets, with the support of the European market, will be 
higher than the actual key interest rate, resulting in a steady approximation of the 
economic wealth of the individual states.   
4.5.5 Impact on Investment Companies, Gross Domestic Product and Investment 
Behavior 
If, therefore, approximately 0,09% of the gross domestic product is invested in ven-
ture capital, then a gross domestic product per capita of 53.720,00 euros and a pur-
chasing power standard of 154,6 (reference size, as stated, is 100) can be expected 
under the new tax conditions, ie the “FUND EUROPAEA”. In order to look at the 
hypotheses from the chapters 2.1.2.5 and 4.1, they are listed here again. 
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If there are better tax conditions for venture capital, the interest of investment companies 
in venture capital will also increase. Therefore, there will be more venture capital compa-
nies. 
The total GDP per capita of the 22 countries studied amounted to 759.000 euros. If 
this sum is divided by 22, an average gross domestic product of 34.527,27 euros is 
obtained. If this sum is compared with the per capita GDP, the expected gross do-
mestic product per capita of 53.720,00 euros under the new tax conditions (with 
permanent application) forces one to recognize the potential that also exists for in-
vestment companies. It is assumed that this domestic product is dependent on the 
accumulated money (it is because this accumulated money is related to the invest-
ments which, according to GDP, are the result of a higher GDP, BIP = C + I + G + 
Ex-Im), then the factor would be 1,56 (53.720,00 / 34.527,27), and thus, the factor for 
fundraising could go up. This means that the collected money would increase from 
87,35 euros (see chapter 2.1.2.5) to 135,91 euros (87,35 * 1,56). At the same time, the 
number of participating companies would also increase by at least a factor of 1,56. 
However, since the tax conditions were preferably extracted for the "FUND 
EUROPAEA", an increase of especially the venture capital companies is to be ex-
pected. This would be equivalent to a shift of the current fundraising ratio of 87,35 
euros per capita, of which 22,30 euros is spent on venture capital investments in the 
countries included in this study. 
If the tax conditions for venture capital are optimized, gross domestic product per capita 
increases. If the gross domestic product per capita rises, the gross domestic product rises as 
well. 
Thus, if the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increases as a result of the 
new tax conditions for venture capital, the gross domestic product also increases 
correspondingly. The new GDP per capita amounts to 53.720,00 euros. If this num-
ber is multiplied by 22, you get 1.181.840,00 euros. This is the total gross domestic 
product per capita of the countries included in this study; this is a significant in-
crease compared to the 790.000,00 euros from above. This means that the total gross 
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domestic product of the European Union would rise from 1.52264E + 13 to 2.69935E 
+ 13 euros. 
If the tax conditions for venture capital are optimized, the average willingness to invest in 
companies that are in the early stages of its existence increases. 
The current willingness to invest (2015) of the 22 countries studied is 13,51 eu-
ros per capita in the Industry Statistic and 8,79 euros in the Market Statistic. If these 
figures are compared with the data obtained in this study, it can be seen that the 
optimized tax conditions (tax expenditures) lead to a significantly higher level of 
investment readiness. The industry statistic has now changed to 34,41 euros, while 
the willingness to invest in target companies (Market Statistic) has risen to 13,93 
euros. 
In addition, the unemployment rate mentioned in Chapter 2.2.3.2 will fall. The 
entrepreneurs will already create jobs, and the suppliers required at the beginning 
will also need more staff. There will also be synergy with external consultants, 
banks and the state, so that positive signals for the labor market can be expected at 
this point. However, in this context, no figures can be mentioned – even in statisti-
cal terms – as a linear increase in employment is not achieved at the expected 
growth rates of investment and gross domestic product. 
 
All these figures show that tax-optimized conditions (in this case, average tax 
rates of those countries which are similar to one another on a high level) can lead 
both to an increased willingness to invest and a higher GDP - and thus also per 
capita (the actual key figure that takes into account the prosperity of the individual) 
also leads to higher willingness to invest. 
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5 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
The objective of this study was to develop a theory-based and empirical anal-
ysis of the influence and impact of taxes in regards to a Private Equity fund and 
analogous Venture Capital fund. Based on theoretical and empirical findings, tax 
rates were derived for the design of tax optimized Venture Capital funds, which 
create the conditions for the successful development of Venture Capital funds, and 
thus, the development of entrepreneurs and in turn the development of the econ-
omy of the European Union.  
In summary, the following findings result from the influence and effect analysis 
and the derivation of the design recommendations:  
 
A. Characteristics of Private Equity: 
 
1. Private Equity describes a form of temporary provision of capital for equity 
financing of companies – and in that also and especially important for en-
trepreneurs and young companies (Hehn, 2011, p. 40 et seqq.; Natter, 2003, 
p. 10 et seqq.). Opposite of Public Equity, which aims at the equity for listed 
companies, Private Equity refers to off-exchange equity for unlisted compa-
nies. Private Equity can be divided – see also Tcherveniachki or Weber 
(2007, p. 18 et seqq.; 2009, p. 23 et seqq.) or Gladstone & Gladstone in their 
Entrepreneur´s Guide to Raising Venture Capital (2002, p. 7 et seqq.) – into 
Private Equity, Venture Capital, Buyout and Mezzanine Capital.  
 
2. Suppliers and consumers of off-exchange capital – also Zipser (2008, p. 1 et 
seqq.) or Reimers (2004, p. 4 et seqq.) – meet on the market for Private Eq-
uity. Consumers are companies with demand for capital which cannot be 
covered by own or borrowed funds. On the supplier side, there are the in-
stitutional investors (Tausend, 2006, p. 13 et seqq.) and private investors 
(Lerch, 2011, p. 6 et seqq.). 
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3. With regard to the classification of Private Equity in the financing structure 
and the financing stages it can be stated that the provision of equity, de-
pending on the financing situation, is often carried out with borrowed 
funds – not always safe as well Regner says (2008, p. 71 et seqq.) – to finance 
the companies. Especially for the realization of the above-indicated buyouts 
– which are to be divided in management buy-out, management buy-in and 
leveraged buy-out – the proportion of borrowed funds is often substantial. 
The use of the leveraged effect – while taking all due caution into account – 
promotes the financing through borrowed funds. The funding is dependent 
on the accession of the investor into the financing. Thus, these funds are 
either provided during the early stages of a company in terms of a start-up 
funding or at later stages, which begin from the phase of expansion on and 
possibly end with the financing of an IPO. 
 
4. The fact that companies engage in financing outside the classical methods 
of financing – such as a bank loan – is based on the fact that those enterprises 
may not be able to provide the appropriate collaterals (Bösch, 2009, p. 203 
et seqq.) to qualify for further loans (Prümer, 2005, p. 108 et seqq.). Reasons 
for such considerations are – non-exhaustive – the difficulties of an enter-
prise to find a suitable successor for the continuation of the business activi-
ties or that it might require monies for the expansion of the production or 
services offered, for going public or – in case of declining activities or struc-
tural and cyclical upheavals – for a Turn Around.  
 
5. A large part of the portfolio companies generate profit by acquiring compa-
nies or shares, selling them again after a certain holding period in connec-
tion with the support through the apposition of expertise (Geidner, 2009, p 
9 et seqq.). This goes hand in hand with a majority stake. This activity is 
accompanied by riskier investments in the early stages of a company con-
stituting a minority stake.  This information is especially important for en-
trepreneurs, because this specialization restricts the choice of the future pro-
vider of capital to minimize the risk of a failing leveraged buy-out early on.  
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6. Private Equity is quite suitable as a separate asset class (Tausend, 2006, 13 
et seqq.). In part, Private Equity investments can perform better during cri-
ses than comparable investments in stock. This positive characteristic might 
induce investors to consider their own investment decisions under different 
aspects than the practice to rely on the performance of Private Equity from 
the past. Thus, Private Equity may therefore not only enrich the portfolio as 
a whole.  
 
B. Regulations of Private Equity within the European Union: 
 
1.    The European Union is an economic and political union of currently 28 – 
United Kingdom has exited via a referendum – European states. Taking the 
gross domestic product into account, the economic power or the size of the 
European Union has expanded in such a way that this market is regarded 
as the largest common market in the world (Ekardt, 2014, p. 113 et seqq.). 
Those institutions, which are especially important for Private Equity, are 
the European Investment Fund, the European Court of Auditors, the Euro-
pean Investment Bank, the European Commission, The European Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee, The European Parliament, 
and especially the European Central Bank (European Union, 2013).  
 
2.    Companies financed by Private Equity, respectively Venture Capital, show 
a faster growth compared to other companies. They create more jobs and 
are aligned more export-oriented (Brehm, 2012, p. 1 et seqq.). Thus, they 
provide a strong economic momentum. In the European context, the invest-
ment in Private Equity and especially in Venture Capital means an invest-
ment in the future. The power of new ideas for products and sustainable 
services is outstanding.  
 
3.    For the European area, United Kingdom – whether it stays that way, is to 
be seen – is the most important market as far as the willingness to partici-
pate in risk-bearing investments is concerned, while Greece is located at the 
bottom end of this scale. On the other hand, there is Denmark, which takes 
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the lead regarding companies financed. Countries, which actually are tra-
ditionally strong economies such as Germany and Italy, do poorly in this 
context.  
 
4. From an economic perspective, many efforts have been strained to battle 
the current problems of the European Union. Until recently, most scientists 
and other experts were of the opinion that the only way out of this dilemma 
in an economical sense, could only be by taking the neoclassical approach. 
Meanwhile, more attention is being paid to the almost forgotten Keynes ap-
proach (Weizäcker, 2013, pp. 1-2).  
 
5. With the continuous development and innovation of the global financial in-
dustry, many different financing and investment institutions emerged as 
opponents for the traditional banks. To take appropriate counteractions 
against those alleged shadow banks, the European Union (EU) has had to 
respond with some regulations. To the latest financial crisis, the EU legisla-
tor responded with Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund 
Manager – the so-called AIFMD. The scope of this directive applies to the 
manager of alternative investment funds, in which alternative investment 
funds in a negative accrual are collective investments, which are not cov-
ered by the UCITS Directive (Buck-Heeb, 2014, p. 276 et seqq.).  
 
C. Affects and Effects of Taxes on Private Equity within the European Union 
 
1. The tax law had to follow those regulations. A large number of individual 
taxes characterizes the tax systems in the industrialized countries, as are 
most EU countries. Concerning tax tangents to Private Equity, the distinc-
tion of Private Equity funds in commercial or asset management is of para-
mount importance in parts of the EU – and especially in Germany (Bohn, 
2009, p. 196 et seqq.).  Moreover, the carried interest (Heim, 2015, p. 124 et 
seqq.) has to be mentioned, which constitutes a profit sharing of up to 20%. 
Losses carried forward, the treatment of interest expenses and the VAT 
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treatment of management services are further areas of the fiscal observatory 
horizon.  
 
2. The incidence of influence and effect in relation to the investment behavior 
depends on many different parameters. The gross domestic product and, 
above all, the gross domestic product per capita, has a strong impact on the 
willingness to invest. Taxes have an impact on the gross domestic product 
and therefore more or less directly on the investment behavior of the coun-
tries.  
 
3. Empirically, it has been shown that the investment activities of domestic 
holding companies are largely dependent on the gross domestic product of 
the respective country.  Overall, it could be depicted that in this segment, 
the Scandinavian countries expose themselves; however, they are framed 
by Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. The same is true for the invest-
ments in the early stages of an enterprise, with Ireland joining the group, 
which apparently is undertaking great efforts to support its start-up entre-
preneurs. With regard to the willingness of countries to invest in domestic 
portfolio companies it could be determined that Denmark shows a strong 
commitment. However, rather not as far as the financing in the early stages 
is concerned. Overall, this in turn resulted in a group with mainly Scandi-
navian countries and Ireland. 
 
4. Empirically it could also be noted that the under consideration of the taxes, 
relevant for Private Equity, respectively Venture Capital, that yet again the 
Scandinavian countries next to Great Britain show high level similarities to 
each other. Of the three major economies, although they account for the ma-
jority of Private Equity transactions, only Great Britain remains at the fore-
front, if the investigation is extended to include the gross domestic product. 
 
5.  The design recommendations for the effect of taxes on the willingness to 
invest are aimed to summarize the tax rates for capital gains tax, withhold-
ing tax and for the company taxes of the countries determined to average 
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rates. In this, the peculiarities such as the taxation of 0% to 36 % in the above-
mentioned tax territories of each country are to be considered, so that uni-
form tax rates for the extracted areas are created.  
The findings gained throughout this study are the basis for further research ap-
proaches to reveal the relevance of Private Equity and especially Venture Capital 
as a financing alternative in the context of the growth of markets within the Euro-
pean Union. During this study, the effect of the gross domestic product per capita 
on the willingness of the countries to invest has been examined and from that, a 
fiscal relevance has been derived. This results in further questions beyond the in-
fluence-effect-relation. Tax –adapted conditions create an equality of opportunity. 
Not yet resolved, however, is:  
 
 Who has access to this tax-optimized FONDS EUROPAEA? 
 Which regulatory framework must be adapted in order to bring this fund 
on the market? 
 Does this fund apply parallel to the current arrangements or is this fund to 
be applied without alternatives? 
 
A wide variety of literature has been read and processed on this study. Here, many 
laws were discovered and deemed interesting and in part even included in this 
study. For example, the Verdoorn´s Law was incorporated in chapter 2.3.5 Eco-
nomic Growth and Full Employment to illustrate the economic growth. According 
to this law, there is a linear relationship between labor productivity and the growth 
of production. In the consideration of Austria and Germany, this relationsip could 
not be imperatively established. At least for the satisfaction of the own interest but 
also beyond, it could be examined in more detail whether the Law of Kaldor is 
actually an axiom. 
A large part of the cluster analysis made have not found their place in this study. 
This is not based on them being nondescriptive or ineffective. That’s quite the con-
trary. Most of these analyses, which, incidentally are provided in the annex, have 
enough potential to be not only interpreted but could lead to investigations of their 
own. As an example, the examination of the per capita capital investments under 
consideration of the unemployment rate in appendix 1 may be mentioned at this 
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point. The correlation between per capita gross domestic product and the willing-
ness to invest is clearly discovered in this present study. Therefrom, it could easily 
be deducted that a high unemployment rate suggests a lower per capita domest 
product, which in turn leads to a lower propensity to invest. In this case, as well, 
this study has indicated the contrary in some part. The behavior of France and Fin-
land can be interpreted as an outlier. However, this seems to be insufficient. Rather 
the time factor could play an important role. Finland has already shown a positive 
trend for some years and is no doubt slowly being rewarded for the Venture Capi-
tal efforts. France, being a traditional Private Equity market, potentially has sup-
ported the volume of large transactions too extensively over time. This time-effect-
relation could also lead to further investigations such as the fundamental questions 
of the performance of the countries and individuals. For this, the gross domestic 
product per capita depicts a brilliant model, especially the placement of France or 
Germany compared to Ireland in this category for instance.  
The BVK (Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften) has 
positively assessed the various initiatives on part of the German Federal Govern-
ment. However, in his paper "BVK draft for a venture capital law", he clarified that 
all these measures are only a small step in the right direction. For example, BVK – 
and this goes without saying for the other member states of the European Union in 
a similar form – speaks of legislative competence which is always a hurdle for re-
newal. The Income Tax Act, the Corporate Income Tax Act, the Value Added Tax 
Act and the Investment Tax Act should be amended. In addition, the Trade Tax Act 
would also have to be reorganized. Compatibility with the law of the European 
Union and international treaties should be examined. On the other hand, the results 
of the present study are not intended to interfere with the respective legal positions 
of the individual Member States, but rather as an additional tool, possibly centrally 
managed, to give the venture capital industry a different look. Uniform tax rates 
applicable only to this “FUND EUROPAEA”.  
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